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THE DOCTRINE

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BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is primarily intended for theological students. The writer's aim has been to meet a want which he believes to exist: the want of a compendious and plain introduction to the doctrine of the Incarnation, giving a connected outline of the theology and doctrinal history which may be studied separately, and more minutely, in larger books. The different elements which are combined in the work may be gathered from the following account of its general plan.

In the introductory part a general survey is given of the fact of the Incarnation: its nature, different aspects, and relation to various provinces of thought and inquiry.

Another section (Part II.) is devoted to the scriptural presentation of the doctrine. The writer believes that this division of the subject strictly belongs to the history of dogma. It seems indeed to be reasonable, both on historical and critical grounds, to assume that the New Testament lies behind the dogma of the Church, as its presupposition, and a determining factor in its development. The theory that the theology of the Church is

merely a product of Greek metaphysics would seem to be largely based on the deliberate exclusion of the evidence of the New Testament;[1] and it is accordingly very important to estimate fairly the strictly dogmatic element in Scripture, if the subsequent process of ecclesiastical definition is to be correctly understood. There is ample ground for the conclusion that a far more considerable element in the development of dogma than "Hellenism," has been the influence of Scripture and the religious experience of Christians.

The third and largest portion of the work (Parts III.–IX.) consists of an historical sketch covering the period between the Apostolic Fathers and the close of the sixteenth century.

The last section (Part X.) may be best described as a connected series of notes on the actual "content" of the doctrine, comprising a brief discussion both of theological points and of the technical terms most frequently employed by ecclesiastical writers.

In dealing with a subject which has been the theme of a literature so vast, the writer has been largely dependent on the labours of others. With a general acknowledgment of indebtedness he must be content; but in particular he feels himself under obligation to the well-known works of Dorner, Harnack, Weiss, Seeberg,

[1] The value of such works as Dr. Hatch's *Hibbert Lectures*, or Dr. Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, is considerably impaired by this preconception. See a valuable chapter on "Hellenism" in Dr. Bigg's recent work on *Neoplatonism* (chap. viii.).

Hagenbach, Liddon, and Bruce. He is deeply conscious of the many shortcomings of a book written amid frequent interruptions, and necessarily limited in scale. If to any the exact study of dogma seems in days like ours a profitless labour, it may be sufficient to reply in the words of a mediæval writer: *O quam frustra timemus circa illam materiam studiorum nostrorum moras impendere, quam semper oporteret, si fieri posset, præ oculis habere, et in ejus admirationem jugi occupatione animos suspendere.*[1] The writer trusts that his work will do nothing to wound or hinder, but rather something to stimulate and encourage, the spirit of practical devotion to HIM *whom to know is life, whom to serve is freedom.*

[1] Ric. de S. Vict. *de Emman.* ii. 20.

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PART I

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§ II. The Purpose of the Incarnation.

1. The Climax of History.
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3. The Restoration of Humanity.
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§ III. Evidence for the Incarnation summarised ; Apostolic belief ; the History of the Church ; the spiritual experience of Christians ; the early New Testament literature.

THE INCARNATION

§ I. The Fact of the Incarnation

To the question, What is Christianity? the simple answer is that in its essence it is not an idea, nor a particular view of life, nor a speculation, but a fact, a unique phenomenon. Of this fact we must consider at the outset the nature, the method, and, in outline at least, the purpose.

1. In its nature or essence what is the Incarnation? It is a movement of Divine compassion and sympathy towards man; the assumption of human nature by the eternal Son of God, in order that He might restore and consummate it by uniting it to His own person. It is an act of grace whereby God actually brings man into fellowship with Himself. This is the account of S. John in his first Epistle: *That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us: yea, and our fellowship is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ.*[1] Being then an action which originates in the Divine love, we are prepared to find that redemption is a work beyond our power to completely analyse or comprehend.[2] It must ever be

[1] 1 S. Jo. i. 3.

[2] Cp. W. H. Mill, *Five sermons on the nature of Christianity*, Nos. i. and ii.

borne in mind that the Incarnation is a *mystery of godliness.*[1]

2. The Method by which the fact has been accomplished must next be considered. It has been summarily described by Bernard, *Modus quidem Dei exinanitio est.*[2] By a continuous act of self-limitation and self-sacrifice, the Son of God condescended to aid humanity from within; taking our nature in its entirety as the robe or vesture of His own personality, and as the medium of His self-revelation; passing through the different phases of a human life, so as to share, not by Divine intuition merely, but by actual fellowship, the reality of our human experience; enabling our nature to achieve that of which in its native strength it was incapable; consecrating it to God in a life of obedience and suffering; perfecting it by submission to the law of mortality; carrying it through and beyond the state of death into the glory of the resurrection life; exalting it to the throne of God, and winning for it acceptance by the merit of His Divine person; finally, re-creating it by the grace and power of His glorified manhood, and henceforth using it as the organ of universal sovereignty. We shall best begin our study of the doctrine by examining the authoritative statement contained in S. John's prologue (S. Jo. i. 1–18). That great passage may be somewhat expanded, and its teaching expressed in six propositions:—

i. As regards the Divine Being, S. John intimates a plurality of Persons in the Godhead. He states the existence, and summarises the work of the Word, who is the eternal self-expression or utterance of God; the revealer of His character and mind; personally distinct from God, yet living in eternal fellowship and communion with Him; in essence coequal with Him: *the Word was God.*

[1] 1 Tim. iii. 16. [2] Bern. *in Cant.* xi, 3.

ii. A doctrine of creation follows. The cosmos is called into being by a *fiat* of the Divine will, but God acts through the agency of His Word. The Word impresses on the universe its visible order and rationality, upholds it in existence, and is Himself its predestined end or climax. Two other points may be noticed. The act of creation seems to be a prophecy of the Incarnation in so far as it is a first step in Divine self-limitation—an act whereby God calls into existence beings other than Himself, sets them over against Himself, and enters into relationship with them. Thus a self-imparting movement of love is seen to be the first cause of the creation. Further, S. John is careful to teach the doctrine of Divine *immanence.* God indwells His own world "absolutely separate from the creature, yet in every part of the creation at every moment; above all things, yet under all things."[1] He is the sustaining cause, the persistent energy, of all that exists.

iii. Humanity is next introduced,—the rational, self-conscious life in which created being culminates. The Logos has ever been *the light of men. He lighteth every man, coming into the world*; being present in the dictates of conscience, in the faculties of invention or discovery, in the organisation and development of social life, in the energies of thought; imparting at once to objects their truth, and to man his faculty to know. As all objects of human thought — all laws scientific, moral, social, artistic—are ideas of the Logos, so all right exercise of human faculties depends upon His enabling presence. He is immanent in His entire creation; but His highest and most distinctive operation is the illumination of the reason and conscience of man.[2]

[1] Newman, *Idea of a University*, p. 63.

[2] Bern. *in Cant.* iv. 4: "Tali proinde dignatur modo illa maiestas suis esse creaturis, omnibus quidem quod sunt, animantibus autem quod et

iv. S. John's doctrine presupposes a fall from light. Under the abstract term "darkness" he includes the varied forms of moral evil. The fall is described by Athanasius as "the aversion"; by Gregory of Nyssa as "the withdrawal of the soul from moral good."[1] Just as a planet on its averted side is dark, so man, in turning away from the true centre of his being, became "darkened," and fell under the power of evil. Thenceforth the universe became a scene of conflict between the darkness and the light, which did not forsake men, nor was itself utterly quenched. S. John's Gospel describes, in its main outlines, the historic conflict thus indicated in the prologue.

v. In due time occurred the self-manifestation of the Logos. He had ever given tokens in the works of creation of His indwelling *power and Godhead*; throughout the course of history He had ever visited men in providence and in judgment. Further, His coming had been heralded by prophecy. John the Baptist is mentioned as the type or crowning example of the whole chain of prophets *which have been since the world began*. In different ages there had been those whom the Divine wisdom inspired in varied degrees and manners; here and there speaking to chosen souls among the heathen, intensifying their thirst for light and truth, and preparing the way for a fuller self-manifestation. For history and prophecy alike pointed to a climax which was reached in the Incarnation. The Logos finally manifests Himself personally and specially to an elect people; but the manifestation has a twofold issue, and acts as a principle of judgment or severance. On the one hand, the incarnate Word meets with national rejection; on the other, with individual acceptance,—the

vivunt, porro ratione utentibus lux, recte vero utentibus virtus, vincentibus gloria."

[1] Ath. *c. Gent.* v.: ἡ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀποστροφή. Greg. Nyss. *Orat. Catech.* v.: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναχώρησις.

"imperturbable mercy" of God holding on its course in spite of human perversity.

vi. S. John concludes by taking a final survey of the Incarnation. He views it generally as the communication to mankind of a permanent re-creative force, lifting men individually into the life of Divine sonship; as a fulfilment of human destiny,—the Word crowning the ascent of created life by taking a material nature to be the organ of His self-revelation, for "Wisdom, to the end she might save many, built her house of that nature which is common unto all";[1] and lastly, as a supreme act of condescension, unveiling the Divine glory, *i.e.* the Divine character and life, under the conditions of an historic human life.

§ II. The Purpose of the Incarnation

The Purpose of the Incarnation may be conveniently considered under four chief aspects.

I. In the first place, it may be viewed as the climax of human history. So it seems to be considered by S. Paul when he declares that in *the fulness of the time God sent forth His Son born of a woman.*[2] This expression implies that the Incarnation was a preordained event which in due course consummated a divinely-guided education of mankind. In all spheres of human activity throughout the ancient world we may discern traces of a deliberate providential guidance: in the history of religion, philosophy, and civilisation. "All history previous to His coming was a prophecy of Jesus Christ. The whole course of external events, and the progress of the human mind, were tending towards Him; the result of both was to demand without being able to produce Him."[3] Christ was ever *He that should come* (ὁ ἐρχόμενος). This line of

[1] Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 52, § 3.
[2] Gal. iv. 4.
[3] Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, etc., p. 324.

thought has been often pursued in detail, and need not be enlarged upon for our present purpose. There is, however, a passage in S. Paul's writings which has been justly said to contain a philosophy of history, and to which, by way of illustration, a brief allusion may be made. In 1 Cor. i. 21–24 the apostle seems to summarise at once the searchings of the Gentile world after God, and the prolonged discipline of the Jewish people. The religion and philosophy of Greece were efforts of the natural reason to find out God. Reason indeed was *the candle of the Lord* in man. The search after God should have been its highest function and purest joy. But reason was unfaithful, and failed miserably in its task (Rom. i. 21, 22). It was therefore "befooled" by God. By a judicial act of Divine righteousness, it was punished for its unfaithfulness. The search after God failed: the world *by means of its wisdom did not come to know God.* From a religious point of view the interest of Greek thought in its later stages lies in its unconscious testimony to the unsatisfied needs of the human spirit. "The Gentiles were brought by these long and fruitless efforts to a consciousness of their own impotence, and they admitted, by erecting an altar *to the unknown God*, how unavailing had been all their endeavours."[1] The despair of the Gentile world is described by S. Paul in a single sentence: *having no hope, and without God in the world.*[2] Yet it must be remembered that this very despair was preparing the Greek to welcome Christ as the Word from God, the very truth, for which he had longed and waited; and the products of Greek thought were destined to be consecrated to the service of the truth faith, and to clothe it in imperishable forms.

As in Greek philosophy S. Paul discerns the search of

[1] Pressensé, *Apostolic Age*, p. 271; cp. *Lux Mundi*, p. 202
[2] Eph. ii. 12.

reason, so in the history of Judaism he contemplates the search of conscience. He teaches that the principle of law, as embodied and expressed in the Jewish Torah, fulfilled a negative function. It served as a Divine discipline, compelling the Jew, through utter self-despair, to look for a revelation of grace. Thus while the Greek *sought after wisdom*, the Jews *asked for signs*, *i.e.* for a display of power, for a Divine triumph of righteousness both inwardly in man's heart and outwardly in the order of human society. The intended result of the law was to deepen the sense of moral impotence. As to the Greeks Christ was *the wisdom of God*, so to the Jew He proved to be *the power of God*.

The general line of thought here followed by S. Paul might be illustrated from the history of Oriental religions. Their tendency, like that of Greek thought, is to culminate in a practical pessimism.[1] They too witness to inextinguishable longings and aspirations of the human heart, which it was intended in God's purpose that the Incarnation should satisfy.

Indeed, one important feature of Christianity is its claim to be the final, the absolute religion. It is final in the first place because it perfectly accomplishes the great end of religion: the union of God and man. In the Incarnation a union of the Divine and human is effected, than which none closer is conceivable. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is mainly concerned to emphasise this point, that in Christ man really finds access to God. "Perfection" (τελείωσις) is rendered possible, *i.e.* the final accomplishment of that to which the heart of man had hitherto aspired in vain,—the joy of unimpeded communion with his Creator. Again, Christianity claims finality as including all elements of truth which other religions had partially anticipated; it exhibits them in

[1] Cp. Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. Lect. x. See also F. D. Maurice, *The Religions of the World*.

their due proportion and relation to other truths. The study of comparative religions deepens our sense of the fact that God in no period of the world's history *left Himself without witness.* It is a favourite thought of the Alexandrine thinkers, especially of S. Clement, that Gentile religion and philosophy were like the Jewish law, *a schoolmaster leading* the Gentiles *to Christ*, or rather that the Word Himself was in every age guiding men onwards towards the knowledge of Himself. The pearls of truth which we meet with in Stoicism, for example, or Buddhism, only illustrate the unity of all religion, the profound correspondence of the gospel to the spiritual needs of men, and the reality of that providential discipline by which the heathen world was being prepared to welcome its rightful Lord. "The pre-Christian religions," it has been beautifully said, "were the age-long prayer. The Incarnation was the answer."[1] Finally, Christianity is the absolute or catholic religion in so far as it tends to develop and consecrate the special gifts and endowments of every race of mankind. All that each race can contribute is required in order perfectly to exhibit *the fulness of the stature of Christ.* A religion which claims to satisfy the fundamental needs of man's nature must display its power to heighten and hallow the riches of individual and national character. And Christian thinkers have loved to trace the way in which each age and race of men has seen a new and special significance for itself in the Divine example;[2] how "since He came, the ministry of the nations has in unexpected ways illuminated the truth of the Incarnation."[3] Christianity,

[1] J. R. Illingworth, *Lux Mundi*, p. 205.

[2] Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 160–161; Church, *Gifts of Civilisation.*

[3] Westcott, *Social Aspects of Christianity*, p. 57. See the same writer's essay on "Christianity the Absolute Religion" in *Religious Thought in the West.*

then, is the absolute religion. It is in harmony with the highest ideas of God at which other religions had arrived. It is in this sense "a republication of natural religion" that it endorses all the highest anticipations that had been formed of God's personality, character, and modes of action. It met the realised needs of human nature: the longing for definite and authoritative truth, the desire for holiness as the one condition of fellowship with God. Christianity answers the questionings which other religions had prompted but could not satisfy. And if it be asked why we should assume the religion of Christ to be final in view of the fact that all other systems "have their day and cease to be," the true answer is suggested by another passage of S. Paul (Gal. iv. 1–7), where the apostle teaches that man being a child and heir of God, God only waits for the *fulness of time* to admit him to his heritage. He waits, that is, till man is sufficiently educated to be capable of using aright the greatest of Divine gifts, namely, the self-disclosure of God in His Son. The process of education has been laborious and slow, because a premature revelation might have been useless or even dangerous. It is intelligible if we interpret God's dealings as those of a Father. Fatherly love is eager to impart its richest and best treasure, so soon as the capacity for worthy use and enjoyment is developed.

II. We pass to a second aspect under which the mystery of the Incarnation may be studied—as the climax of creation: the predestined goal of the whole process of natural development.

According to the Christian view of it, the material universe was designed ultimately to reveal God, and the process of nature from the first tended towards some form of being which should adequately express the most distinctive elements in the Divine life: holiness, love, and

power. On a broad survey this process is seen to be marked by unity, gradation, and specialisation.

(*a*) Unity. The world is an order, or cosmos, and according to the invariable Christian doctrine the Logos was from the very beginning the unifying principle in nature. This is nobly expressed by Athanasius:[1] "The all-powerful, all-perfect, and holy Word of the Father, descending upon all things and everywhere extending His own energy, and bringing to light all things whether apparent or invisible, knits them and welds them into His own being, leaving nothing destitute of His operation. . . . And a certain marvellous and Divine harmony is thus veritably brought to pass by Him." Nature, in fact, reflects one supreme intelligence; irresistibly suggests the idea of a single efficient force—one universal cause that lies at the basis of phenomena.

(*b*) But further, nature exhibits gradation: an ascent of life culminating in the rational and moral nature of man; that is in a being possessed of spiritual energies and capacities by which nature can be moulded, manipulated, and subdued. The goal of the universe thus appears to be the appropriation and control of matter by spirit, and the slow process of evolution gradually manifests more and more of the nature of God, for He is essentially *spirit*. With the advent of man appears a being in whom the progressive movement of things takes a new departure, and enters upon a higher plane. From this point "the natural process passes over into the historical";[2] the physical becomes the basis and sub-

[1] *Cont. Gentes.* xlii. Cp. Tert. *Apol.* xvii.: "[Deus] totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum, verbo quo iussit, ratione qua disposuit, virtute qua potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentum maiestatis suæ: unde et Græci nomen mundo κόσμον accommodaverunt."

[2] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, i. p. 155 (Lect. x. "Revelation in the Natural Order").

stratum of the psychical and moral. The universe thus exemplifies the profound and far-reaching law pointed to by S. Paul in his treatment of the resurrection: *first that which is natural, afterward that which is spiritual.*[1]

(*c*) And so, thirdly, nature ever exhibits a tendency towards differentiation and specialisation,—towards the production of more and more highly organised individual forms of being which themselves inaugurate and propagate new species. "The line of progress is through individuals. All things conspire together to produce the highest, best, most richly endowed individual form, and that brings in the new species."[2] The analogy of nature thus suggests that what Christian theology claims for Christ is strictly in accord with the entire movement of the universe. Since man is the crown of creation, and sums up all the stages of the long ascent of evolution in his own organism, analogy suggests the possibility of a new type, a new individual "recapitulating," as Irenæus expresses it, all that is behind and below him, and becoming the first of a new species, the fountain-head of a new humanity. It is intrinsically credible that in the risen Christ of the Christian creed we have the goal of the whole natural process of the universe, and that His *spiritual body* is "the result aimed at in fundamental and essential impulses of our nature; towards which, therefore, that nature must ever point as what alone can satisfy its desires, fulfil its hopes, and complete its glory."[3] In the language of S. Paul, *The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is of heaven.*[4] Christ consummates the material creation, crowns the nature which from the first He purposed to assume, and exalts

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 46.
[2] Newman Smyth, *Old Faiths in New Light*, chap. v.
[3] Milligan, *The Resurrection*, Lect. iv. (p. 134).
[4] 1 Cor. xv. 47.

it into a loftier, supra-physical order. He becomes the parent of a spiritual progeny. In His own person He marks a new beginning; He is supernatural, but not unnatural, and His advent is marked, as in the ascent of life a new phenomenon ever is marked, by the display of larger powers and capacities. The old order is succeeded by an order which is new, but at the same time fundamental and complete, inasmuch as it corresponds to an original Divine purpose for the universe.[1]

But at this point we are face to face with the question of miracles. If the Incarnation be the manifestation of a new type in the universe, it is, in relation to the order of nature, miraculous, and as such it is pronounced incredible. It is "inconceivable" that there should be "an occasional interruption and disturbance of the regulated order."[2] The question is, in what relation the new beginning stands to the known and regular course of nature, to the law of uniformity as generally understood.

For present purposes it is enough to suggest two lines of thought which make the idea of miracle antecedently credible.

1. We must remember the relation of the physical universe to the moral.

We have seen that Nature culminates in man, and the highest things in man are thought and will, *i.e.* the characteristic elements of personality. In a word, the highest category within our reach is personality, and no use of the term "nature" is accurate which does not include

[1] Cp. Le Conte, *Evolution and its relation to Religious Thought*, p. 362: "As with the appearance of man there were introduced new powers and properties unimaginable from the animal point of view, and therefore from that point of view seemingly supernatural . . . so with the appearance of the Christ we ought to expect new powers and properties unimaginable from the human point of view, and therefore to us seemingly supernatural, *i.e. above our nature.*"

[2] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, i. p. 169.

what is supreme and most distinctive (*κυριώτατον*) in man. Again, nature is the sphere of God's progressive self-manifestation, and we are obliged to conceive of God under categories within our reach. If, then, the highest thing known to us is moral personality, we inevitably judge of God as a Person, so that in man's character and personality we are practically justified in finding an image of the invisible Deity. But what is man's relation to physical Nature? It is to a large extent under his control; he is the interpreter, the servant, and by that very fact the lord of Nature; the most potent force in the universe is moral energy, the self-determined exertion of human will.[1] It appears, then, on a survey of the world that moral ends and purposes are higher than physical laws and conditions. The universe is evidently moulded by moral forces, and directed towards a moral and spiritual end. "The final end of the government of the world," says a thinker who repudiates the miraculous, "is not to be primarily sought in the natural life but in the spiritual and moral life."[2] Here is the point in which the Christian conception of the universe is distinctive: that we live in a moral universe of which the physical world is only a subordinate department.[3] To a moral Deity, *i.e.* a Deity having will, purpose, and character, the moral interests of the universe must be of paramount importance. He cannot be chained down to the course of physical Nature. In a disordered universe such as ours, He must be supposed able to intervene, in order to bring about its restoration, the world being after all from the Divine standpoint a

[1] Temple, *Bampton Lectures*, iii. p. 90: "The freedom of the human will is but the assertion in particular of that universal supremacy of the moral over the physical in the last resort, which is an essential part of the very essence of the Moral Law. The freedom of the will is the Moral Law breaking into the world of phenomena." Cp. Martensen, *Dogm.* § 17.

[2] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, i. pp. 201, 272.

[3] Wace, *Boyle Lectures*, Ser. ii. p. 302.

spiritual order. "Physical law," says a thoughtful writer,[1] "must be looked upon as the normal method by which the moral purpose of the universe is served." But in miracle "God retaining unchanged His purpose of self-revelation adapts the physical order to it in a way which, from the point of view of that physical order, is strange and startling. To the physical order, to the human intelligence, miracles are certainly supernatural; but from the point of view of the will of God, and of that wider conception of nature which covers all His self-manifestation through the world, they are natural enough." Yes, natural enough, God being what Christian faith believes Him to be. "For," says Gregory of Nyssa, "even the good is not truly good if it be not conjoined with justice, wisdom, and *power*."[2] To deny to God the power to intervene in nature is so far to deny His spiritual attributes. Perfect goodness involves the highest intensity, the most completely unfettered action, of righteous will. Accordingly S. Paul contemplates the fact of redemption as a supreme intervention of power. A leading thought of the Epistle to the Ephesians is that of the unbounded wealth and resourcefulness of the Divine might.[3] Man's moral misery and helplessness evokes an unspeakably great assertion of God's character; a unique crisis and upheaval. This we have in miracle, which lays bare the arm that had hitherto worked under the veil of ordinary natural causation. The essential characteristic therefore of a miracle is that it is an event bearing the impress of rational and moral purpose.

All natural laws are indeed expressions of the Divine intelligence,—purpose and design being impressed on the ordinary phenomena of nature considered as a whole. But

[1] Strong, *Manual of Theology*, pp. 69, 71.
[2] *Orat. Cat.* xx.
[3] See Eph. i. 19 ff.; cp. H. S. Holland, *Creed and Character*, p. 184.

in miracle human attention is arrested by the sudden revelation of a purpose, a will and character, analogous to, but transcending the will and character of man. Miracle thus takes its place as an element in the course of God's providential government of the world. It is an occurrence, however, marked not merely by the rationality which pervades all physical phenomena, but by the gracious character of a loving Personality.

2. Another line of thought pointing to the antecedent probability of the Incarnation is suggested by the general course of development. Scientific thought recognises the *teleological* element in the age-long process. We shrink from insisting with the old confidence on the law of uniformity, *i.e.* the necessary resemblance of the future to the past. Present experience is no longer held to be the criterion of what may be expected. And this reminds us of Butler's often quoted remark that men's notion of what is natural will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God and the dispensations of His providence. The word "supernatural" is, in fact, ambiguous. There must be a conception of "nature" which will embrace the immaterial elements in man's constitution, and so cover the entire sphere of God's self-manifestation.[1] Professor Huxley candidly allows that "no one is entitled to say, *à priori*, that any given so-called miraculous event is impossible. . . . . Nobody can presume to say what the order of nature must be."[2] In fact, the widest experience can only justify a proportionate expectation that the future will resemble the past. All we know certainly is that each higher and

[1] "On any logical theory of theism there can be no such distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory all causation is but the action of Divine will."—G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 125.

[2] *Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1887, p. 628.

more advanced product of evolution exhibits new laws and fresh capacities. And what we claim for Jesus Christ is that in Him a new type of being appears, to which new effects, physical and moral, are strictly natural. The Incarnation is, in fact, "the one absolutely new thing under the sun."[1] It is the appearance of a sinless man; a new phenomenon from which new supernatural effects may be looked for as a matter of course. Christ's person is a miracle; and miracles, whether those recorded in the Gospels, or those moral miracles which are matters of daily experience within the Christian society, are just what we should expect from Him, being what He is. They are revelations of a higher life. They force upon us the conviction that "what we call the physical order must be interpreted by, and finds its final explanation in, that higher revelation which in a special sense we call the moral."[2]

In an apologetic treatise this line of thought might be pursued at length, but no more is needed for our present purpose than the above brief restatement of what has been, indeed, a commonplace of recent theology.[3] The effect of these considerations is to dispose us to approach the historical evidence for miracles without undue bias or prepossession. And this is most necessary if, as has been said, "there can be no question that the most serious objections raised against the Incarnation are

[1] Damasc. ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* 2. v. § 20 : τὸ πάντων καινῶν καινότατον· τὸ μόνον καινὸν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον. Cp. Newman Smith, *Old Faiths*, etc., c. v. ; Le Conte, *Evolution*, etc., chaps. vi.–viii.; Holland, *Christ and Ecclesiastes*, Serm. ii. On attempts to account for the sinless Christ as "a sociological variation," see Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 412.

[2] A. L. Moore, *Science and the Faith*, p. 104 f. Dorner, *System of Christian Ethics*, § 6: "A miracle, in the strict dogmatic sense, is constituted by every specifically higher stage, as distinguished from the lower."

[3] See C. Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, no. 2, for an admirable summary of Christian teaching on this subject.

really of an *à priori* character."[1] Evidence can never, in regard to such a subject, be demonstrative or compel belief. An enforced faith would not, we may reverently say, be worth God's while to secure. For the appeal of revelation is moral, as well as historical; it is supported by moral evidence, and lays a claim on man's entire nature. And since the cogency of evidence obviously varies with the particular disposition, experience, and presuppositions of the person who judges, our acceptance of the Christian facts will depend on the idea we have formed of man's condition and needs; of the Divine character and methods of action; of the capacities and destiny of the human soul.[2] For "he who already counts it likely that God will interfere for the higher welfare of men, who believes that there is a nobler world-order than that in which we live and move, and that it would be the blessing of blessings for that nobler to intrude into and to make itself felt in the region of this lower, who has found that here in this world we are bound by heavy laws of nature, of sin, of death, which no powers that we now possess can break, yet which must be broken if we are truly to live, —he will not find it hard to believe the great miracle, the coming of the Son of God in the flesh, and His declaration as the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead; because all the deepest desires and longings of his heart have yearned after such a deliverer, however little he may have been able even to dream of so glorious a fulfilment of those longings."[3]

III. The Incarnation may be further regarded as the divinely ordained means for the restoration of humanity.

[1] J. R. Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 192.

[2] See this point further developed, below, p. 23.

[3] Trench, *The Miracles*, p. 77; cp. H. S. Holland, *Christ and Ecclesiastes*, esp. pp. 48–58.

According to ancient theologians, Christ came to "re-create the universe."[1] He is *the first and the last.* The Mediator in the work of creation is the natural Mediator in redemption. Ignatius speaks of Him as "the mind of God" (*γνώμη θεοῦ*); *i.e.* as the revealer of God's ultimate purpose for the world, and for humanity.

For the scriptural view of man is at once humbling and inspiring; it represents him as weakened and depraved, but encourages him by presenting a high ideal of his present capacities and ultimate destiny. The work of Jesus Christ may be looked at from this point of view as a revelation of the possibilities of our nature.[2] He represents man as he was intended to be; He fulfils the Divine ideal for our race.

How is this restoration effected?

1. Christ reveals man's destiny. In Him God sees humanity corresponding to His eternal purpose, fulfilling its true law; living in unbroken fellowship with Himself amid all the vicissitudes of creaturely life. He sees human nature *faithful unto death,* and perfected through suffering. So the apostolic writer to the Hebrews finds the explanation of man's present depression and failure, in the triumph which Christ has already achieved. As for man, in spite of the promised subjection of all things to him, *we see not yet all things subjected to Him. But we behold Him who hath been made a little lower than the angels, even Jesus, because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour.*[3]

2. Christ pays man's debt.[4] He takes humanity as it is, with all its obligations, its accumulated heritage of

[1] Ath. *de Incarn.* vii. *ἀνακτίσαι τὰ ὅλα.*

[2] Iren. iii. 18. 7; Christ's function as Mediator is *θεῷ παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.*

[3] Heb. ii. 8, 9; cp. Westcott's *Christus Consummator,* chap. ii.

[4] Ath. *de Incarn.* ix.; Aug. *de Trin.* xiii. 18.

infirmity and pain; humanity as the Fall had left it, sin only excepted; and by an act of perfect obedience, to which His Divine person gave infinite merit, He discharged the debt of self-devotion which man owed to His Creator, and in so doing fulfilled man's most deeply seated aspirations. The doctrine of the Incarnation is the necessary foundation of any true conception of the Atonement.

3. Jesus Christ introduces into the heart of humanity a new regenerative force—the energy of His own spiritualised human nature, in order *that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us.*[1] In a noble passage, Chrysostom describes the miserable condition of stricken humanity as it lay, fevered with sin and polluted with defilement, appealing to the compassion of the good physician. "But what doeth He? Like an excellent physician He provideth remedies of great worth, and first tasteth them Himself. For He first followed after virtue, and so imparted it to us."[2] It is the infusion of a new spiritual force that is the means of restoration,—the Divine life engrafted upon the stock of human nature.

4. Finally, Christ makes a moral appeal to man's heart. "Nothing was so needful to raise our hope as the display of the Divine love towards us."[3] The Incarnation, as the assurance of Divine compassion, touches the conscience and the will through the heart. Christ speaks as a fellow-man, a fellow-sufferer, and in His acceptance of the extremities of our human lot makes known God's purpose towards us. *As many as received Him*, says S. John, *to them gave He power to become sons of God*; and the hope of filial fellowship

[1] Rom. viii. 4.

[2] *Hom. in Ep. ad Phil.* 289 E.

[3] Aug. *de Trin.* xiii. 13; cp. *de Trin.* viii. 7: "Hoc enim nobis prodest credere . . ., humilitatem qua natus est Deus ex femina . . . summum esse medicamentum quo superbiæ nostræ sanaretur tumor, et altum sacramentum quo peccati vinculum solveretur."

with God rests on that which we behold actually realised in the life of Jesus Christ. Thus, as Gregory says, the Incarnation had a twofold end: *adjutorium et magisterium, exemplum et auxilium.* "To this end He appeared in flesh, that He might arouse humanity by His admonitions, stimulate it by providing an example, redeem it by dying, restore it by rising again."[1] Similarly Bernard explains 1 Cor. i. 30, "Christ was made unto us wisdom in His preaching, righteousness in His revelation of Divine forgiveness, sanctification in the example of His holy life, redemption in His passion whereby He paid the price of man's salvation."[2]

IV. The Incarnation is in a supreme sense the revelation of God. After long and gradual self-disclosure in Nature, God *spake unto us in a Son.*[3] Revelation has been a continuous process, of which the Incarnation is the culminating moment. It is needless at this point to argue with those who answer in the negative the question whether man can know God? That something is revealed in Nature concerning its Author few will deny; and we have already noticed that unless we content ourselves with a very narrow, arbitrary, and restricted idea of what Nature means, we must include in the term the highest thing within the range of our observation: the personality, will, and character of man. If, in fact, the laws of human character are not arbitrarily excluded from the sphere of Nature, it becomes "strictly scientific to derive notions of God from that human personality, which is the highest object within present experience;"[4] and since a wider view of

[1] Petav. *de Incarn.* ii. 6, § 1, quoting Greg. Mag. xxi *Moral.* c. 5.
[2] *In Cant.* Serm. xxii. §§ 6, 7.
[3] Heb. i. 2.
[4] Illingworth, *Univ. and Cathedral Sermons*, p. 9. This thesis is worked out at length in the same writer's *Bampton Lectures*, "Personality, Human and Divine."

Nature compels us to conceive of God as personal, we can scarcely find difficulty in the alleged fact that He has revealed Himself, a capacity for self-communication being of the essence of personality. "Agnosticism," it has been justly said, "assumes a double incompetence—the incompetence not only of man to know God, but of God to make Himself known. But the denial of competence is the negation of Deity. For the God who could not speak would not be rational, and the God who would not speak would not be moral; and so, if Deity be at once intelligent and moral, there must be some kind or form of revelation."[1]

Here we touch again upon a point already noticed, namely, the fact that our attitude towards what claims to be a Divine revelation will depend on the presuppositions with which it is approached. In part, at least, the preconceived idea of God with which we examine the evidences of revelation is derived from what we know of human personality. The phenomena of personality suggest the probability that God will speak to man, and will educate his capacities for apprehending the revelation when it comes. For men are spiritual beings, and a revelation which is addressed to such "does not constrain us mechanically to receive the truth, but enables us to know it; does not merely tell us what God would have us believe, but raises us into conscious intelligent sympathy with His mind and will."[2] And the history of revelation exhibits exactly this phenomenon. Parallel with the outward self-manifestation of God in history is an inward action on man's spiritual faculties. Revelation and inspiration, history and prophecy, seem to be complementary facts of experience. The Divine reason imparts to the objects known their truth, and to the

[1] Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 387.

[2] Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, chap. 3.

knowing subject his power.[1] The ground of reality and the basis of knowledge alike are to be found in God.

Two points demand attention in this connection—(1) the substance of the revelation of God implied in the Incarnation; (2) the nature of its appeal.

1. The Incarnation supplements the testimony of organic nature, and of human conscience and character. In Nature God reveals Himself in His power and Godhead; He displays His omnipotence and wisdom; in a word, He manifests Himself as a Being possessed of will and intelligence. If it be true that our notion of causality is derived from observation of our own will, we are forced to ascribe to the first cause what we find to be the central force within ourselves.[2] And further, Nature reveals intelligence. In its modern form the argument from Design comes to this, that natural selection is not an arbitrary or haphazard force, but, as is clear from the immense range, and graduated scale of its operations, it is evidently under the control of a designing mind, having a definite purpose, of which in fact our knowledge is only partial and fragmentary.[3] Finally, when we consider the appeal that Nature makes to the sense of beauty,—the direct action, as it would seem, of spirit upon spirit, we gain an enlarged sense of the constancy and directness with which Nature witnesses to the being and character of its author. And beyond

[1] Cp. Plato, *Repub.* vi. 508 E.

[2] Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 146, thus describes the argument: "In voluntary action alone we see a commencement—an origination of motion; since all other causes appear incapable of this origination, experience is in favour of the conclusion that all the motion in existence owed its beginning to this one cause—voluntary agency, if not that of man, then of a more powerful being."

[3] Cp. Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 152, ff.; Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, No. iv. The modern form of the argument from design is admirably stated by G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 67.

the witness of organic nature is that of conscience and history. "The world," says Dr. Martineau, "reports the power, reflects the beauty, spreads abroad the majesty of the supreme cause; but we cannot speak of higher attributes, and apprehend the positive grounds of trust and love, without entering the precincts of humanity."[1] In history God reveals Himself as something more concrete than "a tendency, not ourselves, making for righteousness." In judgments and catastrophes a character displays itself, which the presages of conscience invest with clearer outlines. Conscience at least reveals God as personal. "If the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something higher than we; but what am I?—a person—higher than whom no 'thing' assuredly, no mere phenomenon, can be, but only another person, greater and higher and of deeper insight."[2] Conscience reveals God as a righteous person standing in direct relation to the moral beings whom He has called into existence.

But it may be asked, Can we go no further than this? is it true that Nature and Conscience reveal nothing in the Divine Personality beyond infinite power, calm and inflexible constancy of purpose, righteous will? Butler appears to answer this question tentatively when he points to traces even in Nature of a dispensation of compassion or mercy.[3] More recently indications have been noted that a principle of self-sacrifice has acted as at least a partial factor in development, and that the prevalence of pain in Nature has been overstated;[4] that, in short, Nature reveals a being who is guided by a purpose

[1] *Seat of Authority in Religion*, bk. i. chap. i. p. 36.

[2] Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. p. 104; cp. *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 70, 71.

[3] *Analogy*, pt. ii. chap. v.

[4] See Wallace, *Darwinism*, chap. ii.; Drummond, *Ascent of Man*.

of love. Such a line of thought is welcome as rendering antecedently credible the new word of God which comes to man in Jesus Christ.

For Jesus Christ finally reveals God's nature and character. "If," says Luthardt, perhaps somewhat unguardedly, "we could penetrate all space, we should find but the gospel of power; if we could survey all time, we should see but the gospel of righteousness. We can know the gospel of grace only in Jesus Christ."[1] In Him redeeming grace and love are finally revealed as belonging to the essence of God's Being. "Characteristic of the Divine activity is the salvation of those in need," says Gregory of Nyssa. "The love of man is a proper attribute of the Divine nature."[2] Christ incarnate not only teaches us something of God's nature by indicating that in the Divine Being relationships exist; that God is no mere barren unity, but that to Him belongs an unending, self-sufficing life of love. He also authoritatively reveals the Divine character, the gracious possibilities of heavenly compassion and grace. Accordingly we can point "behind the physical appearances" of Nature to a "moral justification." Over against the impression produced by the severity and relentless sternness of natural laws,[3] we are able to set the revelation of God involved in the life of Him who *went about doing good*, who *pleased not Himself*, who was made *perfect through sufferings*. His relation to pain is an historic fact; a sinless personality has actually suffered the worst that could befall the most guilty. And in the event the fact of suffering is explained; in the light of the resurrection pain is seen to be the way of man's exaltation, and the means whereby he attains to the fulfilment of his true

[1] *Fundamental Truths*, etc., p. 333.
[2] *Orat. Cat.* xxxvi. and xv.
[3] See a statement in G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, pp. 76, ff.

destiny.[1] In some sense it must be true that Love is the key to the history of the universe, and thus

"Consolation springs
From sources deeper far than deepest pain."

In Jesus Christ, then, Divine revelation culminates, for He claims that the Father is *in Him*. The sight of Him is the sight of God;[2] the love He bears towards man is the love of God. He answers man's cry, "Can God be known," by pointing to Himself not merely as One who knows God, but as One in whom God Himself is unveiled, and in so doing He satisfies the deepest spiritual needs of mankind, burdened with the sense of universal suffering and sin. For as has been finely said, "What is needed is such a living faith in God's relation to man as shall leave no place for that helpless resentment against the appointed order so apt to rise within us at the sight of undeserved pain. And this faith is possessed by those who vividly realise the Christian form of theism. For they worship One who is no remote contriver of a universe to whose ills He is indifferent. If they suffer, did He not on their account suffer also? If suffering falls not always on the most guilty, was He not innocent? Shall they cry aloud that the world is ill-designed for their convenience when He for their sakes subjected Himself to its conditions?"[3]

2. It remains to consider the nature of the appeal made by revelation. It is the constant teaching of Scripture that for the knowledge of God a certain moral quality or affinity is necessary. *He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.*[4] In other words, revelation is supported by moral, not demonstrative evidence, and responds to wants, capacities, and instincts which

[1] Cp. Heb. ii. 5–10.
[2] S. Jo. xiv. 9.
[3] A. J. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 354.
[4] 1 S. Jo. iv. 8; cp. the maxim, "Scientia Dei sapientia potius quam scientia" (Alex. Alens.).

must be properly developed before the evidence can be fairly estimated. Revelation does not and cannot appeal to reason only. It makes an imperious claim on man's entire nature; it brings direct motives to bear on will. Thus without the sense of dependence on a creator, without the presages of conscience, the hope of immortality, the sense of sin, and the desire to be free from it—in a word, in the absence of certain great primary needs of the soul—the Incarnation cannot but be antecedently incredible. Our ground of belief is an antecedent sense of probability responding to, or uniting with, external evidence. It is therefore strictly relevant to the question of evidences in such a subject-matter to ask whether the facts testified correspond to our nature, supply its spiritual wants, explain its present condition, and satisfy its upward aspirations. Much has been said and written as to this question of the logical cogency of faith.[1] The conclusion of the matter is perhaps summarily expressed in a sentence of Dr. Newman's: "As a general rule, religious minds embrace the gospel mainly on the great antecedent probability of a revelation and the suitableness of the gospel to their needs."[2] Or in the words of a more recent writer: "It is undoubtedly the case that just as the truths of religion account for and appeal to his [man's] whole being, so the evidence for them appeals to his whole being also. For its complete appreciation there are requirements other than intellectual. There must be not only certain endowments of mind, but the life of a spiritual being. There must be moral affections, moral perceptions, spiritual affinities and satisfactions."[3] In a

[1] See especially Newman, *Gram. of Assent*, and *Univ. Sermons*, x., xi., xii.; Mozley, *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, No. 1; Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 58.

[2] *Univ. Serm.*, p. 197.

[3] R. C. Moberly in *Lux Mundi*, pp. 229, 230.

word, *pectus facit theologum.* A certain preparedness of heart, a certain submissiveness of will, is needful for the estimation of evidence in matters of religious truth. Divine truth is not dead, or abstract, or inert—making no claim on the will and shedding no warmth on the heart.[1] Truth finds man, rather than man truth; and its appeal is before all else to his will, to his faculty of self-surrender.

It is from this point of view that we approach the historic evidence of the Incarnation. The testimony is not of such a character as will compel belief. Revelation is addressed to man as rational and free; it presents itself authoritatively indeed, but not with an absolute or peremptory authority. The evidence is cogent, but not absolutely demonstrative, and it therefore leaves room for the play of character and individuality. The evidence of the Incarnation is weighty, but falls short of carrying absolute conviction unless the idea of Divine condescension is antecedently credible. Historic testimony is of no avail when it is approached with a negative bias which prejudges the case. It has "no power to produce religious faith in a revelation not in itself acceptable or self-evidencing."[2] We must approach it with a consciousness of needs and experiences with which the Incarnation will be coherent; not asking for scientific certainty, but for tokens corresponding to our sense of probability.

§ III. Evidence for the Incarnation

The Evidence for the Incarnation may be conveniently summarised under four main heads.

1. The fact of apostolic belief. A careful study of the Gospels and Epistles will show us how the apostles came by their belief in Jesus Christ. It will be our duty to

[1] See conclusion of Mozley's *Essay on Blanco White.*

[2] Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 494; cp. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, chap. iii.

investigate the account in the second part. It is enough to say, at this point, that the apostles were led on slowly and hesitatingly through intimacy with Christ to the solemn conviction that He was the very Son of God. The crowning fact that proved this was the Resurrection. It is consequently on this event that their testimony concentrates itself, and all subsequent organisation of the Church seems to have been intended to secure a valid and formal witness of this one fact.

Why is the evidence so cogent?

First, because of the character of the witnesses. They are plain, literal-minded men, who profess that *they cannot but speak the things which they have heard and seen.*[1] They tell their story on the very spot where the events which they testified had occurred, and there they deliberately remain.[2] Nothing can shake the strength of their conviction. They persist in declaring it even under every imaginable form of hostile pressure. As to the occurrence of this one fact all are unanimously agreed in spite of the variety of their character, their independence of mind, and their unimaginative temperament.[3] Further, we may fairly insist on the striking change which as a matter of fact the resurrection produced in them. Our Lord's death had scattered them. All had forsaken Him and fled. Their slowness of belief was proof against all announcements that He had risen; He Himself *upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart.* How is it that when once the resurrection is believed their whole character is changed? How come these timid, despairing men to be so strenuous, confident, and bold in telling their story and preaching the risen Christ? Did ever imagination or hallucination produce

[1] Acts iv. 20.

[2] See H. S. Holland, *On Behalf of Belief*, Serm. on *The Gospel Witness.*

[3] Cp. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, chap. viii.

a change so complete and so permanent ?[1] At least there can be no question in regard to the robust solidity of the apostolic belief, and, indeed, the reality of the fact is the only key to the problem involved in the wonderful change that comes over the men themselves, and the only adequate explanation of the results which they achieved in the strength of their conviction.

2. Another department of evidence is constituted by the rise and progress, the permanent continuance, the world-wide expansion, and the peculiar institutions of the Christian Church. The apostolic office is based on the fact of the resurrection, the weekly and yearly commemoration of which is perpetuated in the observance of Sunday and Easter Day. The life of the Christian Church is indeed "a great fact which everyone ought to measure."[2] For the Church claims to be the product of the Incarnation; it is a living organism which cannot be explained apart from the living Person from whom it derives its life. No collection of forces within humanity itself can have created the Church. "To read the history of the Christian Church," says a modern writer, "without the belief that Christ has been in vital and organic relation with it, seems to me to read it under the impression that a profound illusion can for centuries exercise more power for good than the truth."[3] Indeed, we have only to consider what the Church is and has been, and how Christ's prophecies were fulfilled in its history, to estimate Gibbon's "five causes" at their true value.[4] And

[1] Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, pp. 46, 47.

[2] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 120. So Coleridge speaks of the evidential value of "the standing miracle of a Christendom commensurate and almost synonymous with the civilised world" (qu. by Trench, *Miracles*, p. 60).

[3] Hutton, *Theological Essays* (ed. 3), p. 285. Cp. Illingworth in *Lux Mundi*, p. 200.

[4] Newman, *Gram. of Assent* (ed. 6), p. 457.

the assertion that the Church "created" or invented the representation of Christ's person leaves the Church itself a phenomenon to be accounted for.[1] We may, in fact, apply to the Church an observation of Dr. Martineau, which concerns the origin of the physical universe, "Whatever you would require as adequate to the last term must already be present in the first."[2] If the permanence and vitality of Christianity is a fact of experience, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Church lives in virtue of its dependence on an originating cause. Christianity, in fact, cannot be explained apart from Christ.

3. Another field of evidence lies open in the spiritual experience of Christians. It is an argument to which Cyprian appeals in his *Epistle to Donatus*. *Dei est, inquam, Dei omne quod possumus.*[3] The grace of God, the fruits of the Incarnation, are as a matter of fact tested by the experience of Christians. In every age and every class of mankind are found those who have verified Christ's promises; have *set to their seal that God is true*; have tasted the joy of Divine forgiveness, the workings of grace, the blessedness of a Divine presence sustaining them. Thus the figure of Christ presented in the Gospels is "intimately, indissolubly linked with the whole vast movement whose beginning they describe."[4] It may be justly urged that it is unscientific in any appeal to experience to omit the well-attested facts of man's spiritual history. From S. Paul and S. Augustine downwards, there is a long line of witnesses who are unanimous in attributing miracles of spiritual power to Jesus

[1] Dorner, *Doc. of the Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 62.
[2] *Seat of Authority*, p. 14. [3] *ad Donat.* c. iv.
[4] Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 198. Cp. the same writer's *Univ. and Cathedral Sermons*, pp. 28–30; Dale, *The Living Christ*, etc., chaps. i. and ii.

Christ. Here then we have a class of facts for which only the Incarnation can adequately account. The moral victories of the gospel are, we find, often urged by Christian apologists as a ground of belief in the truth of the Incarnation. Cyprian, for instance, appeals to the facts of personal experience,— the illuminating, cleansing power of the Christian sacrament of baptism in his own case.[1] Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa[2] dwell on the moral miracles which Christ has achieved in human society, His power to subdue the hearts of multitudes, and to deliver them from the fear of death and the taint of sin; the evanescence and decay of idolatry; the supernatural endurance of the martyrs; the disappearance of the superstitions, the pollutions, the cruelties of heathendom. "To those," says Gregory, "who do not wilfully resist the truth, no slight demonstration of the Divine Incarnation is afforded by the testimony of the facts themselves." The ruins of the Jewish temple, the deserted and decaying shrines of heathen deities, alike witnessed to the Redeemer's triumph.

4. One more group of facts must be noticed, namely, those presented by the literary products of the second half of the first century. The Incarnation alone satisfactorily accounts for the portrait of Christ contained in S. Paul's earliest Epistles. S. Paul, it has been said, "is a history in himself, man and system alike being in need of explanation."[3] Now there are four Epistles universally acknowledged to be S. Paul's, written between the years 57 and 59, *i.e.* within thirty years of the ascension. These contain—(1) a certain view of Christ's person. Christ is Divine: the phrase *Son of God* occurs

[1] *Ep. ad Donatum.*

[2] Ath. *de Incarn.* xxix.–xxxi. and xlvi.–lv.; Greg. Nyss. *Orat. Catech.* xviii.; cp. Just. M. *Apol.* i. 14.

[3] Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 246.

fourteen times. He is called *Image of God*, *Power* and *Wisdom of God*, *Messiah*, *Lord*. He is represented as the revealer of God, the instrument in creation, a pre-existent Being, yet really human, having *beggared Himself* for man's sake, sinless and a propitiation for sin, *a quickening spirit*.[1] (2) There also underlies these Epistles a tradition as to the facts of Christ's life: His birth, His life of poverty, His institution of the Eucharist, His crucifixion and resurrection, His claim to judge the world.[2]

Besides the Pauline portrait there is the picture of the synoptic Gospels to be accounted for. There is, it is true, much dispute as to the mode of their formation; opinion inclines to the hypothesis of one or even two or more fundamental documents, one at least approximating to the Gospel of S. Mark, the other to that of S. Matthew. But it is on the whole the prevalent view that the three Gospels existed in their present shape before the year 80 A.D., and they appear to represent a collective tradition. Now we find that S. Paul's account of the method of Christ's manifestation, the gradual recognition by men of His Divine nature through experience of His humanity, corresponds to the process of belief as described in the synoptic account. Accordingly we are left to account for a many-sided portrait of Christ, which on the surface at any rate seems to harmonise readily with the substantial reality of the Christian belief as to His person. Theories which represent the gospel account of Christ's person and claim as an afterthought, must inevitably proceed on *à priori* grounds. They do not profess to accept the records as they stand. The Gospels on this theory

[1] See 2 Cor. iv. 4; 1 Cor. i. 24; 2 Cor. iv. 6; 1 Cor. viii. 6; 1 Cor. x. 4, 5; Gal. iv. 4; Rom. viii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. iii. 24 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 45.

[2] This is implied in Rom. ii. 16; 2 Cor. v. 10. Cp. Sanday, *Oxf. House Papers*, No. iv. "What the first Christians thought of Christ."

represent "a Christian mythology"; they are products of "the retrospective anxiety of tradition to force upon [Christ] a theory of His person, of which first Himself and then His religion has been the victim."[1] And thus in point of fact we are left to choose between the acceptance of the Incarnation as a fact, and the supposition that the Gospels represent a late and artificial belief or fancy which persisted in ascribing to a mere man claims and sayings, acts and institutions, which are utterly alien to his historical character and spirit.

It will have been observed that the Incarnation has been dealt with in the preceding pages as a *hypothesis*, the actual truth of which is necessary to account for the results which have appeared to follow from it. This is the only kind of testimony by which such a fact could be supported. The question is whether an Incarnation of God is coherent with known historical facts, and with the general impression derived from the study of human nature and history. Looking thus at the Incarnation, we cannot but admit that "the story fits in with known facts. It is rooted in a great supernatural history. Its supernatural elements are vitally related to the actual order of the world, and are necessary to account for some of the greatest events in the subsequent history of mankind."[2]

[1] Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, p. 353.
[2] Dale, *The Living Christ and the Four Gospels*, pp. 89–90.

PART II

SCRIPTURAL PRESENTATION

§ I. Witness of the Old Testament.

1. Doctrine of Man.
2. Doctrine of the Divine Immanence; The Theophanies.
3. Intimation of plurality of persons in the Godhead.
4. Doctrine of the Messiah, in the Old Testament and later literature.

§ I. Witness of the Old Testament

The antecedent probability of such an event as the Incarnation is to be judged, partly at least, by its relation to the previous anticipations of mankind. Christianity makes its appeal, for instance in S. Paul's sermon at Athens, to truths already impressed on mankind by reflection and the action of conscience; to the knowledge of God already attained. Natural religion prepares the way for further self-disclosures of God, and one of its most important effects on the mind is the anticipation or desire which it produces that a revelation may be given.[1] So Gregory of Nyssa insists that our true starting-point in estimating the probability of the Incarnation is to consider the "pious conceptions of Deity" already current.[2] Now, the Jewish race in particular had been the subjects of a special religious education. Israel was "a sacred school of Divine knowledge for the whole world."[3] In the Old Testament we find, as a matter of fact, the loftiest doctrine of God's nature hitherto attained by mankind, and the clearest anticipations of a further self-manifestation. And it should be observed that the Jewish Scriptures seem to embrace the record of God's preparatory dealings, not only with Israel, but with the Gentiles. The books of Job and of Ecclesiastes may be studied as representing in general outline the final expectations of the ancient heathen world. In Job we see a righteous man, not himself a member of the covenant people, filled with awe at the manifestations in Nature of Divine power and wisdom, and waiting in humble submission for a new

[1] Newman, *Gram. of Assent*, p. 423. See generally chap. x.

[2] *Orat. Cat.* xix.: τὶς οὖν ἂν γένοιτο ἀρχή; . . . τὶς ἄλλη ἢ τὸ τὰς εὐσεβεῖς περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων διεξελθεῖν.

[3] Ath. *de Incarn.* xii.

self-disclosure of God; while the writer of Ecclesiastes concludes his book with the presage of a moment of Divine judgment which shall finally reveal the character and purpose of the Being whose dealings in human life and history are so full of mystery and anomaly. Thus it becomes necessary to study the witness of the Old Testament.

i. The Old Testament doctrine of Man.

Man is made in the *image of God*[1] (Gen. i. 26, ix. 6). It is difficult to determine the precise significance of this expression; but at least it implies that both in nature and destiny man is "theomorphic."

1. In nature: man is possessed of free and rational personality, capable of communing with God, and standing in a necessary relation to ethical good. As such, he is the representative of creation, the high-priest of nature, recapitulating the material universe, and acting as God's vicegerent in relation to it (Gen. i. 28); involving it therefore in the consequences of his fall.[2] Thus it may be said with truth that the *image of God* involves "the whole superiority of man over the sub-human creation, his higher bodily and spiritual equipment, which makes him capable of lordship over the earth."[3]

2. In destiny: man is "theomorphic"; he was made in God's image, and consequently possessed a natural

[1] A summary of patristic opinions is given by Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 56. According to Petavius (*de Incarn.* ii. 7, § 7), the expression "image" has two senses—(1) essential—the reasoning faculty; (2) accidental—the wisdom and virtue in which consists perfection. The fall deprived man of the second, but not of the first. Decus et ornamentum sive perfectionem illius amisit eamque iacturam transmisit in posteros. The gift of "perfection" involved *sapientia, integra libertatis functio, imperium et dominatus in animalia cetera, immortalitas.* This lost "image of God" Christ came to restore. Cp. Iren. v. 16. 2.

[2] See Oehler, *Theol. of the O.T.* § 68; Westcott, *The Gospel of Creation*; Wace, *Boyle Lectures*, Ser. ii. Lect. viii.

[3] Pfleiderer, *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. i. p. 205.

affinity to God, a natural aptitude for union with Him. His very body was so framed as to be capable of representing in a measure the form of Deity (Ezek. i. 26). The Divine plan was only interrupted by the fall; sin has disturbed and retarded the natural development of man, but is foreign to the true law and essence of his being. Man is destined, then, for union with God, and is capable of progress in assimilation to Him. *The likeness of God* is the appointed goal of his moral development. The Incarnation being the appointed means of perfecting human nature according to its Divine ideal, and lifting it into union with the Divine life, men may become in Christ *partakers of the Divine nature.* "He became human," says Athanasius, "that we might be made Divine."[1] Christian thinkers have recognised in the fact that man wears the image of God, at once a prophecy of the Incarnation, and a pledge of man's ultimate exaltation into the life of fellowship with God.

ii. Doctrine of the Divine immanence.

In the Old Testament the Divine Being is represented as holding converse with man, and revealing Himself in various ways through visions, dreams, voices, the spirit of prophecy, and the ministry of an angel. Such immanence pointed ever to a more explicit self-manifestation. "From the beginning," says Irenæus, "the Son has been present with His creature, revealing to all the Father—even to those whom the Father wills, and when He wills, and as He wills."[2] Further, the doctrine of the Divine image implied that within the Divine Being existed in some sense the archetype of humanity. So Tertullian argues from the texts, *Let us make man*, and *In the image of God created He him*, that the second

[1] 2 Pet. i. 4. Ath. *de Incarn.* li.: ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.

[2] Iren. iv. 6, 7; cp. the argument of Ath. *de Incarn.* xli., xlii.

mention of God points to a distinction of persons within the Deity.[1]

In this connection we should specially notice what is implied in the *theophanies* of the Old Testament, as manifestations preparing men for an incarnation of Deity.

The earliest view of the מלאך was that He was the second Person of the Trinity.[2] The lowest view, perhaps, requires that we should believe there was in Him at least a special presence of God.[3] Augustine insists that the theophanies were self-manifestations of God through a created being; in this finite spirit God personally presents Himself: Jehovah is in him. Oehler notes that the same expressions are used in speaking of the representation of God by the Mal'akh as in describing the Divine indwelling in the sanctuary; in both is the Divine "name" and the Divine "countenance." If the *Shekinah* be a real presence of God, "a sinking of the Divine into the sphere of the creature," so also is the *Mal'akh*.[4]

All these manifestations point—

(*a*) To the possibility of personal converse between God and man. This impression is strengthened by a free use of *anthropomorphisms* in describing God's dealings with man.[5]

(*b*) To the possibility of God revealing Himself through and in a created form. God was "training His people . . . . at length to recognise and to worship Him when hidden under and indissolubly one with a created nature."[6] They are, as Bull says, "a prelude of the Incarnation."

[1] Tert. *adv. Prax.* xiii.
[2] See testimonies in Bull, *Def. fid. Nic.* lib. i. c. i.
[3] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 53–59.
[4] Oehler, *Theol. of the O.T.* §§ 59, 60.
[5] Oehler, *op. cit.* § 46.
[6] Cp. Novatian, *de Trin.* xviii.

(*c*) To a twofold relation of God to man: on the one hand God is hidden, on the other revealed. In His essential nature He is invisible (Ex. xxxiii. 20). The gradual development of the idea of the Divine *holiness* implies a constantly increasing sense of the transcendence of God, —His separateness from creation. Thus later prophecy (Isai. xl. 25) connects the conception of moral holiness with that of a spiritual being who cannot be represented in material form.[1] Yet the tendency to anthropomorphic expressions in relation to the Divine Being seems to be heightened in the later stages of Israel's history. We have to account for the strange fact that in those books of the Old Testament in which the strongest protest is made against material modes of conceiving the Divine Being, we have the most frequent use of anthropomorphisms.[2]

iii. Intimations of a plurality of persons in God.

1. The names *Elohim* and *Jehovah* (*Jahveh*).

The name *Elohim* cannot nowadays be pressed in the same way as formerly.[3] The plural is perhaps intensive—the general notion being "fulness of might."[4] But in any case the form of the word combats the notion of a sterile monotheism by implying that all Divine powers and functions, which the heathen distributed among many deities, are concentrated in one being (cp. 1 Cor. viii. 5, 6).

The name *Jahveh*, too, as designating a spiritual being who is identified with other Divine powers and attributes,

[1] Oehler, § 46.

[2] Novatian, *de Trin.* vi., makes some interesting remarks on the meaning of anthropomorphic expressions in the Old Testament.

[3] See, *e.g.*, Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 49 ff.; Oehler, § 36.

[4] Cp. קדושים in Prov. ix. 10, xxx. 3, as an equivalent of יהוה. Some would regard the word as a remnant of primitive polytheistic ideas. See Robertson, *Early Religion of Israel*, pp. 172 and 502; Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 150 f., 426.

and so reveals Himself under a variety of names, shows that the idea of God in Jewish monotheism is not a bare unit. "His nature can only be apprehended as that which involves diversity as well as unity."[1]

2. The Old Testament doctrine, both of the Angel and of the Spirit, prepares the way for a doctrine of the Trinity. In the Spirit, as in the Angel, is a special presence and special action of Jehovah.[2]

3. Glimpses of intercommunion between persons in the Deity, *e.g.*, in Gen. i. 26, "Let us make man." Cp. iii. 22, xi. 7, where we seem to have a colloquy within the Godhead.

4. Triplication of the Divine Name—beyond any point we can call accidental, *e.g.*, the priestly blessing (Num. vi. 23 f.).

5. The doctrine of the Divine Wisdom.

In the book of Proverbs (*e.g.*, viii. 22) Wisdom is introduced as a quasi-personal being distinct from God. She is personified, but never perhaps actually hypostatised.[3] She is no mere attribute of Deity, but the creating, energising, all-subduing, and ordering *Thought* (νοῦς) of God—the Divine plan of the universe, the summary of the ideas embodied in creation. In the Wisdom-doctrine of the Old Testament we can discern progressive stages. Thus in Prov. viii. and Job xxviii. Wisdom is personified as a being distinct from God. In later books she is represented as at once emanating from God (Wisd. vii. 23–25) and immanent in nature (*ib.* viii. 1 f.). The ascription to her of personality is more clearly marked. Finally, in the Philonic doctrine of the Logos, which is the true complement of the Wisdom-doctrine, and is almost anticipated in such a passage as Wisd. xviii. 15,

[1] Caird, *Phil. of Religion*, p. 312. [2] Oehler, § 65.

[3] This is a controverted point, and not easy to determine. Doubtless the language used about Wisdom reacted on the conception.

we seem to stand on the very verge of the New Testament doctrine. Indeed, these personifications of Wisdom "mark the highest point to which Hebrew thought on the world rose." [1] It is a difficult question to decide how far the Wisdom-doctrine in its later form betrays the intrusion of Hellenic thought, but it may be fairly maintained that the tendency to regard Wisdom as the highest moral principle in the universe is characteristically Jewish. It culminates in the lofty Philonic conception of the Logos as "second God," "servant," "archangel," etc., of the Most High.

Much has been written about Philo's doctrine of the Divine Logos. His theology is a blending of Stoic, Platonistic, and Judaistic elements; and his Logos-doctrine is based on the transcendental conception of God which he inherited from his religion. In His self-existence, His absolute essence, God is incomprehensible; He is without attributes; we know only that He is. The Logos, on the other hand, is the operative reason of God, the power through which the Deity comes into contact with the universe. Philo, however, appears to alternate between two conceptions of the Logos. On the one hand, He is immanent in the universe—scarcely distinguishable from the cosmos of which He is the inward principle; on the other, as the ideal of the universe, and as comprehending in Himself the different forces which produce it, He is transcendent, and has His abode within the Divine essence.[2] But, speaking generally, the Logos in the system of Philo occupies a ministerial, mediating position;

[1] Davidson, *Book of Job*, Introd. p. lxii. For a sketch of the Wisdom-doctrine, see Farrar, Introd. to "Book of Wisdom" in *Speaker's Commentary*; Dorner, *Doc. of the Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. pp. 16 f.; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 60–63; Oehler, §§ 235–242.

[2] Cp. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. pp. 95–99; Dorner, div. i. vol. i. p. 27; Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, etc. pp. 405 ff.; Pfleiderer, *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. i. p. 123.

He is a creative and administrative instrument, translating the Divine idea of which He is the expression into concrete facts and laws.

It cannot be said that the Logos is anywhere regarded by Philo as strictly personal, but perhaps the simple reason is, as Dr. Martineau points out, that "the conception of personality as now held is a later acquisition of the Western European mind, and has no equivalent in the philosophy which threw itself into the old Greek moulds of thought."[1] It may be confidently maintained, however, that in closely connecting the idea of creation with the idea of the activity of the Logos, Philo recognises at least a distinct *function*, if not a distinct *personality*, and thus a path is opened towards a fuller recognition of distinctions within the Divine Being. In view of His lofty functions, the relation of the Logos to God cannot be that of a mere attribute to a substance. Some of the terms which Philo applies to the Logos anticipate to a certain extent the Logos-doctrine of S. John. Though S. John does not seem to be dependent on the Philonic idea of the Logos, it was through the influence of Philo's system that the thought of *mediation* between God and creation became fixed in a form from which it could never again be disconnected. "As the mediator of the creation, the Logos is also the mediator of all religious revelation. He is therefore called, on the one hand, the Servant, Ambassador, Substitute, Interpreter, Angel of God, and, on the other, the Representative, High-Priest, Intercessor, and Advocate (Paraclete) of men."[2] "This shadowy form of the Philonic Logos which wavers between conceptual abstraction and personality could naturally not suffice to satisfy the religious need of a real historical revelation of God; but its great historical

[1] *Seat of Authority*, etc. p. 419.
[2] Pfleiderer, *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 227.

significance consisted in this, that it prepared the conceptual form for the theological apprehension and expression of the new revelation in Jesus Christ."[1] Beyond this point the influence of Philo's system cannot be said to extend. There is no trace of it in the teaching of S. Paul, and the central thought of S. John, the identification of the Divine Logos with the historical Messiah, seems to have been remote from Philo's mind. Further, in so intellectual a system as his, the function of faith appears relatively insignificant; while the Christian ideas of atonement, forgiveness, sacrifice, priesthood seem to have little or no meaning. Indeed, we see in the case of such a Platonist as Clement how alien are these ideas from the general tone of his thought.[2]

iv. Doctrine of Messiah.

The yearning for Messiah was at its root an anticipation of the union of Divine and human attributes in a single personality.

[1] Pfleiderer, *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. i. p. 123. A typical passage of Philo describing the functions of the Logos is found in *Quis rer. div. hæres*, i. 42. [Franckf. 1691, p. 509 B & C.]

τῷ δὲ ἀρχαγγέλῳ καὶ πρεσβυτάτῳ λόγῳ δωρέαν ἐξαίρετον ἔδωκεν ὁ τὰ ὅλα γεννήσας πατὴρ, ἵνα μεθόριος στὰς τὸ γενόμενον διακρίνῃ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἱκέτης μὲν ἐστι τοῦ θνητοῦ κηραίνοντος ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον, πρεσβευτὴς δὲ τοῦ ἡγέμονος πρὸς τὸ ὑπήκοον. ἀγάλλεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ δωρέᾳ, καὶ σεμνυνόμενος αὐτὴν ἐκδιηγεῖται φάσκων· "κἀγὼ εἰσήκειν ἀνὰ μέσον κυρίου καὶ ὑμῶν, οὔτε ἀγέννητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὤν, οὔτε γένητος ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων, παρὰ μὲν τῷ φυτεύσαντι πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ μὴ σύμπαν ἀφανίσαι ποτε καὶ ἀποστῆναι τὸ γένος ἀκοσμίαν ἀντὶ κόσμου ἑλόμενον, παρὰ δὲ τῷ φύντι πρὸς εὐελπιστίαν τοῦ μήποτε τὸν ἴλεων θεὸν περιϊδεῖν τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐπικηρυκεύσομαι τὰ εἰρηναῖα γενέσει παρὰ τοῦ καθαιρεῖν πολέμους ἐγνωκότος εἰρηνοφύλακος ἀεὶ θεοῦ." I owe the reference to Dr. Martineau's *Seat of Authority*.

As to Philo's later influence on Christian theology (esp. his exegetic methods), see Harnack, *l.c.*; also Pfleiderer, *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. ii. Lect. vii.

[2] Cp. Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Lect. i. pp. 25, 26.

In tracing the history of this Messianic expectation, we may distinguish four stages.[1]

1. In the first stage, recorded in the Pentateuch, prophecy is vague and indeterminate. It begins with a promise to the race of mankind, according to which "antagonism to evil is decreed to be the law of humanity"[2] (Gen. iii. 15). This is further defined in the promise of a seed (זרע) to Abraham through whom the world is to be blessed—a promise which is repeated to Isaac and to Jacob (Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxii. 18, xxvi. 4, xxviii. 14). It should be noticed that though the Hebrew term is collective in form, it suggests, both in its primary reference to Isaac and in its ultimate application, an *individual*.[3] Gen. xlix. 10 points to the tribe of Judah, possibly to some individual chief, as the future holder of sovereignty over Abraham's descendants. With this we may compare the oracle of Balaam (Num. xxiv. 17), which hints at the sway of an individual, proceeding from Israel and extending over other nations. The words which tradition ascribes to Moses in Deut. xviii. 15–19 primarily refer to a prophetic *order*, but contribute an element to the Messianic idea, namely, the notion of a prophetic mediator through whom God will speak authoritatively to His people. The future ruler and lawgiver is to be in some sense a representative of God; and thus the moral and spiritual purpose of the future kingdom is indicated.

2. So far prophecy has been indeterminate, but the Messianic hope is found to take definite shape in the reigns of David and Solomon. The intervening period had not indeed been without its effect in giving depth and extension to the national hope. The deliverance

[1] Cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, no. 2.
[2] Driver, *Sermons on the Old Testament*, p. 52.
[3] Cp. Lightfoot on Gal. iii. 16.

from Egypt and settlement in Canaan was regarded as a great manifestation of Israel's God, by which He was declared to be supreme and unique among gods, and willing to fight on behalf of the people of His choice. Israel becomes conscious of its vocation as God's people. Thus the kingdom, when in due course it was actually founded, was naturally regarded in a theocratic light. The central idea of Messianic prediction is defined in the oracle of 2 Sam. vii. 5–16, which seems to have had a marked influence on the future direction of prophecy, and forms the starting-point of the Messianic teaching contained in the psalms. Three great ideas may be discerned in this oracle—(1) the Messiah is to be a son of David, *i.e. of human descent.* Henceforth the title "the Lord's anointed" acquires new significance. Originally משיח (χριστὸς) denoted every one, especially the high priest, who was anointed with the holy oil; thus it would be applied to any organ of revelation. But henceforth it becomes specially the title of the theocratic king,[1] and is gradually limited to a descendant of the house of David.

(2) By a Divine covenant of grace, David's house and throne are to be *everlasting.* This interpretation is given to the oracle by the authors of Psalms lxxxix. and cxxxii.[2] The hope of everlasting dominion was destined to outlast the lowest humiliation that might overtake David's descendants.

(3) The theocratic king is henceforth to stand in a peculiar relation to God as His *son* (2 Sam. vii. 14; Pss. ii. and lxxxix.). "Sonship," perhaps, implies primarily a certain moral relationship between God and the monarch, filial devotion on the one side responding to loving faith-

[1] Not necessarily because every king was anointed. There is reason to think that only the first of each dynasty was anointed. See Oehler, § 163.

[2] Cp. the prediction of 2 Sam. xxiii. 1–7.

fulness on the other. The title "son," however, now solemnly transferred from Israel[1] to its king, implies that the son of David is henceforth to be regarded as the representative of his nation.

This oracle is of supreme importance in determining the scope and future direction of prophecy. We find perpetual references to it in later books, and it forms the starting-point of what is called "figurative prophecy," *i.e.* the ascription of ideal attributes to the reigning king. The king is seen "in the light of the promise made to David, and in that light he is transfigured,"[2] and invested with more than human attributes, whether as warrior (Ps. ii.), or royal bridegroom (xlv.), or king reigning in righteousness and peace (lxxii.). Each monarch is in some degree idealised, and thereby becomes a partial type of Christ. The highest point attained by this tendency is found, perhaps, in Psalm cx., where a king is described who combines in his own person the functions of sovereignty with those of priesthood. This combination of the two highest dignities is ascribed to the monarch under sanction of a Divine oath—a noteworthy circumstance which seems to mark the inauguration of a new dispensation.[3]

3. The next stage of the Messianic doctrine is represented in the teaching of the prophets and later psalmists. These great men are themselves, in fact, types of the Messiah. Just as David, the chosen of God, in his suffering and humiliation and final exaltation, foreshadows Christ, so Asaph, and every other afflicted righteous man, in so far as he complains of enemies, is a type of the suffering Messiah; every teacher (*e.g.*, in the didactic psalms[4])

[1] Ex. iv. 22. [2] Perowne, *The Psalms*, vol. i. p. 54.

[3] Cp. Heb. vii. 20, and Westcott, *ad loc.* See also A. B. Bruce in *Expositor*, 3rd ser. No. lvii.

[4] Cp. Ps. lxxviii. 2 with S. Mt. xiii. 35.

represents Him in His prophetic office; every kingly figure points forward to His royal dignity. Further, the whole national history is seen to have a typical significance, and according to the tendency (always displayed by the Hebrew mind) to *individualise* national experiences, it is described in personal, individualistic terms—a fact which points to an individual as embodying and representing the chosen people.[1]

The Messianic doctrine of the prophets is best understood if studied in close connection with the history of their times. It is very important to recognise the circumstantial character of prophecy. It starts from historical data; it depicts the future in terms of the present. "The prophetic oracles," says Dr. Bruce, "were addressed to the present, were rooted in the present, were expressed in language suited to the present, and pointed to a good in the near future forming a counterpart to present evil, or to an evil in the near future which was to be the penalty of present or past sin."[2] For convenience' sake, the prophetic period may be divided into three main epochs: the Assyrian (*circ.* 800–700 B.C.), the Chaldæan (*circ.* 700–538), the post-Exilic (536–400).

(1) The Assyrian period is most conspicuously represented by the two prophets Hosea and Amos, whose scene of activity lies in the northern kingdom; and Isaiah and Micah, whose ministry is confined to Judah. During this period we can distinguish two lines of Messianic prediction—

On the one hand, the *form* of prophecy seems to be

[1] Cp. R. H. Hutton, *Essay on Hebrew Poetry.* Israel as a nation speaks in the first person singular; see, *e.g.*, Ex. xv.; Num. xx. 19, xxi. 22. This is very marked in the psalms, in some of which (*e.g.*, Ps. cxviii.) the personal and national elements are scarcely to be distinguished.

[2] *Chief End of Revelation*, p. 221. Cp. Riehm, *Messianic Prophecy*, pp. 95 ff.; Kirkpatrick, *Doc. of the Prophets*, pp. 13 ff.

determined by the importance of the Davidic kingdom in relation to the Assyrian struggle.[1] The Assyrian threatens the kingdom of God through its king. Consequently the idea emerges of a Davidic (*i.e.* Messianic) king, through whom there is to be deliverance from the national foe. This hope was encouraged by the comparative stability of the throne in the southern kingdom. Thus Amos points to the restoration of *the tabernacle of David* (ix. 11–15); and Hosea sees hope for Ephraim only in a return *to David their king* (i. 11, iii. 5). But these predictions of the king reach their highest point on the very eve of the struggle with Assyria—in Micah and Isaiah. Prophecy now becomes more explicit. The king is to come from David's city, and *shall stand and feed his flock in Jehovah's name* (Mic. v. 2–4); *i.e.* he shall stand in a unique relation to God—gifted with His Spirit (Isai. xi.), executing His righteous will, guided by His wisdom, even revealing His Divine attributes (Isai. ix. 6). The king's chosen city, Jerusalem, is to be the metropolis of nations; peace will be restored by his means to the divided kingdom;[2] his throne will be everlasting and his people holy (Isai. iv. 3). The Davidic monarch may be said, in fact, to be the central figure of prophecy during this critical period.

But side by side with these kingly visions we find the thought of a self-manifestation of Jehovah, who will descend to set up His throne in Zion, as the present sovereign, judge, and redeemer of His people. This thought passes over into the conception of a *day of the Lord*, which is to be the starting-point of a Messianic age, and accordingly is to be a moment both of judgment and deliverance. To the prophets it was quite evident

[1] Cp. Wellhausen, *Sketch of the History of Israel and Judah*, chap. vi.

[2] Zech. ix. 9, 10—a passage which is thought to be written by a late contemporary of Hosea (Riehm, p. 122; but see Kirkpatrick, pp. 441 ff).

that the Divine purpose could be accomplished only through the overthrow of the existing theocracy, and the salvation of a mere *remnant* (Isai. vi. 13; Amos ix. 8; Mic. ii. 12, etc.). The corruptions of the time made it inconceivable that there should be deliverance except by the way of judgment.[1]

A limitation, however, is to be noticed in the development of these two lines of thought, namely, that they are nowhere *combined.* We nowhere find the Messianic king conceived as Jehovah appearing in person. In a later prophet, indeed, the two ideas are found in juxtaposition (see Ezek. xxxiv. 11, 23, 24),[2] but within the limits of the Old Testament canon the lines of prediction, though parallel, do not meet. Two thoughts are prominent—(1) the glory of a Davidic Messiah, (2) the appearing of Jehovah in Zion. The promised redemption is connected now with one, now with the other conception. Both elements enter into the total volume of Messianic prediction, and find fulfilment and adjustment only in Christ;[3] but the time and manner of accomplishment remains unrevealed to the prophets themselves.[4]

(2) What we may call the Chaldæan period of Messianic prophecy extends from the time when Assyria was itself threatened by the Babylonian power to the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, *i.e.* from about 650 to 538. During this period of prophetic activity, royalty, owing to the moral corruption which had been fostered by the example of Manasseh, declined in influence; the national fortunes were felt by the faithful to be no longer bound up with the reigning monarch. The leading effects of this period

[1] Cp. Wellhausen, *Sketch,* etc. pp. 83–85, 104 f.

[2] In the apocalyptic literature the ideas are combined. See Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebrews,* p. 90.

[3] Cp. Oehler, *Theol. of the O. T.* § 216.

[4] Cp. 1 Pet. i. 11.

and of the exile were mainly two. First, the sense of Israel's universal mission was deepened. The universality of God's kingdom had been indeed a prophetic key-note long before the exile: it was probably suggested by the magnificence of Solomon's age, and became spiritualised in the prophetic pictures of the entrance of the heathen into the kingdom of God. But hitherto these great ideas had been conceived only under the form of a world-wide extension of the theocratic state; Jerusalem was still destined, it was supposed, to be the centre of a universal spiritual empire. The discipline of the exile tended to produce new and more profound conceptions of the people of God—its function in history and mission to the Gentiles. A remnant representing the true Israel was destined to be *the light of the Gentiles.* So should be fulfilled Israel's vocation to be *a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.* Thus the figure of the Messianic king melts into that of the commissioned *servant of Jehovah.* Again, the exile taught Israel the purpose and meaning of suffering. The great pictures of the righteous sufferer (*e.g.*, in the Book of Job, in Ps. xxii., and in Isai. liii.) seem all alike to be connected with the experiences of the exile. It is probable that while a large proportion of the exiles either abandoned the spiritual hopes of their race or lapsed into heathenism, the suffering remnant of the faithful persevered under great persecution and discouragement. Their history—of which we have hints here and there in Isai. xl.–lxvi.—was probably marked by great constancy under trial,[1] and amid circumstances of extreme depression and difficulty. This faithful remnant is idealised as an individual who bears the iniquities of his people. A new doctrine of suffering arises. It is recognised (*e.g.* by the author of Job) to be not only or

[1] Wellhausen, *Sketch*, etc. p. 124; Davidson, *Introd. to Book of Job*, xx. ff. Cp. Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures*, No. v.; Kirkpatrick, pp. 361 ff.

necessarily a judgment on sin, but an element in the disciplinary dealings of God, and an indispensable condition or qualification for effective mediation and intercession. The idea of vicarious suffering is fixed and deepened, and seems to be brought to a focus in the conception of an individual righteous man, who, as the accepted representative of his nation, must needs make atonement by suffering for its sins, and so become a prevailing intercessor with God. In this ideal *servant of Jehovah* are concentrated the scattered characteristics of God's faithful: their spirit of dependence, their patient devotion, their unswerving faithfulness in the fulfilment of vocation, their brave constancy under trial, their meek acceptance of death. In this sense the figure of Isaiah liii. is the culminating point of prophecy; but death is not the end in that unique passage. The holy servant enters upon a new and glorified life, in which he sees *the travail of his soul and is satisfied.*[1]

Such is the central idea of prophecy during the critical period when Israel succumbs before the world-power represented by Babylon. The holy remnant (Zeph. ii.; Hab. i.) becomes conscious of its mission before the storm finally bursts on the nation; the education of this consciousness proceeds during the seventy years of the Exile, and the result is a new conception of the Messiah. Not that the idea of the Davidic king is entirely lost; but in accordance with the limitations which seem to be incident to the prophetic gift, the figure of the king is nowhere actually combined with that of the suffering servant. Indeed, so distinct are these conceptions that later Jewish theology invents its second Messiah, the son of Joseph.[2] Perhaps the nearest approach to combination is the juxta-

[1] Cp. Delitzsch, *O.T. Hist. of Redemption*, §§ 71–73.

[2] Oehler, § 234. See also (in qualification) Stanton, *Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 124.

position in Zech. vi. 13, 14 of royalty with priesthood (cp. Ps. cx.). In that passage Joshua is coequal in dignity with Zerubbabel; and possibly the double crowning of the high priest in chap. iii. points to a similar idea.

(3) The work of the post-exilic prophets is to deepen the convictions already current as to Messiah's person and work. After its brief revival in the person of Zerubbabel, the house of David sank into complete obscurity; the Messianic idea was accordingly dissociated from the fortunes of the monarchy, and became connected with humanity at large. Thus the later prophets dwell on the relation of the Messiah to the whole human race. He is called *the Branch* (Zech. iii. 8, vi. 12; cp. Jer. xxiii. 5), and in Daniel vii. 13 *the Son of Man*.[1] But he is at the same time depicted as standing in a unique relation to Jehovah. He is Jehovah's *fellow* (Zech. xiii. 7), His *angel* (Mal. iii. 1), One in whom Jehovah Himself is *pierced* (Zech. xii. 10). But these prophets also gather up the substance of former predictions. Haggai, for instance, unfolds the prospect of a Divine self-manifestation, and a new glory of the *temple* (ii. 9; cp. Mal. iii. 1), a fact which is significant when connected with the revival and reorganisation of sacrificial worship which followed the restoration. We find the Messianic period described in terms suggested by a restored temple worship, which colours the ideals of Ezekiel (chaps. xl.–xlviii.) and Haggai.[2] To these prophets the great feature of the Messianic age is that all things become new: ancient forms are filled with new spirit and power.[3] Nor must we overlook the providential purpose of the period which intervenes between the restoration and the birth of Christ. The main effect of

[1] On the significance of this title, see below, p. 71 ff.
[2] Cp. also Isai. lvi. 7, lxvi. 23; Zech. xiv. 16–19; Mal. i. 11.
[3] Cp. Riehm, *Messianic Prophecy*, pp. 82 ff., 136 ff.

the sacrificial ritual of the second temple was to strengthen and educate the consciousness of sin; to suggest hopes and anticipations of a spiritual kind through the agency of material symbols; to awaken yearnings for one who should not only restore the fallen fortunes of Israel, but should inaugurate *a new covenant*[1] between the holy God and His people: a covenant which should "not only vindicate the truth of the ancient promises, but supply the missing link between the creature who cannot rule and the Creator who cannot obey";[2] a covenant of which the central characteristic was not law, but grace.

What we witness in Christian history is the unfolding and development of those principles which inspired prophecy had learned to trace in the history of Israel. In the moral reign of Christ we recognise the transfigured kingdom of David; in the catholicity of the Church the universalism of the prophets finds its fulfilment; in the action of the Spirit upon society and individual men we discern the full accomplishment of prophetic visions of a righteous nation, and hearts sprinkled with clean water. "Jesus Christ," says Riehm, "so interpreted the Old Testament writings that He, as a Son, fully entrusted with the thoughts and intentions of the Father, brought forth the eternal thoughts of God from their temporary and national surroundings." He is the fulfiller of all the Divine purposes, and we discover in Christianity not so much the literal accomplishment of particular predictions, as a general but close correspondence between Messianic prediction in general and its spiritual fulfilment in Christ. Thus the argument from prophecy, when restated in the form rendered necessary by our

[1] This idea already emerges in Jer. xxxi. 31. Cp. Wellhausen, *Sketch*, etc. pp. 122 f.; Kirkpatrick, p. 314.

[2] R. H. Hutton, *Theological Essays* (ed. 3), p. 283.

present critical knowledge, is very parallel in its results to the modern shape of the argument from design. In both cases the inductive conclusion is drawn, no longer from the narrow field of special cases of correspondence (or adaptation), but from the broad area of prophecy (or Nature) surveyed as a whole. The Old Testament is seen to be "an organism of which Christ is the final cause." "Christ is, in the first instance, His own witness; and instead of being proved conclusively by prophecy, interpreted apart from the light of the Christian era, to be the Christ, He first enables those who believe in Him to understand aright the prophecies, and to see in the correspondence of these, rightly understood, and His personal character and history, the evidence of a Divine purpose running through the previous ages, and finding its fulfilment in Him."[1] The Incarnation is in fact the one key to the right understanding of Hebrew prophecy. The person and history of Jesus Christ alone explain the many-sided imagery under which, in the Old Testament, the hopes and yearnings of Israel are depicted.

4. The Messianic hope in its later stage.[2]

The prophecies of the Book of Daniel had of course profound influence in shaping the Messianic idea. The core of Daniel's conception, however, is not so much the figure of a personal Messiah as the universal dominion of the saints (ii. 44, vii. 14, 27), an idea which tended to strengthen the expectation of a glorious national future which meets us in later stages of the Messianic hope.

In the apocryphal books there is practically no reference to a personal Saviour. Vague hopes of the future glory of Zion, the conversion of the Gentiles, and the deliverance of Israel from heathen foes are the most pro-

[1] Bruce, *Chief End of Revelation*, chap. v.

[2] Schürer, *The Jewish People*, etc. § 29; Stanton, *Jewish and Christian Messiah*, pp. 111 ff.; Westcott, *Introd. to the Gospels*, p. 94 f.

minent elements in the Messianic pictures of these books. The expectations of the later Jews, in fact, betray a vainglorious and unspiritual nationalism, of which Judaism and the synagogue, not the Messiah, are the centre. But in the apocalyptic books, the ideal king of earlier prophecy is revived, and the title of Messiah becomes definitely restricted to an individual yet to come, who is to be the restorer and avenger of his nation. Thus in the Book of Enoch the title "Son of man" is repeatedly applied to the Messiah; and indeed its usage in this book seems to colour the expression as applied to Himself by our Lord.[1]

It is unnecessary, however, to notice in detail the Messianic conceptions of the apocalyptic literature. In some of the writings of this class pre-existence is attributed to the expected Messiah, but only in common with other venerable things and persons, such as the tabernacle, the law, the city of Jerusalem, the lawgiver Moses himself, the people of Israel.[2] The apocalyptic picture is for the most part that of a human prince, exalted, majestic, richly endowed,—whose advent will inaugurate a glorious future for Israel. The Messiah is to be the instrument of judgment on heathen oppressors, the victorious avenger of the righteous. He is human, a son of man, though possessed of transcendent gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and power. According to one view,

[1] See Charles, *Book of Enoch*, App. B.

[2] Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, § 29 (vol. ii. p. 133, E.T.), says: "All the benefits of the future world come down from above, from heaven, where they had pre-existed from all eternity. They are kept there for the saints as an 'inheritance' which will one day be bestowed upon them. In particular does the perfect, the glorious New Jerusalem, which will at the time of the consummation of all things descend to earth in the place of the old, exist there already. So too the Messiah, the perfect King of Israel, chosen by God from eternity, is already there in communion with God. All that is good and perfect can come only from above, because all that is earthly is in its present condition the direct contrary to the Divine." Cp. Harnack, *Dogm.* i. 89 n.; Drummond, *Jewish Messiah*, p. 292 f.

He will appear in days when the tribulation of the righteous has reached its height, and His reign will begin with a wholesale destruction of His foes, after which He will rule in tranquillity and peace, the Holy Land being the seat of His dominion. Palestine is thus the "narrow region of safety and happiness." The universalist ideals of canonical prophecy give way before meagre and exclusive national and legal hopes. Something, perhaps, was also contributed to the form of the Messianic expectation by the current exegetic literature, of which the Septuagint is an early and the Targums are a late example.[1] These last contain, as seems to be generally allowed, only scanty and faint traces of a Divine Messiah;[2] allusions to His being "revealed," and to His eternal preexistence, cannot fairly be said to imply more than predestination in the Divine purpose and foreknowledge. For the most part the royal Davidic descent of the Messiah, His election as the servant of God, His judicial office, His conquest of Israel's enemies, are the most prominent ideas. The conception was a partial one, and gave rise to fatal prejudices, so that on the eve of the Advent, "the only temper which excluded all error was that of simple and devout expectation."[3] To the faithful, the entire period between the cessation of prophecy and the coming of our Lord would be one of devout reflection and spiritual discipline, a time of pause between prediction and fulfilment, in which religious hope was being slowly matured. Perhaps the most spiritual anticipation of the Messianic kingdom, and the most prevalent among devout Israelites at the time of Christ's appearance, is

[1] Schürer thinks they are as late as the third or fourth century after Christ, but they "often fall back on older exegetical traditions" (vol. ii. p. 153).

[2] Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, p. 294. For a summary of the pre-Christian Messianic idea, see the last chapter of Dr. Drummond's book.

[3] Westcott, *Introd.* etc. p. 157.

that contained in the *Psalms of Solomon.* These give expression to that deep sense of sin which two hundred years later was likely to welcome the preaching of John the Baptist, and the spiritual deliverance to be realised in the kingdom of heaven. True Israelites, though as yet very imperfectly conscious of their real needs, were, no doubt, already feeling after that which would satisfy their aspirations. Consequently, "as it is impossible to conceive that any Jew could have pictured to himself Christ as He really came, so it is equally impossible to imagine any other Saviour who could have satisfied all the wants which were felt at the time of His coming."[1] The true Israelite might have fittingly expressed his penitence and faith in such a petition as the following:—

"When Thy name makes its tabernacle in the midst of us we shall find mercy:
And a heathen nation shall not prevail against us, for Thou art our defender,
And we will call upon Thee, and Thou shalt hearken to us.
For Thou wilt show pity towards the race of Israel for evermore, and shalt not put them away.
Truly we are under Thy yoke for evermore, and under the scourge of Thy discipline.
Thou wilt restore us in the season when Thou helpest; showing pity upon the house of Jacob, in a day wherein Thou hast promised them help."[2]

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[1] Westcott, *Introd.* etc. p. 157. The *Psalms of Solomon* were probably composed between 63-48 B.C. (Schürer).

[2] *Psalm. Solom.* vii. 5–9. Cp. for penitential passages, ii. 16 ff., viii. 27–41; for Messianic passages, Pss. xvii., xviii.

The later Messianic expectation is described and summarised by Schürer (vol. ii. pp. 154 ff.). Its main elements are—(1) a time of tribulation preceding Messiah's advent, (2) the appearance of Elijah as forerunner, (3) a personal human Messiah divinely endowed suddenly appearing as a victorious ruler, (4) destruction of Israel's foes, (5) gathering of the dispersed, (6) renewal of Jerusalem, (7) Palestine and the Holy City the centre of the Messianic kingdom, (8) the general resurrection and judgment, (9) the idea (with some limitations) of a suffering Messiah.

PART II

(*Continued*)

§ II. The New Testament presentation.

1. The development of Apostolic faith; the Gospel account of the person and claims of Christ.
2. The Early Preaching of Christ (Acts of the Apostles).
3. Christology of S. James.
4. Christology of S. Peter's First Epistle and S. Jude.

§ III. Christology of S. Paul.

1. Implicit teaching of earlier Epistles.
2. Explicit teaching of the later Epistles as to—
   (*a*) The Method of redemption (Phil. ii. 5–11).
   (*b*) The Redeemer's person (Col. i. 15–20).
   (*c*) The extension of the Incarnate life (Eph. i. 3–14).

General Survey.

§ II. The Person of Christ: New Testament Presentation

I. The New Testament largely consists of apostolic teaching as to Christ's person. But behind the testimony of the apostles, serving as its foundation, lies the narrative of the three Synoptic Gospels.[1] The Epistles describe the belief of the apostles in explicit terms: the Gospels tell us how they came by their belief. We learn in them the method by which faith was educated and reached its maturity. Incidentally we get some insight into the character of the apostles. We find them to be simple, unsophisticated men, witnesses of a fact, and, as such, "intensely matter of fact."[2] They are represented as advancing very slowly and hesitatingly, through intimacy with Christ's character and actions, to a deeper conception of His person. The great value of the Synoptists is that they record for us the actual history of faith in Jesus Christ. They describe His personality, and the impression actually produced by it on the men who were His constant companions. It is therefore of great importance to study the process by which the apostles arrived at their belief.

How, then, were they led to acceptance of Christ as the manifested Son of God?

1. The movement of faith begins historically with the

[1] Of late the tendency to insist on discrepancies in the Gospels has revived, but generally in criticism which starts from Unitarian assumptions. For our present purpose the general truth of the narrative is assumed; most critics would admit that the discrepancies, however closely insisted upon, do not interfere with the impression that we have in the Gospels an authentic portrait of Christ. Latham insists (*Pastor Pastorum*, chap. viii.) on the qualifications which the apostles eminently display as *witnesses*. There is no reason to doubt, in fact, that in the Gospels we have τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστολῶν (Justin, *Apol.* i. 33, 66, 67).

[2] Latham, *op. cit.* pp. 7, 241.

ministry and witness of John the Baptist. He is a representative figure, not only as the last of the Hebrew prophets, but as the type of those who in any age of the world's history have appealed to the highest conscience of their contemporaries. The Baptist first awoke in men the spirit of expectancy; the sense of unsatisfied spiritual need. He first made it possible to believe in such a kingdom as Christ afterwards proclaimed. And he produced on those who heard him the impression of a man absolutely convinced of his message, a man of entire sincerity; for his witness to Jesus Christ involved a brave self-abnegation. He pointed away from himself to Christ. Different causes have been suggested for the extraordinary influence of his preaching, but probably he fascinated men by appealing "to the common hope of Israel—the only hope that remained, that of the *kingdom*. That kingdom had been the last word of the Old Testament."[1] At the same time he met the highest aspirations of conscience by representing the deliverance to come as spiritual, for "the yoke which crushed Israel was not that of Rome; it was *sin*."[2]

2. Next in order we must consider the effect on the disciples of our Lord's personality. For His appeal was directly personal; He drew men by what He was rather than by what He did. Belief sprang from personal knowledge and intimacy; it was the result of subjection to the sway of an incomparable moral authority. To that authority the first disciples yielded themselves up. For them the word of Christ was enough. Thus S. John and

[1] Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, vol. i. p. 275; cf. Pressensé, *Jesus Christ*, p. 293 (ed. 2): "Dès qu'il ouvre la bouche on reconnaît qu'il en a saisi le sens intime et qu'il s'est nourri de la moelle même des Ecritures. L'Ancien Testament revit en lui."

[2] Pressensé, *ibid.* p. 194.

S. Andrew followed the figure to which the Baptist pointed them; *they came and saw where He dwelt, and abode with Him that day.*

Nothing is told us of the manner in which conviction formed itself. We only know that they returned sure of what they had found; *we have found* (they declare) *the Messiah.* And a close study of the narrative assures us that discipleship grew out of direct contact with Christ's personality. He appealed immediately to those faculties in man which could respond to the claim of God. In Him "conscience recognised the rightful lord of conduct, and did Him homage";[1] the heart felt the "self-evidencing" power of His appeal; the intellect bowed before a fresh word of God. "He spoke, men felt it, on the strength of an original and direct knowledge of God and the will of God."[2] He gave His hearers the impression of being no mere teacher of truth, but its very source. For what distinguishes Him from other teachers is the positiveness of His teaching. "His doctrine is never a question and a weary doubt," but "an uninterrupted affirmation."[3] The impression made by this singular positiveness of Jesus is, as a thoughtful writer points out, mainly due to the nature and range of "the questions which He answers with an unwavering *Yea.*" All that men most need to know, all that is fundamentally necessary for the conduct of human life, He declares with unhesitating clearness: the truth that God can be known, loved, and imitated by man; the fatherhood and providence of God; the value of the soul; the necessity and efficacy of prayer; the possibility of forgiveness and restoration; the certainty of judgment. Such teaching at once commended itself to the hearers, because it confirmed the presages of their hearts and

[1] Dale, *The Living Christ*, etc. p. 48. [2] *Ibid.* p. 58.
[3] Newman Smyth, *Old Faiths in New Light*, pp. 198–200.

consciences; it needed no system of evidences. And what Christ's teaching was to the first disciples it still is. "It is self-evidencing; it is rest-giving. Heart, conscience, reason rest in it."[1] It seems to follow that in the reconstruction of their faith men must begin with something analogous to this intimacy with Christ, which was the privilege of the first believers. They must put themselves under the sway of His personality. They must follow His footsteps as they are traced for us in the evangelic record. They must, through close study of the Gospels, come in contact with the person whom they desire to know.[2]

3. As the disciples *follow on to know the Lord*, they become conscious of an imperious claim exerting its pressure on them. The person who awes and attracts them, in the very act of revealing His character and purpose, puts forward a superhuman claim. The claims of Christ must always present an insuperable difficulty to those who believe Him to be no more than man; and, indeed, Dr. Martineau has raised the important question how we are to reconcile "Messianic self-consciouness" with humility.[3] The real solution of this difficulty is to be found, not in arbitrary excision of the many passages in which our Lord puts forward a superhuman claim, but in a juster conception of the Messianic office. The popular Messianic hope of our Lord's contemporaries was utterly distinct from the ideal which He claimed to embody and fulfil. To Him it was not a dignity claimed or asserted, but "a vocation meekly accepted"—a vocation which, as He assuredly foresaw, would involve toil, humiliation,

[1] Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 494.

[2] Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, p. 17, points out the value of the fourfold informal memoir as a powerful means of presenting a *personality*.

[3] In *The Seat of Authority*. For what follows, see Bruce, *Apologetics*, pp. 364–368.

suffering, and death. A great necessity was laid upon Him, which made His self-assertion inevitable; and we may observe that the self-witness of Christ must at once inevitably raise the question of His relation to the God whom He revealed.

This self-witness may be considered under different aspects.

i. The assertion of sinlessness. He is "holier than Israel's holiest" (S. Mt. xii. 6). Dr. Martineau speaks of His "repentance," but Christ never confesses any consciousness of moral defect, in spite of the fact that He is so acutely alive to the evil and misery of sin, that He is the inculcator of humility, that He so vehemently rebukes the self-righteousness of the Pharisee, that He is the preacher of repentance. He never includes Himself among sinners; He has none of the sense of unworthiness that distinguishes Old Testament prophets and saints. And thus, in fact, the dilemma holds, *Christus aut Deus aut non bonus.* We must either forfeit, as some are willing reluctantly but decidedly to do, the moral ideal of a sinless man, or we must accept Christ's self-evidence as due to a fundamental necessity of His being. "Either He who testified concerning Himself that He was without sin . . . must have been an arrogant visionary wanting in all self-knowledge, . . . or in this and in everything else the relations must be as He said."[1]

ii. Closely connected with this is the claim of Christ in regard to human sin: to *forgive* and to *judge.* He claims to forgive sins, and declares Himself to be one that can be sinned against (S. Mt. ix. 2–6; S. Lk. v. 20, 24); and to be a sacrifice for sin in such sense that His blood is *shed for the remission of sins* (S. Mt. xxvi. 28)

[1] Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (*General*), § 75. See Liddon, *Bampton Lectures,* No. iv.; H. B. Ottley, *The Great Dilemma*; R. H. Hutton, *Theol. Essays* (ed. 3), p. 275.

But above all, He reveals Himself as the Judge of men. He impresses men with the conviction that He knows what is in men (S. Jo. ii. 25), and He plainly declares that it is He Himself before whom men will plead in the day of judgment. It is noticeable that it is in the Sermon on the Mount, which some would represent as the sum-total and substance of Christianity, that this tremendous claim is asserted, this judicial attitude towards mankind assumed. But the claim is consistent with the general moral authority with which He teaches. He presents Himself to men as an "incarnate conscience." He implies that they are to be judged by their relation to Himself; to reject Himself is to reject the good.[1]

iii. Christ presents Himself as the giver of a new law. He claims to repeal and to revise the provisions of the ancient law; He is greater than the temple; He exercises control over the observance of the Sabbath; He reinstates the law of marriage as it was *at the beginning*. He assumes the right to announce authoritatively what is binding on the human conscience (S. Mt. v. 22 ff., xii. 8, xix. 4). *It was said to them of old time, ... but I say unto you.*

iv. Christ speaks as one who claims by right the homage and allegiance of men. He offers them rest (S. Mt. xi. 28). He promises not to *cast out* any who come to Him (S. Jo. vi. 37). He predicts His perpetual presence with His people; He declares that to Him *all authority is given in heaven and in earth* (S. Mt. xxviii. 18, 20). We find, in fact, that Christ puts forward that exclusive and jealous claim which can be rightfully exercised by God alone. He treats souls as His own, and bids them follow Him as their master. He claims

[1] Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 58. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 175 f.

to supersede all other ties (S. Mt. x. 37; S. Lk. xiv. 26), and, in fact, demands of man a self-surrender such as could only be legitimately required by the Creator Himself.

v. To a Jew it would appear that our Lord put forward one pretension that would reduce all others to insignificance. He allowed Himself to be called the Christ. At the culminating moment of His life He would not disown the Messianic claim. In point of fact, this Messianic claim is really involved in a title which our Lord is commonly found to apply to Himself: the title *Son of Man*. What did this designation imply?

(*a*) In the first place, our Lord seems to have intended by this title to set Himself forth as the personal embodiment of human nature, the representative individual in whom the race is "recapitulated" and finds its goal. It implies His relation to the whole of humanity as its "embodied ideal." He is neither Jew nor Gentile; His character is marked by a perfect harmony of distinct attributes—in a word, by a certain universality.[1] As Irenæus says, He "recapitulates" human nature. "Nothing local, transient, individualising, national, sectarian, dwarfs the proportions of His world-embracing character; He rises above the parentage, the blood, the narrow horizon which bounded, as it seemed, His human life; He is the archetypal Man, in whose presence distinctions of race, intervals of ages, types of civilisation, degrees of mental culture are as nothing."[2] We see Him "followed by the Greek, though a founder of none of his sects; revered by the Brahmin, though preached unto him by men of the fishermen's caste; worshipped

[1] See a beautiful passage in Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (*General*), § 76.

[2] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 8; cp. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 323.

by the red man of Canada, though belonging to the hated pale race." In Him mankind finds its archetype; towards Him it tends and converges. He is the embodiment of all that is essentially true and good in universal human nature.[1]

(*b*) But the title "Son of Man" had already acquired what may be called an official sense. It had come to be used as a title of Messiah, with special reference to its use in the book of Daniel. But it was in a later apocryphal work, the book of Enoch, that the title became limited to a supernatural or Divine person. The passage in which the phrase occurs in Daniel (vii. 13) seems to be a description of a kingdom which is to supersede and destroy the empires founded on brute violence and material force. The kingdom given to *One like unto a Son of Man* is to be in its origin Divine, in its range and extent universal, in its duration eternal, in its methods and constitution peaceable and righteous. It is quite possible that the reference is to the future destiny of Israel as a nation. But in the book of Enoch there is a significant variation in the title which points to a person as its rightful possessor. *A Son of Man* is the phrase in Daniel; in Enoch is presented *the Son of Man.* The peculiarity of its use in this strange book is that the title has a purely supernatural import. The Messiah, or Son of Man, is of Divine origin, not of human descent; He shares the throne of God; to Him is committed universal dominion, and the supreme task of judgment. Indeed, as it passes into the language of our Lord, the title is already coloured by the conception which appears in Enoch. It implies a claim to superhuman attributes: spiritual dominion, judicial power, the right of remitting sins. But this, the popular notion of the Son of Man, seems to be gradually enlarged and modified by the

[1] Cp. Orig. *c. Cels.* i. 29—a striking passage.

introduction of another element derived from the picture of *the servant of Jehovah* in Isaiah. All the associations that had gathered round that wonderful prophetic figure —the lowly condition, the submissive suffering, the human sympathies, the atoning death and final exaltation of the Isaianic *servant*—are gradually combined with the ideal derived from Enoch, and the supernatural claim and dignity of the Messiah receives its final vindication only as the issue of suffering meekly accepted. The two ideals are in fact brought together in the passage which introduces the culminating passage of Isaiah's Messianic vision: *Behold, my servant shall deal wisely, he shall be exalted and lifted up, and shall be very high.*[1]

Thus our Lord's habitual use of the title Son of Man would naturally convey to His contemporaries the idea of Messianic pretensions, while at the same time the context[2] in which He employs it was calculated to suggest deeper and more sober ideas of what the Messianic dignity involved: a lowly and obscure lot, marked by poverty and suffering; a faithful witness delivered; a death of sacrificial suffering endured; a victory attained, but only by the way of sorrows. To return for a moment to the title *Messiah* (χριστός), which, as we have seen, was implied in the designation *Son of Man.* The name *Messiah* points to the unction with the Divine Spirit by which the theocratic king was equipped for the fulfilment of His ideal calling.[3] When our Lord applied to Himself the passage Isai. lxi. 1,[4] He pointed to the accomplishment of the Messianic

[1] Isai. lii. 13. See Charles, *Book of Enoch*, Appendix B.; Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 361–364; Westcott, *Gosp. of S. John*, add. note on i. 51; Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of the N.T.* § 16.

[2] *e.g.*, Mt. viii. 20, xvii. 22, xxvi. 24; Mk. ix. 31; Lk. ix. 22.

[3] Isai. xi. 2, xlii. 1.

[4] S. Lk. iv. 18, 21.

office in His own person. He implies that the Spirit resting upon His manhood is the source of its special illumination and supernatural power. To the Spirit He ascribes His power to expel devils (S. Mt. xii. 28). His works are wrought not in virtue of any human strength, but as the result of a Divine unction. The anointing with the Spirit is in fact to the manhood the source of grace and power, of Divine knowledge, of special consecration. Thus the title ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ,[1] and even the designation *King of the Jews*, may be regarded as explanatory phrases bringing out one aspect of the Messianic unction, namely, its consecrating efficacy. For the very name *Messiah* as claimed by Christ points to a peculiar dignity, which elevates Him who is called to the office far above the organs and ministers through whom Jehovah had revealed His will, or organised His kingdom, under the old covenant. "In Him Jehovah Himself comes to His people; whoever therefore receives Him receives God Himself."[2] His mission in fact implies a fellowship with God such as no other human being can share, and consequently His claim to the devotion and homage of man is such as only God can justly require.

The unction of the Spirit, however, implied more than supernatural equipment; it corresponded with the general expectation that the Messiah would be invested with royal dignity as the *Son of David*, a title by which in point of fact Christ was often saluted. But while accommodating Himself so far to the popular idea of Messiah, our Lord is careful to impress on His faithful disciples a deeper view of the prophecies which foretold the royal dignity of David's Son. The exaltation to royal glory was to follow, as in David's own case, rejection and humiliation. Only through suffering was

[1] S. Mk. i. 24.

[2] Weiss, *l.c.* § 18, referring to S. Lk. i. 17, 76; S. Mt. x. 40.

Messiah destined to attain the glory which David already foresaw when he called Him Lord.[1]

vi. Lastly, we must consider a claim which ultimately led to our Lord's condemnation. He claims to stand in a unique relation to God as His revealer[2] and His Son. Sometimes this claim takes the form of a co-ordination of His own Name with that of God, as in S. Mt. xxviii. 19; sometimes it is contained by implication in the assertion that He is One who can be sinned against (S. Lk. xii. 10). But it is by the title *Son of God* that He most directly challenges the hostility of His nation and their rulers. While He proclaims the brotherhood of men, and presents Himself to them as one who shares their lot, and fulfils the conditions of dependence and service that man owes to his Creator, He yet detaches Himself from men, by speaking of *My Father which is in heaven*.[3] It is, however, to be noticed that He only acknowledges Himself to be *Son of God* on occasions of exceptional urgency: He accepts the title as rightfully His own from S. Peter's lips;[4] He refuses to disown it when put upon His oath by the high priest;[5] and it is important to observe that the title is never used by Him merely in its theocratic sense. He is not Son of God in the sense that the Davidic king is so called in Psalm ii. and Psalm lxxxix. Nor is He Son of God in a merely ethical sense, as men might be called sons of God by right of creation, or in virtue of moral affinity to the Divine character. In the case of our Lord, the title implies an essential, natural relation to the Father whom He came to reveal.[6]

[1] Weiss, *l.c.* § 19.

[2] Consider S. Mt. xi. 27; S. Lk. x. 22; cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* vol. i. § 17.

[3] S. Mt. vii. 21, etc.

[4] S. Mt. xvi. 16.

[5] S. Mt. xxvi. 63; cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 52 ff.

[6] It is, of course, possible to represent the title *Son of God* as an afterthought, a designation applied to Christ by His disciples as soon as they

Even M. Renan admits that "the position which He attributed to Himself was that of a superhuman being, and He wished to be regarded as sustaining a higher relationship to God than other men."[1] According to Renan this claim on the part of Christ is a part of His "transcendent idealism"; He only advanced it when "the admiration of His disciples overwhelmed Him and carried Him away." But the fact is that the claim is coherent with all else that is recorded of His teaching and life. "The historical Christ," says Luthardt, "and His teaching, are facts. These facts can be, and are, authenticated; but they will remain an insoluble enigma until we suffer them to receive the solution afforded them by His own testimony to His Divine Sonship. If He is the Son of God in this sense, then all is clear, and all else that we are told of Him necessary."[2] As the Fathers of the Church afterwards insisted, the fact of redemption itself is bound up with the literal truth of the declaration that Christ was *the Son of the living God.*

Thus, speaking generally, the rarity and solemnity of the occasions on which our Lord speaks of Himself, or allows others to designate Him, the Son of God, seems a proof that He employed the title in a higher sense than that in which it was used in the Old Testament. It is

recognised Him as the Messiah. Such is the view of Dr. Martineau (*Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 238 ff.), who thinks it is possible to discern stages in the "deification" of Christ: the first stage being connected with the baptism in Jordan, when the grace of Sonship was supposed to have been "conferred" on Christ. This is substantially identical with the *adoptianist* view which Harnack regards as the more prevalent of two types of Christology current in the primitive Church. It is enough to say that Harnack's view, like Dr. Martineau's, seems to be the result of a preconception, rather than of substantial evidence. See *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, § 11; Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, pp. 24 f.

[1] *Life of Jesus*, c. xv.

[2] *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, p. 331.

quite true that the title, as applied to the theocratic king for example, denotes primarily a unique relationship of love, a special claim to be considered the object of Divine election and providential care. Such ideas were probably not absent from Christ's consciousness when He used this sacred title. It implied His sense of being the elect of God, the object of special Divine favour, the mediator of Divine revelation, the instrument of human redemption. But the question remains whether, taken in conjunction with the other assertions and claims which have already been considered, the title *Son of God* does not imply such an original unity of essence with the Most High as could only be blasphemously claimed by a mere man.[1] The name *Son of God* is in fact something more than an official title. It is a title by which Christ seems to detach Himself from men and to speak of God as His Father in an exclusive sense.

4. Christ's miracles are appealed to by Himself as affording evidence of His claims. They are part of the evangelic tradition, an authentic element of the original gospel, and in fact the narrative which seems to form the basis of the synoptic record (that of S. Mark) contains nine narratives of miraculous cures. Thus we have to consider the place of miracles in Christ's teaching. As we have seen, He first presents Himself as *a teacher come from God.* He sways men by the power of His own personality. He authoritatively claims discipleship from men. Accordingly He is recognised and saluted as *Master* (Rabbi). The apostles accept His authority, submit themselves to His moral claim, and so come gradually to recognise the truth about His nature.

(1) First, then, we should observe the close correspond-

[1] This view differs from that of Weiss, *l.c.*, who seems to overlook the significance of passages which *illustrate* the meaning of Christ's claim to be *Son of God.*

ence between the moral claim of Jesus and His exercise of supernatural power. His Person is a miracle in its blending of humility and majesty, and His explicit teaching is accompanied and illustrated by works of supernatural power. Thus the miracles seem to be a constituent and necessary element in His revelation of God; they have inherent probability just because they are in exact harmony with the declared purpose of Christ's coming; He is mighty in word before He is mighty in deed. His miracles have a unique congruity; they illustrate the very truth which He never ceases to proclaim in word and life: the exclusive claim of the Divine kingdom, the superiority of spiritual to material interests, the loving-kindness and grace of God. The supreme miracle is the Incarnation itself; the appearance of a Divine life in the universe charged with new powers and possibilities; the revelation of *the kindness and love of God our Saviour*.[1] The works of power which flowed naturally, as it were, from Christ, displayed Divine goodness in action up to the full measure of gracious possibility.[2] The oral teaching was illustrated by the works; for example, Christ constantly proclaims God's providential care for individuals, and enforces the lesson by cures wrought for the most part in individual cases.[3]

[1] Tit. iii. 4.

[2] See Trench, *The Miracles*, p. 8, with his quotation from Augustine, *in Joh. Tract.* xvii.: "Mirum non esse debet a Deo factum miraculum. . . . Magis gaudere et admirari debemus quia Dominus noster et Salvator Jesus Christus homo factus est, quam quod divina inter homines Deus fecit."

[3] Cp. a striking passage of Chrys. *in Matt. hom.* xxv. (init.), pointing out the close connection between Christ's words and works. He is seen by miracles προοδοποιῶν τοῖς λεγομένοις, and afterwards βεβαιῶν ἐκ τῶν γινομένων τὰ εἰρημένα. See also Aug. *de Trin.* viii. 11: "Itaque ipse Dominus Jesus Christus talia faciens ut mirantes doceret ampliora, et temporalibus insolitis intentos atque suspensos ad æterna atque interiora converteret: '*Venite*, inquit, *ad me omnes qui laboratis*,' etc. Et non ait 'Discite a me

(2) We pass to consider the *character* of Christ's miracles, which are not meaningless portents like the miracles described in the apocryphal gospels, nor ever used for personal display or profit, but only for beneficence or instruction. They are, as it has been said, "not acts of preternatural power, but of preternatural love."[1] For there is no moral appeal in mere displays of power. Wonderful works impress men in proportion as they are recognised to be σημεῖα—"signs" of power subordinated to righteous and beneficent ends. So in Christ's works we witness no mere exhibition of abnormal power, but a revelation of grace. "We must not expect," it has been justly urged, "that the physical, *i.e.* the miraculous evidence for revelation, should be of such a character as to stand above the spiritual evidence."[2] Just as the main arguments for God's existence are those derived from man's personality and moral constitution, while proofs drawn from the order of physical nature are secondary; so in the case of the Incarnation, whatever reveals God's character stands higher than that which displays mere superhuman force. The miracles of Christ do in fact bear a moral impress; they are in keeping with all that He reveals of God's character and attributes. They are exactly such phenomena as we should expect in a moral universe, *i.e.* a world in which physical force is subordinated to righteous law and gracious purpose. The miracles are manifestations of power, but the power is that of righteous will;[3] they indicate that the

quia quatriduanos mortuos suscito,' sed ait '*Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde.*' Potentior est enim et tutior solidissima humilitas, quam ventosissima celsitudo."

[1] Cp. Aug. *de Util. Cred.* xvi., where miracles are said to be of two classes, "Quædam sunt quæ solam faciunt admirationem; quædam vero magnam etiam gratiam benevolentiamque conciliant."

[2] Temple, *Bampton Lectures*, vii.

[3] Wace, *Boyle Lectures*, Ser. ii. Nos. v. and viii. Martensen, *Chr.*

kingdom of God embraces every purpose that relates to the well-being, whether physical or moral, of humanity. Further, they are parallel to, and illustrative of, the claim to exercise power in the spiritual sphere. They are symbolic representations of the redemptive action of God as the Saviour of human souls. Very instructive in this connection are the two miracles recorded in the fifth chapter of S. Luke's Gospel, the draught of fishes revealing to S. Peter his own unworthiness and moral misery, while the healing of the paralytic illustrates the claim to absolve the sinner by the injunction, *Take up thy couch and go into thine house.*[1]

(3) Something should be added as to the use which our Lord makes of miraculous power.[2] Miracles seem to be performed with different purposes in view. Thus, on some occasions at least, they clearly have an *evidential* importance. Some men, of whom Nicodemus may be selected as a type, are ready to recognise in miracle a presence of superhuman power, such as authenticates the teaching and mission of the worker. Miracles, indeed, must ever be the most popular form of authentication,[3] and at one time this was regarded by Christian apologists as their main or even their only function.[4] At least their attractive power may be admitted; they arrest attention, and awaken reflection. Thus S. John tells us *many believed on His name because they saw the signs that He did.*[5] What drew Nathanael, for instance, to Christ was a marvel of supernatural intuition; but our Lord spoke to him of *greater things than these.* He would

Dogmatics, § 147: "His power over nature is by no means arbitrary or unlimited; it finds its bounds in the law of holiness," etc.

[1] S. Lk. v. 8 and 24; cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 159.

[2] See an admirable chapter in Latham, *Pastor Pastorum* (c. iv.).

[3] Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 201.

[4] Cp. Mozley, *Miracles*, Lect. i. p. 5; Butler, *Analogy*, pt. ii. chap. vii.

[5] S. Jo. ii. 23; cp. i. 50.

be believed primarily because of His word; only secondarily because of His works.[1] He would draw men by the influence of His life and moral personality, rather than by the display of wonders. Belief, in the case of the apostles at least, grew out of personal intimacy and knowledge, and miracles served only the purpose of educating or informing a faith already rooted in their hearts.

Again, miracles performed by Christ are "the highest kind of symbolism." His "signs" are redemptive acts, and convey instruction as to God's spiritual dealings with mankind in the unmistakable language of typical outward facts. And this use of miracles seems specially adapted to the purpose of instructing the disciples. Thus some of the miracles which seem less obviously acts of beneficence, *e.g.*, the draught of fishes, the walking on the sea, the withering of the fig-tree, were means by which important truths were likely to be most vividly impressed on their minds.[2] Our Lord seems in fact to have laid Himself out specially to educate the faith of the Twelve; and some of His actions were perhaps calculated to suggest heart-searching reflections or questionings that would afterwards bear fruit in deeper and more intelligent comprehension of the Divine methods and purposes.

Lastly, we should carefully notice the economy which marks the use of miracles. No sign is wrought apart from a benevolent or didactic purpose. Thus Christ is never found to provide by miracle for His own wants or those of His disciples; nor, as a rule, does He supply any need that might be met by the exercise of human energies or foresight. There is also an absence of what

[1] S. Jo. xiv. 11.

[2] Thus the withering of the fig-tree "presented in a parable the situation of the Jews' religion." Latham, *op. cit.* p. 97.

may be called *compulsoriness* in Christ's method. He never displays power in such a way as to overawe men or *compel* belief. For faith is only worthily so called if it be an act of free moral adhesion, and miracles are to be regarded as the effect and reward of a faith already existent, not, generally speaking, its originating cause. Faith can touch the springs of supernatural power. *All things are possible to him that believeth.*[1] In a word, miracles being moral and spiritual acts, as well as physical events, rest on moral evidence, make a moral appeal, and are the Divine response to a moral quality in man.

5. The resurrection of Christ.

That which crowned and justified the faith of the apostles was the resurrection. S. John tells us that when he entered into the sepulchre and saw *the linen clothes lying* and the face-cloth *rolled up in a place by itself* (S. Jo. xx. 7), *he saw and believed.* The tokens of deliberate purpose, of calm and heavenly order and method, were too apparent to admit of doubt that Christ had risen by an act of power *as He said.* For we must remember how repeatedly the event had been foretold by our Lord Himself. S. Paul states for us the evidential significance of the resurrection in Rom. i. 4. He who had been manifested historically as a man among men was *declared* (or marked out) *to be the Son of God in an act of power, according to the spirit of holiness, by resurrection from the dead.* The holiness of His life had pointed to a momentous conclusion respecting His person which the resurrection justified; the combined holiness and miraculous power of Christ's life led to the recognition of His higher nature.

We find accordingly that the testimony of the apostles is concentrated upon this fact, the reality of which alone

[1] S. Mk. ix. 23.

appears to explain their spiritual transformation, and the steadfastness of their persistent witness in the face of hostile opposition; and this argument is greatly strengthened by due consideration of the character and training of those who thus bore their witness.[1] Again, the fact that the resurrection was first doubted and disbelieved, and afterwards proclaimed with calm and unshaken assurance, forbids us to accept any theory of illusion or imposture. It is morally impossible to believe that the whole structure of the Christian Church rests upon an hallucination or a lie.[2] Something has been already said upon this subject. It is here only necessary to recall the position which the belief in Christ's resurrection held in relation to the faith of the apostles. They soon came to understand that the resurrection was in fact inevitable, Christ being what He claimed to be. It afforded a key to the entire life. S. John, who had most closely watched the life of our Lord and had seen most deeply into its spiritual sublimity, was first convinced of the necessity of the resurrection. *He saw and believed.* "A secret flashed in upon him, and a thrill of insight rushed over him; . . . a new light broke over him, and he passed at one bound out of death into life."[3] The victory of Jesus Christ over death was to the disciples the ground of final assurance that under the veil of mortal flesh the eternal Son of God Himself had tabernacled among men. It was a culminating revelation to them of the glory of the Divine Word.

We are now in a position briefly to summarise the different stages which we have traced in the gradual growth of the apostles' faith. Faith, it appears, was formed in them partly as the result of their predisposi-

[1] Cp. p. 30.
[2] Cp. R. H. Hutton, *Theol. Essays*, pp. 137 ff.
[3] H. S. Holland, *Creed and Character*, Serm. ii.

tion to belief. The Old Testament discipline in which they had been reared, culminating as it did in the proclamation by the Baptist of a kingdom of heaven, had fostered in them longings, hopes, expectations of a spiritual kind. There appears in their midst one who is pointed to by S. John as He who can satisfy their needs. They follow, they watch, they study His character, as He discloses to them more and more the purpose of His coming and the nature of His claim. His works of power deepen the impression made by His personality; His teaching opens to them the Divine truths which correspond to their aspirations and needs. In one Gospel especially, that of S. John, we have presented to us the picture of a faith in different stages of its progress,—its fallings away and vanishings, its broken lights, its ventures, its recoveries. And faith is crowned by an ever larger disclosure and ampler promises; by more intimate experience and deeper insight. Faith discerns in Jesus Christ successively the Teacher, the promised Messiah, the Holy One, the Lord of Nature, the Searcher of hearts, the Revealer of God, the supreme Example of endurance and love, the faithful and true Witness, the Conqueror of death. It bows before Him as Lord and God. The apostles first make the venture of faith—first submit to experience, and then know and feel that they are known. Action and trust precede knowledge and assurance.

II. The early preaching of Jesus Christ (*Acts of the Apostles*).

The experience of the apostles themselves seems to have led them to present the truth of Christ's person to others tentatively and in apologetic form. Their preaching starts from what is acknowledged by Jew and Gentile respectively. It appeals, and is adapted to the conceptions of God already current. It would have been

fatal to preach Christ as God to Greeks, whose notion of deity was so degraded, and who could so readily admit Christ into a national Pantheon, without some attempt to link the new doctrine with the fundamental truths of natural religion. It would have appeared to Jews an intolerable blasphemy that Christ should be proclaimed as one with the ineffable Being, whose very name they shrank from uttering.[1]

Thus there is a certain reserve in the apostolic preaching recorded in the *Acts*, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt as to the belief of the apostles themselves. Their faith is implied in the claim to baptize *in the name of Jesus Christ* (ii. 38); in the assertion that there was no *salvation in any other* (iv. 12). Further, Christians were known as those *who called on the name of Jesus* (ix. 14, 21); and S. Stephen is described as praying to Christ as Lord (vii. 59, 60). The undoubted belief of the first disciples was that in Jesus Christ God Himself had been manifested in flesh.

1. The preaching to Jews was apparently planned on a carefully considered system. We may notice—

(*a*) *The use of a historical starting-point.* The facts of Christ's life, ministry, and sufferings were known (ii. 22, *καθὼς αὐτοὶ οἴδατε*). Thus S. Peter can appeal to them as events notorious and of recent occurrence (ii. 22, iii. 13, iv. 10, v. 30, x. 37 ff.). Christ had manifested all the signs of Divine unction. There were unmistakable tokens that *God was with Him.* Starting from this as a secure foundation, S. Peter's preaching insists on the exaltation of Jesus. The man *approved of God* by mighty works publicly wrought (ii. 22) is finally declared to have been made by God *both Lord and Christ* (ii. 36). And, indeed, at an earlier point in the same discourse it is implied that the Lord on whom men must

[1] Cp. Wace, *Boyle Lectures*, Ser. ii. No. v.

call if they are to be saved is none other than Jesus (ii. 21).[1]

(*b*) *The insistance on prophecy, i.e.* on the continuity of Christ's work and revelation of God with all that is recorded in the Old Testament. Thus S. Peter designates Christ by the Old Testament title *Servant of Jehovah* (*παῖς κυρίου*, iii. 13, iv. 27).[2] His sufferings and resurrection were foretold (ii. 23–25). As the prophet *like unto Moses* (Deut. xviii.), as the rejected *corner-stone* (Ps. cxviii.), as the crucified and risen One (Ps. xvi.), Christ had been predicted by ancient prophecy (iii. 22, iv. 11, ii. 23 ff.) The same method is used by S. Stephen (vii.) and by S. Paul in his sermon at Antioch (xiii.); and it must be remembered that the title Messiah would to Jewish ears imply in itself a superhuman being. In a general review of the discourses in the Acts, perhaps the most striking point is the frequency with which the resurrection is insisted upon as the foundation fact of the apostles' testimony.[3] It is proclaimed as the seal of Christ's Divine mission (ii. 32 f., iii. 15, iv. 10, v. 31, xiii. 30); the reward of His work and justification of His claims; the decisive manifestation of the glory of His person. It is the resurrection that proclaims Him *Prince of Life* (iii. 15); *Lord and Christ* (ii. 36); *source of blessing* (iii. 26); *Prince and Saviour* (v. 31); *Judge of quick and dead* (x. 42); *Son of God* (ix. 20).

(*c*) *The practical nature of the apostolic appeal.* The

[1] Weiss, *ad loc.*, remarks that with the following verses (22 ff.) "beginnt der Nachweis dass der *κύριος* von dessen Anrufung die Errettung abhängt, Jesus sei."

[2] "Das in ältester Zeit viel gebrauchte und vieldeutige *παῖς θεοῦ*" (Harnack). Cp. the *Didaché*, cc. ix., x.

[3] "Die Verkündigung von Jesus dem Christus ruhte zunächst ganz auf dem A.T., hatte aber an der Erhöhung Jesu durch die Auferstehung von den toten ihren Ausgangspunkt" (Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, § v.). Cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 39.

preaching of the apostles is addressed to the Jewish *conscience*, disciplined as it was by long familiarity with the law. *God hath made Him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified*, says S. Peter to the Jews (ii. 36), and we read that the appeal was effective. So the apostles invite their hearers to repentance (ii. 38, iii. 19); their aim is to touch hearts by appealing to the sense of unforgiven sin,—of a burden from which the law of Moses could not release the conscience (xiii. 39).

2. The Preaching to Gentiles.

This point is not one that needs much illustration. The general principle of S. Paul evidently is to find a basis for the Christian appeal in the acknowledged truths of natural religion, attested by the conscience and reason of man. Thus we find him insisting at Lystra and at Athens on the two fundamentals of natural religion—(1) the unity and providence of the Creator (xiv. 15 ff.), and (2) the certainty of a judgment to come (xvii. 24–31). He claims of the Gentiles that they shall be true to the teachings of conscience and reason.[1] God had not left Himself *without witness*, in the order of nature; and the doctrine of future judgment had been an accepted one among Greek philosophers. Tertullian even alludes to the prevalent belief as *testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ*,[2] and it is worth while to recall the fact that the book of Ecclesiastes had witnessed to the Divine compassion for the Gentile world by its recognition of the two attributes which even the heathen would ascribe to the supreme God,—those of *Creator* (xii. 1) and *Judge*

[1] The inevitable inference from the order and bounty of nature is suggested by Cicero, *Tusc. Quæst.* i. 29: "Hæc igitur, et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur: vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris?" This passage is referred to by Bishop Jacobson on Acts xiv. 17.

[2] *Apologeticus adv. Gent.* xvii.

(iii. 17). It is observable, however, that the sermon at Athens ends with an allusion to Jesus, and the authentication of His mission by the resurrection (Acts xvii. 31).[1]

III. Christology of S. James.

The Epistle of S. James is interesting as being probably the earliest portion of the New Testament,[2] and *primâ facie* it appears very unlike other New Testament books in tone and spirit. But there is little to warrant the hasty assumption that it represents the earliest type of Christianity, and that a Judaistic type.[3] The Epistle might rather be described as Hebraistic than Judaistic in tone. Its manner and style is that of the ancient prophets, and it may be without inaccuracy described as "the farewell voice of Hebrew prophecy." The circumstances, indeed, under which the Epistle seems to have been written might well kindle the prophetic spirit. The condition of Jerusalem was most miserable; the Jews, as a body, were still fanatically anti-Christian, and the ever-accumulating load of guilt and frenzy kept the city in perpetual disorder and agitation. On the other hand, the Christians were, as a rule, in a backward state of spiritual development. The work of S. James was to lead on men who were in an immature stage of religious belief. "He was specially fitted for this work, because he was so much in sympathy with those whom he addressed." It is possible that the details of Christ's life were as yet comparatively unfamiliar, which would account for the paucity of references to our Lord. But in any case S. James, by his own attitude towards Christ, implicitly repudiates the meagre Ebionitic view of His person, which, perhaps, may be seen exemplified in the *Didache*.

[1] Cp. Weiss, *ad loc.*

[2] See J. B. Mayor, *The Epistle of S. James*, p. cxxiv.

[3] Dr. Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, p. 151, goes so far as to say, "It chiefly illustrates Judaistic Christianity by total freedom from it."

He calls himself the *slave of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ* (i. 1), and applies the title κύριος to God and Christ indifferently,—speaking of our Lord as κύριος δόξης (ii. 1);[1] he assumes that his readers hold *the faith* of Christ (*ibid.*); and he looks for His coming to judgment (v. 8, 9).[2] There is finally a reference to the power of *the name* (v. 14), which recalls the usage of τὸ ὄνομα in the Acts and in S. John's Third Epistle.[3] It thus seems fair to attribute the restrained language of S. James to intention rather than to imperfectly developed consciousness of Christ's person. His general aim seems to be, in accordance with his prophetic standpoint, the exhibition of the ethical aspects of Christianity—(1) as a fulfilment or expansion of the ancient moral law, (2) as a regenerating power. Christianity is viewed, first, as the perfect moral law. The Epistle seems to presuppose a perversion of S. Paul's characteristic doctrine of justification; for S. James takes pains to insist on moral law as a permanent element in true religion. As opposed to the Mosaic code, the Christian law is marked by three main characteristics. It is a law of *freedom* (i. 25), *i.e.* not a system of outward constraint, but a principle of inward life. It is a *royal* law, not only as given to man by one who is the founder of a kingdom, but also as all-regulating and supreme; the substitution of love for servile fear as the mainspring of religious obedience (ii. 8). Lastly, it

[1] Mayor understands this to mean *Our Lord, who is the glory*: δόξα being possibly a reference to the Shekinah. See his note, *ad loc.*

[2] Observe that in this last place ὁ κύριος is used absolutely of Christ: ἡ παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου ἤγγικεν.

[3] Dr. Fairbairn speaks severely of S. James as "timid and conservative." He complains of "the poverty" of his Christology; "the Christology," he says, "is so rudimentary because of a double defect,—it is not rooted in the historical person, . . . and it has no knowledge of the Sonship," etc. (*Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 328 f.). But surely, as Salmon remarks (*Introd. to N.T.* c. xxiii.), S. James' "whole religious life had Jesus for its centre and foundation."

is *perfect*, because it embodies the Divine thought, the absolute will of God for man (cp. Rom. xii. 2, τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον).

So far, S. James writes from the standpoint of one to whom the Sermon on the Mount is the foundation of the Christian system, and accordingly he regards our Lord as lawgiver and judge. But in his conception of Christianity as *the word of truth* from God (λόγος ἀληθείας, i. 18), we find the complementary truth that Christian life is a new creation, Christian grace a regenerating power, and a gift of God. Two expressions are used in this connection. The gospel is λόγος ἀληθείας; it has a creative power in the spiritual sphere like the Divine fiat in creation, and it is the instrument of the soul's new birth. Λόγος in this text has not, indeed, a personal sense, but it implies that the message of God to man is embodied in the life and work of the Incarnate; Christ is Himself a word from God. The word of God is in Him, as a creative and operative power; in Him man is a new creature. Again, the word is implanted or *rooted* in the human soul that receives it (λόγος ἔμφυτος, i. 21),[1] and is the means of its salvation. The significance of this conception lies in the fact that it marks "an immense revolution in the ordinary consciousness of a Jew."[2] It implies that in Christ is revealed a principle of power which the law was unable to bestow; it is akin to the Johannine idea of Christ as the revealer of grace and truth: of a gift enabling man to respond to the requirement of God. Perhaps we should connect with the doctrine of the implanted word or law, the passage in which S. James describes the fruits

[1] A.V. translates ἔμφυτος as equivalent to ἐμφύτευτος, "engrafted"; but see Mayor, *ad loc.*

[2] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 66; cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 285 ff.

of wisdom (iii. 13 ff.). In the use of this term he seems to be referring to the Old Testament doctrine of wisdom, *i.e.* the inward knowledge of the Divine will which results in active and habitual obedience.[1] In any case, S. James' thought seems to be based on the teaching of Jeremiah as to the Messianic age, a predicted note of which was to be the writing of the law in the heart of God's people.[2] In Christ, not only is the will of God perfectly revealed, but the means of its accomplishment by man is provided. The Word of God has thus a twofold aspect: it is, on the one hand, God's authoritative message of requirement; on the other, it is a regenerating force imparted to Christians by which they are begotten again to a new life, which liberates from the power of sin, and brings about the actual realisation of the Divine kingdom on earth.

IV. S. Peter's first Epistle.

The Christology of S. Peter has the simple, direct, objective character which we should expect in view of the writer's own vivid experience of our Lord's life. Four leading thoughts may be discerned in the first Epistle.

1. The continuity of the covenant people. The titles of God's ancient people belong by right to Christians. They are the *elect race*, the *royal priesthood*, the *holy nation*, the *people of possession*, to which the Divine promises had been vouchsafed.[3] The gospel is the fulfilment of the inspired visions of prophecy; it is the full and glorious satisfaction of Israel's hopes, the crown and climax of its history. Even the Old Testament was as it were an organism quickened by *the Spirit of Christ*,[4] foretelling the grace and glory that should follow

[1] So Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 52.
[2] Jerem. xxxi. 33; cp. Weiss, *l.c.*
[3] 1 Pet. ii. 9; cp. Ex. xix. 6; Deut. iv. 20, etc.
[4] 1 Pet. i. 10–12. See Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 48.

His sufferings. Christianity is in fact the embodiment of an eternal purpose. The sanctification of an elect people, consecrated to obedience by the blood of Jesus Christ, was foreknown from the beginning.[1] The Gentile Christians whom the apostle addresses are treated "as sharers in the ancestral prerogatives of Israel; and that not by an afterthought, as it were, of the Divine will, but in accordance with the Divine purpose as it existed before the beginning of things."[2]

2. The reality of the historic Christ. His appearance in the flesh[3] was real and substantial; both in flesh and in spirit He was a partaker of our human nature (iii. 18, 19, iv. 1). The value of His example lies in the fact that He actually suffered for us in the flesh, endured the penalty of sin, became by meek submission the pattern of faith (1 Pet. ii. 21–25), passed into the sphere of departed spirits (iii. 18 ff.). The saving power of Christian sacraments is derived from the grace of Christ's resurrection and ascension (1 Pet. i. 3, iii. 21, 22). Enthroned at God's right hand, He has power to bestow the gift of the Spirit by whose operation Christians are regenerated (cp. 1 Pet. i. 23).

3. The preternatural power of Christ's human acts and sufferings. S. Peter lays special stress on the atoning virtue of the Passion (ii. 22 ff., iii. 18 ff.). The blood of Christ is *precious* (τίμιον αἷμα, i. 19); His bloodshedding derives its efficacy from the merit of His eternal person. Corresponding with this is the ascription of

[1] 1 Pet. i. 2. [2] Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, p. 155.

[3] On 1 Pet. i. 20 ff., where Christ is said to be προεγνωσμένου μὲν πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, φανερωθέντος δέ, κ.τ.λ., Harnack says: "We may trace the specially Jewish idea of pre-existence, *i.e.* existence in the foreknowledge of an omniscient and omnipotent God, of a being afterwards visibly manifested on earth" (*Dogmengeschichte*, vol. i. Appendix I.). In the same way pre-existence was attributed to the Church by early writers. S. Peter implies the *real* pre-existence of Christ in chap. i. 11.

glory to Christ in chap. iv. 11, and the use of λόγος in chap. i. 23, which implies "a perfect revelation of God apparent personally."[1] Like S. James, S. Peter regards this *living word* as the source or instrument of the new birth. Christ is, in fact, the perfect Mediator, revealing God to man, and bringing man *to God* (iii. 18). Here we have a point of contact between S. Peter's Epistle and the Epistle to the Hebrews; the sufferings of Christ restore to man the right of access to God which had been hindered by human sin. The whole body of Christian believers constitutes a holy or royal priesthood, all the privileges which under the Old Covenant belonged to the Levitical high priest alone having been transferred to the Church. The sufferings and exaltation of Christ are thought of as consecrating to the perpetual service of God all those who bear the Christian name.

4. The expectation of the Messianic judgment.[2] Through His resurrection Christ has been exalted to the Messianic glory (i. 21), and placed at the right hand of God, sharing the honour and sovereignty of the Most High (iii. 22). On this fact Christian hope is securely based; a hope which fixes itself upon the second coming of the Messiah. But His revelation will be a manifestation of Divine judgment. He who preached the message of salvation even to the *spirits that once were disobedient* (iii. 19) will Himself judge the quick and the dead. The salvation *ready to be revealed* (i. 5) means deliverance in the impending judgment, which therefore is the goal of Christian hope, and the moment of entry on the Christian inheritance.[3]

[1] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 70; cp. φανερωθέντος, 1 Pet. i. 20.

[2] See generally Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* §§ 49, 50.

[3] The so-called second Epistle is of unknown authorship and uncertain date. It represents our Lord as an object of knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις, 2 Pet. i. 8, ii. 20; cp. chap. iii. 18), and this knowledge is the end of the life of grace. Here again by implication is given the most exalted view of Christ's person. To Him belong μεγαλειότης (i. 16), δόξα καὶ ἀρετή (i. 3).

S. Jude speaks of himself as *the slave of Christ* (v. 1). His main thought is the finality of the faith of Christ, as One in whom we have union with God. His gift is eternal life; His mercy the object of hope; He whom heretics deny is ὁ μόνος δεσπότης καὶ κύριος.

§ III. The Christology of S. Paul[1]

The form of S. Paul's Christological doctrine is largely determined by the moral and practical aim which the apostle had in view at different epochs of his life, and by the spiritual experiences of his own career. In his earlier letters he exhibits Jesus Christ in His relation chiefly to the fundamental need of humanity, justification before God; and in relation on the other hand to the expectations and claims of the Jewish people. Christ is at once the Messiah, the promised seed of Abraham, and the source of the righteousness in virtue of which man finds acceptance with God. In later Epistles we find a more comprehensive view of Christ's person. The historical and cosmic significance of the Incarnation is insisted on; the fact that it is at once the consummation of an age-long purpose of God for man and for the universe; and the revelation of a *mystery of godliness* hitherto hidden from mankind.

I. In the two earlier groups of Epistles (ranging in

To know Christ is to be a partaker of the Divine nature (i. 4). "The author, in teaching such a participation, shows that he has passed beyond the Jewish separation between God and the world; that a mighty revolution of Jewish conceptions has been brought about by the knowledge that in Christ the union of God and man had been accomplished" (Dorner, div. i. vol. i. note X. p. 353).

On the question of the genuineness of 2 Peter, see Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, vii. note B.

[1] See generally Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 331–337; Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, esp. c. 3; Pressensé, *Early Years of Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 264 ff. (E.T.).

date from 52 to 59 A.D.) teaching as to our Lord's person is mainly implicit. A position is assigned to Christ which seems inevitably to imply His divinity.

Thus, in respect to His *nature* and rank in the scale of being, Christ is invested with Divine attributes. He is co-ordinated with God in greetings and farewells (*e.g.*, 2 Thess. i. 2; 2 Cor. xiii. 14). He is the source of S. Paul's own apostolate (Gal. i. 1). He is represented as a pre-existent Being (Rom. i. 4, *πνεῦμα*;[1] 1 Cor. xv. 47; 2 Cor. viii. 9); as the agent in creation (1 Cor. viii. 6), as exercising a mediatorial function (1 Cor. x. 4). Finally, He is called Lord (*κύριος*), and in a great climactic passage, *God over all, blessed for evermore.*[2] On the other hand, S. Paul has a clear grasp of our Lord's real humanity, His humiliation, His sinlessness, His sufferings (Rom. i. 3, viii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21, viii. 9, xiii. 4; Gal. iv. 4). Pfleiderer infers from the comparative absence of reference to the details of our Lord's earthly life that S. Paul had little or no knowledge of the traditional facts, but in reply it has been urged that S. Paul's experience was of a kind peculiar to himself. By a sudden and violent transition he was called on "to believe in a glorified Lord, and not to follow a suffering teacher." The Church instinctively felt that his conversion "was to him what death was to the other saints, the entrance into a higher life."[3] Henceforth

[1] The doctrine of the Son's pre-existence seems to be implied in this expression of S. Paul, as certainly it is in later theology. Cp. Lightfoot, *Epp. of S. Clement*, vol. ii. p. 230, note.

[2] Rom. ix. 5. The arguments as to the application of this passage are well stated in Gifford's Commentary, add. note on ix. 5. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 316 ff.; cp. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 308, note; Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* vol. i. p. 393, note (E.T.).

[3] Westcott, *Introd. to the Gospels*, p. 220; cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 58; and Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 305: "The history is the very groundwork of the apostle's thought, everywhere assumed in it, inseparable from it, the element in which it lives, moves, and has its being."

he knew Christ after the flesh no more.[1] The Christ present to his thought was the risen and ascended Redeemer in the splendour of His Divine glory.

But S. Paul's conception of Christ's person may be gathered no less clearly from the statements which he makes respecting our Lord's *office* in relation to humanity. Not only is He the future Judge whose return is the Divine event towards which our universe tends (1 Thess. ii. 19, iii. 13, and iv. 6, 17; 2 Thess. i. 8–10, etc.; Rom. xiv. 9; 2 Cor. v. 10). He is the Justifier of humanity, the one Mediator between man and His Creator (Rom. x. 4, v. 15; Gal. iii. 24). He is the Giver of grace, a *quickening Spirit*, the Head of a new humanity, the second Adam, exercising lordship in the realm of grace as in that of nature (Rom. v. 18 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii. 17).[2]

Further, the expression *Image* applied to Christ in both an earlier and later Epistle (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15) implies that Christ is not only the representative of God, but the essential revealer of the invisible Father. On the other hand, references to Christ as *sent* (Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 4) imply the subordination of the Son to the Father,—a doctrine which is implied in other passages, such as 1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3, xv. 28, and is indeed inseparable from the conception of Sonship.

It will be clear from this brief sketch what position S. Paul assigns to our Lord. His view of Christ is essentially (to borrow a somewhat vague modern term) *pneumatic*. Christ is the heavenly or spiritual man; in His original subsistence Divine, and therefore in His incarnate life a new creation of God, "a Being above nature, who has life and is capable of giving it";[3] a Being who assumes human nature, that He may present

[1] 2 Cor. v. 16. [2] Cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 308–310.
[3] Fairbairn, *op. cit.* p. 311 (1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.); cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 79 (vol. i. p. 408, E.T.); Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 81.

it, perfected by obedience, as a living sacrifice to God; that He may indwell humanity as the source of its righteousness and the pledge of its future glory. It is thus on the whole true that the earlier Pauline Epistles "construe the Christian fact rather in the anthropological than in the Christological form."[1] S. Paul's own experience taught him to regard Christianity mainly as a new way of human salvation, vouchsafed to man in the person of the Divine Redeemer; as a revelation of grace bestowed on mankind through the mediation of the second Adam.

The leading ideas which give distinctive character to S. Paul's implicit teaching on the person of Christ seem to be the following:—

1. The conception of Christ's Lordship; to Him belongs a Divine sovereignty which He has merited by the life of creaturely service and obedience, and on the possession of which He entered at the resurrection. *We preach*, says the apostle, *Christ Jesus as Lord*.[2] This is the distinguishing mark of the Christian profession and of apostolic preaching. The title sums up Christ's relation to the visible universe and to the Church; Christians belong to Him;[3] they are bound to accept His commands as decisive;[4] they are *under law to Christ*;[5] He is the fountain-head of all grace, authority, and disciplinary power;[6] He is to be finally looked for as judge.[7] Like S. Peter, S. Paul does not hesitate even to apply Old Testament Jehovah-passages to Christ;[8] and he ascribes to Him that absolute sovereignty over the

[1] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 50.
[2] 2 Cor. iv. 5; cp. 1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. x. 9.
[3] Rom. xiv. 8; 1 Cor. iii. 23.
[4] 1 Cor. vii. 10, etc.
[5] 1 Cor. ix. 21; Gal. vi. 2.
[6] 1 Cor. v. 4; 2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10.
[7] 2 Cor. v. 10.
[8] Rom. x. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 16; cp. 1 Cor. x. 22. The absolute expression ὁ κύριος is often applied to Christ. ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς in 1 Cor. xvi. 23; 2 Cor. i. 14, xi. 31; cp. Rom. xiv. 14.

universe which belongs to Deity alone. He is *Lord of all*;[1] *Lord of glory*;[2] the splendour of the Divine state belongs to Him as the exalted Messiah; the essence of the Divine nature is His; He is Spirit.[3]

2. The thought of Lordship is qualified by that of *Sonship*. Christ is in a unique sense the Son of God (ὁ ἴδιος υἱός, Rom. viii. 32; cp. 3), in the sacrifice of whom is displayed the transcendent greatness of Divine love. The title *Son* imports something beyond mere Messianic dignity,—the dignity with which in the resurrection Christ was invested, and which was then recognised as essentially His own.[4] The term denotes a personal relationship to God, in virtue of which the sufferings and death of Jesus acquire special significance. Further, all allusions to the *sending* of the Son[5] imply that in His original state or nature Jesus Christ was an inhabitant of heaven;[6] the Incarnation was a change of state in the life of a pre-existent being, a change which involved subjection to creaturely limitations and the law of educational discipline (γίγνεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμον, Gal. iv. 4). It was an act of abnegation, in which an unknown measure of condescending grace was exhibited.[7] At the same time the term Son, while it implies a position of unique pre-existent glory and bliss, naturally conveys the further thought of subordination to the Father; the Son, notwithstanding His Divine dignity, being sealed as the executor and Mediator of the Divine purpose of salvation. Thus the Divine sovereignty of the Son is ultimately to be surrendered to the Father;[8] for the essential relation

[1] See Rom. x. 12, iv. 13 (as Lord of the Messianic kingdom Christ is heir of the world); cp. Gal. iii. 16 f.; Acts x. 36.

[2] 1 Cor. ii. 8. [3] 2 Cor. iii. 17; cp. 1 Cor. xv. 45.

[4] Cp. Acts xiii. 33 (Ps. ii. 7); Rom. i. 4.

[5] Rom. viii. 3 (πέμψας); Gal. iv. 4 (ἐξαπέστειλεν).

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 47: ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

[7] 2 Cor. viii. 9: ἐπτώχευσε πλούσιος ὤν. [8] 1 Cor. xv. 24–28.

of the Son to the Father is that of dependence. The cessation of Christ's kingship can only be understood as the close of a mediatorial function which will have attained its purpose. *He must reign,* says the apostle, *till He hath put all His enemies under His feet.* Here the "kingdom" is spoken of in relation to the opposition of a rival *rule, authority, and power.* It plainly means the sovereignty exercised by the exalted Christ for the accomplishment of a Divine purpose, the achievement of a Divine victory, the establishment in humanity of the kingdom of God, the overthrow of sin. "*That* kingdom must close when its purpose is accomplished. In that sense, but in that only, in which a king puts down his enemies, and has then no more opposition to contend with, there is the prospect of a time when our Lord can be no longer King."[1] The position of filial dependence involves the ultimate cession of sovereignty to Him who is the source of all rule, authority, and power.

3. As to the historical human life of Christ, S. Paul only mentions what is to him of immediate doctrinal importance.[2] He speaks of His human descent and birth under the law; His life of self-denial; His institution of the Eucharist; His sufferings, death, and resurrection.[3] He also touches upon the constraining force of Christ's example;[4] but there are two points on which he lays special stress: the consubstantiality of Christ's humanity with ours; and the sinlessness of His nature.

Christ's human nature was of a piece with ours. He took to Himself flesh, with all its weakness and suscepti-

[1] Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord,* Lect. iv. See Chrys. *ad loc.* As in the Apocalypse βασιλεία seems to refer less to the splendour of royalty than to the Old Testament conception of sovereignty as a means of deliverance and victory over foes.

[2] Cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* § 78.

[3] Gal. iii. 16; Rom. ix. 5; Gal. iv. 4; Rom. xv. 3; 1 Cor. xi. 23, etc.

[4] 2 Cor. x. 1; 1 Cor. xi. 1; 2 Cor. viii. 9.

bility to suffering and death.[1] S. Paul contrasts the *flesh* of Christ with a higher element in His being (Rom. i. 3, ix. 5): the term σάρξ being clearly employed to denote the totality of human nature: that which is characteristic of man as such (elsewhere comprehended in the expression μορφὴ δούλου, Phil. ii. 7). In virtue of this bodily nature, from which the life of the soul (ψυχή) is inseparable, Christ was subject to suffering, temptation, and death; in a word, to all the ordinary affections and experiences of sinless humanity.[2] For the "flesh" is not in itself necessarily sinful; it has become the sphere and instrument of sin only through the misuse of human free will. Christ is "flesh," is "man," morally such as he originally was, but physically such as sin has left him, *i.e.* subject to creaturely weakness, pain, temptation, and death, but sinless. The flesh in Christ is not the *flesh of sin*; He *knew no sin* (2 Cor. v. 21); He came into the world only *in the likeness of the flesh of sin*, *i.e.* subject to all the outward conditions and experiences of sin-stricken humanity, subject to the pressure of temptation, and of all the vicissitudes which are the normal consequences of human sin.[3] S. Paul does not anywhere touch directly upon the subject of the supernatural birth; he speaks of Christ as *made of a woman* (Gal. iv. 4) in a context where the main thought is similarity of the general conditions common to Christ and the race He came to redeem. Consequently we cannot appeal to him as bearing testimony to the evangelic tradition; but as he nowhere contradicts

[1] 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Rom. vi. 9.

[2] On S. Paul's usage of σάρξ, see Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 68; Liddon, *Ep. to the Romans*, p. 4; Gifford, *Ep. to the Romans*, Introd. p. 48; Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, vol. i. See H. Scott Holland's serm., "Made under the Law" (*On Behalf of Belief*, p. 187).

[3] On Rom. viii. 3, see Gifford's additional note; Weiss, § 78, etc. The doctrine of Christ's sinlessness is dealt with in a later part of this book. See Orig. *in loc.* and esp. Tert. *de Carne Chr.* xvi.

it, we may take it for granted that he would admit the virginal birth as the natural and credible account of a supernatural fact, which he evidently accepts, namely, the sinlessness of our Lord's manhood.

4. The significance assigned by S. Paul to Christ's death and resurrection may be urged as a proof of the exalted conception he had formed of His person.[1] It is only necessary to point out the leading aspects of the Divine sacrifice which meet us in the earlier Epistles. It is, first, a supreme display of Divine righteousness and love: righteousness vindicating the law that sin deserves and necessarily involves penalty; love finding a way by free self-sacrifice to reconcile holiness with mercy.[2] Again, it is a vicarious self-oblation: a representative offering, a submission to the law of Divine justice made on behalf of men by One who suffered in their stead;[3] One who submitted, though sinless, to be the sacrifice for sin.[4] Again, it is a redemption, the blood of Christ being a propitiatory sacrifice by which mankind was delivered from the curse and tyranny of sin. The phrase *ἀπολύτρωσις* (Rom. iii. 24) implies, according to Old Testament usage, the idea of deliverance, but at a mighty cost. The self-surrender of Christ to death is described as a redemption-price (*τιμή*, 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23) with which mankind has been purchased, but the thought is combined with that of propitiation. Lastly, the work of Christ is regarded ultimately as a reconciliation, or atonement, by which God again admits man, on his submission to the Divine will, into favour and friendship. In this connection it is the *obedience* of Christ,

[1] Cp. Weiss, § 80.

[2] See Rom. iii. 25, 26, iv. 25, viii. 32; 1 Cor. xv. 3; Gal. ii. 20.

[3] 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; *περὶ ἡμῶν*, 1 Thess. v. 10; *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*, 1 Cor. xv. 3; *διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*, Rom. iv. 25.

[4] 2 Cor. v. 21.

exemplified both in His life and in His submission to death, that is the means of reconciliation, while the ground of it is to be found in the Divine mercy.[1] The result of this act of grace is the acceptance, or justification, of man, and the imparting to him of the righteousness of Christ.[2] The new life of Christians, however, is the self-communication of the risen Redeemer's life and grace. If they are reconciled to God by the death of His Son, they are saved by His *life*.[3] Thus the work of Christ as man's atoning sacrifice is merged in His function as the mediator of salvation. The resurrection sets as it were the seal upon the Redeemer's work, and is the proof of its efficacy and acceptance with God. This mode of conceiving Christ's work entirely corresponds to the "pneumatic" view of His Person. "Theology was to Paul," says Harnack, "looking forwards, the doctrine of the liberating power of the Spirit (of Christ) in all the concrete relations of human life and need. The Christ who has already overcome law, sin, and death, lives as Spirit, and through His Spirit lives in believers, who for that very reason know Him not after the flesh. He is a creative power of life to those who receive Him in faith, that is to say to those who are justified."[4] The pre-existent, crucified, risen, and exalted Christ is in fact the ruling principle and decisive element in the theology of S. Paul.

From this brief summary of the apostle's earlier teaching we turn to his more explicit theological statements.

II. The explicit Christological teaching of S. Paul may be best exhibited by a brief consideration of three conspicuous passages which treat the Incarnation from different points of view.

1. The method of redemption is described in the

[1] Rom. v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. v. 18–20. [2] Rom. v. 9.
[3] Rom. v. 10. [4] Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 82.

earliest Epistle of the first captivity, Phil. ii. 5–11. It should be observed that the whole passage is introduced with a practical moral purpose,—to illustrate the spirit of self-sacrifice, which does not insist on its rights. Our Lord is presented as the pattern of one who foregoes prerogatives that might be claimed, and renounces the state of pre-mundane sovereignty which by right was His. This is generally allowed to be the motive of the passage.[1]

The chief points to be observed in this great passage are the following:—

(*a*) The unity of the person whose action is described. The passage starts from the historical person Jesus Christ, and traces the continuous action of a single personal will. The Incarnation is the transition, or descent,[2] from a heavenly to an earthly and human existence; from a state of glory to one of servitude and trial.

(*b*) The pre-existence of Jesus: *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*. This phrase implies possession of all the characteristic and essential attributes of Deity. *μορφή* is not to be confounded with *οὐσία*, but only one who was God could subsist *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*. The word *μορφή* in fact comprises all those qualities which convince us of the real presence of a being or object.[3] In this state

[1] See, *e.g.*, Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, i. p. 137 (E.T.).

[2] Cp. Eph. iv. 10, *ὁ καταβάς*.

[3] See Lightfoot, *ad loc.*; Chrys. *ad loc.*; Trench, *Synonyms of the N.T.* § 70. *μορφή* presupposes *οὐσία* and *φύσις*, and cannot exist without them. "*μορφή* addit essentiæ et proprietatibus essentialibus et naturalibus alia etiam accidentia quæ veram rei naturam sequuntur et quibus, quasi lineamentis et coloribus, *οὐσία* et *φύσις* conformantur atque depinguntur."—Zanchius (ap. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 19). Chrys., however, says *ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοῦ φύσις*. It would be more strict to say, perhaps, that the Son of God could part with *μορφὴ θεοῦ* but not with *οὐσία* or *φύσις θεοῦ*. But, says Chrys., *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης οὐσίας ὄντα, τὴν ἄλλης μορφὴν ἔχειν*. "In our case," he adds, "who have a composite nature (*σύνθετοι*), form pertains to the body. But in the case of the simple, uncompounded nature, it pertains to the essence (*οὐσίας*)" (*ad Phil.* 238 D.).

our Lord *originally subsisted, i.e.* before his Incarnation. *Equality in state with God* (τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ), with all that it implied of glory and bliss, was His own. But He did not regard this state as a *prize* or dignity to be retained. He therefore ceased for a season to be equal in state to God.[1] He surrendered the enjoyment of privileges which He might have claimed.

(*c*) The κένωσις is the process or method by which our Lord *emptied Himself* of the state of Deity. The *voluntariness* of the action is emphasised (ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν). In what this self-emptying consisted it is impossible to speculate. S. Paul, however, implies that though in the abstract difficult to conceive, it was a real act of the Divine will;[2] he does not exclude the idea that the Son of God continued *in some sense* to be what He was before. So Chrysostom insists, μένων, φησὶν, ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν.[3] The real point is the exhortation to imitate the *mind* of Christ; there is no special insistance on the mystery of the *act* by which He became incarnate.[4]

[1] With ὑπάρχων, κ.τ.λ., cp. S. John's ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν (i. 1), and the statement of S. Jo. xvii. 5. Chrysostom insists φύσις γὰρ ἐλάττων οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἁρπάσαι τὸ εἶναι ἐν μεγάλῃ· οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἁρπάσαι τὸ γενέσθαι ἴσος ἀγγέλῳ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. Harnack (*Dogmengesch.* vol. i. Appendix 1) deals very fully with the Pauline (Hellenic) conception of pre-existence. S. Paul, he thinks, is the primary author of that form of Christology which was afterwards expressed as follows :—Χριστὸς, ὁ κύριος ὁ σώσας ἡμᾶς, ὢν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα, ἐγένετο σὰρξ καὶ οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἐκάλεσεν (2 *Clem.* ix.). The idea that Christ is ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ (*Apoc.* iii. 4) is to be referred to the specifically Jewish idea of pre-existence. Thus, according to Harnack, S. Paul (and also S. John) holds a theory midway between the Jewish and Greek ideas of pre-existence. Harnack's view, however, seems to be based on a partial and biassed survey of the earliest Christian thought.

[2] Cp. the parallel passage, 2 Cor. viii. 9 : δι' ὑμᾶς ἐπτώχευσε πλούσιος ὤν.

[3] *ad Phil.* 247 E., 248 D. Aug. *in Joh.* xvii. 16 : "Non se exinanivit amittens quod erat, sed accipiens quod non erat." See also Cyril Alex.'s exposition, *Ep. ad Johann. Antioch*, 107 c. ff. [Pusey, *Three Epp. of S. Cyr.* p. 48].

[4] Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 16.

(*d*) The assumption of another nature is implied in the words *λαβεῖν, γίγνεσθαι*. The Son of God assumes the form of a servant (*μορφὴν δούλου*), *i.e.* the essential attributes of a servant of God: the life of creaturely dependence and service as contrasted with the glory and sovereignty of the Son in His natural state.[1] The phrase *being made in the likeness of men* brings out the complete and representative character of Christ's assumed nature. In relation to men He was like them (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων*); He was one of themselves.[2] The Greek phrase does not imply a docetic view. "He does not mean," says Chrysostom, "that Christ did not possess a body of flesh, but that His flesh sinned not, and was only *like* to the flesh that had sinned. It was like in nature, but not in defect (*κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, οὐ κατὰ τὴν κακίαν*).[3] 'Likeness' implies that it was not *in all respects* the same, *e.g.* as regards conception of a virgin, and sinlessness." Finally, Christ *was found* (*appeared*) *in outward fashion as a man*; He passed through the external phases of ordinary human experience. The incidents of His life were such as could fall under the observation of His fellow-men.[4] Yet the word *fashion* (*σχῆμα*) implies that this was a transitory phase, a temporary stage, in Christ's human development.

(*e*) The essential characteristic of the nature assumed by the Divine Son was submission to the will of God.

[1] Joh. Damasc. *de Orth. Fide*, iii. 21: *καὶ δούλην ἀνέλαβεν φύσιν, καὶ γὰρ δούλη ἐστιν ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτὴν θεῷ*. Corn. a Lap. (*ad Phil. l.c.*): "Hæc servitus . . . creaturæ, qua talis est propria, in duobus consistit: primo, quod creatura tota sit subiecta dominio Dei, utpote quæ totum suum esse a Deo . . . accepit et continuo accipit; secundo, quando rationalis creatura est, obligatur in omnibus Deo quasi Domino parere, eum revereri et colere: quæ duo Christo, ut homo est competunt."

[2] Joh. Damasc. *l.c.*: *δοῦλος μεθ' ἡμῶν κεκλημένος*.

[3] *ad Phil.* 248 A.; cp. Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, i. p. 53.

[4] *σχῆμα*, habitus, cultus, vestitus, victus, gestus, sermones et actiones. —Bengel.

He was *obedient unto death*; His human nature was made the organ of a perfect obedience. In the word *obedient* Christ's entire human experience is summarily comprised;[1] and the conditions under which obedience was rendered were voluntarily assumed (ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν). There was on Christ's part a voluntary continuance in the state which He assumed.

(*f*) The reward of human obedience was exaltation, according to a necessary law of Divine action (διὸ καὶ, v. 9). The manhood of Jesus Christ is raised from death to be the organ of supreme sovereignty and the object of universal adoration. The exaltation is here regarded, not as a necessary consequence of the union of the human with the Divine in the person of Jesus, but as an illustration of a fundamental law of the moral universe.

Thus in outline S. Paul describes the conditions under which redemption was achieved. He says nothing as to the problems which the doctrine of the κένωσις presents to faith. Only one thing is strictly necessary for the purposes of the apostle's argument, namely, the truth that He who thus vouchsafed to undergo a true human experience was Himself more than man. The great purpose of the entire passage is to represent the Incarnation of the Divine Son as an act of immeasurable condescension. Christ's obedience "would lose its highest significance as a pattern and prototype if it were not the obedience of Him who was originally and essentially the Lord of glory. . . . They who make Christ a mere man, in order, as they say, to do honour to the ethical, the human, weaken and injure the ethical, because they deny to Christ the means and the possibility of the highest manifestation of love. The truly ethical, truly human example which Christ has left us rests on the mysterious basis of the Divine in His being, and loses its power,

[1] Cp. Rom. v. 19; Heb. v. 8.

becomes empty and flat, when it is detached from this." [1]

2. The most impressive description of the Redeemer's person is found in the Epistle to the Colossians (chap. i. 15–20). In the third group of his Epistles, to which this letter belongs, S. Paul is no longer confronting Judaistic error as to salvation, but a Judæo-Oriental conception of Christ's person.[2] In the heresy which the Colossian Church seems to have exhibited in a nascent form, it has been customary to trace the fundamental idea of the Gnostic cosmology, namely, that of the essential inherent evil of matter. It is not necessary to pursue this conception to its source. It is sufficient to point out its practical consequences, which were mainly two.

(1) If matter is evil, the question arises how God can create or otherwise come in contact with matter? This problem was solved by the supposition that there existed a hierarchy of intermediate beings, each containing less of the Divine element than the one higher in the scale. The lowest of these beings, it was taught, would be sufficiently akin to gross matter to come into contact and relation with it.

(2) But again, if matter be evil, how can the soul be liberated from its control? In answer to this question use was made of the Christian idea of redemption, which was represented as consisting in the liberation of spirit from the trammels of matter. This result was to be achieved by a rigid asceticism, and by contempt and depreciation of the body.

[1] Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (*General*), § 79.

[2] Dr. Hort (*Judaistic Christianity*, pp. 116 ff.) questions the current opinion that the Colossian heresy was of a speculative type, connected with Essene influences. His weighty arguments make the connection at least very doubtful. The distinctive features of the heresy seem rather to be derived from Palestinian (Pharisaic) Judaism than from Essene influence.

These ideas appear in their developed form in later Gnosticism; but in germ, at any rate, they underlie the mode of thought which S. Paul combats by a direct and positive statement of the significance of Christ's person, and the effect of His work in practically abrogating the ceremonial ordinances of Judaism.

In this passage the Son of God is exhibited as the *Image of the invisible God.* The term εἰκών, which S. Paul uses in an earlier Epistle (2 Cor. iv. 4), implies a twofold function of the Son. (1) In Him is presented the adequate and essential *expression* of the Divine nature; He is the *visible representation* of Deity, because in Him dwells the plenitude of Divine attributes. (2) He is the *revealer* of Deity, manifesting that which in itself is invisible. His character is a true manifestation of the Divine glory; in Him is conveyed to man a real and perfect knowledge of God. The function here ascribed to the *Image* is equivalent to that of S. John's *Logos* (cp. S. Jo. i. 18, xiv. 9, 10).

From this conception of the Son's person follows the truth of His essential relation to the natural creation and to the new creation—the Church of redeemed humanity.

i. The Son is *firstborn of all creation,* or *in relation to all creation.* To Him belongs the dignity of primogeniture (πρωτοτόκια); in relation to creation He is *prior to it* (αὐτός ἐστι πρὸ πάντων), and *exercises sovereignty* over it. In fact, the expression πρωτότοκος, when considered in its context, implies the Son's pre-existence; while its Messianic associations suggest the idea of lordship and heirship.[1]

The mediatorial function is thus involved in the fact of Divine Sonship, and this is first exercised in the act of creation. All things were created *in Him,* as their

[1] See Lightfoot's exhaustive note, *ad loc.*; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures,* pp. 321 ff.; and Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 103.

archetype; *by Him* as the co-operating agent; *unto Him* as their final cause. All things in Him *cohere*, *hold together* (συνέστηκεν). The laws which by their interaction bind the universe into a rational and ordered whole (κόσμος) are expressions of His mind. In Him created life eternally *was* (Rev. iv. 11); the universe was ever present to the thought of God. The pre-existent Word was, in the phrase of Philo, the κόσμος νοητός: the ground and source of all existence.[1] There is, in fact, but one link between God and the universe, between the absolute and the world of matter, namely, the person of the Son.

ii. The Son also stands in an essential relation to the Church, or new creation. "The Creator," says a living writer, "is so bound to His creation that He cannot allow it to be divided from Him by evil, for this would be its ruin. And so at the touch of evil the cosmology becomes a soteriology; for when sin enters the world, the Creator, who is good, has no choice but to become the Saviour."[2] The mediatorial function which the Son exercises as Creator, He fulfils also as Redeemer. He is the one link between God and mankind. "He absorbs in Himself the whole function of mediation. Through Him alone, without any interposing link of communication, the human soul has access to the Father. He is the Head with whom all the living members of the body are in direct and immediate communication, who suggests their manifold activities to each, who directs their several functions in subordination to the healthy working of the whole, from whom they individually receive their inspiration and their strength."[3]

It is unnecessary to dwell on the details of this

[1] Cp. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 125.
[2] Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. .
[3] Lightfoot, *Colossians*, p. 183 (ed. 1).

passage; it will suffice to point out its leading thought, the cosmical significance of Christ's person and work. In the earlier Epistles the thought of the exaltation of Christ pointed back to that of His heavenly origin. But it is characteristic of the group of Epistles to which the Colossians belongs that the significance of the Redeemer's person is deduced *à priori* from the mystery of God's creative thought, according to which the purpose of salvation was intimately connected with the plan of the universe realised in creation. The eternal purpose of love is fittingly and naturally carried into effect through the agency of God's *Beloved*, the *Son of His love*,[1] who alone can endue humanity with the grace of adoptive sonship. As all things were created by the Son, so all were created *for Him* (εἰς αὐτόν). The ultimate goal of the universe is the restoration of all things to their natural dependence on Christ as the centre and source of their life and movement.[2] This conception of Christ marks an advance in the later theology of S. Paul, as compared with that of his earlier Epistles.

3. In Ephesians i. 3–14 is described the extension of the incarnate life in the kingdom of redeemed humanity.

The conception of Christ's person as the source of a new life, the archetype of a new nature, leads on to the idea of a catholic society, of which the risen and ascended Lord is the Head and life-giving principle. The Church is contemplated as perpetuating the life of the Son of God, and as uniting individual souls to Him by a process of incorporation. The quickening power of Christ's spiritualised humanity is the principle of the Church's unity, and the gift which it perpetuates.

The first chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians speaks

[1] Eph. i. 6; Col. i. 13.

[2] Eph. i. 10: ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν Χριστῷ.

of this gift of a new life—the characteristic gift of the new society—under a threefold aspect.

i. The gift is predestined by the Father. Individually, men are destined for the privilege and status of sonship, which is to be realised through union with Christ (*διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, v. 5). This "sonship" is one not only of mystical connection through a new birth, but of moral affinity: *He chose us out before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blemish before Him in love.* The historical work of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the Church's existence, but though the Incarnation is an event in time, it is the fulfilment of an eternal and world-embracing purpose, to be realised in the elect community of which Christ is the Head.[1]

ii. The gift is communicated to mankind in Christ, the Author of our redemption by means of His blood. According to the Divine purpose for the universe, all things are to be summed up (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*, v. 10) in Christ. He was foreordained to be the principle of their unity, the source of their life, the mainspring of their renewal, the controller of their movement. His work is one of reconciliation or restitution of all things to a state which they were predestined to attain; a restoration of harmony between God and the universe.[2]

But the Church of redeemed humanity stands in a peculiarly close relation to the Redeemer's person. If He is the Head of the body, she is the complement, or fulness, of His being (*πλήρωμα*).[3] To her Christ communicates the totality of His Divine attributes, so that she herself becomes filled up to the measure of Divine fulness;[4] she attains, by perpetual increase, to the full stature which in Christ she is predestined to reach. By the gradual extension of the incarnate life, the

[1] Cp. Eph. i. 22, iv. 15.
[2] Eph. ii. 16.
[3] Eph. i. 23.
[4] Eph. iii. 19.

universal lordship of Christ is vindicated and manifested; the sum of things in heaven and in earth is again gathered into harmonious unity under the headship of the Divine Son; the whole creation, spiritual and material,—every order of being, angelic or human,—is included in the scope of Christ's redemptive work.

iii. Finally, the gift of the new spiritual life is sealed by the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, the characteristic endowment or blessing of the new creation. Through His operation the soul undergoes a new birth which conveys the remission of sins, and translates into a new sphere of being. The subjective condition of this process is faith.[1]

A careful comparison of the leading ideas of the different groups of Epistles, shows that S. Paul is guided by the same fundamental principles in each; but in later letters he develops these principles in greater detail and in a more contemplative tone. The idea of salvation as a mystery, as *hidden wisdom*, is expanded in the Ephesians, and the work of Christ is described with the use of much the same imagery as in Romans and Corinthians. The ideas of *redemption*, *reconciliation*, *peace*; the associations connected with sacrificial *blood*, meet us in the later as in the earlier group of Epistles. The *sealing* of Christians with the Spirit, which is the *earnest* of their inheritance; the grace of *adoption* and *heirship*; the antithesis between faith and works, between the righteousness of the law and the righteousness obtained from God; the high significance attached to Christ's *resurrection*, and to baptism as an act of incorporation into Christ—all these thoughts reappear in an expanded and richer form in the Epistles of the captivity. From a doctrinal point of view, therefore, it is a mistake to over-emphasise the differences of literary form which distinguish the later from the earlier writings of the apostle.[2]

[1] Eph. i. 13.

[2] Cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* § 100.

Without going into further detail, we may give an idea of the place which our Lord occupies in S. Paul's thought by a very brief survey of the leading Christological thoughts of each group of Epistles.

In the Epistles to the Thessalonians Christ is referred to more than once as the Judge of men. We have already noticed what that claim on His behalf necessarily implies. To S. Paul the coming (*παρουσία*) of Jesus Christ is the supreme event to which creation moves.[1] It will be a moment of revelation: *the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with His mighty angels.*[2] It is impossible to conceive that He for whom Christians are exhorted to patiently wait;[3] He who is the author of their salvation, the deliverer from Divine wrath,[4] the dispenser of grace,[5] the present comforter of His people,[6] —can be less than Divine.

In the Epistles to the Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans the work of Christ is contemplated in its relation to anthropology. Christ is the source of justification and of spiritual life to mankind; while to the apostle himself, He is Master, Lord, and Judge; the source of his ministerial power, the sustainer of his weakness, the subject of his preaching.

S. Paul's doctrine of justification is based on the dignity of the person of Christ. The Judaisers whom he confronts in the Epistle to the Galatians were men who either had never understood, or were wilfully rejecting, the completed work of Jesus Christ. The whole antithesis between grace and law, faith and works, which underlies the Epistle, rests on the assumption that the religion of Christ is absolute and final. All that preceded it was rudimentary, preparative, imperfect, dis-

[1] 1 Thess. i. 10, ii. 19, v. 23.
[2] 2 Thess. i. 7, ii. 8.
[3] 2 Thess. iii. 5.
[4] 1 Thess. i. 10, v. 9.
[5] 1 Thess. v. 28; 2 Thess. i. 12.
[6] 2 Thess. ii. 17.

ciplinary. In Christ the promise of God was fulfilled; the promise of blessing, the promise of righteousness. What is it that gives this finality to the justifying work of Jesus Christ? How is it that in Him man is finally liberated from the bondage of the law? Why is His cross an object of glory and exultation? The answer is that the author of redemption is in a unique sense *the Son of God*.[1] The grace of His passion and resurrection is independent of historical limits of time; it is perpetuated in the life of the redeemed; it is imparted in the sacrament of regeneration,[2] which incorporates the believer into Christ,—identifies him with Christ, "whose perfect obedience and expiatory sufferings are thus transferred to him."[3] Finally, the great blessing which prophecy had foretold—the gift of the Spirit—is communicated in and through Christ. *God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts*.[4] And the faith which on man's part appropriates the blessings of redemption; the faith which justifies; the faith which saves, has Jesus Christ for its object. Christ is, in fact, to the soul that which its Creator and God alone can be. He is the object of the soul's supreme act of self-surrender,[5] of its most absolute confidence and trust.

In the Epistles to Corinth and to the Romans Christ's manhood is presented as the source of spiritual life to mankind. He is the *quickening spirit* who makes alive the dead inert mass of humanity. He accomplishes this in virtue of His relation to the race as a whole, which is analogous to the position of the first Adam. The work of each man, the first and the second, is, in accordance with the law of solidarity, universal in its effects. Each is in a sense a "universal" person, transmitting the con-

[1] Gal. ii. 20, iv. 4. [2] Gal. iii. 27; cp. Rom. vi. 1–11; Col. ii. 12.
[3] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 348. [4] Gal. iv. 6.
[5] Gal. ii. 16, 20, etc.; cp. Liddon, *l.c.*

sequences of his action to his posterity. The first Adam transmits to his descendants the natural weakness and liability to corruption and death that resulted from his sin. The second Adam transmits the effects and benefits of His sinless righteousness; but it is by a new birth, and according to the law of a supernatural life. For by the resurrection the humanity of Christ is spiritualised and endued with an all-pervasive, penetrating, and vitalising power. *In Christ shall all be made alive.* The weak, petty, but destructive cause of man's ruin—Adam's act of lawless disobedience—is more than counterbalanced by the full, rich, and exuberant power of Christ's work. For grace is mightier than sin; life than death; Divine Spirit than the life of nature. And here again we are compelled to acknowledge that the source of life, the renewer of humanity, must be more than human; for His work of re-creation is such as belongs only to the original Creator of man's nature.[1]

Passing to the next great group of Epistles, those belonging to the first captivity, we find an expansion of fundamental ideas already suggested. In these Christ occupies "not simply an historical, but a cosmical place."[2] The mystical aspect of Christology is brought into prominence: the relation of Christ as Mediator to the whole system of created things; the method, the efficacy, and the universal significance of His redemptive work. This has been already illustrated at greater length. It is sufficient now to gather up the main thoughts which the apostle develops: (1) that of the κένωσις — the mystery of Divine self-limitation;[3] (2) that of the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις—the "recapitulation" of all things in Christ: the consummation of their destiny, the restoration of their original unity, the fulfilment of the primal

[1] See Rom. v. 12–21; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45–48.

[2] Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 318.

[3] Phil. ii. 5 ff.

purpose of creation;[1] (3) that of reconcilement between God and man on the one hand, between Jew and Gentile on the other, in the one body of the Crucified.[2] In each of these great themes, the real point insisted upon is the dignity of Him whose life and death and resurrection have been so rich a revelation of Divine grace, so unspeakably powerful in effect, so universal in scope. The glory of a Divine Person is implied in the various titles of our Lord in these Epistles: *Lord*,[3] *First-begotten*,[4] *Head of the Church*,[5] *Son of God's love*,[6] *Image of the invisible God*,[7] *He that filleth all in all*.[8] It is implied in His work as Mediator, His grace as indweller of hearts,[9] as the sanctifier of the Church,[10] as Saviour,[11] as the Lord of a kingdom,[12] as the possessor of the plenitude of Divine attributes.[13] It is in keeping with this that to the apostle himself Christ is the central object of thought and contemplation, faith and hope, love and service, devotion and adoration.

Of the Pastoral Epistles it needs only to be said that they reproduce, without materially adding to, the conceptions of Christ's person already developed in the earlier Epistles. They insist, perhaps, more fully on the universality of Christ's redemptive work.[14] S. Paul seems to regard our Lord's person with a deeper sense of veneration and awe. He dwells on the mercy which Christ had displayed towards himself;[15] he contemplates Christ as the awarder of the final crown. For the rest he speaks of Him as *Mediator*, and uses a phrase more familiar in the writings of S. John, which implies Christ's dignity as a pre-existent Being.[16]

[1] Eph. i. 10. [2] Eph. ii. 13 ff. [3] Phil. ii. 11. [4] Col. i. 15.
[5] Col. i. 18. [6] Col. i. 13. [7] Col. i. 15. [8] Eph. i. 23.
[9] Eph. iii. 17. [10] Eph. v. 26. [11] Phil. iii. 20. [12] Col. i. 13.
[13] Col. i. 19. [14] See 1 Tim. ii. 3 ff.; cp. generally Weiss, §§ 107, 108.
[15] 1 Tim. i. 16, etc. [16] ἐφανερώθη, 1 Tim. iii. 16.

Enough has been said to illustrate the wealth of S. Paul's thought, and the profound depth of his insight into the mystery of Christ. The impetuosity and energy of his style in earlier Epistles gives place in his later writings to the calm, chastened, and contemplative manner of one who had done and suffered much for the cause of Jesus Christ.

PART II

(*Continued*)

§ IV. The Epistle to the Hebrews.

§ V. The Theology of S. John.
The Apocalypse.
The Epistles.
The Gospel.

§ VI. General review of the Apostolic teaching.

§ IV. The Epistle to the Hebrews

The Epistle to the Hebrews was apparently written to Christians of Jewish descent, who were familiar with the ceremonial worship of the temple; probably to some definite society, *e.g.*, the Christian Church of Jerusalem, or some neighbouring community. The writer is dealing with believers, whose insight into the true significance of their religion is narrow and defective; who bitterly feel their isolation and exclusion from the fellowship of their fellow-Israelites, and who under the pressure of manifold troubles are tempted to apostasy, and are actually betraying symptoms of spiritual degeneracy. This temper the writer confronts by exhibiting Christianity as the final, the absolute religion: both because it perfectly accomplishes the true and only end of religion[1]—the union of God with man; and because it fulfils the great spiritual ideas suggested by the sacrificial ordinances of the Mosaic law. The general thought differs from that which is most characteristic of S. Paul. The main idea of the Epistle to the Hebrews is not the abolition, but the fulfilment of the ceremonial law in the Person and work of the historical Christ.

The Epistle deals with the subject of the Incarnation under three heads:

I. The person of the Son (chaps. i.–vi.), in whom is revealed and realised the true destiny of man. Christ is set forth as the perfect Mediator.

(*a*) As being *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, Jesus Christ is the natural Mediator in creation, and true revealer of God. He conveys to man a final authoritative message from God. He is the "Apostle" of God (iii. 1). This thought is developed in terms which point to the writer's connection

[1] Note especially the recurrence of the words *τελειοῦν*, *προσέρχεσθαι*, *ἐγγίζειν*.

with Alexandria. The Son is described as *the radiance* or *effulgence of the Divine glory, i.e.* perfectly manifesting the Divine character and attributes; and also as *express image of the Divine essence, i.e.* embodying in a distinct personality the totality of Godhead. The natural Mediator in nature—upholding the universe as creator, sustainer, and heir of all things, He is in virtue of His Sonship the effective Mediator in the sphere of grace. In His own person He makes atonement for sin; in His own person He assumes our nature, and lifts it to the Divine throne.[1]

Such is the transcendent dignity of the Son of God, and it is exhibited by the method of comparison. Christ is contrasted successively with the highest ministers of the old dispensation. He is above prophets, above angels, above Moses the mediator of the law, above Joshua the giver of rest to Israel. The partial and fragmentary message of the prophets is contrasted with the final and authoritative word of the Son; the dependence and service of created angels with the immutability, the eternal years, the universal sovereignty of the Son; the minister in God's household with the maker of the house; the captain who brought Israel into the troubled rest of Canaan with the ascended King who provides for the people of God the repose of an eternal sabbath.[2] The main effect of this series of contrasts is to heighten the thought of the unbroken continuity of Christ's work. The same sovereign will has ever been calmly at work, *bearing all things on their course* to a predestined end.[3]

(*b*) Christ is also truly man; His humanity is perfect, real, representative. He stands in relation to mankind as one of a community of brethren; one with them in

[1] Chap. i. 1-3. On the Christology of the Epistle, see Westcott, *Hebrews*, 424 f.

[2] Chap. i. 1, 4 ff., iii. 1-6, iv. 8 ff. [3] Chap. i. 3.

the conditions of a moral probation on earth; the forerunner, in whose exaltation through suffering is seen the Divine purpose for man. Accordingly the writer insists (1) on Christ's experience of our lot as complete. He is *captain* of a host; one of many brethren; we are *partakers of Him* who *laid hold of the seed of Abraham.* He shares the general conditions of a human lot in the tasting of trial, temptation, and death. He displays human virtues: trust, faith, dependence, sympathy, submission, faithfulness unto death.[1] (2) In Christ, the mystery of man's humiliation and suffering is explained. It is seen to be the fitting way of exaltation; the appropriate discipline of human character; the condition of perfect fellowship with God.[2]

Christ therefore is not only God's *Apostle* to mankind; He fulfils the other side of the mediatorial function. He is *high priest,* the perfect representative of man before God.[3]

II. The high-priestly office of Christ (vii.–x. 15).

The central theme of the Epistle is next developed, and this passage may be regarded as an expansion of the thought that in Christ man fulfils the Divine purpose; he has priestly access to God, and is finally united to Him. For the representative office of high priest Christ was prepared by His experience of suffering and probation. The dignity of this function is exhibited by a new comparison, namely, between the two types of priesthood embodied severally in Melchizedek and Aaron.

[1] See chap. ii. 10–18, iii. 14, iv. 15, v. 7–9.

[2] *ἔπρεπεν,* ii. 10, v. 5, 9.

[3] *ἀρχιερεύς,* ii. 17, iii. 1, iv. 14. Cp. Iren. iii. 18. 7. *ἔδει τὸν μεσίτην θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν καὶ θεῷ μὲν παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ γνωρίσαι τὸν θεόν.*

The priesthood after the order of Melchizedek is exalted over that of Aaron in two main respects.

i. It is a universal, supra-national priesthood. In virtue of His complete human experience, Christ is the representative not of a single race, but of humanity. He exercises His priestly function in a sphere spiritual, universal, eternal, which transcends the accidents of space and time. The peculiar glory of Melchizedek lay in the fact that he was free from the limitations of humanity; he was *without beginning of days or end of life.*[1] So the glorification[2] of Christ as high-priest begins with His uplifting from the earth. He enters the sphere which is spiritual and therefore real—the sphere of true sacrifice, *the true tabernacle,*[3] of which the earthly tent was but a shadow or figure. He has an *inviolable priesthood*—the tenure of which is uninterrupted by the accident of death,[4] and which rests on the sure basis, not of a human ordinance, but of a Divine oath.[5] Hence the writer draws the conclusion that in the priesthood of Christ we see the introduction of a better hope (vii. 19). This, it has been said, is the "dogmatic centre" of the Epistle, setting forth Christianity as the religion of hope—hope *better* in relation to Judaism; hope absolutely *good* in regard to the true end of religion—union with God.[6]

ii. The priesthood of Christ fulfils the legal types. As priest He has *somewhat to offer.*[7] What is His offering? The oblation He brings is *Himself*;[8] and the efficacy and finality of His offering lies in the fact that it is *spiritual* and is *one*, whereas the Levitic sacrifices were *material* and *many.*

His oblation is *spiritual*: an inward oblation of *will*,

[1] Chap. vii. 3. [2] Chap. v. 5. [3] Chap. viii. 2.
[4] Chap. vii. 15–24. [5] Chap. vii. 20. [6] Dr. A. B. Bruce.
[7] Chap. viii. 3. [8] Chap. ix. 14, 26.

which finds expression in the outward act of self-surrender to death (x. 5 ff.). Christ's body is the instrument of a sinless will; His death finds acceptance as an act of perfect obedience, and in virtue of His inseparable and unchangeable Divine personality (*πνεῦμα αἰώνιον*, ix. 14), He is enabled to be at once priest and victim. This point is brought out by an exposition of Ps. xl. (x. 5–10).[1]

Further, Christ's offering is *one*, whereas the sacrifices of the law were many and oft-repeated. His is the sacrifice of a life that passes through death and is brought into holy fellowship with the living God. Thus the human nature which He had made the organ of His suffering obedience attains its true destiny in abiding union with God. The blood sprinkled on the Mercy-seat was as it were a type of human life surrendered and dedicated to the life of Divine fellowship and service.

Christ's ministry is, in short, *διαφορωτέρα λειτουργία*; it belongs to Him as the Mediator of a *better covenant*.[2] His sacrifice in fact inaugurates this *new covenant*, and consecrates the whole sphere of covenant obligation and access to God, just as the ancient tabernacle on the Day of Atonement was purged, and its sanctity renewed by sprinkling of blood.[3] The thought of the deficiency of the old covenant paves the way for the third main section of the Epistle. On the one hand, it was in pro-

[1] An important point to notice is the writer's conception of Christ's offering as *spiritual*. Being so it belongs to *heaven*, the sphere of realities, though it took place on earth. It is a *true* sacrifice because it was the outward manifestation of a spiritual fact—the entire devotion of a sinless will. The phrase *διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου* lifts the offering of Christ into that only true order, and the oblation is regarded in all its stages as a transaction within the *true* sanctuary (viii. 2). Pfleiderer sees in this opposition between the heavenly and earthly—the order of true ideas and that of sensible copies—a clear indication of the writer's connection with Philo. *Phil. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 235.

[2] Chap. viii. 6, 13. [3] Chap. ix. 18–23; cp. Levit. xvi. 14–19.

phetic vision superseded;[1] on the other, its symbolic sanctuary bore on its very structure the marks of imperfection.[2]

III. The new spiritual covenant based on the completed work of the ascended Christ (x. 15 to end). The affinity between this Epistle and S. Luke's Gospel appears in the thought that the bloodshedding of Christ is the foundation of a new covenant relation between God and man.[3] It is as it were an axiom of the Epistle that a covenant implies a sacrificial death as its condition.[4] The sacrifice of Christ having been treated in § II., the writer passes to consider the peculiar features of the new covenant. He proceeds to describe (1) its *requirement*: faith (connected with baptism, the covenant sign);[5] hope;[6] and love.[7]

(2) Its *glory*, in comparison of the first covenant, which had been ratified amid circumstances so awe-inspiring. The new covenant introduces man into a heavenly order; a sphere in which he finds himself in contact with a host of spiritual forces, a world of heavenly beings; an immovable kingdom of priests, enjoying free access to God, and consecrated to a life of acceptable service (xii. 18–29).

(3) Its *perpetuity*. It rests on the person and work of One who lives for evermore, enthroned at God's right hand, ever interceding for His people, ever presenting Himself in the power of the act once for all accomplished (xiii. 8–19; cp. vii. 25–28).

The closing benediction (xiii. 20 f.) gathers up the main features of Christ's high-priestly service. He is the *great Shepherd*, a phrase recalling Isai. lxiii. 11, and

[1] Chap. viii. 7 ff.; cp. Jer. xxxi. 31 ff. [2] Chap. ix. 1–10.
[3] Cp. S. Lk. xxii. 20, ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου.
[4] Chap. ix. 16, 17. [5] Chap. x. 22, 23. Faith illustrated in chap. xi.
[6] Chap. xii. 1–13. [7] Chap. xiii. 1–6.

implying that Christ leads men to their true rest. He is risen and ascended (the two thoughts are never separated, though the latter is chiefly characteristic of the Epistle). He lives within the veil, ever presenting Himself together with His members as an acceptable oblation to the Father. He is able to *make men complete for doing God's will* (xiii. 21), by bestowing the Spirit, in whose strength the obligations of the new covenant can be fulfilled.

The above brief survey of this great Epistle will have illustrated the breadth and comprehensiveness of the Christology which is peculiar to the writer. It may be fairly said that the distinctive conception of Christ, which determines His rank in relation to God, His place and work in the universe and humanity, is that of Sonship.[1] From this conception follows the idea of Christ's relation to the Father, as One in whom the essence of the Divine character and being is manifested and the idea of a necessary relation to the universe, as creator, preserver, heir of all things, and redeemer. The Sonship of the Redeemer underlies and conditions the sonship of man, which is realised through the fellowship of Christ with man in a common nature.[2] The special circumstances of the Hebrews give to the Epistle its peculiarly "hieratic" and sacerdotal character. In this feature the Christology of the Epistle supplements that of S. Paul;[3] and the writer is guided in the form and presentation of his argument by his perception of

[1] Bp. Westcott notices "the use of the anarthrous title 'Son,' which emphasises the essential nature of the relation which it expresses," as characteristic of the Epistle. *Ep. to the Hebrews*, p. 425; cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 118.

[2] Chap. ii. 14.

[3] See generally a study of this Epistle in Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 320–328; and the important papers of Dr. A. B. Bruce in *Expositor*, ser. iii. and iv. Also Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, pp. 156–159.

the influences actually at work among the Hebrew Christians, for whom the ancient priesthood and sacrificial system still retained such incomparable attractions. The very choice of the term *Son*, and the reasoning back from the exaltation of Jesus to His original nature (i. 2–4), implies that the writer shares with his readers the Messianic hopes, and the belief that in Christ they have been fulfilled. But the name which in Old Testament usage had denoted the ethical relationship to God of the Messiah, is in this Epistle employed to express a natural or essential relationship. The Sonship of Christ lies behind His Messianic function, and is the foundation and justification of it. His exaltation is based upon the dignity of His original nature. He who became Lord over all "had *à priori* a relation to that all." From the Son's Messianic lordship over the world is inferred the creation of the world by Him, and its continuous subsistence in Him.[1]

The same thought of Sonship determines the writer's conception of Christ's high-priestly work—Christianity is essentially a new covenant, the characteristic of which is *perfection* (τελείωσις), *i.e.* the establishment of unimpeded fellowship between God and man. For the attainment of this end a new Mediator is required—one who, wearing the nature that needs redemption, can perfect it through obedience, bring it near to God and dedicate it to His service. Consequently the high priest is one of many *sons* who are being brought to glory;[2] He who sanctifies and they that are sanctified are *all of one*; all have a common origin. Accordingly the Son shares with those whom He deigns to call brethren, the flesh and blood which are subject to temptation, suffering, and death.[3] He is *in all points* made like them, and through actual experience acquires the power

[1] Weiss, *l.c.* [2] Chap. ii. 10, 11. [3] Chap. ii. 14.

of sympathy with their weaknesses; thus even in His exalted state He can be touched with the feeling of their infirmities, and can give succour to the tempted in time of need.[1]

It is consistent with the same point of view that the Messianic salvation itself is conceived as an *eternal inheritance*,[2] on the possession of which Christians enter as sons of God. The Christian community is thus described as the *Church of the firstborn*;[3] the sufferings of the faithful are indications of the fatherly love and favour of God,[4] and are the fitting discipline of preparation for the life of glory. So the writer frequently addresses his readers as "brethren," and specially inculcates the duty of *brotherly love*.[5] The Church in fact, like Israel of old, constitutes a family or *household of God*,[6] the ruler set over it being a Son, who is *the first-begotten* (πρωτότοκος) even before He enters on His mediatorial work as High-Priest of humanity.

§ V. The Theology of S. John[7]

S. John's work was to a large extent practical. He is traditionally the organiser of the Church and the

[1] Chap. iv. 15, 16. [2] Chap. ix. 15.
[3] Chap. xii. 23. [4] Chap. xii. 6–8; cp. ii. 10.
[5] Chap. xiii. i. So in vi. 10 Christian love is said to be shown to God's *name*—because all Christians are sons of God.
[6] Chap. iii. 6.
[7] A few words are necessary in explanation of the general treatment of this subject in view of current literary and historical criticism. The different books traditionally ascribed to S. John are not here used as historical testimony of Christ's life and work, but only as evidence of certain Christological *beliefs*,—of the *interpretation* of Christ's life which prevailed in the Church during the period between S. Paul's death and the middle of the second century, and which very deeply coloured the theology of the subsequent period. It is not therefore of present importance to discuss (*e.g.*) the different theories as to the date of the Apocalypse,

episcopate in Asia Minor.[1] As a writer his importance is that he seems to complete, combine, and harmonise the different types of apostolic teaching. His main characteristic is intensity of thought, combined with a corresponding absoluteness of expression. To him, as to the writer of Hebrews, Christianity is the absolute religion—the final disclosure of God, revealing the perfect way of fellowship between God and man. It is final, because it rests on the fact of a real incarnation of Deity. S. John is often contrasted with S. Paul. The difference between the two apostles is one of training, of mental habit, and intellectual method, but practically the great point of contrast lies in the fact that "S. Paul begins with anthropology, S. John with theology."[2] S. John does not commence, like S. Paul, "with man and his misery, but with God and His perfection."[3] Hence the mystical tone of his writings, their calm depth, their sustained elevation. To him "what proceeds in time belongs to eternity; the outward event is the visible symbol of what is innermost in the Divine nature and ultimate in the Divine purpose."[4] In the historic Incarnation and its issues he contemplates the eternal laws of Divine self-manifestation. In the history of Christ's conflict and victory he sees ideal principles at work, and each

or as to the nature, sources, and "tendency" of the Fourth Gospel. The Tübingen views in their developed form may be easily ascertained from such works as Pfleiderer's *Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii. Lect. vii.; or Martineau's *Seat of Authority in Religion*. It would seem that the last word of criticism is very far from having been said as to the date of the Apocalypse, or its exact character as a composition. The present condition of the question is stated most temperately by Dr. Sanday, *Inspiration*, pp. 369 ff., as also all that is to be said in regard to other points of Johannine literature. Cp. Salmon, *Introd. to the N. T.* Lectures xii.–xvii.

[1] Clem. Alex. ap. Euseb. *H.E.* iii. 23.

[2] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 243. See the whole passage.

[3] Pressensé, *Early Years of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 442 (E.T.).

[4] Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 344.

incident becomes a parable, speaking of God, His purpose for the world, and His judgment of men. "His idealism," says Weiss, "lets this Son of Thunder see *à priori* throughout the deepest essence in the outward form, the immutable law in the changeful actuality, the final consummation in the germinal beginning."[1] He traces all phenomena back to their ultimate principle; tendencies present themselves to his mind in their final development. It is this habit of thought that is common to the writer of the Apocalypse and the author of the Gospel, and so far the tradition which ascribes both books to S. John finds internal justification.

1. *The Apocalypse.*

The general characteristic of the book is its fidelity to Jewish conceptions, together with an absence of elements that can be fairly called Judaistic.[2] The Christian Church is the continuation of the Jewish Church of the Old Testament, but the continuity of the true Israel is not identical with the continuance of the actual nation. The unbelieving "Jews" who persecute the followers of Christ have no real claim to the title; they are a *synagogue of Satan.*[3] The true Israel is gathered from all the nations of the world; and its identity with the Old Testament Church is ideal. In accordance with this ideal conception the imagery and symbolism of the Apocalypse are derived from Old Testament books, and from scenes familiar to the Jews: the Holy land, the city of Jerusalem, the temple courts, the brazen altar of burnt-sacrifice, the inner shrine with its altar of incense. Further, the book claims the

[1] *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 141.

[2] *e.g.*, the idea of special prerogatives belonging to Jewish Christians as such, which some critics have discovered in the imagery of the book. See Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, pp. 160 ff.

[3] Chaps. ii. 9, iii. 9; cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 130.

character of prophecy.[1] The seer speaks of himself as being *in the spirit*.[2] The general subject treated is the conflict of the Church and the world, the history of Jesus Himself indicating the law of development, and the ideal course which the conflict is destined to follow. The book depicts this conflict under concrete forms, and imagery derived for the most part from the prophetic writings.

i. The central figure is the person of Christ, who is described in terms suggestive of His human descent from the chosen people: He is *the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the root and the offspring of David, the Christ of God*.[3] The writer thus starts from the recognised Messianic conception of our Lord, but the Messianic dignity and glory are the reward of sacrificial suffering; His kingly dominion is combined with high-priesthood (i. 13); the Divine throne is the reward of death voluntarily accepted.[4] Christ's Messianic lordship and victorious sway over a hostile world are the fruit of humiliation.

But the exalted Messiah is recognised as originally of Divine essence. His glory is the glory of God. Thus He is described as pre-existent in relation to creation;[5] the *first and the last*; the *Alpha and Omega*.[6] He is associated with the Father as the source of grace; He is the Divine Judge; the bestower of the Holy Spirit; the Lord of lords; the *holy and true*. He is with the Father the supreme object of adoration in heaven; He shares the throne of God.[7] The title *Word of God* is

[1] Chaps. i. 3, x. 7, 11, xxii. 6, 7, 9, etc.; cp. Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 375.

[2] Chap. i. 10, etc.

[3] Chaps. v. 5, xi. 15, xii. 10, xxii. 16.

[4] Christ is described as a lamb (ἀρνίον) twenty-nine times.

[5] Chaps. i. 17, ii. 8, iii. 14.

[6] Chap. i. 11, 17, etc.; cp. Isai. xli. 4, xliv. 6.

[7] Chaps. v. 13, xii. 5, iii. 1, v. 6, xvii. 14, iii. 7, xix. 11, v. 8–13, vii. 9, iii. 21, etc.

given to Christ (xix. 13), and implies His pre-existent activity in relation to creation. It is as the Word that He is called *the beginning of the creation of God* (iii. 14). This seems to be the earliest form in which the Logos-doctrine appears, and Dr. Westcott observes that "it is still kept within the lines of the Old Testament ideas."[1]

It must be remembered in estimating the significance of this exalted language that S. John writes with all the "monotheistic passion of the Jew."[2] And nothing in the book is more striking in this connection than the stern denunciation of idolatry (see chaps. ix. 20, xxi. 8, xxii. 15). The writer, however, seems to have no consciousness that the worship of the supreme God is imperilled, or His honour impaired, by the exalted position assigned to Christ. God and the Lamb are co-ordinate objects of worship. The wondrous visions of the fourth and fifth chapters seem, in fact, to be a pictorial expansion of the command, *Ye believe in God; believe also in Me.*[3]

ii. The work of Christ is contemplated as a victory in process of achievement. He rides forth on His course *conquering and to conquer.*[4] But the victory is accomplished through a redemptive death, followed by a heavenly exaltation. And further, His victory, historically realised, is the pledge of the victory of the Church. She is to be led to victory along the way of sorrows trodden by her Lord. Thus great stress is laid on the Passion; Christ is the Lamb slain and then exalted and adored; His blood brings release and cleansing to His redeemed. The thought of the Hebrews that the discipline of suffering was Christ's fitting preparation for His

[1] *Gosp. of S. John*, Introd. p. lxxxvii. [2] Fairbairn, p. 333.
[3] S. John xiv. 1. See Milligan, *The Book of Revelation* (Expositor's Bible), pp. 66, 67.
[4] Chaps. vi. 2, xix. 11 ff.

priestly work reappears in the conception of Christ as the eternal High-Priest standing and ministering in the midst of the Church.[1] But with this is combined the idea of the Son of Man victorious over His foes, which is characteristic of the later Jewish apocalyptic books. Indeed, it is implied that the lordship and kingly reign of Christ is the underlying truth of history and the goal of its movement. To live and reign with Him is the hope of the saints.[2]

2. *The Epistles* may be regarded as a kind of commentary on the Gospel, and seem to presuppose it at any rate as oral instruction. They also point to the diffusion of heresy of a docetic type, which in its developed form appears as Cerinthianism. The error of Cerinthus will meet us in another connection. Its central feature was the severance of the Divine element in Christ from the human; the Divine Christ being united to the man Jesus at His baptism and leaving Him before the passion.[3] Against this error, and other forms of speculation which denied the reality of the Incarnation, S. John asserts the unity of the person of Christ, and the reality and perfection of His humanity. The one Lord Jesus Christ is said to have come "*in*" not "*into*" the flesh.[4] In fact, the purpose which S. John has in view is to exhibit Christianity as the true way of union with God through participation in the real manhood of Christ, in whom the Divine life was once for all manifested, and in whom an actual Divine fellowship between man and God is guaranteed.

[1] Chaps. v. 9, 12, xiii. 8, i. 5, i. 12–17.

[2] See Chaps. xi. 15, xii. 10, xix. 15, 16, xx. 4, 6.

[3] Westcott, *Epistles of S. John*, pp. xxxiv. f.

[4] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 242, note g. Cerinthus taught that Jesus was a man born of Joseph and Mary, and asserted "*in eum* descendisse Christum," etc. Iren. i. 26. 1. Contrast 1 S. Jo. iv. 2.

The Incarnation is dealt with under three aspects—

(1) As a *mission* of God the Son[1] by the Father. This indicates the doctrine of subordination (ὑποταγὴ τάξεως) which is explicitly recognised in later theology. At the same time, the idea is suggested (as in ἀπόστολος, Heb. iii. 1) of the finality and authoritativeness of Christianity.

(2) As a *coming* of the Son of God *in flesh*. The true human life and sufferings of Christ are presupposed, and the sufficiency of the atoning sacrifice.[2] The different terms employed (ἦλθεν, ἥκει, ἐληλύθως, ἐρχόμενον) imply that the fact of the Incarnation not only occurred historically once for all, but is permanent and abiding in its results; and is perpetuated as a continuous Divine gift,—a gift which is appropriated through union with Christ.[3] It may be noticed in this connection that the general tone of the Second and Third Epistles is ecclesiastical, and presupposes such teaching as that of S. Paul on baptism (Rom. vi. 2 f.), fellowship with Christ being attained by the process of incorporation into His body.[4]

Finally, the permanence of Christ's manhood is represented as the ground of His intercession.[5]

(3) As a *manifestation* of the one true God under the conditions and limitations of a human life. The word ἐφανερώθη (1 Ep. i. 2, iii. 5–8) implies the pre-existence of Christ. In Him *the life* of God *was manifested*;[6] we learn finally and absolutely the character of

[1] ἀπέστειλεν, 1 Ep. iv. 10; ἀπέσταλκεν, 9 and 14; cp. Westcott, *Epistles of S. John*, pp. 121–125.

[2] See 1 Ep. iv. 2, v. 6, 20, ii. 2 (ἱλασμός, cp. iv. 10). See also 2 Ep. 7.

[3] 1 Ep. v. 11.

[4] Cp. Bede on 1 Ep. i. 3 (quoted by Westcott), "Manifeste ostendit B. Johannes quia quicunque societatem cum Deo habere desiderant primo ecclesiæ societati debent adunari."

[5] 1 Ep. ii. 1.

[6] 1 Ep. i. 2.

God. *God is Light, i.e.* self-imparting holiness and truth; *God is Love, i.e.* self-communicating and self-sacrificing goodness which seeks from man an appropriate response.[1] The absolute character of the Divine revelation in the Incarnate Christ is enforced by the protest against false progress (2 Ep. 9). The Incarnation is the test of all truth; to advance beyond it is to forsake the authoritative standard of faith, and so far to be parted from God. Only "faithful continuance in 'the doctrine' brings a living possession of God as He is revealed in His fulness."[2] To reject the Incarnation is to forfeit the true theism.

3. *The Gospel.*

It is a mistake to regard the Gospel as specially written with a polemical or didactic or conciliatory aim. It is, however, instinct with a purpose, namely, that of exhibiting the historic progress of belief—the stages or steps by which the person, whom S. John's readers already recognised as Divine, successively revealed Himself under the conditions of a human life. With this aim in view S. John selects typical incidents and discourses as illustrative of his central theme. He traces in the facts of Christ's earthly life the eternal principles of Divine self-manifestation, and the moral causes of the issue in unbelief or acceptance. While therefore the Apocalypse employs concrete imagery, the Gospel uses abstract phraseology. Such expressions as "the *Word*, the *life*, the *light*, the *darkness*, the *truth*, the *world*, *glory*, *grace*, are terms which at once place the reader beyond the scene of a limited earthly conflict, and raise his thoughts to the unseen and the eternal."[3]

[1] 1 Ep. i. 5, iv. 8.

[2] Westcott, *ad loc.*; cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 243, note t.

[3] Westcott, *Introd. to the Study of the Gospels*, p. 264. See a fine passage in Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 343, 344; cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* § 141.

Important questions arise as to the authenticity and character of the Fourth Gospel. Two points seem to be of special importance—(1) the relation of the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptists, in regard to which it is enough to note that S. John deals with the life of Christ as of one already admitted to be Divine. He writes for believers, and aims at depicting the Divine person, already acknowledged and worshipped, in typical stages of His self-manifestation. "The only real difference," says Bishop Martensen, "is that John gives distinct expression and prominence to that which is already present in the other Gospels, though in undeveloped fulness. The first three Gospels present the Divine glory of Christ essentially from the prophetic and eschatological point of view; or, if we may so express ourselves, the point of view of His *post-existence*. They regard His glory principally as the glory of the One who, having already come, will henceforth continue to come; on whom depends the future, not merely of the human race, but also of the universe. . . . . Now such a view of Christ involves in it the thought—a thought to which John gives clear expression—that He who is the *last*, who in His future will be exalted to power over all things in creation, over all things in heaven and on earth, must also have been the *first*, must have existed before all creatures;—the thought that He to whom we must ascribe post-existence in such a sense must also have been pre-existent."[1]

(2) The nature of the discourses. In these the words of Christ seem to be coloured partly by the strong Hebraistic cast of the writer's thought—which is direct,

[1] Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 127. This, it may be remarked, is only one point of view from which this question may be approached. The question is amply discussed by Westcott, *Gosp. of S. John*, Introd. pp. lxxvii. ff.; Watkins, *Bampton Lectures*; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 247 ff., etc. See also A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, bk. iii. chap. ix.

simple, and instinct with poetical parallelism; partly by the necessities involved in proclaiming the gospel to the new world of Greek thought in the midst of which the writer lived. The use of current phraseology would be necessary to translate Christ's teaching into suitable literary form. Again, as a historian with a very distinct conception of the person whom he describes, the writer may naturally be supposed to have interpreted to some extent what he records. There seems on this ground to be no reason whatever for disallowing a certain subjective element in the discourses as recorded by the evangelist. Finally, something is accounted for by the necessities of condensation. S. John appears to select, arrange, emphasise different sayings of the Lord in accordance with a premeditated plan, the exact limits of which it would be presumptuous to define. On the whole, the purpose and principle, according to which the discourses are grouped, becomes apparent on close study of the Gospel. S. John seems to give a compressed summary —"and that also," it has been said, "a summary in translation"—of what was uttered on certain critical occasions, each discourse being intended to present some particular aspect of Christ's person and work.[1] All utterances which the evangelist ascribes to our Lord, in the actual form which enshrines them, must be regarded as an integral portion of his theology. Historical criticism may properly deal with the question of the authenticity of the words ascribed to Christ; doctrinal theology is concerned with S. John's own conception of Christ's person and work.

Theology of the Gospel.

1. The central thought of S. John is contained in the sentence: *no man hath seen God at any time; the only-*

[1] On the "free reporting" of Christ's thoughts, see Bruce, *l.c.*, and Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N.T.* vol. ii. pp. 313, 314 (E.T.).

begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him (chap. i. 18, R.V.).[1] The Divine nature interpreted through the Sonship of Christ, revealed through the mediation of the word,—this is the starting-point of his theology.

We are first met by the doctrine of the Λόγος, a phrase which S. John seems to borrow, not from a Hellenic, but from a Palestinian source. In the Targums the *Memra* or "Word" is used paraphrastically to express the personality or character of a being.[2] Thus *the Word of God* is a paraphrase for God Himself. Both Philo and S. John would be familiar with the phrase; but each would read into it, so to speak, his inherited conceptions of the Divine nature and activity. Philo would connect the word Λόγος in the LXX. with the conceptions of current philosophy, Stoic or Platonist. S. John, inheriting a Jewish, *i.e.* a moral, not metaphysical, idea of God, seems to transfer the term *Word* to Christian theology, as expressing in Old Testament fashion the fact of Divine activity and self-revelation. Philo's dominant thought is that of the Divine *Reason*; S. John's that of a Divine *Word*, the manifestation of the Divine will in action. The one thought, as Dr. Westcott points out, is complementary to the other, and is characteristic of a different school of thought.[3] S. John's Λόγος is Hebraic; Philo's is Alexandrine.[4]

[1] On the reading of marg. μονογενὴς θεός, see Westcott, add. note, *ad loc.*

[2] Cp. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* § 145.

[3] Westcott, *Gosp. of S. John*, Introd. p. xvi.; cp. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. i. §§ 40, 41.

[4] The tendency of writers like Harnack and Pfleiderer is to return to the idea of the Philonian genesis of the Logos-doctrine. Thus Pfleiderer (*Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii. p. 239), says: "The whole religious view of the world of the Gospel of John is based upon Philo; as in his system, the Johannine has also its cardinal point in the opposition of God and world, and of the mediation of both by the Logos," etc. Cp. Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, § 7, 3; Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, No. ix.

The term Λογός as employed by S. John implies—

(*a*) Essential inherence in God. The *Thought* of God subsists *in* God as an eternal element in His Being. As the Fathers express it, God never was without His thought (ἄλογος). Thus all idea of what is material or created is excluded.

(*b*) Mediatorship between God and the universe. The Logos is the agent in creation, and the adequate and essential revealer of God's Being and purpose.[1]

The Logos of S. John is in fact a distinct and pre-existent Being, but the full significance of the title is only seen in its combination with the complementary conception of Sonship.

The expression Υἱὸς μονογενής brings out more fully the relation of the Λόγος to God. Gregory of Nyssa indeed insists that Logos is a relative term and connotes the essential Fatherhood of Him whose the Logos is. But the term *only-begotten Son* definitely expresses the truth afterwards embodied in the ὁμοούσιον: the Son's unity of essence with the Father. It implies, however, specially—

(i.) The truth of the Son's derivation from God, His subordination to the Father. Whatever the Father is, such is the Son; but His essence is communicated, derived from the fountainhead of Deity.

(ii.) Distinct, but unique personality.

(iii.) A relationship of perfect moral communion with the Father, and of co-operation in healing and saving activity.[2]

Thus the two terms taken together guard the true

[1] The Old Testament origin of S. John's conception of the Logos plainly appears in the reference to creation (chap. i. 3; cp. Ps. xxxiii. 6).

[2] An admirable statement of the relation between Λόγος and Υἱός is to be found in Newman, *Arians*, chap. ii. § 3; and Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 235 ff. Cp. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 340, 341.

conception of Christ's Person. The Son derives His being from the Father's substance, yet is coeternal with Him. The Logos is "identical with the eternal intellectual life of the Most High," yet has a personal subsistence distinct from that of the Father.

2. There are other titles applied to Christ in the Fourth Gospel which point to current Messianic expectations. Such are the *Lamb of God*, *the Son of God*, *the King of Israel*, *the Son of Man*, and such minor descriptive phrases as ὁ ἐρχόμενος (vi. 14), ἀπεσταλμένος (ix. 7), and others.[1] These are chiefly important, not as throwing light on the conceptions peculiar to S. John, but as connecting him with the whole stream of Messianic thought which prevailed among the Jews. They rather bear upon the authenticity of the Gospel than illustrate its theology. The frequency, however, of Messianic allusions is interesting as connecting S. John's representation of the historical Christ with that of the Synoptists. It assures us that the person described by all the four evangelists is one and the same, and that He fulfilled the anticipations of Hebrew prophecy.

There are two features connected with the Messiahship of Jesus to which special prominence is given in the record of S. John—(*a*) His Divine mission, (*b*) His heavenly origin.

(*a*) Christ continually speaks of Himself as *sent by God*,[2] and the acceptance of this fact is spoken of as the crowning point of faith and Divine knowledge. To recognise and welcome His message as an authoritative revelation of God is His great requirement of man. As the Son and consecrated messenger of God, He transcends the prophets of the Old Testament; as the object of Divine love He is entrusted with the Messianic authority

[1] Cp. Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, pp. 145–158.

[2] See chaps. v. 38, vi. 29, xvii. 3; cp. xvii. 8, 21, 23, 25.

and prerogatives. He has power (ἐξουσία) given Him to quicken the dead, to impart the Spirit, to judge the world.[1] On Him as Messiah it devolves to accomplish the works of God, especially *the work* (xvii. 4) which had been predicted for the Messianic times. His miracles bear testimony that He is sent by the Father, not merely as one messenger among others, but as a Son.[2] Hence S. John speaks of Christ's miraculous works as "signs," *i.e.* emblems of the spiritual operation of Divine power, which Jesus exercises in His Messianic calling.[3] They do more, however, than exhibit the nature of redemptive activity; they illustrate the relationship in which the Son stands to the Father. For the Son performs these works in absolute dependence on the Father's controlling will; in subservience to His purposes and the advancement of His glory. They are wrought in the power of an indwelling Divine life.[4] Here, then, the Messianic promise of Jehovah's presence in the midst of His people finds fulfilment. In Christ the Father finds a perfect organ of self-manifestation,—one who perfectly fulfils His counsel and ministers to His will; one to whom Divine prerogatives can be absolutely entrusted: *all that the Father hath*, our Lord declares, *are mine*.[5] Thus not merely is all severance of will or operation excluded; the unity of the two Divine persons is only adequately described in a phrase which implies no less than identity of essence: ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν.[6]

(*b*) Again, the fulfilment of the Messianic office is found to involve a closer relationship of Christ to God than that dependent on electing love merely. For the

[1] Chaps. v. 21, 22, 27, xv. 26, xvi. 7.
[2] Chap. v. 36.
[3] Cp. Weiss, vol. ii. p. 328, note 6.
[4] Chap. x. 38, xiv. 10.
[5] Chap. xvi. 15.
[6] Chap. x. 30. See an exposition of this passage in Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 3–5; cp. Liddon *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 185, 186.

fulfilment is larger than the promise: in the Messiah Jehovah not only makes Himself known; He becomes visible;[1] He manifests Himself as present and operative in the world. The special manifestation of God by Christ depends upon His unique knowledge, and the intimacy of His communion with the Father. This special knowledge is claimed by Christ in the synoptic record;[2] but in the Fourth Gospel His self-witness is even more explicit. He knows the Father in virtue of a pre-existent life of communion with Him; He knows Him with the direct intuition of one who alone has seen the Father's face.[3] He was the object of the Father's love *before the foundation of the world*;[4] He shared His glory, and only came forth from Him[5] to manifest Him under the conditions of an earthly life. He is of heavenly origin, but appears as the *Son of Man*;[6] the Divine glory belonged to Him from eternity, and He resumes it when the state of humiliation has reached its close.[7] That glory is veiled in the days of His flesh, but is in some degree manifested to the eye of faith.[8] The Incarnation is in fact the forthcoming of a heavenly being, and such a passage as viii. 42, *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον*, seems to point beyond the idea of Divine mission to that of Divine origin; to a connection with God "internal and essential, and not that of presence or external fellowship."[9] It implies the true Deity of the Son, as derived from the Father. The thought of Divine mission with which the verse concludes is merged in that of actual Divine nature and origin.

[1] Chap. xiv. 9–11.
[2] S. Mt. xi. 27; S. Lk. x. 22.
[3] Chaps. iii. 11, vi. 46.
[4] Chap. xvii. 24.
[5] Chaps. xvi. 27 (*παρὰ τοῦ πατρός*), xvii. 8, xiii. 3 (*ἀπὸ θεοῦ*), xvi. 28 (*ἐκ τοῦ πατρός*); cp. viii. 42.
[6] Chap. iii. 13; cp. Dan. vii. 13.
[7] Chap. xvii. 5.
[8] Chap. ii. 11.
[9] See Westcott, *ad loc.*

3. S. John's Gospel is not only concerned with transcendental theology; it delineates with special care the human figure of our Lord. It is the gospel of a human Christ, and records traits specially indicative of suffering and humiliation; the weariness, the thirst, the tears of Jesus are recorded by S. John alone. Yet it is to be noticed that the word ἐσκήνωσεν (i. 14) implies that the life in the flesh was a transitory stage in the course of a complete development; the human nature was the veil of a higher pre-existent personality,[1] the organ of a Divine self-manifestation. S. John in fact regards the human life of Christ under two aspects: as a partial concealment yet partial manifestation of a glory laid aside for a time, but finally resumed (xvii. 1–5). Consequently he speaks of the miracles as *signs* (σημεῖα) and *works* (ἔργα) appropriate to a supernatural Being, manifesting His nature and character. They are in fact manifestations of a pre-existent glory (ii. 11, xi. 40).

In the same way the sufferings of the passion are never dwelt upon as instances of humiliation, but rather as the initial stage in a final revelation of Divine grace. The humiliation is on its moral side glorification. The sufferings of Christ display the glory of the Divine character, infinite willingness to redeem, infinite capacity for self-sacrifice.[2] S. John seems to display no sense of a contradiction between the dignity of the Person who suffers and His actual experiences.[3] As it has been truly said, "He has seen the cross through the resurrection."[4] From the supreme moment when S. John *saw* the empty sepulchre *and believed*, the incidents of the

[1] See Westcott, *ad loc.* Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, p. 153, seems to think that the reference in ἐσκήνωσεν is to Jewish anticipations of a return of the Shekinah.

[2] See Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 34, 35.

[3] See Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 348. [4] *Ibid.* p. 345.

incarnate life were transfigured. Once exalted from the earth, once glorified, the Son of Man was seen as He is; and the work of the Spirit is to *glorify* Him more widely and fully, *i.e.* to manifest His true nature to the world (xvi. 14).

4. The characteristic work of the Redeemer is the communication of life; the thought of the Messianic kingdom falls into abeyance. The idea of eternal life corresponds indeed to the fact that individuals accept Him whom the Jewish nation as a whole rejects.[1] Eternal life is the gift of the Divine Saviour to those who receive Him; it is their present possession,[2] and brings with it the present blessedness of Divine fellowship.[3] As the bestower of this highest good Christ is Himself *the Life*, and *the bread that gives life to the world*.[4] The life consists partly in the perfect knowledge of the Father which is communicated in Christ; partly in the vital and re-creative energy which actually flows from His person. As the imparter of true Divine knowledge, He is the *Light of the world*;[5] as the source of quickening power, He is *the Saviour*, who delivers from the power of sin and death.[6] The deliverance is achieved by the sacrificial suffering of Him who is *the Lamb of God* (i. 29)—a term which seems to refer to the mute and patient sufferer of Isai. liii. 7. S. John clearly conceives the death of Christ as a sin-offering, and therefore attaches special significance to His blood, which has a propitiatory value, neutralising the sin which separates man from God, and a purifying power, by which the guilty soul is cleansed.[7] The idea of vicarious death is implied in the

[1] Chap. i. 11, 12.
[2] Chaps. iii. 36, v. 24, vi. 47, xx. 31; cp. 1 S. Jo. v. 12, 13.
[3] 1 S. Jo. i. 3. [4] Chaps. xi. 25, xiv. 6; cp. vi. 33, 35, 50, 58.
[5] Chaps. viii. 12, xiv. 6. [6] Chaps. v. 34, x. 9, xii. 47; σωτήρ, iv. 42.
[7] The functions ascribed to Christ's blood are ἱλασμός, 1 S. Jo. ii. 2

image of the good Shepherd (x. 11, 15; cp. xi. 51, 52), and in the express statement that Jesus gives His flesh for the life (ὑπὲρ τῆς ζωῆς) of the world (vi. 51). From this point of view Christ's work as life-giver is contrasted with that of Satan, the slayer of men from the beginning.[1] *The Son of God was manifested that He might destroy the works of the devil.*[2] The historic conflict between light and darkness indicated in the prologue results in the victory of light.[3] So in the Apocalypse the consummation of salvation is described as the triumph of life (xxi. 4).

§ VI. General Review of Apostolic Teaching on the Incarnation

The Epistles, surveyed as a whole, contain the gradual development, as the practical necessities of conflict and of evangelistic work required, of the doctrine of Christ's person. All the writers are at one in their general conception of the Incarnation, as a supreme self-manifestation of God.[4] But the common faith finds varying expression; a broad illustration of the gradual advance in clearness of view is to be found in the simple fact that in the Acts Jesus Christ is called *servant of the Lord* (παῖς κυρίου), while in S. John's writings He is called ὁ Λόγος. Of the different types of first century Christology three can be distinguished with more or less accuracy in the New Testament—(1) There is the type represented by S. James and S. Peter, whose Christology is objective,

(see Westcott, add. note, *l.c.*), and καθαρισμός, 1 S. Jo. i. 9; cp. Heb. i. 3, ix. 14, 22.

[1] Chap. viii. 38, 41, 44. [2] 1 S. Jo. iii. 8.

[3] νικᾶν, νίκη are characteristic words of S. John. Elsewhere only thrice in N.T. (S. Lk. xi. 22; Rom. xii. 21; cp. viii. 37).

[4] Cp. Harnack, *Grundr. der Dogmengeschichte*, § 5. 2.

simple, and closely related to Old Testament conceptions of the Messiah. (2) There is the theology of S. Paul, the opponent of Jewish particularism: dialectical, anthropological, and practical. (3) There is the contemplative and mystical type, represented by S. John and some of S. Paul's later Epistles, which seem to be of a transitional character. It is the tendency represented by the Johannine Christology that is found to prevail during the period immediately subsequent,—the age of Logos-theology. Only at a later period, especially in the theology of Augustine, do the conceptions most characteristic of S. Paul come specially into the foreground.[1] But each aspect of the apostolic teaching becomes a permanent element in the theological thought of the Church. Thus, underlying the common belief of all the writers, we find very different conceptions of the actual nature of Christ's work. According to S. James, Christianity is the engrafting of the Divine word of truth, which becomes the perfect law of liberty written on the heart of man. S. Peter regards it chiefly as a new birth to a life of hope, of which the source is Christ's resurrection. S. Paul dwells on the possibility of justification which has been opened to faith by the finished work of Christ, and the new creation which has been achieved by the operation of Divine grace. To the author of the Hebrews the characteristic effect of the Incarnation and Passion is "perfection" (τελείωσις), *i.e.* the perfect accomplishment of the true end of religion, the union of man with God. The Apocalypse develops the thought of the progressive

[1] Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 18. This account differs widely from the view of Tübingen critics that the theology of the next age ought rightly to be considered a "Hellenised Paulinism, or Paulinised Hellenism" (Pfleiderer). According to this view, S. John's Gospel does not represent a different apostolic type, but is in its main conceptions based on the teaching of Paul and Philo.

Divine victory inaugurated by Christ's triumph over death. S. John embraces these various aspects of Christian salvation in the one comprehensive conception of eternal life. The diversity thus recognised cannot fairly be resolved into antagonism; it is adequately explained by the method of revelation, which comes to man, not in the form of a code or system, but as the progressive self-manifestation of the Divine Spirit, who *breatheth where He listeth*, and whose presence is a law of liberty.

It is important to remember what lies at the root of the apostolic teaching—the spiritual consciousness of the whole Christian society, and the witness of worship and tradition. In this connection we should notice that three elements constitute the basis and safeguard of Christian belief.

1. The tradition (*κήρυγμα ἀποστολικόν*—*παράδοσις ἀποστολική*)—whether of doctrine or of the Christian facts. To this S. Paul and S. Jude allude; and the early Fathers refer to it as orally delivered in the different churches. This tradition served to guard the essential elements of Christian belief before a scientific theology had developed itself.[1]

2. The Eucharist. The witness of worship supplemented that of oral tradition. It was a standing evidence of the truth of the apostolic message; a continuous memorial of Christ's command given on the eve of His Passion. The Eucharist was, in fact, based upon a certain belief as to Christ's person: it *showed forth* His mediatorial death; it linked the first coming to the

[1] Cyr. Hieros. *C.I.* v. 12: *οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔδοξεν ἀνθρώποις συνετέθη τὰ τῆς πίστεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ πάσης γραφῆς τὰ καιριώτατα συλλέχθεντα μίαν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν τῆς πίστεως διδασκαλίαν.* "The word *παράδοσις* (traditio) originally comprehended the whole tradition of the doctrine of salvation, without distinguishing between the oral and the written" (Hagenbach, § 31, note 2).

second; it was the memorial and pledge of a vital union of God and man. Further, the rite of baptism, including as it did the remission of sins, "stood connected with the higher estimate of Christ's person, inasmuch as the basis of remission was laid in Christ's propitiatory work."[1] And it should be observed in general how great is the importance to be attached to early Christian liturgical hymns and doxologies as evidence of Christian belief.[2] There are traces of hymns even in the Apocalypse, and two important liturgical pieces are preserved in the *Didache* and the *First Epistle of Clement*. Christ is there described as *παῖς θεοῦ*, by whom true life and the knowledge of God have been revealed, and praise is ascribed to Him.[3] He is *high-priest* and *guardian of souls* (*προστάτης*, 1 Clem. lxi.; cp. *δεσπότης τῶν πνευμάτων*, of *God*, lxiv.), and is regarded generally as the medium through whom all Divine grace and blessing is bestowed. But there is nothing of specific doctrinal importance in these prayers, and no reference to the facts of Christ's life, death, or resurrection. On the other hand, an early writer, quoted by Eusebius, insists on the testimony of early hymnology as to the Church's Christological belief. "How many psalms and hymns of the brethren are there, written by faithful men from the beginning, which sing the praise of Christ as the Word of God, thus ascribing to Him Deity."[4] And Pliny's letter to the Emperor Trajan testifies that the central feature of early Christian worship was the praise of Christ as God.[5]

[1] Dorner, *Doc. of the Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 167.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 172, 181.

[3] *Didaché*, ix., x., *ὡσαννὰ τῷ υἱῷ Δαβίδ.*

[4] Caius ap. Euseb. *H.E.* v. 28. [Routh, *Reli. Sacr.* ii. 129 ff.] *ψαλμοὶ δὲ ὅσοι καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γραφεῖσαι, τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες.*

[5] Plin. *epp. ad Traj.* xcvi. On the witness of worship generally, see Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 393 ff.; Bingham, *Antiquities*, xiii. 2.

3. There is also the witness of holy seasons to be considered, notably the institution of Sunday, *the Lord's Day*, marking the close of the old creation and the foundation of the new. The observance of Sunday commemorated the fact of the resurrection, with which a Divine life, a higher order, had originated. Ignatius even speaks of Christians as "no longer observing Sabbaths, but fashioning their lives after the Lord's Day, on which our life also arose through Him and through His death."[1] There is some doubt as to the exact origin of Sunday observance, but the traces of it are very early.[2] Akin to it in dogmatic importance is the great festival of Easter, the first founded of the great Church feasts, testifying to the reality and completeness of the redemption wrought by Christ.

In the Gospels and Apostolic Epistles the records of revelation lie before us in their diversity and their unity. The various types of doctrine succeed and supplement each other; the truth they contain is a deposit once for all committed to the Church.[3] Thus early teachers insist that the apostles committed the whole body of revealed truth to the Church. "This," says Tertullian, "we believe at the outset that there is nothing further which we are bound to believe." "The apostles," says Irenæus, "poured most amply into the Church, as if into a rich depository, all that pertains to the truth." "What they then preached," he elsewhere says, "they afterwards by God's will transmitted to us in Scriptures—as the foundation and pillar of our faith."[4]

[1] Ign. *ad Magn.* ix.; cp. *Barn. ep.* xv., which speaks of Sunday as ἄλλου κόσμου ἀρχήν [Dorner, div. i. vol. i. p. 423].

[2] Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Plin. *l.c.* "soliti *stato die* ante lucem convenire," etc. Cp. Bingham, xx. 2.

[3] 1 Tim. vi. 20; Jude 3, etc.

[4] Tert. *de præscr.* 8; Iren. iii. 4. 1; 3. 1.

It follows that the Scriptures are the criterion of catholic truth. On this point the teaching of East and West is unanimous. It is enough to give two typical utterances. Cyril of Jerusalem says to his converts, "Do not believe even me when I teach you these things, unless you receive the demonstration of what I announce to you from the Divine Scriptures." S. Augustine writes, "In those things which are openly set down in Scripture are found all the things which make up our faith and rule of life."[1]

[1] Cyr. *C.I.* iv. 17 ; Aug. *de Doc.* ii. 9 ; cp. Hipp. *c. Noet.* ix. ; Ath. *c. Gent.* i. ; Vinc. *Common.* ii. ; T. Aquin. *Summa*, pars 1, q. i. a. viii. ad 2.

PART III

THE AGE OF APOLOGETICS

§ I. The Apostolic Fathers.

§ II. Heresies as to Christ's person in the first and second centuries.

1. Ebionism.
2. Gnosticism: Marcion.

§ III. The Defence of the Faith.

General characteristics of Eastern and Western theology.

§ IV. The Greek theology.

Epistle to Diognetus.
The Apologists in general.
Justin Martyr.
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§ V. Western theology.

General survey.
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§ I. The Apostolic Fathers

The Apostolic Fathers derive their name from the fact which gives to their writings such peculiar value, namely, that they hand on to the generation that succeeds them the traditional teaching of the apostles. Substantially their conception of Christ agrees with that of the apostles; but the faith of these early Fathers is, in expression at least, rudimentary and inchoate; they speak as men who use the unstudied language of devotion, and their writings lack the fulness, richness, and comprehensiveness of inspired Scripture. They repeat such biblical phraseology as had reached them, whether in oral or written form, but without attempting to construct a system of theology. They insist upon the central fact of the tradition, the appearance of a Saviour who was Divine, but they do not examine its bearings, nor face the problems it inevitably presents. They cling with childlike tenacity to the received faith, without attempting any theoretical explanation, or any apologetic defence of their belief. They are content with simply pointing out its relation to Old Testament prophecy, and its correspondence with common human needs. The fact is that in the age immediately following the apostles, the Church was mainly absorbed in dealing with practical tasks, and cultivating the Christian life. A new joy had dawned upon the world: the possibility of forgiveness and of goodness. The intense realisation of this blessing, and the passionate desire to extend it to others, sufficiently accounts for some of the features which strike us in a survey of the sub-apostolic writings. We are impressed, for instance, by the way in which the *Didache* formulates the life of holiness in its doctrine of the "two ways"—an idea which seems to have been common in the first age, and possibly had a pre-Christian

basis.[1] Church-fellowship is primarily membership in a community pledged to holiness, to the fulfilment of God's will. The gospel is regarded as a new law, and even Christ Himself is presented as the supreme Lawgiver, who has revealed the way of life, and in so doing has become the Saviour of mankind.[2] We notice, too, the practical dualism which insists on separation from the world as the main condition of salvation; that acute sense of the rooted evil of the world which betrays itself in the common belief of early Christians in regard to the pervading presence and busy activity of evil spirits. It would seem that these writers had inherited S. John's idea of a world wholly subject to the power of the evil one, and utterly alienated from God. To such thinkers Church discipline, unity, and organisation would seem to have absolutely vital importance, as a protection against sin and error. Hence we find in the foremost Father of this age an untiring insistance on submission to episcopal rule and governance, which he evidently believes to be an indispensable safeguard rather of unity and order, than of true doctrine. The period of the Apostolic Fathers is, in fact, one in which the Incarnation is regarded primarily as a supreme gift of God, the meaning, power, and depth of which is intensely and deeply felt, but inadequately expressed. And it should be noticed how strong is the *church-consciousness* of the apostolic writers—*i.e.* their sense of belonging to one holy Church of God which has existed in all the ages. "If we fulfil," says the writer of the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, "the will of God our Father, we shall belong to the first Church, the spiritual Church which existed before the creation of the sun and

[1] Harnack speaks of the Διδαχή as a "catechism of Christian life," and traces it to the "gnomic" teaching of Alexandria and to the Sermon on the Mount.

[2] Cp. Herm. *Sim.* viii. 3 and 7.

moon; but if we fulfil not the Lord's will, we shall be of the scripture that saith, *My house has become a den of robbers.*"[1] There is indeed apparent in these writers the sad sense of isolation; of belonging to a community scattered to the four winds;[2] but the faithful were sustained by the dignity of their function as light-bearers and witnesses for truth in a world of darkness. They felt themselves to be the soul of the world,[3] and were supported by hopes of the approaching return of Him whom they had learned from the Old Testament to know as the promised Messiah, and from their own spiritual experience as Divine Saviour.[4]

The Christology of the Apostolic Fathers.

After making all allowance for the inadequacy and imperfection of the statements of the Apostolic Fathers on the subject of the Incarnation, it seems difficult to resist the impression that on the whole their Christology is of the "pneumatic" type, *i.e.* they believe in the Incarnation as the manifestation of a pre-existent Being in human form, and this Being they recognise as Divine.[5] They speak of Him as *Son of God*, without indeed fully comprehending the consequences of the confession, and being very possibly influenced by Messianic traditions; but in any case the phrase seems to imply a pre-existent Sonship. In the Incarnation it is God who has been *mani-*

[1] [2 Clem.] xiv. The same idea of the pre-existence of the Church is found in Herm. *Vis.* ii. 4.

[2] *Didaché*, ix, x.

[3] *Ep. ad Diog.* vii.

[4] See 1 Clem. 23, Polyc. 2, Barn. 4. Cp. the prayer of *Didaché*, ix.; *Jud. Petri*, i. *s. fin.*

[5] The distinction between the *pneumatic* and *adoptianist* Christology is Harnack's. It raises the question whether, in the view of the early Church, Christ was a pre-existent Spirit (Divine), or a human person adopted by God and made the object of an apotheosis. See Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, § 11, p. 36. The theory is examined, and shown to be based on very inadequate evidence in Prof. Swete's book, *The Apostles' Creed*, pp. 27 ff.

fested in flesh. The thought of a true Divine Sonship exists in the consciousness of the Church before there is any conception of an eternal generation.[1]

This doctrine of a pre-existent Sonship is implied in several passages of the Epistle of *Barnabas*,[2] notably in the fifth chapter, which speaks of Christ as the unendurable sun veiling His glory in order to dwell with men. "Then He manifested Himself to be the Son of God. For if He had not come in the flesh how could men have been saved by beholding Him, seeing that even when they look upon the sun, which must one day cease to exist, and is the work of His hands, their eyes are unable to bear His rays." The writer speaks of the Son as "manifested in flesh";[3] as Lord, who will judge the living and the dead;[4] as Son "not of man, but of God," of whom David speaks as *My Lord* in Psalm cx.[5]

Hermas is a writer of less importance, and is thought to favour a lower form of Christology (Adoptianist).[6] In tone and spirit he is more akin to S. James; and it is clearly not his main object to state the doctrine of Christ's person. Meagre, however, as are the references to our Lord in Hermas, there are two things which seem to range him on the side of the *pneumatic* Christology. On the one hand, he makes the explicit statement (*Sim.*

[1] Swete, *l.c.*

[2] *Barn. ep.* v. § 10. The date of this work is fixed by Lightfoot in the reign of Vespasian, 70–79 A.D. (see *Epist. of S. Clem.* vol. ii. p. 509); but Hort inclines to place it in Hadrian's reign (after 117), *Jud. Christ.* p. 191.

[3] *e.g.* chaps. vi., xii. [4] Chap. vii. [5] Chap. xii. § 10.

[6] Harnack (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 160, note 4) seems to assign a disproportionate importance to Hermas. He admits that he is the only writer who gives "clear expression" to the adoptianist Christology; and that this type of belief can only be discovered by a "closer investigation" of the extant literature. He also acknowledges that the "pneumatic" Christology is that of S. Paul, S. John, the writer of the Hebrews, the Pastoral Epistles, and other Apostolic Fathers. Cp. Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, pp. 28, 29.

ix. 12) that the "Son of God is prior in origin to all His creation, so that He was the fellow-counsellor of the Father in His [work] of creation." On the other hand, we should notice that the Son of God is described as *Spirit*, a term which raises important questions as to the writer's conception of the relation between the different persons of the Divine Trinity, but appears certainly to imply the doctrine that the Son is a pre-existent Being.[1] It is quite possible that Hermas held a confused view of Christ's person, and even identified Him with the Holy Spirit, but he does not hesitate to speak of His pre-existence with the Father;[2] and it should be added that while he uses the title *Son of God*, he avoids the name *Christ*, which on Harnack's theory would have seemed the more natural appellation. Finally, the function assigned to the Son of "sustaining the universe" corresponds to the description of Him as the "counsellor" of God.[3] It would seem unreasonable to doubt that Hermas, in spite of his Judaic tendency, adhered to the apostolic view that in Christ the Divine and pre-existent Son had been manifested on earth.[4]

There is less question in regard to the theology of *Clement*, who is specially mentioned by Irenæus as one

[1] See the whole of *Sim.* ix. 12, where the phrase *φανερὸς ἐγένετο* occurs.

[2] See *Sim.* v. chaps. 5 and 6. There is great controversy as to the views of Hermas on Christology. A good summary of the main opinions is given by Funk, *Opera Patr. Apostol.* pp. 457–459 (ad *Sim.* v. 5). Lightfoot appears to accept the view that Hermas applies the term *Spirit* to the pre-incarnate Son (cp. [2 Clem.] § 9). See Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. pp. 123–135; Bull, *Def. Nic. Creed*, bk. ii. c. 2.

[3] *Sim.* ix. 14, *εἰ οὖν πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ βαστάζεται, κ.τ.λ.* *Sim.* ix. 12, *σύμβουλος.*

[4] The ancient homily known as "Second Epistle of Clement" is valuable as the product of an age from which few literary fragments survive (*circ.* 140). It opens with a protest against low (Ebionitic) views of Christ, *οὕτως δεῖ ἡμᾶς φρονεῖν περὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς περὶ θεοῦ . . . καὶ οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς μικρὰ φρονεῖν περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν.* On its resemblance to the *Shepherd* of Hermas, see Lightfoot, *S. Clem. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 200.

who faithfully handed on the tradition of the apostles, especially all that they had taught about the unity of God and the continuity of His action in the Old and New Testament. The Almighty God who created the world, called Abraham, gave the law, and sent the prophets, is also "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."[1] Clement is remarkable for his comprehensiveness; without being philosophic or systematic, he combines different elements of the apostolic teaching. His view of our Lord's person may be gathered from the Trinitarian formulæ which occur in his Epistle,—passages in which Christ is co-ordinated with the Father and the Holy Spirit.[2] Language is also used by Clement which implies that to him Christ is a living, active person, the object of the devotion of the Church, and the source of its present life. Christians are exhorted to pay Him reverence.[3] He is called the "beloved Son" (*παῖς*) of God, sent from God, Mediator of the Divine revelation, and author of man's salvation. He is further described as High Priest—a term borrowed directly by the writer from the Epistle which seems to form the groundwork of his thought, that to the Hebrews. Accordingly, Clement lays much stress on the salutary sufferings of the Saviour, as having infinite merit and efficacy. Through the shedding of His blood we have redemption; the pains which He endured were "the sufferings of God,"[4] the Church is His flock, and He its Lord.[5]

It cannot, on the whole, be said that language of this type is inadequate, though it is unsystematic and devo-

[1] Iren. iii. 3. 3.

[2] 1 Clem. §§ 46, 58. The formula in 58 is quoted by S. Basil, *de spir. sanc. sancto* 29, as "archaic."

[3] See §§ 21, 59, 42; cp. 16, *ἦλθεν*, 36, 61, 64, 7, 21, 49, etc.

[4] § 2, *τὰ παθήματα τοῦ θεοῦ*, according to the oldest reading. See Lightfoot, *ad loc.*

[5] §§ 32, 54.

tional. Doxologies are generally addressed to the Father through the Son, but in one case Clement seems to ascribe Divine glory and majesty directly to Jesus Christ.[1]

The Christology of IGNATIUS will repay a closer study. His letters are marked by a force, freshness, and individuality that brings them nearer than the other writings of this age to the Apostolic Epistles themselves. The general tone and tendency of his thought is akin to that of S. Paul's later writings, especially the Epistle to the Ephesians.[2] His main work, however, was that of a Church ruler. He felt himself called to the task of defending and consolidating the organisation of the Church in view of dangers arising from an incipient form of heresy, which seems to have combined a Judaistic insistance on ceremonialism with docetic views of our Lord's person. To minds imbued with Oriental mysticism it appeared inconceivable that a Divine Being should have come into contact with gross matter. The human life and sufferings of one who was truly God could only be apparitional or putative (*ἐν δοκήσει*).[3]

Ignatius accordingly insists positively on two fundamental truths—

1. The true union in Christ of a Divine and a human element: as Ignatius expresses it, the union (*ἕνωσις*) of spirit and flesh. In this antithesis lies the gist of his theology. It is sufficient by way of illustration to quote one crucial passage (*ad Eph.* vii.): *εἷς ἰατρός ἐστι σαρκικὸς καὶ πνευματικὸς, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς*

[1] § 20; cp. §§ 50, 64. [2] Harnack, *Grundr. der Dogm.* § xi. p. 41.
[3] Iren. iii. 16. 1: "Alii vero [dicunt] putative eum passum, naturaliter impassibilem exsistentem." See generally Lightfoot, *S. Ignatius*, vol. i. pp. 359–368. As to the exact character of the heresies attacked by S. Ignatius, see Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, Lect. x.

ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν.[1] Of this antithesis each side is developed in different passages. The *deity* of Christ is asserted in almost "theopaschite" language in *Ephesians* xviii., "Our God, Jesus the Christ, was conceived in the womb by Mary according to a dispensation." So Ignatius speaks of "the passion of my God," "the blood of God," "Jesus Christ our God," "Son of Man and Son of God."[2]

In one passage Christ is called Λόγος, and is described as the essential revealer of God. "There is one God who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ, His Son, who is His Word that proceeded from silence, who in all things was well-pleasing to Him that sent Him."[3] He existed at the Father's side from all eternity.[4] Ignatius simply states this aspect of the truth without offering any solution of the problem as to the Divine unity. Here we see in germ the Logos-doctrine of the apologists, and the antinomy which they endeavour to solve. On the other hand, Ignatius insists vehemently on the reality of Christ's *human experience and sufferings.* In his striking phrase, the gospel is the "flesh of Jesus."[5] Thus in one passage he speaks of Jesus Christ "who was of the race of David, who was the Son of Mary, who was truly born and ate and drank, was truly persecuted under Pontius

[1] The expression ἀγέννητος does not deny the Divine generation of the Son, that conception not having in Ignatius' day been systematically thought out. It is no proof, therefore, that Ignatius denied the pre-existent Sonship. His aim is simply to enforce the antithesis ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός. Cp. Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, pp. 27, 28. In a later age γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος would have been more cautiously expressed. See Lightfoot, *S. Ignat.* vol. ii. pp. 90 f. (Excursus), who remarks that to Ignatius "the eternal γέννησις of the Son was not a distinct theological idea"; see also Bull, *Nicene Creed*, vol. i. p. 96.

[2] See *Eph.* Inscr. and §§ 1, 20; cp. *Rom.* §§ 3, 6, etc.

[3] *Magn.* viii.; cp. *Eph.* xix.; *Rom.* viii.

[4] *Magn.* vi.; cp. *Polyc.* iii. τὸν ὑπὲρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς ὁρατόν, κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, E.T. vol. i. p. 163.

[5] *Philad.* v.; cp. ix.

Pilate, was truly crucified and died . . . who, moreover, was truly raised from the dead."[1] Again, "He suffered truly, as also He raised Himself truly, not, as certain unbelievers say, that He suffered in semblance, being themselves mere semblance."[2] It would seem as if the word ἀληθῶς were a kind of "watchword against docetism."[3] The real humanity of the historic figure in the Gospels was the ground of all that Ignatius hoped and suffered.[4] His faith centres in Jesus Christ incarnate.

2. The nature of the Church corresponds, in Ignatius' view, to the dual nature of Christ. She exhibits and perpetuates under visible, earthly conditions the Divine life of her Head. She is indwelt by Jesus Christ; His life is her life, and the mirror and guarantee of the oneness of the Divine life is the episcopate; the bishop embodies and represents the double-sided life of the Son of God. "Thou art fleshly," says Ignatius to Polycarp, "and spiritual."[5] The bishop visibly embodies in an earthly sphere the grace and power of a spiritual and celestial order. So, again, sacraments have a double nature: under a visible material form is veiled the gift of a spiritual presence, of a Divine life. In them, too, the union of flesh and spirit is perpetuated.[6] The life of the Church has, in fact, its visible secular side, and its invisible spiritual side, but the life is ever one and the same, namely, the life of the glorified Christ Himself. He is the personal source of life and therefore of unity; through sacraments the one life is communicated to the faithful; in the episcopate the perpetuation of the one life is symbolised and secured;[7] outward union with the

[1] *Trall.* ix.
[2] *Smyrn.* i., ii.; cp. *Magn.* xi.
[3] Lightfoot on *Trall.* ix.
[4] Cp. *Trall.* x.
[5] *Polyc.* ii.
[6] See *Smyrn.* vi., viii.; *Philad.* iv.
[7] See *Magn.* i.: ἐν αἷς [ἐκκλησίαις] ἕνωσιν εὔχομαι σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ διὰ παντὸς ἡμῶν ζῆν. *Ibid.* xiii.: ἵνα ἕνωσις ᾖ σαρκικὴ τε

Church is, in fact, the condition of spiritual union with Christ. Hence Ignatius' repeated insistance on subjection to the bishops and presbyters.

The fundamental thought of these passages seems to be common to the sub-apostolic age. Thus the writer of the *second epistle of Clement* describes the Incarnation in an unusual phrase. Christ, he says, "being originally spirit became flesh";[1] but as regards the Church he goes further than Ignatius, and traces an analogy between the incarnate Lord and the visible Church. The Church also, he insists, "existeth not now for the first time but hath been from the beginning: for she was spiritual, as our Jesus also was spiritual, but was manifested in the last days that He might save us. Now the Church being spiritual, was manifested in the flesh of Christ, thereby showing us that, if any of us guard her in the flesh and defile her not, he shall receive her again in the Holy Spirit: for this flesh is the counterpart and copy of the spirit."[2]

There is a strong vein of mysticism in Ignatius, which is exemplified in his treatment of the facts of the Redeemer's birth and death;[3] but this does not interfere with his general tendency to insist on the objective reality of the Incarnation. Ignatius is the great teacher of the sacramental significance of the incidents of the incarnate life. In this respect he would seem to be powerfully influenced by the thought of S. John, and may be regarded as the forerunner of Melito, Irenæus,

καὶ πνευματική. Cp. *Rom.* Inscr.; *Smyrn.* i. A catena of passages on the ministry is collected by Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, c. 6.

[1] [2 Clem.] ix.

[2] [2 Clem.] xiv. The general idea is probably Platonistic, and is further developed in the Valentinian system with its æon "Ecclesia." See Lightfoot *ad loc.* Hermas also dwells on the pre-existence of the Church. *Vis.* ii. 4; cp. *Vis.* i. 3.

[3] See *Eph.* xix.

Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria.[1] The short epistle of POLYCARP exhibits a close dependence on earlier writings, especially S. John's first Epistles, and is peculiarly valuable on account of its fidelity to the tradition, "the word delivered unto us from the beginning."[2] Polycarp also speaks of the fundamental Christian fact as "the coming of our Lord in flesh."[3]

In the above brief survey of the Apostolic Fathers it has been our aim simply to illustrate their conception of Christ's person. There were many contemporary currents of thought and speculation which have left their impress on these early writings, but it is no part of our plan to investigate them, or to show their bearing on the thought of the early Church. We started with the statement that Christianity in its essence is not so much a creed as a fact. It has been the aim of this section to show how that fact was apprehended in the apostolic age; what was its influence on thought and action. Accordingly it is important to notice how the central fact is made the basis of corporate life and organisation. The Church consists of small and scattered communities of believers bound together by common ordinances and united by a common hope, looking for a speedy return of the Lord to judge the world, and meanwhile cultivating a life of brotherly kindness and austere sanctity, as the most effective means of witnessing to a hostile world their belief that in the incarnate Christ, God had indeed *visited and redeemed His people.*

§ II. HERESIES AS TO THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CENTURIES

The first great struggle of the Church was with Jews and heathens without her pale. In the second century

[1] Harnack, *Grundr. der Dogm.* § xi. p. 41.
[2] Polyc. *Ep. ad Phil.* c. vii.; cp. 1 S. Jo. ii. 24. [3] *Ibid.* vi., vii.

she had to contend with elements of Judaism and heathenism within. Incipient traces of this struggle are already discernible in the Pauline Epistles: we find S. Paul dealing with Judaistic reaction in the churches of Galatia; with tendencies to ethnicism in Corinth; and with a form of Essene-Gnosticism at Colossæ. But during the course of the second century heresy assumes definite and systematic shape, and, generally speaking, appears in one of two forms—(1) Ebionism, (2) Gnosticism.

1. Under the name Ebionism may be included all modes of thought which tend to regard Christ merely as a human teacher; all Judaising "pseudo-Petrine" tendencies. Practically Ebionism is Christianised Judaism, appearing at first, perhaps, as an imperfect form of Christian belief, but having a retrograde tendency in a Jewish direction.

2. Gnosticism, on the other hand, is of the nature of a reaction towards heathenism, and may with some correctness be described as a "pseudo-Pauline" tendency. It is in fact essentially a kind of heathen theosophy which incorporates a Christian element in its theory of redemption.

Thus while Ebionism contracts the area of Christianity, Gnosticism is rather a vague expansion of it. Ebionism is akin to the "adoptianist" view of Christ;[1] "the meagre, common-sense moral view." Gnosticism represents the speculative, "pneumatic" view of Christ, only exaggerating it in a docetic direction. Perhaps we might go further and maintain that in these two forms of misbelief we have the fundamental prototypes of all the errors that meet us in Christological thought; the exaggeration which in countless forms is the product on the one hand of a deistic, on the other of a pantheistic conception of God.[2] Both types of thought are opposed

[1] Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 128.

[2] Cp. Wordsworth, *The One Religion*, Lect. ii.

to the reality of the doctrine of a Divine Incarnation. Ebionism anticipates the Arian view that Christ is no more than a creature of God; Gnostic docetism, the Eutychian denial of the permanence of our Lord's humanity.

I. *The Ebionites.*

The original Jewish Christians who adhered to their national customs[1] while they accepted the Christian faith probably called themselves Nazarenes. Theirs was a timid, narrow, stunted, imperfect Christianity. They used the so-called Gospel of the Hebrews, and observed Mosaic ordinances, but did not positively refuse to hold communion with Gentile Christians. Their conception of our Lord's person, though by no means adequate, was at least higher than that of other Judaistic sects, and S. Jerome, perhaps, fairly describes them as being neither Christians nor Jews. This type of belief is probably represented by the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, which seems to have been written shortly after the fall of Jerusalem. In this work Christ is connected with the tribe of Levi, and is regarded as the giver of a new law.[2]

The Ebionites, if we are to regard them as distinct from the Nazarenes,[3] are the rigid descendants of those fanatical Judaisers whom we meet with in the earlier Epistles of S. Paul, with the difference that their belief is more formal, consistent, and reactionary. Of these there seem to be two well-marked types: Pharisaic and Essene.

1. The Pharisaic Ebionites were a larger and more

[1] Just. M. *Dial.* xlvi.: τὸ σαββατίζειν λέγω καὶ τὸ περιτέμνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τὰ ἔμμηνα φυλάσσειν καὶ τὸ βαπτίζεσθαι ἀψάμενόν τινος ὧν ἀπηγόρευται ὑπὸ Μωϋσέως (qu. by Hort, *Jud. Chr.* p. 194).

[2] Cp. Lightfoot, *Galatians* (ed. 6), p. 320.

[3] The distinction is questionable, though maintained by Zahn and Bishop Lightfoot. Harnack thinks that apart from the Gnostic Jewish Christianity (see below) "there is but one group of Jewish Christians holding various shades of opinion, and these from the beginning called themselves Nazarenes as well as Ebionites" (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 257).

influential body than the Nazarenes. The name *Ebionite* is Hebrew, and its history is obscure; possibly the name *Ebionim*,[1] "poor men," was originally applied by Church writers to the Hebrew Christians generally, whether in its literal sense or as suggesting that they claimed to fulfil the first beatitude. At anyrate after the fall of Jerusalem the name became in fact restricted to the bigoted and sectarian party who did not, like the Nazarenes, approximate to the Church, but developed the heretical tendency which was latent in their conception of Christ; "as they had never really perceived what was involved in the faith that Jesus is the Christ, their faith respecting Him would inevitably shrink."[2] They may accordingly be regarded as Jewish Christians (Nazarenes) whose faith had degenerated into a belief that Christ was a mere man. This at anyrate is the main point of their creed.[3] Characteristic of this sect were also (1) their view as to the permanent obligation of the law; (2) their extreme millenarian ideas, according to which the earthly Jerusalem was destined to be the centre of a Messianic kingdom of Christ and His saints; (3) their abhorrence of S. Paul as an intruder, apostate, and heretic. There were other minor points still in dispute among these sectaries, *e.g.*, the question of Christ's supernatural birth, which need not detain us.

2. More prominent, however, than the Pharisaic Ebionites were those of a Gnostic type, whose ascetic and mystical tendencies may have been due, as Bishop Lightfoot thinks, to the influence of the Essenes. The

[1] אביון is thought by some early writers (*e.g.*, Tert. *de Præscr.* 33) to be the name of a personal founder. Orig. *c. Cels.* ii. 1, suggests that it implies "the poverty of their law." In v. 61, he distinguishes between the two types of Christology; cp. Iren. i. 26. 2.

[2] Stanton, *Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 166.

[3] See Just. M. *Dial.* 267D; cp. Hort, *Jud. Christ.* p. 200.

forerunners of these may already be discerned in the heretics denounced by S. Paul in the Epistle to the Colossians. This younger type of Judaic Christianity soon tends to eclipse the elder, and in fact seems to have had a wide expansion: partly because of its speculative and theosophic tendency, which harmonised with permanent elements in the Syrian character; partly because it became embodied in a literature. From this sect emanate the pseudo-Clementine writings which apparently belong to the second half of the second century, and the Book of Elchasai (or Elxai), which occasionally gives a name to the sect.[1] The general history and character of this literature does not concern us, but the Book of Elxai is important as indicating the principal tenets of the sect from which it emanates, and the general standpoint of their Christology. The gospel is depicted as a restoration of the primeval, universal religion, which has ever been perpetuated in the world, and is identical with the Mosaic system regarded not as a ceremonial law, but as a type of religious belief. The organs of this religion are the great prophets, in whom Christ, the one true prophet, has successively revealed Himself. Thus He seems to be identified with Adam, the primal man, who has reappeared at various epochs in human history; in fact, Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses are seven different incarnations (so to speak) of the same being who has reappeared in Christ. There seems to be

[1] Hilgenfeld collects the fragments of the Book of Elxai, *Nov. Test. extra Can. rec.* Cp. Harnack, i. 260 ff. See Epiph. *Hær.* lii.; Hippol. *Philos.* x. 29. Harnack briefly deals with the question of the date and composition of the *Clementina*, and assigns to them a late date (200–250 at the earliest); he inclines to trace them to a catholic source, and thinks that their purpose is didactic and moral, not theological. They presuppose the diffusion of Elchasaitism, and display the influence of Stoic and Pantheistic ideas (i. 264 ff). Bigg, *Studia Biblica*, vol. ii., suggests a different view of their origin, which Harnack pronounces "not improbable."

no trace in the system of any conception of Christ as the Saviour. He is only a teacher and prophet, who has been frequently manifested on earth in various forms.[1] This idea of Christ's repeated births was intended apparently to secure the continuity of Christianity with the pure religion of the Old Testament; and to commend Judaism to the world by representing it as the primeval and universal religion. The same object was aimed at in the doctrine of forgiveness, which might be bestowed on everyone who observed certain ceremonial conditions and made a profession of faith.[2] In return for these concessions, the ordinary restrictions of the Jewish mode of life were to be observed.

Apart from these theosophic ideas, the Gnostic or Essene Ebionites approximate to the Pharisaic sect in their insistance on the legal system, but with a certain tendency to expansion; for baptism takes the place of circumcision, and ceremonial ablution that of sacrifice. Again, they display a similar hostility to S. Paul, whose lineaments can be distinctly traced under the figure of S. Peter's great enemy, Simon Magus. Practically this form of Ebionism was rigidly ascetic—a feature which betrays the latent dualism of the system. Over against the Divine Wisdom is set Satan, the prince of the material world; the good principle, however, and the evil are alike essential elements in the Divine Being, and thus the entire system seems to be based on a pantheistic neutralisation of moral distinctions in God.

It is not difficult to see how Ebionism of the type above described leads on to the system of Cerinthus. While Oriental influence would tend to strengthen the prevalent idea of the essential evil of matter, the Jewish

[1] Epiph. *l.c.*: Χριστὸν δὲ ὀνόματι ὁμολογοῦσι, κτίσμα αὐτὸν ἡγούμενοι καὶ εἰ ποτε φαινόμενον· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πεπλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Hippol. *Philos.* ix. 13.

mind would ever find a stumbling-block in the doctrine of a crucified Messiah. On the one hand, it would appear inconceivable that a Divine being should create, or be in any sense subjected to material limitations; on the other, an easy escape from the scandal of the Passion would be opened by a docetic view of Christ's sufferings. The earlier stages of this idea were combated by Ignatius; the developed form of it is found in the system of *Cerinthus*, whose main characteristic as a teacher is the double distinction or severance (μερισμός) which he maintains (1) between the supreme Deity and the Creator, (2) between the man Jesus and the heavenly Christ. According to Cerinthus the Christ, a celestial being, whom possibly he identified with the Holy Spirit, descended upon Jesus at His baptism, anointed Him to the Messianic office of revealing the unknown Father, and forsook Him again before His Passion. Accordingly Cerinthus may be correctly regarded as the representative of Essene Judaism in its final stage.[1] His chiliastic views seem to exclude him from the ranks of the Gnostics. He found, indeed, a place for some characteristic Gnostic ideas in his system, but his view of our Lord as a mere man, endowed with an exceptional gift of the Divine Spirit, is essentially Ebionitic. It is, however, a matter of some difficulty to determine precisely his true relation to the different types of error which have been under consideration.[2] A close study of the nature of the Judaising movement in the first and second century makes it

[1] Cp. Iren. i. 26. 1; Euseb. iii. 28. Schaff, *Ante-Nic. Christianity*, vol. ii. § 123. Cerinthus is akin to Judaistic heretics—(1) in his gross chiliastic views and insistance on circumcision; (2) in his rejection of the Gospels, except a mutilated S. Matthew. Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 197; Lightfoot, *Ignatius*, i. 364–368; Westcott, *Epp. of S. Jo.*, Introd. pp. xxxiv. f.

[2] See the divergent views in Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 23, note 4. The question is discussed by Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, Lect. xi.

evident that manifold phases of misbelief and shades of speculation were only too likely to be current. It need only be observed finally that the main tendency of Judaistic error, in its Essene development, is to a false spiritualism. While the earlier type of error is rationalistic, the later is speculative. As Dorner remarks, "The tendency which conducts to Sabellianism and that which conducts to Arianism are as yet turbidly confused";[1] they begin to separate in the third century, and assume a distinct and more or less philosophic form.

II. *Gnosticism.*

The systems of thought which are classed together under the general name of "Gnosticism" are not without importance as real attempts to present Christianity in its true character as the absolute religion. That which the mass of believing Christians accepted as a perfect way of life must be capable from another point of view of being presented as a universal system of Divine knowledge. Herein, however, lies the main error of Gnosticism. It is based on a narrow and exclusive conception of Christianity as a new philosophy of the universe, of history, and of the Divine nature itself. It has a characteristic tendency to ignore or disparage the historical origins of Christianity,—to disconnect the facts and ideas of the New Testament from their root in the Old Testament history. Nevertheless it is important to recollect that Gnosticism, as a factor in the history of the Church, is only one form in which the reigning spirit of Greek philosophy finds its embodiment. In the second century Hellenic paganism tended to assume a syncretistic character. "The cultured," says Harnack, "no longer had a religion in the sense of a national religion, but a philosophy of religion." The baffled instinct of worship, and the yearning for moral self-

[1] Dorner, *op. cit.* div. i. vol. i. p. 217.

discipline, found their satisfaction no longer in the outworn creed of Greece, but in the cults and mysteries of the East. Gnosticism has in fact a practical, as well as a speculative side, and this no doubt accounts for its dangerous attractiveness in an age when Christianity was still struggling for its existence, and the spiritual needs of mankind were peculiarly urgent.

1. And yet in one of its aspects Gnosticism has the character of a pagan reaction.[1] It marks the reappearance within the Christian pale of the exclusive aristocratic spirit of ancient philosophy and religion. Its leading feature is an over-estimation of knowledge and a depreciation of faith. Faith was regarded as a virtue fitted only for the rude mass of mankind; the animal men (ψυχικοί) who were incapable of higher things. Far superior to them were the spiritual (πνευματικοί), whose privilege was not to believe, but *to know*. This exclusive temper had already displayed itself in apostolic times,[2] and is closely connected with a fundamental misconception as to the meaning of redemption, as if men were to be saved not by faith but by speculation,—not by love but by knowledge. The spirit of the Gnostic systems was thus diametrically opposed to that of Christianity. "For our prophets," says Origen, "and Jesus Christ Himself and His apostles, were careful to adopt a style of address which should not merely convey the truth, but which should be fitted to gain over the multitude, until each one, attracted and led onwards, should ascend as far as he could towards the comprehension of those mysteries which are contained in these apparently simple words." [3] The gospel had indeed pro-

[1] There is thus an element of truth in the idea of Irenæus (ii. 14.1 ff.) that Gnosticism actually borrowed some of its ideas from heathen mythology.

[2] Cp. 1 Cor. viii.

[3] *c. Cels.* vi. 2 (Clark's translation). See *ibid.* vii. 60, and cp. Col. i. 28.

mised the true knowledge of God; but knowledge was destined to be the outcome of a moral discipline in which faith must be a constant and essential element.

2. Again, Gnosticism was in principle eclectic, borrowing from many systems, and incorporating widely different elements. Its tendency was, to use a convenient term, highly syncretistic. It drew material from Oriental, Hellenic, and Jewish sources; it employed in dealing with the Old Testament the allegorical method already in vogue among Greek philosophers and in the Christian schools.[1] And all the scattered elements were combined chemically, as it were, in a fantastic or even poetic system which can only be appropriately called Christian in virtue of the prominent idea of a redemption of which Christ is the agent—an idea which, in one form or another, is common to all forms of Gnosticism. It is probable, as Harnack remarks, that no such considerable stress was laid by the Gnostic teachers on the theoretic details of their systems as on the practical discipline of life by which they attracted their followers, and the place they assigned to Christ; the philosophic life was held to be of higher importance than philosophic theory. It seems difficult otherwise to explain the practical success and wide extension of the Gnostic movement. In some way it must have satisfied the yearning for a higher life and the spirit of devotion to Christ. But it seems inaccurate to describe the Gnostics as "the first theologians,"[2] except in so far as they attempt to deal constructively with the new material supplied to thought by the Christian faith. The revelation of the gospel had profoundly modified current ideas of God, and of His action in nature and history. The Gnostics are so far theologians that they endeavour to restate the doctrine of God in accordance with those vast conceptions of the

[1] Cp. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 75, 76. [2] Harnack.

Divine nature and providence which had been opened to man by the Incarnation of Christ; that they attempt to grasp and articulate the master thought of S. Paul that in Christianity was revealed *the dispensation of the fulness of times*,[1] the catholic religion, which must ultimately supersede all other systems of faith, even the most venerable. What the Gnostics lacked was the idea of a historical development or education of faith, and to this deficiency is due their rejection of the Old Testament. They exaggerated one side of the Pauline theology, while they overlooked S. Paul's insistance on the permanent value and importance of the Old Testament history and theology.

The various attempts that have been made to classify the Gnostic systems need not here detain us; we are rather concerned with the general features common to a widely-diffused intellectual tendency. For "the epoch-making significance of Gnosticism for the history of dogma," says Harnack, "must not be sought chiefly in the particular doctrines, but rather in the whole way in which Christianity is conceived and transformed." Some sects betray affinities with Judaism; others display an expansive tendency, admitting more of the pagan mythopœic element; in others, Christian ideas are preponderant. The most practicable division, but one which must be adopted with caution, is that which is based on the geographical distribution of the Gnostic sects. The Syrian Gnosticism may be distinguished from Alexandrian Gnosticism on the one hand and from the practical and critical system of Marcion on the other. But the greater groups were surrounded by a number of motley communities which defy classification, and exhibit various phases of intellectual extravagance. Broadly speaking, the Oriental dualistic and ascetic element is characteristic of the Syrian school, of which Saturninus and

[1] Eph. i. 10.

Bardesanes are representatives. The Platonistic idea of God, and an elaborate system of *æons* or emanations from the supreme Deity is characteristic of the Alexandrine Gnosticism of Valentinus, which spread widely in Gaul and the West. The system of Marcion is connected with Asia Minor, and is perhaps not to be regarded as Gnosticism proper, but rather as an exaggerated form of Paulinism. Nor is it clear to what extent, or for how long a period, the different Gnostic sects stood in any definite relation to the Church. The prominent teachers would naturally excite suspicion by their aggressive attitude towards the Old Testament; but it was not so easy as we are apt to suppose, to formally exclude false teaching from the pale of the Church in days when an authoritative standard of doctrine was as yet lacking.[1] Nor does it appear to have been a simple matter to form and organise associations or schools apart from the Church. But at anyrate the problem presented to the Church by Gnosticism was that of excluding a false view of Christianity, and this was found to be most easily achieved by insisting on the real doctrinal significance of the tradition. Gnosticism thus paved the way for the more complete formulation of the Christian creed.

The problems with which Gnosticism busied itself were mainly two—(1) the problem of creation; of the mode in which an infinite, absolute, transcendent Being can come in contact with, or be the creator of matter; (2) the existence of evil, and the means of deliverance from its power. These problems were approached in the light of a prejudice common to all the Gnostic systems, and ultimately derived, in all probability, from Oriental sources, namely, the idea of the essential evil of matter. Redemption was thought to consist in the liberation of the spiritual element from the bondage of matter, a result

[1] Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, pt. i. bk. i. c. 4, § 4 (vol. i. 214 f.).

to be attained through rigid asceticism and intellectual enlightenment. It is the need of such redemption that gives occasion for Gnostic soteriology and Christology.

It only concerns us for present purposes to collect the leading characteristics of Gnosticism as a system opposed to the doctrine of the Church.

1. The repudiation of an Incarnation, a manifestation of Deity in visible form. To evade the idea of a true Incarnation,—a real contact with matter,—a docetic view of Christ's humanity was adopted (*e.g.*, by the Syrian Gnostics and Tatian); or, on the other hand, a distinction was made between the heavenly æon Christ and the man Jesus. This implied a double nature and a double personality in Christ. The Redeemer as Redeemer was not strictly human, for human nature was inherently sinful. Coherent with this general point of view in Christology is the conception of redemption as enlightenment; Christ is the revealer of the unknown God, and delivers man from the bondage of material existence. His historical appearance is itself the manifestation of the truth by which mankind is redeemed.

2. Insistance on the contrariety between the Old and New Testament, and a consequent distinction between the supreme Deity and the inferior, or even hostile, creator (Demiurge). The supreme God was the God of the New Testament revealed by Jesus Christ; the inferior Deity was the God of the Jews. This view implies an opposition between creation and redemption, and is also based on the belief that the New Testament alone is the record of revelation, and that whatever be the historical value of the Old Testament, its religious significance is comparatively little. According to one interesting Gnostic document, which may be quoted in illustration, the God of the Old Testament is most properly described as just; inferior to the perfect God,

and falling short of His righteousness, being in fact "generated, and not ingenerate."[1] The Demiurge was the lowest of a hierarchy of æons, or heavenly beings emanating from the supreme Godhead, gross enough in nature to come in contact with matter, and therefore a possible medium through whom the higher might pass over into the lower, the Divine, spiritual, and uncreated element into the created and material sphere.

3. Characteristic of the Gnostics is also the appeal to a secret tradition supposed to be derived from the apostles themselves. This secret tradition was to be elicited by a critical examination of the apostolic writings, and a free use of the allegorical method. The consequence of this position was a tendency to reject the historic tradition of the Church as to the facts of Christ's earthly life. Events and actions were treated as mere symbols; texts were distorted or explained away by allegorising. The narrative of the Gospels was represented as being not a history of Christ, but an allegorical description of cosmological facts and laws. History was only the fluctuating outward expression of intellectual and moral ideas; Christ had no history in any intelligible sense. A word should be added as to the practical system of the Gnostics. Compared with the uniform ethical teaching and discipline of the Church, the practice of the Gnostics varied in one of two directions. Some sects were ascetic, professing to follow the example of Christ in forbidding marriage, the acquisition of property, and the use of flesh or wine. The Syrian Gnostics were, as a rule, of this type. Other communities were antinomian and immoral; thus the Nicolaitines, Carpocratians, and some of the Egyptian Gnostics cultivated "indifference";[2] matter

[1] γεννητὸς ὢν καὶ οὐκ ἀγέννητος. *Ptolemæus ad Floram*, ap. Epiph. *Hær.* i. 33.

[2] τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ζῆν.

being alien from man, and hostile to spirit, was to be used or left unused at pleasure; contact with it could neither hinder nor help the upward strivings of the spirit.

Enough has been said to illustrate the general character of Gnostic ideas and speculations. There can be no doubt that they gave a powerful impetus to the "world-appropriating" tendency in Christianity. In spite of much that is fantastic, arbitrary, and even revolting in different systems, the Gnostic movement as a whole exercised deep and lasting influence on the Christological thought of the Church. It undoubtedly owed its wide popularity to its hold upon the central thought of Christianity,—the redemption of the world by a Divine Being condescending to man's need; and many of the problems which confronted later theologians, were already anticipated by Gnostic thinkers. But the rock on which Gnosticism split was its implied denial of the universality of the Christian salvation. "Had Gnosticism remained unsubdued," says Dorner, "it would have appeared as if thought or science and Christian faith were mutually contradictory. Thus there would have been introduced into Christianity the intolerable distinction of an esoteric and exoteric truth, which would be as foreign to its nature as Gnosticism itself." [1]

Marcion is, perhaps, hardly to be classed as a Gnostic, inasmuch as his interest is more practical than speculative, and his aim was that of being a reformer of the Church on the basis of what he believed to be the Pauline gospel; indeed, he was the founder of a church of his own, and so far differed from the Gnostics as to exalt faith above knowledge. His system is akin to that of the Gnostics, however, in drawing a sharp distinction between the good God, whose free grace is revealed in the New Testament, and the limited, defec-

[1] *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 254 (E.T.).

tive being revealed in the Old Testament. The basis of his system is, in fact, an exaggeration of S. Paul's familiar antithesis between law and gospel, flesh and spirit, works and grace. Three points may be specially noticed.

1. Marcion's criticism of the Old Testament, which was of the hard, crude, literalistic type. Carrying with him to the study of the Old Testament a pessimistic idea of the imperfections of the created universe and the severity of natural laws, he seemed to himself to discover in the God of the Old Testament a being whose attributes corresponded to the actual phenomena of the world: a being limited in power and knowledge, hard and just, but destitute of any moral quality that held out hopes of redemption to man.

2. Opposed to this being was the God of love revealed in Jesus Christ, who proclaims the gospel of grace to mankind, and founds the Divine kingdom on earth. But this idea was traversed by a very limited conception of the meaning of salvation, and by the same prejudice against matter that distinguished the Syrian Gnostics. It was only the spirit of man that would be redeemed; the flesh was necessarily subject to the power of the inferior God. Hence Marcion taught a rigid asceticism; and his teaching was soon distorted in a dualistic direction.

3. His significance for Christology is that his system bears witness to the general faith of Christendom that in Christ the love and grace of God were finally manifested. It is true that Marcion conceived Christ's bodily appearance as docetic; Christ assumed an apparent body, and was therefore exempt from any necessity of human birth or human development.[1] He seems, however, very inconsistently,[2] to have attributed special

[1] Tert. *de Carne Christi*, 1: "Marcion, ut carnem Christi negaret, negavit etiam nativitatem, aut ut nativitatem negaret, negavit et carnem," etc.

[2] Tert. *adv. Marc.* iii. 8.

value and importance to our Lord's death upon the cross, perhaps in deference to prevailing Christian ideas. Indeed, in Marcion's view, the very essence of Christianity was the revelation of grace in Jesus Christ; this central fact S. Paul alone, as he supposed, among the apostles had grasped; and Marcion believed it to be his own special mission to restore the fundamental truth of Christianity to its rightful place in the consciousness of the Church. This was the aim of his one-sided and rationalistic biblical criticism,[1] and of his attempt to found a church of believers, which should bring the life of practical Christianity within the reach of ordinary men. Further, Marcion's opponents were compelled to acknowledge that in the standard of their moral life his followers did not fall short of the highest Christian ideal. But what is chiefly noticeable in his Christology is a feature which often meets us in the history of doctrine, namely, the way in which his view of Christ's nature and office is distorted by a false conception of God. He betrays throughout his system a dualistic tendency; he was so carried away by the idea of redemption as a work of beneficent love that he could not imagine the coexistence of other Divine attributes with love—exact punitive justice and necessary hostility to human sin. He is, in fact, overmastered by the supposed antithesis between the Old and New Testament revelation. He cannot conceive the method by which Divine love acts: its slow and gradual approaches, its progressive self-manifestation, its disciplinary delays. The Old Testament theophanies he dismissed as "unworthy of God." Thus Tertullian rightly remarked that with Marcion "all things happened on a sudden."[2] He had no idea of a gradual and

[1] See Mansel, *The Gnostic Heresies*, p. 207.

[2] Tert. *adv. Marc.* iv. 11: "Subito Christus, subito et Joannes. Sic sunt omnia apud Marcionem." Cp. *de Carne Christi*, 2.

progressive Divine movement towards man; but it was this very idea that formed the basis of the catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, according to which the Divine Logos, who had ever been the light of men, manifested Himself finally in a human form. As Harnack remarks, "Marcion's attempt is a proof of the unique value of the Old Testament to early Christendom, as the only means at that time of defending Christian monotheism."[1] In abandoning the historical basis of Christianity, Marcion misconceived the very truth which he had at heart, in spite of his desire to exhibit it in its primitive purity.[2]

§ III. The Defence of the Faith

Gnosticism had served one great purpose. It had aroused interest in Christianity as *the Truth*, and had so given a decided impetus to the formulation of Christian doctrine. The latter half of the second century is marked by the rise and development of a rule of faith in opposition to the shifting creeds of Gnosticism, and by the beginnings of a systematic apologetic, *i.e.* an endeavour to conceive and state scientifically the creed of the Church. Probably every church already possessed a brief baptismal confession, rehearsing the main facts of the Christian tradition.[3] But the hostile pressure of the Gnostic movement soon convinced the Church of the absolute necessity of possessing a fixed standard, by which strange doctrines

[1] *Dogmengeschichte*, vol. i. p. 243.

[2] The system of Marcion marks the first of those "Pauline reactions" which are "the critical epochs of theology and the Church." "One might," says Harnack, "write a history of dogma as a history of the Pauline reactions in the Church, and in doing so would touch on all the turning points of theology. . . . Paulinism has proved to be a ferment in the history of dogma" (i. p. 116); cp. Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, pp. 53, 283 ff.

[3] Cp. Ep. of S. Jude, 3; Clem. *ad Cor.* i. 7; Polyc. *ad Phil.* 7.

might be tested. It would seem that it was the Roman Church which mainly encouraged the tendency to formulate the common faith; and the Apostles' Creed in its present form seems to bear the marks of conflict with Gnostic speculation. It has been said, not perhaps altogether inaccurately, to be "the simple but emphatic protest of the Church against Gnostic heresies; the summary of that which was believed or felt to be true."[1] Thus the first clause affirms that God is one, and is Himself the Creator of the world, unlimited by any evil or inferior power. The phrase, "His only Son our Lord," sets aside the hierarchy of æons. The recital of Christ's incarnation, passion, death, and resurrection excludes docetic ideas of His humanity. The creed, in fact, as a whole, asserts the truth which forms the essence of the Church's faith. But the teachers of the period 150–300 A.D. do not merely hold tenaciously to the substance of the tradition of belief which they had received; they endeavour to give it philosophic expression, and to exhibit it in its relation to scientific thought. The period is, in short, an age of apologetics, and the writers whom we are to consider may be fairly described as apologists, inasmuch as they are mainly concerned to vindicate (1) the historical continuity of Christianity—its connection with the history and theology of the Old Testament; (2) the absolute character of Christianity as a final revelation of a God who had never left Himself without witness. In the Old Testament the apologists found a link of connection with Judaism; in current philosophy a point of contact with the Hellenic mind; to both Jews and Greeks they acknowledged a debt.

A prominent and characteristic feature of Gnosticism had been its exaltation of knowledge over faith. This point of view might be met in one of two ways,

[1] Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 111.

either by recognising the element of truth it contained, and endeavouring to estimate the true function and sphere of intellect in religion; or by an uncompromising resistance, which might take the form of a disparagement of human reason, and an insistance on its necessary limitations. It may be remarked that both tendencies have an essential function to fulfil in Christian thought. The first has been described as "the world-appropriating," the second as the "world-resisting" tendency.[1] "There will ever exist," says Neander, "two tendencies of the theological mind, of which, while the one will seek to understand and represent the supernatural element of Christianity in its opposition to the natural, the other will endeavour to point out its connection with it. The one will seek to apprehend the supernatural and supra-rational element *as such*; the other will strive to apprehend it in its harmony with reason and nature—to portray to the mind the supernatural and supra-rational as being nevertheless conformable to nature and to reason. Thus there is formed a predominance of the supra-naturalistic or of the rationalistic element, both of which, however, in a sound and healthy development of Christian doctrine, ought to exist in due measure and proportion."[2] The two tendencies may be said, with justice, to characterise respectively the Latin and Greek theologians of the apologetic age.

The Western theology may be traced to the school of S. John in Asia Minor, which viewed the faith in the light of a deposit to be secured and guarded from corruption by faithful transmission. Irenæus, whose education in Asia Minor constitutes him a connecting link between the disciples of S. John and the churches of Gaul, transplants this tendency to the West. The

[1] Neander, *Church History*, vol. ii. pp. 196-198.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 197; cp. the same writer's *Antignosticus*, Introd.

Western mode of regarding Christianity was ethical and practical. The Roman mind especially was marked by wonderful tenacity of an idea or system once grasped, and a strong instinctive sense of its moral bearings. In Tertullian, again, the prevalent spirit of the West found an instrument who could give it scientific expression. He was a theologian "in whom the elements of the Roman and of the Carthaginian character mutually pervaded each other."[1] The Greek theology, on the other hand, especially in its Alexandrine representative Clement, was speculative, quick to assimilate, and marked by a wonderful aptitude for harmonising revelation with reason. It may be contrasted with the Latin theology as being more optimistic in tone, and perhaps comparatively deficient in *moral* as opposed to intellectual interests. Thus while the Westerns regarded the faith mainly as a rule of truth or body of doctrine authoritatively delivered, and secured by the fixed organisation of the Church, the Alexandrines insisted on the continuity of revelation. To them Christ was not merely the final revealer of a transcendent Deity, but the Logos who in all ages of the world's history has been enlightening and educating humanity; Christianity was not merely a creed, but a perfect philosophy. The contrast or divergence between the two types of mind has been sometimes exaggerated;[2] it might be carried into almost endless detail, and is a tempting subject for antithetic treatment;[3] but for our present purpose it is enough to notice that these two types of thought are not related as higher and lower, for each has its due place in the Christian mind. The Church is at once the *salt* and

[1] Neander, *Church History*, vol. ii. p. 199.

[2] As by Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, pp. 176 ff.

[3] See, for instance, Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* bk. i. chap. iv. §§ 1, 2.

the *light* of the world, *i.e.* distinct and separate from the world, even while necessarily attracting all that is akin to itself. It may also be remarked that the predominant tone of thought in the Church was, as we should antecedently expect in an age when persecution was still common, of the Western type. The apologists of the Greek school are in fact the first who stem the prevailing current of Christian opinion when they teach that Christianity is not only a life, but a philosophy.[1]

Before entering further into detail, we may notice one great thought which gives its theological character to this age. Before the appearance of Gnosticism, the term Logos was "a little used treasure";[2] as applied to Christ's person it had been left undeveloped. The practical result of Gnosticism is that the significance of the term Logos is more completely realised and expanded by the leading teachers, both Eastern and Western. What then we have to study in the theological writers of this epoch is the rise and development of the doctrine of the Logos. It was an expression already current in religious philosophy; the work of the apologists is to claim it for Christian faith.

§ IV. The Greek Theology

The *Epistle to Diognetus* may be regarded as a kind of introduction to the theology of the second century. It is a beautiful treatise, anticipating the thoughts of later theologians of the type of Athanasius, but expressing them with a freshness and simplicity that points to an early date of composition.[3] Apart from its apologetic

[1] Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 21. 2.

[2] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 257.

[3] See Cruttwell, *Lit. Hist. of Early Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 300–308. Cruttwell is inclined to place it between 161–180 A.D. In any case the idea of Justin Martyr's authorship is inadmissible.

purpose, and its explanation of the nature of Christianity as a manifestation of the power of God on behalf of helpless humanity (c. ix.), the epistle is interesting for its high estimate of knowledge—a point in which it anticipates the teaching of Clement. Thus (c. xii.) the writer says, "Not the tree of knowledge destroys [man], but disobedience; . . . life without knowledge is not safe, nor knowledge without true life. . . . Let your heart be knowledge, and your life the true word received." Here is displayed that anxiety to present Christianity as the highest philosophy which marks all the apologists, combined with the thought that, though rational in its content, the Christian faith is the result of a Divine revelation, and can only be apprehended by a mind supernaturally enlightened.

The Christology of the letter may be shortly summarised. Christ is significantly described as *the Word*, and is represented as fulfilling two functions—(1) that of Revealer, (2) that of Redeemer.

1. As revealer, the Word manifests the true nature of God as Love. It is noteworthy that this hint is left undeveloped by the writers who are most influenced by Platonism, but it is expanded by Athanasius in his treatise on the *Incarnation*. God is revealed by "His only begotten Son,"[1] who is sent primarily that men may know God as Father. Originally the Creator of the universe (τεχνιτής), He is sent into the world as the Father's representative (ὡς θεὸν ἔπεμψεν) and as being the natural Mediator between God and man. Accordingly it is His work to manifest the true character of God, who had ever showed Himself "not only kind to man, but also long-suffering. And truly He always was, and is, and will be such,—kind, good, slow to anger (ἀόργητος), and true, and indeed the sole being who is

[1] Chap. x.

good."[1] Further, the Divine method in redemption was worthy of the Divine character. The Son was not sent, as man might have supposed, to exercise tyranny, or to smite with fear. "Rather the Father sent Him in gentleness and meekness, like a king sending his son who is also a king; He sent Him as God, as man to men; He sent Him as purposing to save, as persuading, not doing violence to men, for violence is no part of God's nature. He sent Him as calling men, not pursuing; He sent Him as loving them, not judging."[2] Thus with great beauty the ethical aspect of redemption is insisted on, as an act worthy of a God of love, and fitting in relation to a moral being such as man; for it is hinted (c. x. *init.*) that there is an essential affinity between the Logos indwelling the soul of man and the Logos who reveals the Father—a thought more fully developed by the Alexandrines.

2. As Redeemer, Christ comes to reveal the Divine compassion for sinners; to suffer as their ransom and the price of their redemption, after long forbearance on God's part, and the filling up of the cup of human iniquity. Salvation, which is life, could in no other way be attained by man than by a gift of Divine pity. The death of the Son is not stated to be an atoning sacrifice for sin, but rather a supreme manifestation of Divine love, and the source to mankind of Divine healing, light, strength, and life.[3]

Here, then, we have the characteristic notes of the Greek theology, which perhaps reaches its most complete expression in the *de Incarnatione* of S. Athanasius. It only remains to note that the writer calls himself "a disciple of apostles," and professes to "minister what has been handed down" to himself.[4] The epistle, in

[1] Chap. viii. [2] Chap. vii. [3] See the beautiful passage, chap. ix.
[4] Chap. xi. (the genuineness of which, however, is doubtful).

fact, embodies in a finished literary form that view of the Incarnation which is characteristic of S. John.

From the writer of the *Epistle to Diognetus* we pass to the group of second and third century writers generally known as apologists, the principal names being those of Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus, Athenagoras, and the Latin writers Tertullian and Minucius Felix. All these may be said to have in common the conception of Christianity as a philosophy or system of truth, based on Divine revelation and attested by the continuous witness of prophecy. All agree in teaching the natural correspondence of the Christian "philosophy" to the reason of man. In a sense the Christian view of God, and the world, and the human soul is as old as the creation, and the apologists occasionally insist that what other philosophers have well said belongs to Christianity.[1] Even Tertullian, in spite of his vehement repugnance to human philosophy, accepts the same point of view when he calls the soul of man "naturally Christian."[2] Christianity is, in a word, the true and absolute religion, revealed to man from heaven, and resting on the authority of a line of inspired prophets. "For from the beginning God sent into the world men worthy, in virtue of their uprightness and innocence of life, to know God and manifest Him—men fulfilled with the Divine Spirit."[3] And the self-manifestation of God has been impartial, not, as the Gnostics taught, confined to a small minority of mankind. "Not only," says Tatian, "do the rich among us pursue our philosophy, but the poor enjoy instruction gratuitously; for the things which come from God surpass the requital of earthly gifts. Thus we admit all who desire

[1] Justin, *Apol.* ii. 13; cp. Tatian, *c. Græc.* xxxi.; Theoph. *ad. Autol.* iii. 29; Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* vi.

[2] Tert. *Apol.* xvii.

[3] Tert. *Apol.* xviii.

to hear."[1] In the same spirit Clement explains the words of S. Paul to Titus: *the grace of God which bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men.*[2] The very fact that the apologists make their appeal to Gentiles makes them apparently the more careful to insist on the universality of the faith they defend.

It is important when we first come in contact with the conception of Christianity as a philosophy (ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία) to distinguish the two main currents of thought which were inherited by the apostolic writers: Stoicism and Platonism. From Platonism were derived those speculative ideas which already to some extent appear in Philo, respecting God and His relation to the universe: the abstract conception of Deity, as a Being transcending the capacity of human faculties; the dualistic opposition of God and the material universe; the idea of redemption as consisting in knowledge, and attainable by ascetic discipline; the unfettered tendency to religious and cosmological speculation, combined with a certain deference to religious authority. On the other hand, the influence of Stoicism appears in the conception of Christianity as natural religion (Tertullian), in the tenacious grasp of ethical ideas, in the concrete conception of the faith as a deposit, a body of truth once for all delivered, beyond the range of which speculation was to be discouraged. Probably a common feature of both systems was the use of allegorism,[3] which played so large a part in the theology of the Gnostics, the Greek apologists, and the systematic theologians of Alexandria.[4] Coloured, then, to some extent by previous thought, the philosophical conception of Christianity found expression in the doctrine of a Divine Logos.

The term Logos was, as we have seen, a formula

[1] *c. Græc.* xxxii.
[2] *Protrept.* i. § 7.
[3] Cp. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, No. 2.
[4] Harnack, i. 109 f.

already current in religious philosophy. It was an aid to thought in its efforts to conceive the mode in which a Divine Being could undergo such movement, change, and limitation as is implied in the work of creation and providence. For the Greek apologists, and to some extent even the Latin, were dominated by Platonistic conceptions of God. They described Him for the most part in negative predicates, "ineffable," "ingenerate," "invisible," "incomprehensible," and the like.[1] God was conceived primarily as the supreme cause, manifesting Himself in the order and rationality of the created universe, before He manifests Himself in revelation. The Logos, the personified Divine Reason, thus appears to be the necessary and essential mediator between the transcendent nature of God and the created universe. For the supreme Deity was never ἄλογος.[2] The Logos, who is the Divine Reason, the idea and potency of the world, ever existed in God. He issued forth to create the universe, "generated" (so it is expressed by more than one writer) "by an act of will"; and thus the Logos had a beginning of subsistence *in time*. But He is not separated from His source; though His personality is distinct, He yet remains in some sense identical in essence with God. In so far as He manifests the invisible God, and exercises the creative power of Deity, He is a distinct and subordinate Being, and in comparison with the Father, a creature, "the first-begotten work of the Father."[3] It is clear that the

[1] Theoph. *ad Autol.* i. 3: τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀνέκφραστον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀφθάλμοις σαρκίνοις ὁραθῆναι. δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος, μεγέθει ἀκατάληπτος, ὕψει ἀπερινόητος, κ.τ.λ. See other passages in Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 37, and cp. Athenagoras, *Leg. pro. Chr.* x.

[2] Athenagoras, *Leg.* x. ἀϊδίως λογικὸς ὤν.

[3] The most important passages are Athenagoras, *Leg. pro. Chr.* x.; Tatian, *c. Græc.* v., where the phrases, θελήματι προπηδᾷ, ἔργον πρωτότοκον τοῦ πατρός, γέγονε κατὰ μερισμὸν οὐ κατ' ἀποκοπήν, are specially noteworthy;

difficulties of this doctrine are not adequately realised by the apologists, and we find undoubted instances of confusion in the statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, especially an uncertain grasp of the distinction between the Word and the Spirit of God,[1] but the Logos doctrine developed by these writers very significantly testifies to the universal belief in the Redeemer's pre-existence. In this respect they powerfully influence the theology of the next century, in which the Church endeavours to grapple, not with Christological problems, but with those which are involved in the revelation of a Divine Trinity.

It corresponds with this general conception of the function of the Divine Logos and of His activity within the soul of man, that the apologists display a tendency to make redemption consist in Divine enlightenment; in the revelation of a heavenly wisdom, by which man is delivered from the power of darkness, and his freedom strengthened. Even where this thought is not explicitly developed, it seems to underlie the high estimate of prophecy which is common to all these writers.[2] The prophets proclaim authoritatively those truths of natural religion which philosophy had in a fragmentary manner anticipated; they are the preachers of a doctrine, by the acceptance of which men may attain to salvation and triumph over the powers of evil. This idea, which may be traced to a Platonic source, seems to pervade the writings of the apologists, but is especially prominent in Clement. "Since the Word Himself has come to us from heaven, we

Theoph. *ad Autol.* ii. 10 and 22, where we find the expressions λόγος ἐνδιαθέτος, λόγος προφορικός; Just. M. *Apol.* ii. 6; *Dial.* 56, 61, 128; Tert. *adv. Prax.* 2-9. Clement's idea of the Logos is more ethical, as also is that of Irenæus.

[1] See, *e.g.*, Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 44, note 4.

[2] Cp. Clem. *Protrept.* viii.; Theoph. *ad Autol.* ii. 9; Just. M. *Dial. c. Tryph. passim.*; *Apol.* i. 36 ff.

need not, I take it, go any more in search of human learning to Athens, to the rest of Greece, and to Ionia. For if we have as our instructor Him that filled the universe with His holy energies in creation, salvation, beneficence, legislation, prophecy, teaching, we have the teacher from whom all instruction comes. . . . Receive Christ, receive sight, receive thy light,

'In order that you may know both God and man.'" [1]

Christ is the teacher, who by the manifestation of truth rescues men from darkness and saves them. "Let them raise their eyes, and look above; let them abandon Helicon and Cithæron and take up their abode in Sion, *For out of Sion shall go forth the law and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.*" [2] Thus Clement sees in the Logos the merciful instructor of man, by whom the tenderness of the Divine Father is revealed. Two traits, indeed, are very conspicuous in Clement—(1) his optimistic idea of man's rational faculties and native affinity to the Logos, (2) his keen and even ecstatic sense of the Divine love displayed in the Incarnation. "The image of God is His Word, the genuine Son of mind, the Divine Word, the archetypal light of light; and the image of the Word is the true man, the mind which is in man, who is therefore said to have been made *in the image and likeness of God*, assimilated to the Divine Word in the affections of the soul and therefore rational." [3]

But the redemptive action of the Logos flows from a fountainhead of Divine love and pity. "Not as a teacher speaking to his pupils, not as a master to his servants, nor as God to men, but as a father does the Lord gently admonish His children." [4] "For God of His great

[1] Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* xi. §§ 112, 113 (quoting Hom. *Il.* v. 128).
[2] *Ibid.* i. §§ 2, 7.
[3] *Ibid.* x. § 98; cp. ix. *sub fin.*
[4] *Ibid.* ix. *init.*

love to man comes to the help of man as the mother-bird flies to one of her young that has fallen out of the nest; and if a serpent open its mouth to swallow the little bird, the mother flutters round, uttering cries of grief over her dear progeny; so God the Father seeks His creature and heals his transgression, and pursues the serpent, and recovers the young one, and incites it to fly up to the nest."[1] "It has been God's fixed and constant purpose to save the flock of men; to this end the good God sent the good Shepherd."[2] From these passages it is clear that while the Logos-doctrine is the very pivot of Clement's system, it is coloured not so much by a Platonistic idea of God, as by deep and fervid religious sentiment. In tone he is more akin to the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* than to Justin; and he seems to be less perplexed than the latter writer by the grave problems which his doctrine involved.

There are two of the apologetic writers whose Christology should be studied in somewhat closer detail.

JUSTIN MARTYR is an interesting figure, both from a literary and from a theological point of view. His spiritual history, as recorded by himself,[3] reveals a mind of singular sincerity and wide intellectual sympathies. The mental discipline through which he passed had a certain continuity: its main result was a restless thirst for the knowledge of God, and since this knowledge seemed to him to be the only worthy end of human life, he naturally came to regard Christianity as essentially a philosophy,[4] and Christ as the supreme revealer of God. In Platonism he had found that which brought him to the threshold of the Church: and a Platonist he remained in philosophic

[1] Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* x. § 91 (quoting Hom. *Il.* ii. 315).
[2] *Ibid.* xi. § 116.
[3] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. ii.
[4] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. viii.: *ταύτην μόνην εὕρισκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον· οὕτως δὴ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φιλόσοφος ἐγώ.*

method, in mental attitude and temper, throughout his life. He is a typical specimen of the Greek apologists, concerned to represent Christian faith to the cultured and thoughtful as a system of Divine knowledge, and exhibiting in a striking degree that "world-appropriating" temper which laid claim to all monotheistic and ethical truth that could be discovered in the works of the poets or sages of Greece. It was his favourite thesis that each of the ancient heathen thinkers "spoke well in proportion to the share he possessed of the sporadic Word, discerning what was akin thereto." . . . . "Whatever things," he says, "have been rightly uttered among all men, are the property of us Christians." [1]

The bearing of Justin's thought on Christology may be best understood by a consideration of the doctrine of God which he inherited from Platonism. Justin's conception of God is practically one with that of all the Greek apologists. He teaches an abstract monotheism. God is the cause of all existence; the only God; ineffable, incapable of change or local movement, recognised by man through the works of creation, and named in accordance with the attributes which creation reveals: "Father, God, Creator, Lord, Master." [2] It is this abstract idea of God which, as we have seen, necessitated the thought of a creative Logos, by whom the invisible Father might be manifested. At the same time the Platonic conception of God is linked to the actual history of revelation by Justin's identification of the only God with the God of the Old Testament. "There will be no other God, Trypho, nor was there ever from eternity any other existing than He who made and disposed in order this universe. . . . We reckon none other to be God than Him who led your fathers out from Egypt with a mighty hand and uplifted arm. Nor have we set our hope on

[1] *Apol.* ii. 13. [2] *Apol.* ii. 6.

any other (for there is none other) than the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." [1] Justin believed, with the other apologists, that so far as Christianity was a philosophic system of monotheistic cosmology, the Old Testament writers were its true exponents.

We pass to Justin's Logos-doctrine, and here it should be noticed that the necessities of abstract thought combined with the witness of the Old Testament in pointing to the divinity of a second Person, or Son of God,[2] the evidence for whose existence appeared to lie on the very surface of the Jewish Scriptures. He is a being numerically distinct from the Father,[3] and is even called a second God (*θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος*).[4] Though the Logos is a premundane Being, who before creation existed in perpetual converse and communion with the Father, He had an origin. "This offspring, which was truly projected from the Father (*ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα*), existed with the Father before all creatures, and the Father communed with Him. . . . He whom Solomon calls Wisdom was begotten as a first principle (*ἀρχή*) before all His creatures," etc.[5] By Him as an instrument all things were created; and He is attested to be Divine [6] by the titles assigned Him in Scripture—Word, Wisdom, Power, and Glory of Him that begat Him. Justin makes the place and function of the Logos in the Godhead strictly subordinate and ministerial,[7] and His unity with the Father is described as if it were in its essence only a *moral* unity—a unity of co-operation and service; but the relationship is illustrated by the in-

[1] *Dial.* xi.

[2] *Apol.* i. 13, ii. 6. Justin insists on (1) the uniqueness of this Sonship, (2) the subordination of rank which it involved.

[3] *Dial.* cxxviii.: *ἕτερόν τι ἀριθμῷ*; cp. lvi.

[4] *Dial.* lvi.

[5] *Dial.* lxii.—an important passage.

[6] *Dial.* lxi.: *ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων γεννηθείς, κ.τ.λ.*

[7] *Dial.* lxi.

separable union of the radiance with the sun, the Logos being actually begotten of the Father, but without any division of the Divine substance.[1] Finally, it is by an act of will that He is begotten.[2] According to Justin, this is the ultimate ground of His subordination in rank.

The function of the Logos is to be the essential revealer and interpreter of the invisible Father.[3] In this work of manifestation there is a preparatory stage before the Incarnation. (1) To the Jews the Logos revealed God in prophetic announcements. Much stress is laid by all the apologists, and not least by Justin, on the function of the prophets. These proclaimed beforehand the word of wisdom and revelation which was finally manifested in the Son; and it is on the fulfilment of prophecy that the claim of Christianity to be *the* Truth is mainly based.[4] Much importance is also attached by Justin to the theophanies of the Old Testament; He who appeared to the patriarchs is by him identified with the Logos. But the entire Old Testament bears witness to Him; Ezekiel, Daniel, Isaiah, David, Solomon, Moses, Zechariah describe Him by different titles.[5] "The whole manifold Scripture, with all its many parts and voices, is, as it were, a mighty drama composed by a single author, the Word of God, who alone speaks through all the characters displayed."[6]

(2) But God left not Himself without witness even among the Gentiles. To them too He made Himself known by partial manifestations. Justin teaches that the Logos is the Divine reason immanent or "sporadic"

[1] *Dial.* cxxviii. [2] *Dial.* lxi.

[3] *Dial.* cxxviii.: λόγον καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμιλίας φέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Hence the λόγος is called ἄγγελος, *Dial.* lvi.

[4] See *Dial.* ii.; cp. Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 21.

[5] *Dial.* cxxviii.; *Apol.* i. 36.

[6] H. S. Holland in *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Justinus."

in humanity. There is an unconscious prophecy in human thought corresponding to the conscious prophecy of Hebrew seers. Every man in every race possesses an implanted germ of the Word, by the power of which he apprehends whatever truth, moral or intellectual, he knows. This striking thought is distinctive of Justin, though it is more completely developed by the Alexandrians. It is true that the manifestation of the Word in heathen sages was only fragmentary and partial; but so far as they were guided in moral conduct, or in philosophic speculation, by the light of the indwelling Logos, they were Christians and friends of Christ. Reason in man is in fact the "candle of the Lord," the manifestation of the Divine reason.[1] But the *whole* Word of God, the Divine reason itself in a personal form was disclosed only in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos.[2]

Revelation thus culminates in the incarnation of the Word; and His work is redemptive. He "redeems" man by revealing truth which aids him in his struggle against adverse powers,[3] and in his effort to fulfil by a righteous life the law of his being. This intellectual conception of redemption is, as we have noticed, characteristic of the apologists, and shows their affinity to Plato, and their strong sense of the close relation between belief and conduct, character and creed. Christ then redeems mainly by His teaching: He is "our Master."[4] "The word of His truth and wisdom is more

[1] The implied thought is the essential relation of man's soul to the Divine Logos. "Wo das Vernünftige sich offenbart hat, da ist stets die *göttliche* Vernunft wirksam gewesen" (Harnack, *Dogm.* i. p. 424). The most important passages are *Apol.* i. 46; *Apol.* ii. 8–10, 13.

[2] *Apol.* ii. 8.

[3] "Dämonenherrschaft und Offenbarung—das sind die correlaten Begriffe" (Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 425).

[4] *Apol.* i. 4.

ardent and more enlightening than the powerful rays of the sun, and penetrates into the very depths of heart and mind."[1] Justin, however, does not overlook the redemptive significance of Christ's sufferings, and of His present glorified life. He is a "Helper and Redeemer at the sound of whose name even demons do tremble": such power has "the dispensation of His passion."[2] He is the High-Priest, and Christians are the true high-priestly race;[3] He is the Head (ἀρχή) of a new humanity regenerated through baptism, through faith, and through the cross.[4] Through Him men can become gods.[5]

The doctrine of the person and work of the Holy Spirit is as yet undeveloped. Justin speaks of Him as holding "the third place," "a third rank" in the Godhead, and as an object of Christian worship and devotion.[6] The function of inspiration is specially ascribed to Him: He is "the prophetic Spirit." But Justin betrays some indistinctness of thought on the relation between the Spirit and the Logos,—the inspiration of the prophets being ascribed sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other. But the way in which he cites the baptismal formula is sufficient to show that there was no tendency in Justin to a Sabellian confusion of personalities, in spite of his indistinct sense of differentiated functions in the Godhead.[7]

Such is Justin's Christology, and it is of a sufficiently representative type to warrant a few words of criticism.

In Justin the term Logos seems to be employed as a

[1] *Dial.* cxxi.; cp. *Apol.* i. 23.

[2] *Dial.* xxx.; cp. lxxvi.

[3] *Dial.* cxvi.

[4] *Dial.* cxxxviii.: *ταῦτα ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπ' ἀλλαγῇ καὶ ἐπαναγωγῇ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους.*

[5] *Dial.* cxxiv.

[6] *Apol.* i. 13, 60.

[7] See *Apol.* i. 33, 36, 60, etc.; cp. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 44, note 4. On Justin's idea of angels, and the worship due to them (*Apol.* i. 6), see H. S. Holland in *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Justinus," p. 578.

standing expression for Christ's higher nature; it guards the idea of pre-existence, just as the complementary phrase "Son" (*ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱός*, *Apol.* ii. 6) implies distinctness of personality. But Justin's use of the term seems to combine the Hebraic conception of "creative word" with the Hellenic or Stoic conception of an immanent Divine reason. It is at this point that we notice the limitations of his thought. He suggests no doctrine of an eternal Sonship, nor even employs such terms as *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός*. This means that he is unable to discern the full bearing of the two images by which he illustrates the relation of the Son to the Father: reason and thought,[1] flame and the fire from which it is taken; the one suggesting the unity of the two Divine persons, the other their distinctness.[2] The problem, How is the same Being at once one with God and distinct from Him? he leaves untouched. By protesting against any division of the Divine substance, he vindicates the unity of God; he satisfies the demands of Platonic and Mosaic monotheism. But he suggests plurality when he insists that the Logos is *ἕτερόν τι ἀριθμῷ*, numerically distinct from God.

The problem therefore which he hands on unsolved is that of correlating two Beings each of whom is God. He is satisfied for himself not to carry his analysis further. He guards the unity of God by insisting on the subordination of the Son, as "begotten" with a view to the work of creation, though pre-existing within the Divine Being.[3] The Divine unity is accordingly maintained by *minimising* the independent existence and activity of the Logos.

[1] Or "utterance." See *Dial.* lxi. Otto's note. [2] Cp. *Dial.* cxxviii.

[3] *Apol.* ii. 6: *ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνὼν καὶ γεννώμενος ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε.* Otto says, "*συνών*, nempe *τῷ πατρί* h.e. tanquam eius mens: *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος . . . γεννώμενος*: *λόγος προφορικός*."

Justin's language is in fact of an Arian cast, just because he cannot see his way to any consistent solution of the problem which Arius was to raise, *Was there a time when the Son was not?* He speaks of the Father alone as "increate" (ἀγένητος); the Son is His offspring, produced or begotten "by an act of the Father's will";[1] and the question might naturally be asked, If the Sonship depends on the Father's will, is it an absolute, coeternal Sonship?

The "generation" of the Logos is in fact thought of by Justin relatively, as a fact prior to creation; it is not grounded, as by Athanasius, in a metaphysical necessity. But Justin's language implies that the generation is at anyrate unique. If it is described as a voluntary act, at least the Gnostic idea of physical necessity is excluded. If the Son is called γέννημα, "offspring," He is nowhere spoken of as a "creature" (κτίσμα, ποίημα). Finally, the very phrase "He begat a certain rational power proceeding from Himself" (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ)[2] seems to imply an identity of nature in the Son and in the Father. The limitations of the Logos doctrine are thus due to the fact that Justin does not fully analyse his own conception of God. "Subordination of the Son to the Father must represent the immediate, primary, natural, and intelligible method of presenting to the reflecting mind the reconciliation of the duality of Persons with the unity of will. The very title *Son*, or *Word*, implied it. So far, too, the logic inherited from the philosophies would supply the needful formula." What was needed was the evolution of a higher logic which could "justify the synthesis already achieved by the Christian's intuitive belief in the absolute divinity of a dependent and subordinate Son."[3]

In passing from Justin to *Clement of Alexandria* we

[1] *Dial.* lxi. [2] *Dial.* lxi.

[3] H. S. Holland in *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Justinus," p. 574*b*.

are conscious of a difference of tone; the Christian facts and ideas which in Justin had fulfilled simply an apologetic purpose, are presented by Clement in something of a systematic and dogmatic form. The difference of treatment corresponds to the difference between the sphere in which each teacher moved. At Rome, the gospel was still struggling for recognition; Alexandria was a "city of science"; the centre of a kind of renaissance of Greek culture and thought, and its famous catechetical school, which first rose into prominence under Clement's rule, aimed at giving theology its legitimate position as the all-embracing science. For the age was one of transition; and in Clement we see the Christian apologist conscious of a wider mission than the mere defence of his faith. Thought was in fact "passing from the immediate circle of the Christian revelation to the whole domain of human experience."[1]

Naturally enough, therefore, Clement finds in philosophy no parent of error, but a Divine gift by which the heathen world was of old being prepared for the gospel, as the Jews were by the law. Philosophy was to the Greeks a guide to righteousness, a providential discipline, which was destined to be crowned by the Incarnation of the Word.[2] Christianity is the belief in a God who has ever been educating our race and leading it on towards perfect union with Himself, through the mediation of the Word, disciplining mankind by means of two agencies—Greek philosophy and the Old Covenant. The main interest of Clement is this highly-wrought and richly-developed conception of the Logos. To him the Christ of Christianity appears to be the omnipresent Divine Reason in every stage and degree of its manifestation; but only fully revealed at the Incarnation.

[1] Westcott in *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Clemens Alexandrinus."

[2] See *Strom.* i. 5, § 28.

Christ's advent is a fact which illuminates the whole previous history of the world. All along its course He has been immanent in the rational creation; chastening and enlightening it, and guiding it towards the fulfilment of its original destiny. This idea of the action of the Logos seems indeed to combine the Philonic with the Hebraic conception. The Word is not merely the spoken utterance of God, the creative Word "projected," as Justin had expressed it, from Deity; He is the speaking, teaching Word, the active Wisdom that ever was in and with the Father.[1] Further, it would seem clear that Clement has no doubt as to the distinct personality of the Logos. "In order to believe truly in the Son, we must believe that He is the Son, and *that* He came, and *how*, and *for what end*; . . . and we must know *who* the Son of God is. . . . Again, in order that we may know the Father, we must believe the Son, that it is the Son of God who teaches. And the knowledge of the Son and Father . . . is the attainment and exact apprehension of truth by the Truth."[2] Starting then from the same Platonic basis as Justin, Clement passes beyond him in two points—(1) He has a clearer grasp of the unity of the Logos with God. In the Logos it is God Himself who is immanent in the world. The same attributes are predicated of both Father and Son. (2) He withdraws from the pronounced "subordinatianism" of Justin.[3] He even goes so far as to declare that the Son "begets Himself,"[4] *i.e.* is the cause of His own

[1] Thus Clement deprecates the *passive* term λόγος προφορικός, *Strom.* v. i. § 6. See Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 289.

[2] *Strom.* v. i. 1. Cp. Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alex.*, p. 68, who points out that according to Clement prayer is to be addressed to the Word; *ibid.* p. 69.

[3] See Bigg, *u.s.* p. 69, note 3, where this point is discussed.

[4] ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὁ λόγος σὰρξ γένηται, κ.τ.λ. *Strom.* v. 3, § 16 (Dorner, *op. cit.* div. i. vol. i. p. 296). Cp. a note in Harnack, i. 578, 579.

Incarnation. On the other hand, he is akin to his predecessor in his idea of the function of Christ, as the only revealer of the unknowable Father; redemption is enlightenment, and philosophy the necessary condition of advancing from faith to knowledge. He has also some points of contact with Gnosticism—specially his insistance on an "unwritten tradition," which is the rule of scriptural interpretation, and a guide in the apprehension of truth.[1]

Such, then, is Clement's conception of the Logos. It is in effect a bold and fruitful expansion of the teaching of the prologue to S. John's Gospel. The great philosophic ideas which underlie his treatment—the thought of the immanence of God, of the unity of truth, of the essential affinity between the Word and the human soul—are, as it were, claimed by him for Christianity.[2] What, perhaps, surprises us is the comparative absence of reference to the Christian facts—the life of Christ and His redemptive work. The references to the Passion are few, and the name High-Priest is applied to our Lord in the limited sense which Philo gives to the term; Christ is our Representative and Intercessor before God, rather than the One Mediator who offers the atoning sacrifice for man. Partly this peculiarity is due to Clement's optimistic estimate of man's condition and capacities; partly, perhaps, to a characteristically Greek deficiency in his idea of Divine holiness.[3] It is by His precepts and His gifts that Christ redeems,[4] rather than by His sacrifice; by His glorified life, rather than by His death. In fact

[1] See Westcott in *Dict. Biog.* p. 565.

[2] Clement somewhat superficially maintains, like Justin, that the Greek philosophers borrowed from Moses.

[3] Cp. Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, etc. p. 80 ff. The fact is noticed and distorted by Allen, *Continuity of Religious Thought*, p. 49.

[4] See (*e.g.*) *Pæd.* i. 2, § 6.

there is much in Clement's system that suggests comparison with the Stoic picture of the ideal wise man;[1] there is a kind of cheerful belief in the sufficiency of man's power, not, indeed, to initiate, but at least to co-operate with, the means employed for his redemption.

With regard to the actual conditions and mode of the Incarnation, one point in Clement's system calls for notice. It has been questioned whether his conception of Christ's humanity is not docetic in form or tendency. He shows traces of a Platonic idea of the body as the seat of sinful affections and a prison-house of the soul, and in one passage he even speaks of Christ as playing His part in a drama.[2] But there are passages of less equivocal sense; and the questionable statements have some value as testifying to Clement's grasp of the fact that a Divine Being had really assumed the conditions of manhood. He speaks of Christ as "a spirit made flesh" (*πνεῦμα σαρκούμενον*),[3] and draws out the contrast between the higher and lower nature of Christ antithetically in a series of phrases which remind us of Ignatius. "Believe, O man, Him who is God and man. Believe the living God who suffered and is adored; believe, ye slaves, Him who died; believe, all ye of human kind, Him who alone is God of all men. Believe, and receive for your reward salvation."[4]

A general survey of the early Greek theology shows clearly the nature of the problems involved in the Church's belief, problems which were destined to emerge and press for solution in the following century. Amid

[1] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii. Lect. viii.

[2] *Protrept.* x. § 110: *τὸ σωτήριον δρᾶμα τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ὑπεκρίνετο ἀγνοηθείς.* I must be content with referring to the discussion in Dorner, div. i. vol. i. pp. 297–299; Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, pp. 71, 72; Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. 595, note.

[3] *Pæd.* i. 6, § 43.

[4] *Protrept.* x. § 106.

all the divergent modes of statement, however, the one truth which seems to be accepted as part of the constant Christian tradition is the pre-existence of the Logos who was manifested in the Incarnation. The relation of this truth to the current conception of God was not as yet satisfactorily explained; and, indeed, the question was likely to be insoluble so long as Divine personality was understood in the ordinary sense of that term. The idea of personality as something finite and exclusive must be modified. Hitherto the only way of evading ditheism had been the idea that the Logos only became personal when He proceeded forth to create. In the distinction of the Logos from Himself (in the phrases λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός), the first step was taken towards an analysis of the idea of Deity which pointed to eternal and necessary relationships within the Divine essence.

§ V. Western Theology

We are still dealing with great representatives of the apologetic era in Christian theology. The Greek school, as we have seen, confronted Gnosticism by a counter-system of *Gnosis*. They regarded Christianity as the true philosophy which ancient sages had sought after, and which Jesus Christ had brought to light in a final and full disclosure of the one true God, authoritatively but partially revealed in the Old Testament. The Western school had no such sympathy with philosophy. They borrowed its concepts and terminology only from necessity; they did not altogether discard, but they mistrusted speculation. Their tendency was to suspect it as the parent of error.[1] They found it at once more easy and effectual

[1] See *e.g.*, Tert. *Apol.* 46: "Quid adeo simile philosophus et Christianus, Græciæ discipulus et cæli, famæ negotiator et salutis, verborum et

to confront the Gnostic with the consent of the Catholic Church, to measure his speculations by the fixed and rigid rule of an orthodox and universally accepted confession of faith. While the Greeks had represented the expansive and (so to speak) *appropriative* tendency in the Church, the Westerns laid stress on the distinctiveness and finality of her creed. It would seem that the tendency to expand the brief baptismal confession into a standard formula of belief was already clearly marked both in Rome and Asia Minor, and as we have seen, the effect of Gnostic speculation was to give impulse and direction to this tendency. But two great names are perhaps more closely identified with the movement than any other—Irenæus, whose education and experience made him a link between Asia Minor and the West; and the passionate, vigorous, and eloquent Tertullian of Carthage, whose instincts and legal training predisposed him powerfully to accept and adhere to a fixed and authoritative standard of faith. Of these two names the first will occupy us at this point; the theology of Tertullian is important chiefly in connection with the Monarchian controversy, and will be considered later. But the two names should at least be connected for a moment in any survey of apologetic literature, and the remarks which follow apply in great measure to both writers, and in scarcely less degree to Cyprian of Carthage and Hippolytus of Rome.

The Western policy and method, then, was that of confronting the "secret tradition" of the Gnostics with the Church's definite and constant rule of faith. In the uniform tradition of the churches was contained a standard by which all strange doctrines might be tested. This line of defence had already been found effective.

factorum operator, rerum ædificator et destructor, interpolator erroris et integrator veritatis, furator eius et custos?" Cp. *de Præscr.* vii., etc.

We hear of the learned antiquarian Hegesippus (*circ.* 170) making a tour of the churches in order to assure himself of their doctrinal agreement.[1] Both Irenæus and Tertullian forego the appeal to Scripture,[2] and fall back on the fixed baptismal creed publicly and universally taught by the successors of the apostles. The distinguishing marks of this catholic "rule of faith" were—(1) unity, as opposed to the shifting, diversified, and complicated speculations of the Gnostics; (2) antiquity, as opposed to novelty; (3) finality, as opposed to any new revelation of essential or saving truth.[3] *Adversus regulam nihil scire, omnia scire est.*[4] It is noticeable that while Irenæus and Tertullian put Scripture somewhat in the background, Cyprian more definitely connects "the tradition" with Scripture as its source;[5] but he is speaking of traditional *usage* rather than *doctrine.* By Irenæus at anyrate the tradition of the Church is thought of chiefly as doctrinal, and he seems generally to imply that in substance it agrees with Scripture and is identical with the written teaching of the apostles.[6] Further, he closely connects the preservation of the Church's *rule of faith* with the apostolic *regimen.* It is the episcopate which is the external bond of unity; bishops inherit the apostolic teaching office (*locus magisterii*);[7] they possess the gift of truth (*charisma veritatis*).[8] In this close connection of the *faith* with the *order* of the Church, we trace the idea which lies at the root of the peculiarly

[1] Euseb. *H.E.* iii. 32, iv. 22. [2] See Iren. iii. 4. 1; Tert. *de Præscr.* xix.

[3] See esp. Iren. i. 10, §§ 1, 2, iii. 2. 1; 3. 1; 4. 1. Tert. *de Virg. Vel.* i. "Regula fidei una omnino est, sola immobilis et irreformabilis," etc. *de Præscr.* xiv. *et passim.*

[4] Tert. *de Præscr.* xiv. [5] *Ep.* lxxiv.

[6] Cp. Iren. iii. 1. 1. Harnack points out that the relation of the *regula* to Scripture is not made quite clear or consistent by the Western school. *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 22.

[7] Iren. iii. 3. 1. [8] iv. 26. 2.

Western conception of the Church, as a visible, authoritative exponent of truth, accessible to all, and universally established; the living oracle of Divine truth; catholic in external diffusion, one in doctrine and organisation.[1] This theory of the Church, perhaps formally stated first by Irenæus and Cyprian, was not altogether new, and cannot be quite fairly described as a "transformation"[2] of the episcopal into the apostolic office. The Western literature of the second century is so deficient that we are not warranted in drawing very positive conclusions. We may well believe that an idea so wide in its scope, and destined to be so fruitful in results, was of gradual growth, the importance of the episcopal office being gradually enhanced under the pressure of controversy and the growing need of clear and definite statements of the Church's faith. Thus the conception of the Church which we find in Irenæus and Tertullian is very far from being "a creative act" of theological genius; it may be traced to the epistles of Ignatius, and behind them to the New Testament itself.[3]

So far we have dealt with the mode of thought, or rather the line of defence, which is characteristic of the Western apologists generally. Of these, IRENÆUS may be taken as the most prominent teacher of Christology, not indeed that his doctrine on the Incarnation is very systematically developed, for the rich and beautiful statements scattered up and down his writings seem at times merely incidental to his main purpose, which is "*The refutation of Gnosis falsely so called.*" Perhaps the chief point of contrast between Irenæus and the great Greek

[1] Iren. iv. 33. 8: *γνῶσις ἀληθὴς ἡ τῶν ἀποστόλων διδαχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ἐκκλησίας σύστημα κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] As by Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 18. Harnack seems to underrate the teaching of Ignatius, and to draw conclusions too confidently in regard to a period of which after all we know comparatively little.

[3] Cp. C. Gore, *The Christian Ministry*, pp. 55, 56.

apologists is that while they use the Bible as a storehouse of proofs and illustrations, he is in form and in spirit a biblical theologian. His master-thought is the unity of God and of His self-revelation to the world. Against Gnostic ideas of the contrariety of the New to the Old Testament, against their distinction of the supreme God from the Creator, Irenæus insists upon the essential unity and continuity of the revelation recorded in both Testaments. God is one, simple, and perfect. He is indivisible; one and the same Being has been at work in each stage of history; and His action has ever been marked by gradation, progression, continuity. The tradition of the churches has ever proclaimed "the one God, omnipotent, Maker of heaven and earth, the Creator of man, who brought about the deluge, and called Abraham, who led the people out of Egypt, spake with Moses, set forth the law, sent the prophets, and has prepared fire for the devil and his angels."[1] God then is one; but He is also in His essence a Spirit, incapable of partition or self-expansion in the Gnostic sense. "The Father of all is at a vast distance from those affections and passions which operate among men. He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, altogether like and self-consistent, since He is wholly understanding, and wholly Spirit, and wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the entire source of all that is good."[2] Further, as an intelligent and personal Being God is knowable, not merely "Depth" (Bythus);[3] yet man's knowledge of God is the gift of

[1] Iren. iii. 3. 3; cp. iii. 1. 2; 9. 1; 10. 6; 11. 7.

[2] ii. 13. 3. Obs. such a passage appears Sabellian in tendency, but is corrected by the numerous passages asserting the distinct personality of the Son, *e.g.* iv. 6. 7.

[3] ii. 5. 4; 6. 1; iv. 6. 4; 7. 4.

Divine love: "through His love and infinite benignity, He has come within the range of human knowledge."[1] The essence of His being is love,[2] or more strictly righteousness guided by infinite wisdom and pity. "He is good and merciful and patient, and saves whom He ought, nor does goodness desert Him in the exercise of justice, nor is His wisdom impaired; for He saves those whom He should save, and judges those that are worthy of judgment. Neither does He show Himself unmercifully just; for His goodness, no doubt, goes on before and takes precedence."[3] Thus it is characteristic of God to act on men by persuasion rather than by force, and to fulfil His purpose rather by justice than by the display of power.[4]

I. The revelation of God in the historical Christ is the starting-point of Irenæus' theology, and accordingly he studies the Incarnation from the soteriological point of view. The idea of redemption is the central thought. The Logos-doctrine is no essential part of his system; he is more closely concerned with the historical significance and results of the Incarnation. He studies the actual work of the God-Man from several points of view: as redemption from death, and the means of immortality; as a propitiation of God's righteous displeasure; as the renewal of man's freedom; as the fulfilment of his true destiny. But the current doctrine of the Logos in His eternal relation to the Father finds a place, albeit not a very prominent one, in his theology, and his conception of the Logos corresponds generally to the absoluteness and finality which Irenæus ascribes to the gospel revelation. We may notice in this connection—

1. Irenæus deprecates any attempt to explain the generation of the Divine Word.[5] "If any one says to us,

[1] Iren. iii. 24. 2. [2] See esp. iii. 20. [3] iii. 25. 3 and 4.
[4] v. 1. 1. [5] "Generatio inenarrabilis," ii. 28. 6.

How was the Son produced by the Father? we reply to him that no one understands that production, or generation, or calling, or manifestation, or by whatever name one may describe His generation, which is, in fact, altogether indescribable." The thought on which he prefers to insist is the eternal coexistence of the Logos with the Father.[1] Any point beyond this is involved in "unspeakable mystery." Thus Irenæus repudiates physical metaphors (*e.g.* προβολή, prolatio), and even seems to deprecate the accepted phrase λόγος προφορικὸς.[2] Such language seemed to him to imply a division in the Divine substance.

2. On the other hand, Irenæus speaks of the functions of the pre-incarnate Logos with the breadth and freedom of Justin or Clement. To the Logos were due all pre-Christian manifestations of Deity, especially those recorded in the Old Testament. In all stages of history the Word was the essential revealer of God; in the whole sphere of the rational creation He has ever been at work; but the Incarnation is the fullest and most adequate manifestation of God. In Christ, the God-Man, the invisible becomes visible, the infinite Being limits Himself; God unites Himself to His creature; the glory of God manifests itself in the living man.[3] Thus the race of mankind, created through the agency of the Word, reaches its consummation and fulfils its true destiny in Christ; and "the end is joined to the beginning."

[1] Cp. ii. 30. 9: "*Semper* autem *coëxistens* Filius Patri olim et ab initio semper revelat Patrem," etc. Cp. iii. 18. 2: "Filius Dei *existens semper* apud Patrem."

[2] ii. 28. 6.

[3] See iv. 12. 4, iv. 20. 7 (a noble passage), iv. 6. 3, iii. 6. 2. "Per Filium itaque, qui est in Patre et habet in se Patrem, is qui est manifestatus est Deus." See also iv. 4. 2, "Mensura enim Patris Filius quoniam et capit eum"; iv. 6. 6, "Omnes viderunt in Filio Patrem; invisibile etenim Filii Pater, visibile autem Patris Filius," etc.

"Wherefore," says Irenæus,[1] "the prophets, receiving the prophetic gift from the same Word, announced His advent according to the flesh, by which the blending and communion of God and man took place according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Word of God foretelling from the beginning that God should be seen by men, and hold converse with them upon earth, should confer with them and should be present with His own creation, saving it and becoming capable of being perceived by it, and freeing us *from the hands of all that hate us*, that is, from every spirit of wickedness, and causing us *to serve Him in holiness and righteousness all our days*, in order that man, having embraced the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory of the Father."

Here, then, we have a complete and coherent view of redemptive history, which has, in fact, become part of the permanent thought of the Church. The unity of the author of creation and redemption is asserted; docetic ideas of Christ's humanity are set aside; the historic development recorded in Scripture is acknowledged; the continuity of revelation is maintained; the proof from prophecy is recognised. It would be difficult to find in any Church writer a greater comprehensiveness of thought, or a simpler grasp of the great facts of the Bible history, as Christianity has interpreted it.

II. The conditions and purpose of the Incarnation are viewed by Irenæus chiefly from the human side, as the consummation of human destiny, and as the reversal of the effects of the Fall. This is consistent with his general point of view, according to which theology centres in the fact of redemption—an idea which, it is obvious to remark, he shares with the Gnostics. In the Incarnation a Divine Person enters on a human existence. On this point Irenæus insists particularly; the subject of

[1] iv. 20. 4.

Incarnation is very God; God in His loving condescension accepting the limitations of manhood; God in His moral perfection teaching men the things concerning Himself. But the relation between the Godhead and the manhood is not, according to Irenæus, the same in every stage of the incarnate life. In the temptations and sufferings of the *status exinanitionis* the Logos is "quiescent."[1] But since the Ascension Christ's glorified manhood subsists under the conditions of the Divine life; it has entered into the glory of God;[2] in the Son of God human nature has attained its consummation.

God Himself, then, is man's Redeemer;[3] "for the Mediator between God and man must needs, through His own affinity to each, bring both together into amity and fellowship, so presenting man to God and revealing God to man." Love has discovered a way of helping man and enabling him to recover what he had lost in Adam. Irenæus regards evil as permitted for a providential end. Man's apostasy has been the occasion for a marvellous display of Divine magnanimity;[4] it has awakened the consciousness of need; the thirst for union with God. And man must respond to the movement of Divine pity by obedience, gratitude, and self-surrendering love, if he is to attain to the vision of God which is his very life.[5] It is in the person of the incarnate Word that the race of mankind finds its true Champion and Head. Christ is the second Adam, in whom the original type of manhood

[1] Iren. iii. 19. 3: *ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι . . . καὶ σταυροῦσθαι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· συγγινομένου δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν καὶ ὑπομένειν καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι.*

[2] Cp. iv. 20. 4.

[3] iii. 21. 1: *ὁ θεὸς οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο· καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς.* Cp. iii. 18. 7, iv. 33. 4.

[4] iv. 37. 7; cp. iii. 20. 1 and 2, iv. 14. 1.

[5] iii. 20. 2. "Vita hominis visio Dei."

is restored; in whom man's original destiny is triumphantly fulfilled. And here we touch on the most characteristic feature of Irenæus' system: the idea, derived from S. Paul, that Christ "recapitulates"[1] human nature; gathers into Himself all that belongs to its true essence; fulfils all that belongs to the true idea of manhood. And His work, as the representative man, is twofold—(1) He accomplishes man's ideal destiny; (2) He takes up anew and carries to a victorious issue the conflict in which man had been worsted.

1. The Incarnation is viewed by Irenæus, first, as a fulfilment of man's original destiny. Christ is the Head of a new race; the first-fruits of a new humanity. It was therefore necessary that Christ should "recapitulate" in His own person the different stages of an ordinary human life, in order that man's nature in its entirety might be united to God, that man might "receive the adoption, and become the Son of God."[2] Accordingly the second Adam "did not evade any condition of humanity nor set aside in Himself the law which was His own ordinance for the human race." Thus after passing through every stage of a normal human life, He yielded Himself to death "that *in all things He might have the pre-eminence,* existing before all and going before all."[3]

2. The Word also assumed the nature of man with a view to achieving the victory over the tempter by whom man had been once overcome. We notice that Irenæus anticipates Anselm in teaching that as it was man who had fallen, it was a moral necessity that man should conquer. The victory which man had failed to secure is accomplished in Christ, in whom humanity is recapitu-

[1] On "recapitulation" (*ἀνακεφαλαιῶσις*), see the detached note at the end of the section.

[2] Iren. iii. 19. 1.

[3] ii. 22. 4.

lated; by His obedience He reverses the effects of man's disobedience. "He fought and conquered; for He was man contending for the Fathers, and through obedience doing away with disobedience completely."[1] "For it behoved Him who was to destroy sin and redeem man, subject to the penalty of death, that He should Himself be made that same thing which *he* was (that is, man), who had been drawn by sin into bondage, and was held by death; in order that sin might be destroyed by *man*, and *man* might go forth from death. God recapitulated in Himself the ancient formation of man, that He might kill sin, deprive death of its power, and quicken humanity."[2]

It should be noticed in this connection that we first find developed in Irenæus a theory of the atonement which exercised great influence on subsequent thought: the idea that by the victory of Christ the devil lost his right of dominion over man—a dominion acquired indeed by violence, but only brought to an end by a Divine victory wisely and justly obtained. Divine justice required that what the strong man had unjustly seized should be recovered by lawful conflict. In this conflict Christ was victorious; but Irenæus seems to imply that what He might have lawfully claimed, namely, the devil's captives, He preferred to obtain by way of persuasion.[3] The devil freely consented to accept the death of Christ as the ransom for his prisoners. There is no necessary connection between the two thoughts of moral victory and legitimate ransom. It is apparently Irenæus' desire to give its true significance (1) to the obedience of the Saviour and His constancy under temptation, (2) to the atoning death upon the cross. It cannot be said that Irenæus has any consistent theory of redemption, for

[1] Iren. iii. 18. 6. [2] *Ibid.* § 7.
[3] v. 1. 1; 2. 1; 21. 2, 3; cp. v. 22. 1.

there are other aspects of the subject which he occasionally notices.[1] Nor does he overlook the importance of the resurrection of Christ as the first-fruits of a general restitution of mankind.[2] It is a fair criticism on the conception of Satan as a being having independent rights which God respects, that it displays a remnant of "residuary dualism" which contrasts rather strangely with the great unities insisted on by Irenæus.[3] But the attempt to answer the question, *Cur Deus homo*, which the Greek apologists had not raised, is a feature which gives special character to Irenæus' theology.[4]

III. We may briefly notice, in the last place, the close connection of the doctrine of the Spirit with that of the Incarnation. In this point, as in many others, Irenæus develops richly the teaching characteristic of S. Paul. From the manhood of the uplifted and glorified Redeemer proceeds the Holy Spirit, as the mediator of the Redeemer's life-giving presence, infusing it through sacramental channels into humanity as a re-creative force. "To bear God," to be penetrated by the Divine Spirit, was indeed the predestined glory of human nature. In earlier stages of revelation this result had been consistently held in view; man had been gradually trained and prepared for that high dignity,[5] which in Christ was actually attained by human nature. Through the agency of the Spirit, who is the mediating link between God and the creature, human nature is prepared and fitted to receive the Son. And He, in His glorified manhood, is Himself the very

[1] *e.g.* that of *reconciliation* of man to God through Christ's death, v. 14. 3; the payment of a *debt*, v. 17. 3.

[2] iii. 19. 3.

[3] See Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 67, note 1.

[4] Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 473.

[5] iv. 14. 2: "Prophetas præstruebat in terra, assuescens hominem portare ejus Spiritum et communionem habere cum Deo."

fountainhead whence the Spirit proceeds.[1] The normal sphere of the regenerating and quickening action of the Holy Spirit is the Church.[2] *Ubi enim ecclesia, ibi et Spiritus Dei, et ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia et omnis gratia.* Irenæus seems, in fact, to conceive of the Holy Spirit, not (according to later theology) as "accomplishing the presence" of the ascended Christ, but as co-operating with Him in the restoration of humanity,[3] enabling men to "ascend through the Spirit to the Son."[4] It is not necessary for our present purpose to determine this point precisely. It may suffice to say that the Holy Spirit is co-ordinated with the Son as an agent in the redemptive work; He is the link between Deity and humanity. So far as there is a distinction drawn between their functions, Irenæus seems to teach that the subjective Divine life in man is the work of the Spirit, whilst the creative act by which it is brought into being is due to the Logos. The creative operation and love of the Son precedes the indwelling of the Spirit.[5]

The profound influence on Christian thought of the Christology of Irenæus seems to be due to several causes. In the first place, it is realistic or concrete, not abstract. Its central figure is the historical Christ; its dominating thought the reality of the redemption wrought by Him; it is worked out in the phraseology of the New Testament, especially of S. Paul. Perhaps something also is due to the generally optimistic, even triumphant tone, of Irenæus. The Gnostic theology had

[1] Passages of chief importance—iii. 9, 17, 18, 19, 24, iv. 38, v. 6, 8, 10, 12.

[2] iii. 17. 3; 24. 1.

[3] Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 324.

[4] v. 36. 2.

[5] See Lipsius in *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Irenæus," p. 277; and Dorner, *l.c.*

regarded the Divine descent into a material mode of existence as a fall or degradation; to Irenæus it is the turning-point of redemption.[1] The Gnostics had limited to a few the possibility of redemption; Irenæus teaches that the victory of Christ is that of humanity at large, and that thereby is secured for all who will grasp it the gift of the highest good: immortal life and the knowledge and vision of God. Further, the New Testament ideal, as depicted by Irenæus, seemed to satisfy the yearnings awakened, perhaps, by Neo-Platonic speculation: yearnings for spiritual purification and enlightenment, and for mystical union with Deity.[2] Above all, it was in full correspondence with the spiritual needs and aspirations of average men, and with the consciousness of Christians, in its insistance that God Himself had deigned, in pity and love, to visit man and help him. *Factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod est ipse.*[3] And this great truth was brought home to men, not as by the Gnostics, in the mystical and fantastic garb of mythological imagery, but in the simple and majestic language of revelation. The picture of Christ's person in the pages of Irenæus is in a manner self-evidencing; it is worthy of God.

NOTE.—*The Doctrine of the "Recapitulation" (ἀνακεφαλάιωσις).*

The expression is derived from S. Paul, Eph. i. 10, where it is said to be the Divine purpose of grace in the fulness of time *to sum up all things in Christ* (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*). The

[1] See this contrast developed in Iren. ii. 20. 3 (referred to by Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 472).

[2] Cp. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. p. 473.

[3] Bk. v. præf.; cp. iii. 23. 2: "Opitulatus est homini et in suam libertatem restauravit eum."

word is also used of that saying in which the whole law is *briefly comprehended* (*ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται*), Rom. xiii. 9. The idea seems also to have been known to Justin.[1]

The Greek commentators give more than one explanation of the word *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*.[2] But in Irenæus the general purport of the word is clear. The phrase implies two essential ideas—(*a*) *consummation* of all that has gone before; Christ "comprises" humanity in Himself as its true representative, with its different elements, material and spiritual; (*b*) *complete fulfilment of the original idea* of the universe, a fuller and more perfect embodiment of it. Thus derivatively the word *recapitulare* implies "restoration" or "recombination" of elements which the Fall had disintegrated to their original truth and unity.

Christ then "recapitulates" human nature. He assumes it in its reality and completeness—such, sin only excepted, as the Fall had made it. He passes through each successive stage of human life in order to consecrate it afresh to God. As Mediator, He presents it, according to the truth of its original idea, to the Father. He brings it back into accord with the Divine thought; as the archetype of manhood, He restores it in His own person to its initial truth and purity. He "joins the end to the beginning." In Him not only humanity, but all the material and spiritual creation is summed up; is gathered into a unity of which He is the representative.[3]

[1] In his lost work against Marcion. See Iren. iv. 6. 2, and cp. Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* p. 97.

[2] See various explanations, ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* ii. 7.

[3] Petav. *l.c.* quotes Cyr. Alex. *in Joh.* ix. as explaining *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι* thus: *τὸ ἀνακόμισαι πάλιν καὶ ἀναλαβεῖν εἰς ὅπερ ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ τὰ πρὸς ἀνόμοιον ἐκπεπτωκότα τέλος*. Petav. adds: "Christus ideo venit ut ad unum dissipata ac dissociata universitatis membra redigeret, et tum inter se, tum vero cum auctore ac capite suo colligeret."

This seems to be the best exposition of the word, which does not exclude collateral ideas such as that suggested by Chrysostom, that in Christ we see a *compendious action* of Divine power,[1] finishing the work and *cutting it short in righteousness* (Isai. xxviii. 22; Rom. ix. 28). The Incarnation was, as it were, a summary way of reducing all things to their true relation to God. Cp. Iren. iii. 18. 1: "*In compendio* nobis salutem præstans ut quod perdideramus in Adam . . . hoc in Christo Jesu recuperemus." The most important passages for study of the doctrine are Iren. iii. 16. 6; 18. 1, 7; 21. 10; 22. 2, 3. Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. i. p. 465; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, i. p. 237.

[1] Chrys. *hom.* 23 *ad Rom.* xiii.: ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται· τούτεστιν, συντόμως καὶ ἐν βράχει τὸ πᾶν ἀπαρτίζεται τῶν ἐντολῶν ἔργον. Cp. *ad Eph.* i. 9: τὰ διὰ μακροῦ χρόνου οἰκονομούμενα ἀνεκεφαλαιώσατο ἐν αὐτῷ, τ. ε. συνέτεμε.

PART IV

THE BEGINNING OF POLEMICS

§ I. The Monarchian controversies.
Adoptianism.
Modalism or Patripassianism.

§ II. Anti-Monarchian theology.
Christology of Origen.

§ III. Tertullian—Novatian—Hippolytus.

§ IV. The Close of Third Century Christology.
The two Dionysii.
Later writers of the school of Origen.
1. The Close of Third Century Theology ; the Council of Antioch (269).
2. Confusions in Ante-Nicene terminology.
3. Anticipations of Nicene doctrine.
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§ I. The Monarchian Controversies

The confident tone of the great anti-Gnostic writers, Irenæus and Tertullian, might lead us to suppose that their conception of Christ as the incarnate Logos was the common property of Christians; but a study of the controversies which disturbed the earlier part of the third century serves to show that there was by no means a general acceptance of the Logos-doctrine, which had played so large a part in the writings of the apologists. The fact is that in proportion as the doctrine came to the front, the Trinitarian problem necessarily became more acute. The third century witnessed various attempts to solve the problem on a Unitarian basis. The result achieved, after severe struggle, was the practical exclusion of all explanations that tended to simplify the complex mystery guarded by the Church, at the expense of some essential element in the Christian tradition. The doctrine of the *μοναρχία*,[1] or unity of the Godhead, is a fundamental article of faith. "Scripture and the Church avoid the appearance of tritheism by tracing back (if we may so say) the infinite perfections of the Son and Spirit to Him whose Son and Spirit they are."[1] The necessity of a constant protest against polytheism led the Church—perhaps in a special degree the Roman Church—to insist tenaciously on the Divine unity. It had been the task of the apologists to give its due prominence to this truth. But as yet Christian writers had

[1] Monarchia: singulare et unicum imperium [Dei]. Tert. *adv. Prax.* 3. Cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 1. Dion. Rom. speaks of *τὸ σεμνότατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας, τὴν μοναρχίαν* (ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 373. See the note, pp. 385–387). Epiph. *Hær.* lxii. 3, says expressly, *ὅτι μὲν ἀληθῶς εἷς ἐστι θεὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερος σαφῶς ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ θεοῦ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὡμολόγηται, καὶ συμπεφώνηται ὅτι οὐ πολυθεΐαν εἰσηγούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μοναρχίαν κηρύττομεν* (qu. by Harnack, *Dogm.* i. 613). See also Routh, *Rel. Sacr. l.c.*

failed to discover any mode of synthesis by which the two doctrines of the Divine unity and the Deity of the Word might be harmonised. The "Monarchian" or Unitarian teachers virtually denied the distinctions of Person within the Godhead, on which apologists like Justin and Irenæus had laid such emphasis. Their error may have been in some degree the result of an intellectual reaction on the part of ordinary lay Christians against the subordinatianist tendency of the apologetic theology.[1] Tertullian says expressly that simple "unskilled persons" (*idiotæ*) shrank with horror from the economy, *i.e.* the Divine revelation involved in the Incarnation. *Expavescunt ad οἰκονομίαν. Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus.*[2] This statement seems to indicate that the Christology of the apologists was as yet little known in the Church at large; in some quarters the Logos-doctrine was probably suspected as a speculation akin to Gnostic ideas, and derogatory to the Divine dignity of Christ. The doctrine was, in fact, a philosophical conception, and as such little likely to be widely popular or intelligible; it might even seem to threaten the simplicity of faith. The average Christian, who had no means of estimating the apologetic importance of the doctrine, would naturally be slow to welcome it, or recognise it as a true element in the Church's creed. At anyrate, the reactionary tendencies of the time make their appearance in the heresies which are called, though not very happily, Monarchian.[3] Of these there were two classes, —not perhaps always easily distinguishable.

1. Some fell back on what has been termed the "Modalistic" solution of the Trinitarian problem. They denied the *separate personality* (ἰδιότης) of the Son and

[1] Neander, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 292–294. [2] *adv. Prax.* 3.

[3] The name first appears in Tert. *adv. Prax.* 10, "Vanissimi Monarchiani."

Spirit of God. They regarded "Father" and "Son" as two designations of one and the same subject: God in two different relations to the created universe. It followed that what Scripture records of the Son might be predicated of the Father. Pressed logically, this view resulted in Patripassianism.

2. The simpler solution was that which may be called "Adoptianist" or humanitarian: the denial of the *Deity* of the Son and Spirit. According to this view Jesus Christ was a mere man, endowed with a higher gift of inspiration than others, whether prophets or saints, and gradually elevated, as a reward for His sinless virtue, to Divine dignity.

It may be observed that both views might claim to find support in Scripture. The "Modalists" would point to the Old Testament theophanies and the Apostolic Epistles, and would be supported by the universal consciousness of Christians that in the Incarnation a Divine Being really appeared on earth. The "Adoptianist" school might claim that their view was in accord with the *prima facie* impression derived from the Synoptic Gospels. It is noticeable that this latter school of thinkers can be traced back to the obscure sect of the Alogi,[1] mentioned by Epiphanius, who rejected the Johannine writings on critical grounds, and fashioned their Christology on the basis of the Synoptist narrative. At any rate either school represents a feeling of right jealousy for an intrinsic element of the Christian tradition: the first for the Divine *monarchia*; the second for the historical Christ of the Gospels. Thus the Alogi seem

[1] Epiph. *Hær.* li. 3, invents the name. See *Dict. Biog. s.v.* "Alogi." They were a sect of anti-Montanists in Asia Minor (*circ.* 170), who rejected the Gospel of S. John and the Apocalypse—the former probably on the ground of its teaching as to the Paraclete. See Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 616 ff.

to have laid great stress on the synoptic narrative, even accepting the miraculous birth of Christ; but they rejected the Johannine conception of the Logos on the ground that it appeared to contradict the earlier tradition, and to favour docetic error.

I. It was at Rome that the Adoptianist teachers first endeavoured to found a school. Theodotus of Byzantium gained followers in Rome about the year 185; his most noteworthy successors being a younger Theodotus, and at a later period, Artemon. The "Theodotians"[1] held that Christ was a mere man (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος), specially under the influence of the Holy Spirit, who descended upon Him at the Baptism; and that He was finally exalted after due probation to Divine dignity. Possibly Theodotus had some connections with the Alogi of Asia Minor; like them he appealed to Scripture in proof of his views, but did not reject the Gospel of S. John.[2] Theodotus himself was cut off from communion by the Roman bishop Victor, perhaps about 195. This step is of crucial importance as a declaration of the traditional teaching of the Church of Rome on the subject of Christ's Divinity. The party of Theodotus represented their views as those which had been handed down from the apostles; the action of Victor marked his sense of what was to Christian consciousness a "God-denying apostasy."[3] The critical methods of the school were zealously pursued under the leadership of the younger Theodotus, but the vigilance of the Roman pontiffs prevented the formation of a schismatic Church (200–218). It is to

[1] See Epiph. *Hær.* liv.

[2] The proof passages appealed to by the Theodotians were such as these: Deut. xviii. 15; Jerem. xvii. 9; Isai. liii.; S. Mt. xii. 31; S. Lk. i. 35; S. Jo. viii. 40; Acts ii. 22; 1 Tim. ii. 5. Cp. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 623, note 2.

[3] Caius [?], ap. Euseb. *H.E.* v. 28.

be observed that these Monarchians did not reject the idea of a second Divine hypostasis, namely the Holy Spirit, whom they seem to have identified with the Son of God, and who accordingly was a more exalted being than Jesus on whom He descended. Of this eternal Son they believed Melchizedek[1] to be a manifestation. Christ was merely a man in whom a similar manifestation (λόγος θεοῦ) was made; a man exalted above others only in virtue of His superior holiness. The theological method of these humanitarians is also noteworthy. "They forsake," says an old writer quoted by Eusebius,[2] "the Holy Scriptures, and devote their attention to geometry, as if indeed they were of the earth and spake of the earth, and were ignorant of Him that cometh from above." They seem in fact to have applied to theological problems the hard "geometrical" methods of dialectic, and to have made special use of the philosophy of Aristotle,[3] whereas on the side of catholic theology Platonism was at this time the most influential system. Moreover, just as they preferred the empirical philosophy to that of Plato and Zeno, so they rejected the allegorical method, which was favoured by the Church, in favour of a crude grammatical literalism, and endeavoured to ascertain on critical principles the original text of Scripture;[4] principles which were destined rather less than a century afterwards to be applied with more success at Antioch, on a basis common to all educated Christians of that time,—that of Platonism.

Of *Artemon*, a later leader of the Humanitarian school, little is known beyond the fact that he taught in Rome

[1] The name "Melchizedekians" may be only another title of the Theodotians. See some notices of them collected by Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 202; cp. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 627 f.

[2] Euseb. *l.c.*

[3] Cp. Neander, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 299.

[4] Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 626.

some time before the middle of the third century, and put forward the startling claim that his views had been those of all the Roman bishops previous to Zephyrinus (202–218). He seems to have asserted somewhat more definitely than Theodotus the superiority of Christ to the prophets in respect of His supernatural birth and sinlessness. It might be gathered from Novatian's *de Trinitate*[1] (*circ.* 250), that humanitarianism had not yet entirely ceased to find defenders in Rome. But it would be a mistake to identify these views with the bare Ebionitic conception of Christ, for the Theodotians claimed to be in accord with the rule of faith, and they do not seem to have intended to teach that Christ was a "mere man" (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος). In their view He was rather one on whom the pre-existent Spirit or Son of God descended, in order to enable Him for His redemptive work.

In the East the Adoptianist Christology found exponents in *Beryllus* of Bostra, in whom the two divergent types of Monarchianism seem to approximate, but who in any case needed to be convinced by Origen of the truth of the Logos-doctrine.[2] The most celebrated heretical teacher, however, is *Paul* of Samosata, bishop of Antioch (262–272), the first specimen of a courtly prelate, favoured by the powerful Queen Zenobia.[3] According to the doctrine of Paul, Christ's personality was human, but the Divine Reason dwelt in Him ὡς ἐν οὐδένι ἄλλῳ. The Logos was a quality or attribute of the One God, which wrought in Moses and the prophets, but

[1] Esp. c. xi.

[2] Euseb. vi. 33, seems to give a substantially true account of Beryllus as—(1) denying the pre-existence of Christ, (2) asserting that He was a perfect man indwelt by Deity. See Redepenning, *Origenes*, pt. ii. pp. 98 ff.; Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. 35 ff. ; Harnack, i. 633–635.

[3] Harnack represents him as a "nationalist" bishop, who opposed the scientific theology of the Greeks on patriotic grounds. He wished to assert the "old teaching" of the Church as against Hellenising tendencies.

in a specially exalted degree (*μᾶλλον καὶ διαφερόντως*) in Christ. In the human Christ the Logos dwelt "not essentially but as a quality" (*οὐκ οὐσιωδῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιότητα*). Accordingly Paul drew a distinction between the Redeemer who was "from below" (*κάτωθεν*) and the Divine Logos who wrought in Him "from above." The connection between the Divine element and the human person was only of a moral order: a unity of will and love such as might subsist between two persons. As the reward of His unbroken obedience and victory over temptation, Christ was exalted into a state of indissoluble fellowship with God, and obtained the *name which is above every name.* In view of the predestinating purpose of God concerning Him, He can be called God. Finally, it should be noted that Paul asserted the "consubstantiality" of the Logos with God (*ὁμοούσιον*); but he used the term (*ὁμοούσιος*) in a sense which was intended to exclude the idea of a distinct personality.

Such in brief outline seems to have been the system of Paul: a system which perhaps seemed to himself the most consistent with the gospel narrative, and with the truth of Monotheism, but which combined two features usually disjoined: a Sabellian view of the Godhead,[1] and a humanitarian conception of Christ. He taught in fact the *apotheosis* of a good man, not an Incarnation of God. Consistently with this belief he abolished the use of hymns addressed to Christ, as an objectionable custom of modern origin, for the Deity of our Lord was, as he supposed, a dignity acquired, not an essential part of His nature. It seems, indeed, that Paul combined the two elements which

[1] Ath. *c. Apollin.* ii. 3, ascribes Paul's heresy to his anxiety to preserve the unity of God. See other references to him in Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 38, iii. 51. Epiph. *Hær.* 65, regards him as a renewer of Artemon's heresy. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 627, 628 note, gives a full list of original authorities. See esp. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 285–367.

appear separately in Sabellianism and humanitarianism. According to him the Logos was an impersonal quality of God, and might be called "Son" only in a metaphorical sense.[1] The historical Christ on the other hand was an inspired man, in whom the Divine Word or Wisdom dwelt. The union between the two is no more than a "conjunction" (*συνάφεια* or *συνέλευσις*); they are in fact two distinct persons (*ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*). The perpetuity of Christ's union with God (the Logos) was the reward of His moral probation and victory,—a kind of "indefectible grace" vouchsafed to His manhood. He could be described as "pre-existent" only in virtue of the predestination and foreknowledge of God.

The proceedings against Paul ended in the issue of a synodal letter by the six bishops who met at Antioch in 269. This will occupy our attention later.[2] It needs only to be pointed out that the Christology of Paul was not without its influence at a later period on Lucian of Antioch and his school, which was the seed-plot of Arianism.[3] The same general conception of the relation between the Logos and Christ seems to have become traditional in the Church of Antioch, as may be gathered from the theological statements of Theodore the Mopsuestian. The condemnation of Nestorianism was in a sense a second condemnation of the Samosatene, who was always regarded by later writers as in some sense an arch-heretic.

[1] *ὁ πατὴρ ἅμα τῷ υἱῷ* [*sc.* *τῷ λόγῳ*] *εἷς θεός.*

[2] A synod was held as early as 264, Firmilian of Cæsarea being present. The aged Dionysius of Alexandria sent a letter (Euseb. vii. 28). This was followed by a second synod—both being without result. The third synod, probably held in 268, ended in Paul's excommunication and deposition, which was not finally effected till 272.

[3] Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 5, describes Arius' doctrine in terms which show connection with the theology of Paul. Harnack [i. 645 note] traces the influence of Paul in the school of Antioch and in the *Acta Archelai*; cp. p. 647 note.

II. The type of Monarchianism which seems to have been most prevalent in the third century, and most difficult to contend with, was that which questioned the reality of personal distinctions within the Godhead; a phase of thought which is sometimes called "Modalism."[1] Not only, as we have seen, did ordinary Christians shrink from the "economy," through fear of falling into ditheism; "Modalism" also seemed to embody the universal belief as to the fundamental fact of Divine redemption, namely, the Incarnation of God. It appeared to secure the truth of Christ's Divinity, and accordingly was favoured even at Rome. The earliest Monarchians of this type appear in the East near the close of the second century. Their teaching first becomes explicit in Praxeas and Noetus, and assumes a philosophic form in Sabellius.

Praxeas, a presbyter of Ephesus, and a violent opponent of Montanism, appeared in Rome, it would seem, during the last decade of the century; but probably the main scene of his activity was Carthage.[2] The teaching of *Noetus* of Smyrna, and his pupil Epigonus, seems to have attracted more attention at Rome, and to have even commended itself to the Roman bishops, especially to Callistus (217–222), the opponent of Hippolytus. Perhaps the simplest expression of Modalism is that of Noetus.[3] Starting from the unity of God, he maintained that it was God the Father Himself who was born, suffered, and died. Christ was in fact the Father.

[1] *i.e.* as teaching that the so-called "Persons" of the Blessed Trinity are only "phases" or "modes" (*τρόποι ἀποκαλύψεως*) under which the one God reveals Himself. On the affinities between Modalism and Stoicism, see Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 651, 652 note, 661.

[2] This corresponds best with the fact that he is ignored by Hippolytus. As to his probable career, see *Dict. Chr. Biog. s.v.* "Praxeas."

[3] Hippol. *Philos.* ix. 1–10, insists on the connection between the teaching of Noetus and that of Heraclitus, not quite without just reason; cp. Harnack, i. 652 n. See generally Hippol. *c. Noetum* (in Routh, *Opuscula*).

Noetus laid great stress on the will of God, as that element of His personality whereby He submitted Himself to conditions non-natural to Deity: visibility and passibility.[1] The Father, in so far as He voluntarily subjects Himself to these mortal conditions, is the Son, the distinction between the two Divine Persons being only nominal. The doctrine of Praxeas exhibits that of Noetus in a more highly elaborated form. Praxeas impugned the catholic belief as tritheistic; and himself insisted on the distinction between the Father and the Son as substantial rather than merely nominal. The Father is Spirit; the Son is Flesh. Since in Christ the Divine principle is the Father, and the humanity assumed is the Son,[2] the Father actually shared the sufferings of the Son,[3]—Himself suffered in the Son. This "Patripassianist" view is the chief characteristic of the naive and unphilosophical form of Modalism. The formula of Callistus preserved by Hippolytus[4] was intended to be of a mediating character, but was so far in accordance with the language of Praxeas and Noetus as to be virtually Patripassian. The last sentence is worth quoting as illustrating the author's desire to recognise the element of truth in the adoptianist view.[5] "For the

[1] He declared the Father to be *ἀφανῆ μὲν ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, φαινόμενον δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν βούληται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀοράτον εἶναι καὶ ὁρώμενον . . . ἀγεννητὸν μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, γεννητὸν δὲ ὅτε ἐκ τῆς παρθένου γεννηθῆναι ἠθέλησεν, κ.τ.λ.* (Theod. ap. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 27.) As illustrating this the theophanies of the Old Testament were cited.

[2] Tert. *adv. Prax.* xxvii. They specially appealed to S. Lk. i. 35.

[3] *Ibid.* xxix.: "Compassus est Pater Filio."

[4] *Philos.* ix. 12. See the formula ap. Harnack, i. 664. It expressly adduces as a proof-text S. Jo. xiv. 11. "It was the bridge," says Harnack, "by which the Christians of Rome, originally Monarchian in their ideas, followed the tendency of the time and of ecclesiastical science, and passed over to the recognition of the Logos-Christology."

[5] *Ibid. l.c.*: *πότε μὲν εἰς τὸ Σαβελλίου δόγμα ἐμπίπτων, πότε δὲ εἰς τὸ Θεοδότου οὐκ αἰδεῖται.*

Father who became present in Him, after assuming the flesh, deified it by uniting it to Himself, and made it one [with Himself], so that Father and Son are called one God. Now this [Godhead] being one Person (ἓν πρόσωπον) cannot be two; and thus the Father suffered with the Son."

Enough has been said to illustrate the character of Modalism as it appeared, and was controverted in the West. Anxious though they were to refute it as a speculative opinion, the Western writers probably lacked the qualifications for dealing with it critically. As we have already seen, their strength lay in their tenacious hold of the Christian tradition that Christ was very God, and that there was only one God. This practical grasp of two verities, which they found it difficult exactly to adjust, gave to the attitude of the Western Fathers a decisive importance in relation to the Arian struggle.

Sabellius, who was probably a bishop or presbyter in the Pentapolis (N. Africa), taught actively in Rome during the earlier part of the third century (*circ.* 215), and was therefore a contemporary of Noetus and Praxeas. But his system is of much greater interest than theirs as an attempt to give philosophic form and consistency to the Modalistic tendency, and to exhibit it in its cosmological, not merely in its theological relations. According to Sabellius, the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit[1] designate three distinct phases under which the one God described in the Old Testament[2] successively manifests Himself. God is the Monad (or τὸ ὄν), and may be described as υἱοπάτωρ. The three names Father, Son, and Spirit together express His relation to the world; the Father is revealed in the giving of the law; the Son,

[1] The recognition of a third προσῶπον differentiates the Sabellian from the Noetian view.

[2] Epiph. *Hær.* lxii. 2, says he used the Old Testament and New Testament Scriptures, and especially a so-called "Egyptian Gospel."

in the Incarnation; the Spirit, in inspiration and the re-creation of souls. Whether the idea of strict temporal succession in the Divine self-manifestations was maintained by Sabellius is not clear; what is certain is that in his view the personal names represented only three energies in one hypostasis. Sabellius agreed with the Catholics that creation was the work of the Logos, but His forthcoming was merely a transitory manifestation or phase (*πρόσωπον*) in the eternal life of God. There are some important points in the system which are matters of dispute,[1] but its pantheistic tendency is developed in a theory afterwards advanced by Marcellus of Ancyra, which was justly censured as Sabellian, viz. that of a self-expansion of the Monad into the Triad; all created existence had proceeded from God through the mediation of the Logos; but, as Athanasius observed, the appearance of the Logos being transitory, it would follow that created existence must ultimately cease. For if the Monad by a process of self-expansion (*πλάτυσμος*) produces the universe, by self-contraction (*συστολή*) He will annihilate it. The final stage of the Divine process must be a restoration of the original unity,[2] God, the Monad, being finally *all in all.*

Of Sabellius' own system it may be remarked—(1) He finds no room for an Incarnation in the proper sense. The humanity of Christ would seem to have no relation to his teaching; at anyrate it is completely ignored.[3] (2) The importance attached to cosmology was not without its effect on Christian thought. In the

[1] *e.g.* whether *πάτηρ* and *μόνας* were identical (as assumed above); and in what exact sense he used the terms *πρόσωπον*, *ὁμοούσιος*, and *γέννησις*.

[2] Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 25. *εἰ ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν προῆλθεν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναχωροῦντος αὐτοῦ . . . οὐκετι ἐσόμεθα.* Cp. *Orat.* iv. 12, 14. Neander, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 317 ff.

[3] See Dorner, div. i. vol. i. pp. 167–171.

Christology of Athanasius, the mediation of the Word in nature is represented as parallel and preparatory to His work in redemption.[1] (3) Finally, the word πρόσωπον became discredited and was finally excluded from catholic terminology. On the other hand, the significant term ὁμοούσιος seems to have been used by Sabellius. The employment of the word in the Nicene symbol is the result of a long sifting process by which the orthodox connotation was gradually determined.

§ II. Anti-Monarchian Theology

The conflict with different types of Monarchian error passed without leaving any deeply marked traces in the West. In Rome itself Sabellianism seems soon to have become extinct. The West was, in fact, characteristically slow to add to the received faith even in the way of explanation or definition. A passing reference to the Patripassian heresy is made by Cyprian,[2] and possibly with a view to its exclusion, the creed of the Church of Aquileia was enlarged by the addition of the words *invisibili et impassibili* to the clause *Credo in deo Patre omnipotente*.[3] Paganism was still powerful in the court and the army, in learned circles and in general society. Thus according to some writers of the early fourth century, like Arnobius and Lactantius, the main importance of Christianity lay in its declaration of Monotheism and its pure morality. Few Western writers of the third century show any disposition to welcome the profound speculations connected with the Logos-doctrine; they accept the name Logos, and in untechnical biblical

[1] Cp. Harnack, i. 680.

[2] *Ep.* lxxiii.

[3] Rufin. *Comm. in Symb. Apost.* c. v.: "Sciendum quod duo isti sermones in Eccl. Romanæ symbolo non habentur. Constat autem apud nos additos hæreseos causa Sabellii, illius profecto quæ a nostris *Patripassiana* appellatur."

phraseology they insist on the truths finally vindicated at Nicæa and Chalcedon, the full Deity of Christ and the perfection of the two natures ;[1] but beyond this they do not go.

Such is the general character of Latin theology of the third century. If we wish to gain some idea of the precise extent to which the Alexandrian Logos-theology was accepted by Western writers, we must examine the system of Tertullian and the works of Hippolytus and Novatian. It seems desirable, however, before doing so to deviate a little from chronological order, and to survey the Christology of the great teacher, who was the ablest and boldest Christian thinker of his age, and whose work exercised the most profound and lasting influence on Christian dogmatics: ORIGEN of Alexandria, the pupil of Clement and his successor as the master of the famous catechetical school.

Christology of Origen.

Origen's career [185–254] extends over the period within which the main problem of Trinitarianism was first seriously faced by the Church, and a succession of systematic efforts was made to solve it. It is chiefly in relation to that problem that his theology will here be reviewed. His life was an eventful one ; his character possessed an extraordinary charm. Specially conspicuous in him seems to have been "the love which enabled him, notwithstanding his varied culture, to strike his roots deeply into the doctrine of the Church, and to take it and its spirit as regulative of Christian gnosis."[2]

It will not be necessary to touch, except incidentally,

[1] Cyprian may be taken as an instance (*d.* 258). See esp. his *Test. adv. Jud.* lib. ii. cc. 6, 10 ; and a beautiful passage in *de Bono Patientiæ*, vi. See also *de Idol. Van.* xi.

[2] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, i. 2. 105. As to Origen's life and doctrinal system, see Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, Lect. iv., v., and the references there collected. See also the glowing panegyric of Greg. Thaum. ; cp. Vinc. Lirin. *Common.* xvii. There is a recent study of Origen in Pfleiderer's *Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii. Lect. viii.

on the varied, fertile, and profound speculations of Origen as to the creation and destiny of the universe; his somewhat fantastic angelology and demonology; his analysis of human free-will, or his methods of biblical interpretation. His training in the school of Neo-Platonism, and his broad intellectual sympathy, gave him numerous points of contact with even such opponents as Celsus, both in methods and principles;[1] while the immense range of his knowledge, and the inexhaustible fulness of his ideas, makes him of all theologians the most many-sided.[2] Further, his reverence for truth made him anxious to find a place in his system even for popular ideas on theology. He was at once conservative of Christian tradition and daring in speculation beyond its limits. Of his Christology it has been said that, with one exception, he finds a place for every view of Christ's person that had been entertained during the preceding two centuries.[3] He shows traces of the influence of Philo, and of the very Gnosticism which he so energetically opposed. Thus his system, on the one hand, appears to gather up and incorporate the main ideas and tendencies of his own time; while on the other, it was full of suggestions which were to be developed in different directions during the age that followed.

Origen seems to have visited Rome during the pontificate of Zephyrinus (202–218), *i.e.* during the interval between the expulsion of Theodotus by Victor and that of the Noetian school by Callistus. He could not fail to be impressed with the difficulty and peril of the doctrinal crisis implied in these two events; but the question of Christ's Deity in its relation to the Divine unity was, in fact, pressed upon him not only by the controversies within the Church, but also by the work of the Unitarian

[1] See the curious judgment of Porphyry, quoted by Euseb. vi. 19.
[2] Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 568 note. [3] *Ibid.* 597.

Platonist Celsus. Hence the form of Origen's Christology may be said to have been determined mainly by the controversial necessities of the time.

I. He approaches the Incarnation from the Platonistic standpoint. The attributes of God are described mainly in negative terms. He is the Monad, incorporeal, passionless, incomprehensible, absolutely simple, "pure intelligence, or something transcending intelligence and existence."[1] God is dimly revealed in creation as the source and sustainer of all being; but the only absolute knowledge of Him must be imparted by the Logos. Origen is not content, however, with a merely metaphysical conception of Deity as the first cause of all existence; God possesses the attributes of spirit,—will, self-consciousness, moral character. His omnipotence is not absolute or unconditioned; it is limited by His perfections; He can do only what He wills,[2] and His will is good. Thus, in opposition to the Marcionite severance of Divine justice from Divine goodness, Origen maintains that both attributes are combined in the one God. "The God of the law and the Gospels is one and the same, a just and good God; He confers benefits justly, and punishes with kindness; since neither goodness without justice, nor justice without goodness, can display the [real] dignity of the Divine nature."[3] This point is important, because to the Divine goodness Origen traces the origin of revelation. Self-communication is of the essence of the good.

II. In exhibiting the truths of revelation, Origen was guided partly by an *à priori* idea that the very fact of revelation necessarily postulated the existence and activity of the Logos; partly by anxiety to be loyal to the tradition of the Church. He is at one with Clement and the Westerns in his adherence to the rule of faith,[4]

[1] *c. Cels.* vii. 38: ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας.
[2] *c. Cels.* v. 23. [3] *de Princ.* ii. 5. 3. [4] *de Princ.* i. 2. 1.

though within its wide limits he felt himself at liberty to articulate, expand, and interpret at pleasure. But here again he moved within the lines of Scripture; his daring flights of fancy invariably have their basis in some biblical incident or text, which by the aid of allegorical interpretation, or the "spiritual sense," was made to illustrate the deepest mysteries of the Divine dispensation. Especially in relation to his Christology we shall have occasion to notice how largely certain texts seem to dominate his thought. He is akin to Irenæus in being a biblical theologian. His theology might almost be called a methodical exegesis of Scripture.

III. His doctrine of the Logos only differs from that of his predecessors in the greater precision with which he insists on the distinct hypostasis of the Son, who was manifested in the Incarnation. It is noticeable that he starts from the historical person of Christ. "We must note that the nature of the Deity which is in Christ in respect of His being the only begotten Son of God, is one thing, and that human nature, which He assumed in these last times for the purpose of the economy, is another." Here, at the outset, is a strong statement of the distinction between the two natures combined in our Lord's person.

In Origen's doctrine of the Son, we may notice two or three distinctive points.

1. He teaches the doctrine of an eternal generation of the Son. The Son is coeternal with the Father. Origen uses the phrase which was afterwards contradicted by Arius, *οὐκ ἐστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*.[1] The Light was never without its radiance. Nay, the relation of Father and Son is supra-temporal; the "generation" of the Son is an eternal process within the Divine Being, a movement without beginning or end. "The Father eternally

[1] See *de Princ.* iv. 1. 28; cp. i. 2. 10.

generates the Son."[1] This eternal generation is explained, according to the tradition of the Greek apologists, as an intemporal exercise of the Father's will. The Son is begotten *velut quædam voluntas Eius ex mente procedens.*[2] And while thus securing the Divine freedom, Origen definitely excludes the physical metaphors which were commonly employed by his predecessors and contemporaries. He deprecates "prolatio" (προβολή) as too corporeal a term to be predicated of a movement internal to the Divine essence.[3] There can be no partition of the indivisible substance of Deity.[4] "For the Son is the Word, and therefore we are not to understand that anything in Him is cognisable by the senses. He is Wisdom, and in wisdom there can be no suspicion of anything corporeal. He is the true Light . . . but He has nothing in common with the light of this [visible] sun." Nothing, indeed, could be more emphatic than Origen's insistance on the Godhead and distinct personality of the Son. He is the perfect "image of the invisible God"; unchangeable, essentially God, and not merely by participation (κατὰ μετουσίαν). There is community of essence between Father and Son.[5] And the Son is a person separate from the Father, having distinct functions, and independent subsistence; not personally identical with the Father, though actually Divine.

Such is one line of thought pursued by Origen in regard to the subsistence of the Son. He argues logically

[1] *Hom. in Jerem.* ix. 4: ἀει γεννᾷ ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν. *De Princ.* i. 2. 4: "æterna et sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatur a luce."

[2] *de Princ.* i. 2, §§ 6, 9.

[3] *de Princ.* iv. 1. 28; cp. i. 2. 4: "Infandum est et illicitum Deum Patrem in generatione unigeniti Filii sui atque in subsistentia eius exæquare alicui vel hominum vel aliorum animantium generanti."

[4] *l.c.* §§ 6, 11.

[5] Communio substantiæ. As to the possible use of ὁμοούσιος by Origen, see note in Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 179.

from the scriptural doctrine that *God is Light*; and he endeavours, with the aid of the analogy of light and its radiance, to do justice to the tradition of the Church that the Son was a Divine hypostasis. In one point he agrees with Tertullian, while in another he advances beyond him. On the one hand, he freely interchanges, as Tertullian does, the terms Logos and Son,[1]—the abstract term and that which connotes moral relationship; on the other hand, while Tertullian conceived the Trinity as economic,—God as it were in movement, opposed to God *in statu*,—Origen, by his doctrine of the eternal generation, replaces the thought of movement (prolatio) by that of an eternal process, ever complete in itself, yet ever continued.[2]

2. But besides the inferences which he drew from those passages of Scripture which pointed to the co-equality and coeternity of the Son, there was a second line of thought into which Origen was led by the exigencies of his logic. As supreme Cause and Source of Being, the Father must be conceived to be greater than the Son. If He is *αἴτιος*, the Son, who derives from Him His being, must be *αἰτιατός*, and so far inferior. The Father is *αὐτόθεος*, or *ὁ θεός*; the Son is *θεός*. The gulf between the original fount of Deity and the Son is recognised by the incarnate Christ Himself. Origen insisted specially on three recorded utterances of Christ: "My Father is greater than I"; "Thee, the only true God"; "There is none good save One."[3] It is remarkable, however, that Origen only attempts to formulate the inherited doctrine of the subordination of the Son within the actual lines drawn by Scripture. Thus, in accordance with what he conceived to be the teaching of the last-quoted text, he denies to the Son essential good-

[1] See *in Joh.* i. 23. The reference is from Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doc.* § 43.
[2] Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 115 note and 109.
[3] S. Jo. xiv. 28, xvii. 3; S. Mk. x. 18.

ness. He is good, but not the very good; the image of Divine goodness, but not absolute goodness,—not unalterably good.[1] This, perhaps, is the most extreme statement advanced by Origen in connection with the Son's subordination. As the image of God, the Son is *αὐτοσοφία*, *αὐτοαληθεία*, but Scripture forbids our speaking of Him as *αὐτοαγαθός*. Origen seems further to deny that the highest kind of prayer, adoration with doxology, may lawfully be addressed to the Son. He teaches that "we may address the Saviour in immediate supplication for those boons which it is His special province to bestow. But in the supreme moment of adoration, when the soul strains upwards to lay itself as a sacrifice before the highest object of thought, we must not stop short of Him who is above all."[2] But here, again, it should be observed that Origen is guided by our Lord's own statement, "Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My name, He will give it you."[3]

These two points give to Origen's doctrine of the Divine Sonship its peculiar character. While we acknowledge that the subordination of the Son is unguardedly pressed, it is interesting to observe Origen's method and motive. His method consists in faithful adherence to the scriptural statements; his motive seems to be the desire to guard, and in some measure restate, an essential part of the tradition he had inherited, the tradition which

[1] *de Princ.* i. 2. 13 [Fragm. i. 5]: *εἰκὼν ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοαγαθόν. καὶ τάχα καὶ υἱὸς ἀγαθὸς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἁπλως ἀγαθός . . . οὐχ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός.* The passages are given by Bigg, p. 181.

[2] Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 186. Cp. Bull, *Def. Nic. Creed*, i. p. 256 ff. "If we regard the Son relatively as He is the Son, and derives His origin from the Father, it is certain that all the worship and veneration which we offer to Him redounds to the Father, and is ultimately referred to Him as the fountain of Godhead." See also Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 390, 391 note.

[3] S. Jo. xvi, 23. See *de Orat.* xv., xvi,

guarded the *monarchia* by emphasising the ministerial function of the Son.[1] Besides this, his Platonistic conception of God led him to distinguish between what is *incommunicable* and what is *communicable* in God. The Son possesses all of the Divine that can be communicated, —the totality of the spiritual attributes of God. But incommunicable is the fact of being the primal ἀρχή, the fountainhead of existence. If the οὐσία of the Father consists in His being ἀρχή, the Son may be even described as ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενον τοῦ πατρός.[2] But in reality the subordination is "modal." The Son is inferior to the Father only in being generate; only in deriving from the Father the Divine essence. "It is the difference between cause and effect, and in this aspect it sometimes seems to Origen immense."[3]

In regard to the question of the age, the reconciliation of the Son's *hypostasis* with the Divine unity, Origen cannot be said to give a perfectly consistent account. Thus in one passage he speaks as if the unity of the Godhead consisted in a perfect moral harmony of will between the Father and the Son. They are one in unity of thought, in identity of will and purpose.[4] But his tendency is to fall back on the traditional position, that the Divine unity consists in the fact of the Son's *derivation* from the Father, and of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.[5] The already ancient doctrine of subordina-

[1] See *de Princ.* præf. § 4.

[2] *De Orat.* xv. [where notice the v.l. ὑποκείμενος]. Origen does not use the terminology of the doctrine of the Trinity *in its later sense*, but the terms are already employed, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ὑποκείμενον, προσῶπον, possibly ὁμοούσιος. See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 163–165 notes.

[3] Bigg, *l.c.* 181.

[4] *c. Cels.* viii. 12: τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος. He illustrates by Acts iv. 32.

[5] Origen's doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not very clear. He seems in one passage to speak of Him as a creature, but this is balanced by very strong Trinitarian language. See Bigg, *op. cit.* 171 ff. (notes).

tion seemed to be the only available key to the problem. And with this position the use of the word ὁμοούσιος was consistent. So far as there is a communicable οὐσία of God, the Son might be called "one in essence" with the Father. For the word οὐσία might either denote the incommunicable essence of Deity (*i.e.* in later language, the ἀγεννησία which belongs to the Father alone); in this sense the Son is ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν. Or it might mean those attributes of Deity which are capable of being communicated,—the essence of Deity, which is derived by the Son from the Father as light from light; in this sense the Son might be called ὁμοούσιος.[1]

IV. The Incarnation of the Son is the culminating point of the Divine self-revelation. In relation to creation the Son is the eternal Wisdom, the archetype of the universe;[2] the Life and Truth of all things, giving them their consistency and rationality, sustaining and perfecting them according to the true law of well-being for each. He is the Way, providing for the mutability of the creature; the Resurrection, finally destroying death. But as the revealing Word, His activity is confined to the sphere of rational creation, within which He discloses and interprets the secrets of the Divine intelligence.[3] In the Incarnation He becomes the God-man, and passes over, as it were, from the simplicity of the Divine subsistence into the life of manifold relationships involved in redemption; manifesting Himself to men according to their individual needs and capacities as Propitiation, Physician, Shepherd, the True Bread, the Lamb of God.[4]

[1] See Dorner's very clear statement, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 127, 128.

[2] *de Princ.* i. 2, § 2: "Continens in semetipsa universæ creaturæ vel initia vel formas vel species."

[3] *l.c.* § 3: "Tanquam arcanorum mentis interpres."

[4] These and other ἐπινοίαι of the Son are arranged in an ascending scale, denoting different stages in the progress and receptivity of the believer.

His highest function, however, is that of the heavenly teacher, who reveals the hidden depths of Divine knowledge, and imparts a new principle of power to man by exalting him into the life of communion with God. Origen seems, indeed, to make a strange distinction between the historical redemptive *work* of the Son, which deals with human needs in a lower or initial stage, and the function of Divine *revelation* which implies an immediate union between the Logos and the human soul. Accordingly in his system the historical life and death of Christ are *relatively* unimportant; he would have the soul soar beyond the crucified and rest in the Logos; the incarnate life is not *the* truth, but *a* truth beyond which lies a higher; the historic manhood is a medium through which the Logos makes Himself known in His lower redemptive functions; in His highest function He abides in God and with God. The historic work of Christ is indispensable for the great mass of imperfect humanity, and has its significance even for the perfect; but the perfect no longer depend on it for the satisfaction of their own spiritual needs.[1] "God the Word," says Origen, "was sent indeed as a physician to sinners, but as a teacher of Divine mysteries to those who are already pure and who sin no more." "Blessed indeed are they who, requiring the aid of the Son of God, have become such that they no longer need Him as Physician healing the diseased, nor as Shepherd, nor as Redemption, but only as Wisdom and Word and Righteousness, and anything else that He may be to those who, by reason of their perfectness, are able to receive His best gifts."[2] This conception of Christ's work naturally suggests comparison with the Gnostic idea of two classes of believers, spiritual

[1] See Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. 592 ff. He refers specially to *c. Cels.* iii. 61, 62, and *in Joh.* i. 22.

[2] *in Joh.* i. 22.

and psychic. The point of contrast is that while the Gnostic conceived Christ's humanity docetically as mere transient appearance, Origen insists on its entire reality, and assigns to it an abiding significance, at least until the final return of all spiritual beings into God, when God shall be all in all.[1]

Such is Origen's general point of view respecting the Incarnation. His account of its actual method is peculiar, and is determined by his preconceived theory as to the origin of the soul. It was not possible for the Logos to unite Himself directly and immediately with matter (*τὸ μὴ ὄν*); He could only assume human nature through the medium of the soul. What then was the origin of souls? It was to be found, Origen answers, in a defection from a higher state. Creation was eternal. This condition seemed to be required by the eternity of the Divine nature and attributes. Since God was ever omnipotent, "He must always have had those over whom He exercised dominion"; He must from all eternity have possessed a sphere for the display of His perfections.[2] There pre-existed, therefore, a world of created spirits, capable of advance (*προκοπή*), and therefore morally free. Of these spirits some were steadfast, or rose to a higher estate; some rebelled and became devils. Others became cold in their love, and in consequence of this defection became "souls."[3] But, not very consistently, Origen seems to have believed also in the possibility of a sinless soul;[4] such at anyrate was the soul which the Logos finally assumed. Originally it was like other souls, but

[1] Origen teaches that in the end the exalted humanity of Christ passes over into God. In this *μεταβάσις* humanity finds its true perfection. *c. Cels.* iii. 41; cp. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 143.

[2] *de Princ.* i. 2. 10.

[3] *ψυχή* der. from *ψύχειν* = "cooled down *πνεῦμα*."

[4] See Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. note 23 (p. 462); Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 190 note.

in the pre-existent stage it remained faithful, having no part in the premundane apostasy, and ever cleaving to the Logos in indissoluble love.[1] This soul was by the Logos united to Himself as the medium of an incarnation, the effect of the union being comparable to that of fire on iron. "The soul which like iron resting in the fire, has ever reposed in the Word, ever in Wisdom, ever in God, *is* God in all that it does, feels, and understands." It becomes immutable through its union with the word; in this soul the fire of Deity found its rest,[2] so that it became the fitting instrument of God. Through the mediation of this perfect soul,[3] the Logos was enabled to assume a body, and through it to impart progressive degrees of glory even to the flesh. The humanity of Jesus was in virtue of the virginal birth free from original taint, but it was real and consubstantial with ours. In this very body He died and rose again from death; but He rose in glory, the substance of the manhood being as it were changed into spirit, and finally made one with the Divine Logos.[4]

Of this Christology it may be remarked, in the first place, that, while it recognises completely the distinct natures of Christ, its object rather is to emphasise the singleness of His personality. The unity of the Divine person seems, however, to be secured by the idea of a gradual fusion in the pre-existent state of two personal subjects, the Logos and the human soul. After the Incarnation, the person of the God-Man is one and

[1] *de Princ.* ii. 6. 3.

[2] *de Princ.* ii. 6. 6, especially the words "in hac anima ipse ignis divinus substantialiter requievisse credendus," etc.

[3] *Ibid.* ii. 6. 3: "Hac ergo substantia animæ inter Deum carnemque *mediante* (non enim possibile erat Dei naturam corpori sine mediatore misceri) nascitur Deus homo," etc.

[4] Origen says (*Hom. in Jerem.* xv. 6) that Christ is now no longer man (οὐδαμῶς ἄνθρωπος).

indivisible. The simile of iron resting in fire has been said to mark an epoch in Christology.[1] Just as, if the iron is touched, it is the fire that is felt, not the iron, so the human soul, resting in the Logos, "is God in all that it does."[2]

Next we may note that in Origen's system a real effort is made to recognise the truth and significance of Christ's manhood. Harnack says that Christian Gnosis here really takes up and incorporates in its scheme the Incarnation. As a system of scientific Christology, Origen's view of Christ is most appropriately compared with that of Valentinus or Basilides, if we wish to estimate the advance made in theology since the period of Gnosticism. The fact of the Incarnation, as presented by Origen, reveals not only the condescension of God in manifesting Himself in a human life, but the capacity of human nature to become actually one with God.

A Christology so full and complex as Origen's, which endeavoured to do justice to every aspect of truth which had attracted previous thinkers, naturally gave rise to imputations of "heresy" from many different quarters. But one form of error cannot with justice be ascribed to Origen, namely, the Sabellian or "Modalistic" conception of God; and it is in relation to error of that type that his system is chiefly important. Its significance, from this point of view, is that it securely entrenches the Logos-doctrine in the faith and thought of the Church, and this doctrine is seen to fulfil its function in securing the distinctness of the Divine hypostases. Certainly Origen is hampered in his effort to develop his own thought

[1] Westcott in *Dict. Chr. Biog. s.v.* "Origenes," p. 136.

[2] *de Princ.* ii. 6. 6: "Omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit Deus est." From this would follow the *communicatio idiomatum*. Bigg. *Chr. Plat.* p. 190.

by his Platonistic idea of God, which, whatever be its merits, is more metaphysical, and even (in a sense) pagan than ethical and Christian. The least, however, that can be said is that he materially helps forward that restatement of the Christian doctrine of God which the Arian troubles showed to be imperatively necessary.

V. A few words are needed on Origen's theory of redemption, which reflects, like the rest of his system, the many-sidedness of his mind. It has been already observed that two aspects of redemption presented themselves to his thought. The redemption of the perfect consisted in the revelation to them by the Logos of the depths of Divine knowledge. This idea of redemption Origen shares with Clement and others of the Greek school. But the idea prevalent in the Church at large, the idea of redemption as a victory over Satan, and the Divinely-ordained means of ransoming mankind from his tyranny, was one which Origen felt bound to recognise. To different classes of men the Redeemer reveals Himself according to their need: to one class as victor over death and sin; to another as the teacher of Divine mysteries. Nay, to the same soul in different stages of its upward progress the Son of God may manifest Himself in successive relations (ἐπινοίαι), and the soul responds by a growing receptivity, gradually, by communion with the Divine, rising to the state of beatific union with God. But although Origen seems to attach a lower significance to the historic redemption than to the mystical redemption through knowledge, he develops freely the doctrine of Christ's Atonement. He recognises different aspects of the Passion: its representative value, its propitiatory virtue, its power as a victory over demons, its significance as a ransom paid to the devil, its dignity as the offering of the Mediator and High-Priest of humanity. He dwells on the element of

inexplicable mystery in the death of Christ,[1] and the moral appeal it makes to the heart of man. But perhaps most distinctive of Origen is the thought of the cosmic significance of the Atonement. The perfect Christian depends for his attainment to the highest stage of Divine contemplation, on the reconciliation wrought by Christ's death. And the history of the world finds its central point in the bloodshedding of the cross, which is one of those efficacious realities that belong to the heavenly order, and are therefore eternally true. The blood shed on earth was sprinkled mystically on the altar in heaven, whereby, as the apostle said, *pacificavit per sanguinem crucis suæ sive quæ in terris sunt sive quæ in cælis.*[2] The entire universe participates in the effect of the Divine work. Christ is the great High Priest who brings about a reconciliation between God and the universe, and restores all things to their true place in the kingdom of the Father.[3]

Enough has been said to give some idea of the range and profundity of Origen's speculations. Naturally, the influence of his system in succeeding centuries was incalculably great. The history of Christology during a long period is the history of Origen's ideas. All schools of theology could discover in his works something either to rouse their antagonism, or to support their leading positions. Arians and orthodox, critical and mystical interpreters, secular clergy and monks, could alike appeal to him.[4] Faith and knowledge seemed

[1] See *c. Cels.* i. 31.

[2] Col. i. 20. For the passage of Origen and other references, see Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 212 note. Cp. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 146.

[3] See the magnificent passage *in Joh.* i. 40.

[4] Harnack, i. 603; cp. Vinc. Lirin. *Common.* xvii.: "Quis non ad eum paulo religiosior ex ultimis mundi partibus advolavit? Quis Christianorum non pene ut prophetam, quis philosophorum non ut magistrum veneratus est?"

to be reconciled in a great intellectual structure, which found room at once for the sublime ideals of Platonistic thought, the devout intuitions of the Christian saint, and even the fantastic religious conceptions of popular theology. Perhaps the generous verdict of a recent writer may fitly conclude this section: "If it is the task of theology to unfold the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God which are hidden in Christ, to put them into relation with the various elements of the consciousness of the time, and to prove them to be the fulfilment of all previous germs of truth, and the correction of all previous errors, and thus to make the Divine principle the ennobling leaven for all human thought and life, then we must recognise that Origen has fulfilled this task of theology in a masterly and truly exemplary way."[1]

§ III. Western Theology in Relation to Monarchian Errors

The Christology of the two chief Western writers of the early third century, Tertullian and Hippolytus, marks an important turning-point in the history of doctrine. On the one hand, in opposition to Gnosticism, they may be ranged with Irenæus as representatives of the Western tendency to repel, or at least depreciate, the speculative and idealistic spirit which created the different types of Gnosticism. On the other hand, they differ from Irenæus and other kindred spirits in the fact that they more completely accept, and embody in their system, the doctrine of the Logos. In this point they are practically at one with the great Greek thinkers, although the standpoint from which they approach the doctrine, their modes of thought, and forms of terminology are widely different. There is in both the Latins

[1] Pfleiderer, *Philos. and Devel. of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 280.

and the Greeks a philosophical apprehension and treatment of theology, but "the constructive ideas of the Greek Fathers were metaphysical, of the Latin political and juristic."[1] It is interesting to study the contrast between Eastern and Western writers in their mode of handling a common stock of apologetic theses, and in their controversial methods, when dealing with the same misconceptions and errors. Thus it will not be inappropriate to introduce at this point the system of TERTULLIAN, and study it in its anti-Modalistic rather than its anti-Gnostic aspect. As an apologist, indeed, he disparages reason, and speaks scornfully of philosophy as the parent of error; but this is due largely to his temperament, and his tendency to place himself at the extreme point of opposition to the system which he denounces. Yet in his polemic treatises he displays a mind saturated with Stoic thought, appealing freely to "nature" or "reason," and speaking of God and of the Logos as if their substance were corporeal and capable of quasi-physical division and distribution. He is akin, too, to the Stoics in his conception of the Logos as "coming forth" or "produced" in order to create,—the doctrine of the Godhead being treated by him mainly in relation to cosmology. On the other hand, Tertullian's conception of the functions and internal relations of the Divine "Persons" is largely coloured by Roman jurisprudence. The very terms which he introduces into Latin theology are juridical; he regards the Divine self-revelation as a mode of "administration," implying grades of rank, agency, and delegated authority.

Tertullian's Christology is mainly comprised in his treatises *adversus Praxeam* and *de Carne Christi*.

In the former of these tracts he deals with the Divine

[1] Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theology*, p. 75. See the whole of the section, pt. i. chaps. iv. and v.

nature. There is some reason for supposing the work to have been aimed more at the influential Monarchians at Rome than at Praxeas.[1] It gives us a clear idea of Tertullian's position in regard to the great question in dispute—the unity of God. That unity consists not so much in the necessary singleness of the first cause of all existence,[2] the uniqueness of the supreme "substance," as in the "sole and single lordship" which must be ascribed to the Creator.[3] The unity is in fact administrative rather than numerical. The administration through "Persons" of the Divine lordship does not necessarily imperil unity of substance. God then is one, and regarded as a "substance" He has in a sense corporeity. Though essentially spirit, He has a body in which spirit necessarily finds its self-expression,[4] for the Divine substance is the supreme reality, and to the idea of reality belongs corporeity. Further, God being a substance is capable of distribution or division; He can be known in part, though not in His totality.

This brings us to the Trinitarian doctrine of Tertullian. He has but little idea apparently of an immanent or essential Trinity of *persons*. The "Trinity" is in Tertullian's view our name for God in movement or self-manifestation. This movement or process is the background as it were of creation, history, and redemption. God is manifested in His relation to the world in successive stages "economically" as Triune in "Person," though one in substance. It will be noticed that Tertullian here

[1] Praxeas has even been supposed to be a nickname for Noetus or Epigonus or Callistus. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 655.

[2] Cp. *adv. Marc.* i. 3.

[3] *adv. Prax.* 3: "Monarchiam nihil aliud significare scio quam singulare et unicum imperium."

[4] *adv. Prax.* vii.: "Quis enim negabit deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie." Cp. *de Carne Christi*, xi. "Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est."

introduces terms which became the recognised formulæ of later orthodoxy: *substantia* is predicated of God as an individual and real existing Being. *Persona* is derived from Roman law, and means "person" in the sense of an individual having legal rights and functions. The thought of a distinction of "Persons" in the Blessed Trinity is by Tertullian connected with the kindred thought of differentiated functions or operations. God is revealed as tri-personal in the process of His self-communication to the world.

The Logos-doctrine which more particularly concerns us, is in its essential points described in the *Apology*, c. xxi. (1) God from all eternity possessed within His own Being the Word, the Reason, and the Power by which He created the universe. The essential quality of this "Word" is spirit, because it belongs to the Divine essence which is spirit. (2) This "Word" issued forth in order to create, and in virtue of this movement or act of production (*prolatio*) is called "Son of God" and "God." (3) He is derived from the one Divine substance, yet shares it; as Tertullian elsewhere expands the thought, He is a "derivation and portion" of the whole Divine substance, the Father being the total substance.[1] The relation of the Word to the Father is illustrated by the familiar *simile* of the sun and its radiance. A ray from the sun is *portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur.* (4) The Word thus begotten is distinct from God in manner of subsistence (*modulo*) and in position or rank (*gradu*). He

[1] *adv. Prax.* ix.: "Pater tota substantia est. Filius vero derivatio totius et portio sicut ipse profitetur, *Quia Pater major me est.*" Cp. *adv. Marc.* iii. 6. The Father has the *plenitude* of Deity; the Son is *portio*, certe qua plenitudinis consors. Harnack points out that Tert. was hampered by the axiom derived from his philosophy that Godhead in its entirety *cannot* pass over into the finite, but only a portion of the Divine substance, which *being originate* so far contains an element of finitude, i. 491.

becomes incarnate in the Virgin's womb, and is born in time (*nascitur homo Deo mixtus*). The human being thus formed is the Christ. Here in outline we have the Christology which is developed more fully in the treatise *adv. Praxeam.* All the characteristic notes are struck—(1) the distinction between the two natures—expressed in traditional phrase by the words *caro—spiritus*; (2) the Stoic term *prolatio*, used to express the forthcoming of the Word in creation, and the tendency to identify this "forthcoming" with the "generation of the Son"; (3) the community of the substance shared by the Son with the Father, consistently with subordination in rank, and a separate personal subsistence; (4) the integrity of the two natures united in the person of the historical Christ.

In two points especially the doctrine of Tertullian is peculiar and calls for comment.

1. His teaching as to the Divine generation. His tendency is to limit the idea of "generation" to that movement by which the Word of God issued forth in the work of creation. In consequence of this forthcoming the "Word" (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) or "Reason" of God became *Filius Dei.* The "Sonship" in this sense was an event that had its origin in time, and consequently there was a time when the Son was not.[1] Tertullian seems in fact to use the phrase "generation of the Word" in one of its customary and recognised senses as if it were the only sense. This usage of the term may have been traditional in the African Church,[2] and in Tertullian's case it must be explained subject to the qualifications which his language elsewhere suggests. The phraseology just mentioned, however, if taken by itself, implies that though there

[1] *c. Hermog.* iii.: "Fuit autem tempus cum et delictum et Filius non fuit, quod Judicem et qui Patrem Deum faceret." See Bp. Bull on this passage, *Def. Nic. Creed,* pt. ii. p. 512.

[2] Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ,* div. i. vol. ii. p. 215.

existed in God an eternal *potency* of Fatherhood, there was a time when He could not be properly called "Father." The Logos is immanent reason or thought before He is the uttered Word.[1] And by his insistance on this point Tertullian may be assumed to have been travelling along the same line of thought as "those who at a later period tried to show that the Trinity is the eternal process of the Divine self-consciousness confronting itself with itself."[2] Tertullian, in short, grasps the distinction between the Divine substance of the Word and His separate personality: but he can only represent the distinction by fixing it in time. The Word ever existed in God; but He became personal, He became *Son of God*, when He came forth to create, to bring into actuality the Divine thought of the world.[3] There are considerations, however, which ought to qualify this estimate of Tertullian's doctrine, for he adduces images which at least suggest the notion of an eternal distinction between the *hypostases* of the Trinity. The *conjunction* of the three persons is illustrated by the simile of the root, the shrub, and the fruit; their *inseparability* by that of the fountain, the stream, and the river; their *coherence* by the image of the sun, the ray, and the terminating point or apex of the ray.[4] Further, Tertullian nowhere speaks of the Son as "created." His usual phrases are *prolatum*, *prolatio* (προβολή),[5] terms

[1] "Non sermonalis a principio sed rationalis Deus, etiam ante principium," *adv. Prax.* v.

[2] Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 63.

[3] *adv. Prax.* vii.: "Hæc est nativitas perfecta Sermonis dum ex Deo procedit, conditus ab eo primum ad cogitatum in nomine Sophiæ: . . . . dehinc generatus ad effectum."

[4] *adv. Prax.* viii.

[5] *l.c.* "Prolatum dicimus Filium a Patre sed non separatum." Cp. *adv. Marc.* ii. 27. Novatian (no doubt following Tertullian) insists on the distinction between "factum esse" and "procedere" (*de Trin.* xv).

which he expressly defends as catholic in spite of their misuse by Valentinus.[1] His difficulties seem to arise in fact partly from his Stoic preconceptions, partly from his reaction against Gnostic idealism. His thought is, so to speak, realistic, and is expressed in concrete imagery; and to this realistic mode of thinking is due his representation of the Divine Sonship as an event or process of development in time. As we shall see, the very word "Sonship" falls in with Tertullian's tendency to change an "abstract process into a concrete relationship."[2]

2. The other point which differentiates Tertullian's Christology is his conception of the Son's subordination. The idea is, of course, an integral part of the standard doctrine of the apologists. Tertullian's treatment of it, however, is characteristically juristic, or even political. The earlier apologists had laid much stress on the ministerial function of the Word, His origination at the Father's will, and His dependence on it. The same line of thought is adopted by Tertullian, but is modified in a characteristic manner. The Son is said "to do nothing without the Father's will," but rather in the sense that He exercises freely a delegated Divine power, than ministers to a superior. The *Monarchia* of God, as it seemed to Tertullian, might be secured by the idea of administration. "The Son," he says, "received all power from the Father. . . . We thus see that the Son is no obstacle to the *Monarchia*, although it is now deposited with the Son. . . . No one, therefore, will impair it by admitting the Son [to it], since it is certain that it has been committed to Him by the Father, and hereafter is to be delivered up to the Father again."[3] It is clear that Tertullian's conception of the *monarchia* as *singulare*

[1] Cp. Justin's προβληθὲν γέννημα, and see a note on προβολή in Newman, *Athanasian Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 458.

[2] Fairbairn, *op. cit.* 394.

[3] *adv. Prax.* iv.

et unicum imperium is the determining factor in his theology. In his view the Son and Holy Spirit differ from the Father, not in substance, but in rank, form, and aspect (*specie*); they exercise a plenary power which is inherent but derived. The Father is not prevented by the fact that He is sole ruler from "ministering His own monarchy" through whatever agents He chooses. "I contend that no dominion so entirely belongs to one only . . . as not also to be administered through other *persons* closely connected [with it] whom it has provided as *officials*."[1] In a word, the unity of supreme authority is not impaired by its distribution among different agents. The Divine power is exercised and administered by thousands of angels and inferior beings. Why should it be supposed to suffer detriment or division if exercised by and through those who share the Divine substance, who embody "the very force, and the whole wealth (*census*) of the *monarchia*"? It is obvious that this image of administrative or economic unity falls short of the essential unity (*unitas substantiæ*) which Tertullian elsewhere predicates of the Trinity. This strict subordinatianism seemed to be the only escape from the charge of ditheism;[2] and it corresponded closely with Tertullian's conception of the Divine work as preeminently self-revelation. God in His transcendental height can only descend to man and come within reach of his intelligence by means of an economic movement. The Trinity in a manner flows down from its source, as the light flows from the sun, or the stream from the fountain.[3] Deity in itself remains invisible, inaccessible, incomprehensible. The Son is Godhead passing over into

[1] *adv. Prax.* iii. (notice the words *personæ* and *officiales*).

[2] *adv. Prax.* iii.

[3] *l.c.* viii.: "Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre *decurrens*, et monarchiæ nihil obstrepit, et *οἰκονομίας* statum protegit."

the finite, God made accessible, capable of converse with man, in that His Deity is not absolute but derived. He is the Light made endurable to human eyes by the softening and diminution of its splendour.[1] Again, the Father is impassible, but the Son is capable of redemptive suffering. The stream which at its fountainhead is undisturbed may be troubled as it flows onward in its course; but it remains the same water, only subject to different conditions. In all this line of thought we see traces of the philosophic distinction between God's transcendence and His self-manifestation; only to Tertullian the distinction is not one of abstract thought merely, but is capable of being expressed and represented under the concrete form of separate personalities. "Whatever attributes," he says to Marcion, "you require as worthy of God will be found in the Father, who is invisible, inaccessible, imperturbable, and (so to speak) the God of the philosophers; whereas the qualities which you censure as unworthy must be ascribed to the Son, who has been seen and heard and encountered, the witness (*arbitro*) and servant of the Father, uniting in Himself God and man, God in mighty deeds, in weaknesses man, in order that He may bestow on man as much as He takes from God. What in your eyes is the entire disgrace of my God, is in reality the very sacrament of man's salvation. God held converse with man that man might learn to act as God. God put Himself on a level with man, that man might be able to be on a level with God. God was found little, that man might become exceeding great."[2]

Thus through the Divine Sonship the Deity is brought near to man and enters into relationship with him. It is the main office of the Son to reveal the invisible Father. Tertullian goes further, and in some very striking passages represents the Son as preparing and

[1] See cc. xiv., xvi., xxix.

[2] *adv. Marc.* ii. 27.

training Himself, from the period of the creation onwards, for the Incarnation. This was the purpose of the Old Testament theophanies. They were preludes to the Incarnation, which from the beginning was the goal of the Divine "generation" or "filiation." "God objectively realised amongst men in Christ is the climax of the idea of the world, is that final aim which gives unity to the world and completion to the Word, that is to the self-objectification of God."[1] The Son was ever "learning to be incarnate" and to converse with mankind. In the Incarnation the self-manifestation of God reaches its culminating point. Through the "economy," or dispensation involved in the Sonship of the Word, the "God of the philosophers" remains in His transcendence and yet is revealed. *Invisibilis est, etsi videatur; incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repræsentetur; inæstimabilis, etsi humanis sensibus æstimetur.*[2]

We are now in a position to estimate more clearly the importance of Tertullian's Christology. Briefly expressed, the contribution of Tertullian to Christian thought is the expansion of the idea of the *Sonship*. Hitherto the idea of the *Logos* had been predominant. But with Tertullian, as Dorner says, "the age of Logology is succeeded by the age of Sonship." The defect of the Logos-doctrine had been its tendency to obscure the *personal* element in the Divine relations. The term "Logos" by itself was an abstraction; it was incapable of conveying the fulness of the Christian thought. Even S. John had supplemented the expression by the word μονογένης. It was the merit of Tertullian that he gave vitality and prominence to

[1] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 65. The passage referred to is *adv. Prax.* xvi.: "Ita semper ediscebat et deus in terris cum hominibus conversari, non alius quam sermo qui caro erat futurus." Cp. *adv. Marc.* ii. 27.

[2] *Apol.* xvii.

the other scriptural term "Son," and henceforth the idea of personality became a permanent factor in Trinitarian doctrine. The defect of Tertullian is that he considers the Word to have had no proper *personal* subsistence before the *prolatio*. His tendency is to regard the essence of the Son as eternal, but the personality as having an origin in time. It remained for Origen to combine the *eternity of the Son's essence* with the thought of *the generation of His person*, in the phrase *αἰωνία γέννησις*.[1] But Tertullian's statement, in spite of some confusions, has at least the great merit of introducing, and emphasising, the idea of *moral relationships* within the Deity, and so he marks a return on the part of theology to the ethical idea of God which, in the hands of Athanasius, was to be employed with such effect against Arianism.[2]

Tertullian's doctrine of the Incarnation bears many marks of individuality, but in the main follows that of Irenæus. Similar phrases to those of the earlier writer are used to describe the union of natures in Christ. He is *homo Deo mixtus*;[3] *caro hominis cum spiritu Dei*. The distinction between *caro* and *spiritus* to denote the manhood and the Godhead is one which Tertullian inherited. In his development of the idea of "two natures" in Christ, he practically anticipates the language of Leo and the definition of Chalcedon.[4] He grasps tenaciously the

[1] See above, p. 241. Cp. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 79 ff. Dorner holds that Tertullian uses the word *filiatio* in a threefold sense. There is (1) an eternal filiation: God's possession of His own Word within His being—this is a potential Sonship; (2) temporal, the "generation" of the Son, when He issues forth to create; (3) final, the Incarnation: *l.c.* pp. 68, 69.

[2] Cp. Newman, *Athanasian Treatises*, vol. i. p. 53.

[3] *Apol.* xxi.; cp. *de Carne Christi*, xviii.

[4] See *adv. Prax.* xxvii.; observe that *substantiæ* is used by Tertullian for the later *naturæ* (*φύσεις*); cp. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 512 note.

unity of the person in whom two natures are conjoined: *videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona Deum et hominem Jesum.* He insists on the consequences of this unity in a passionate outburst, which is a good example of what was called at a later time *communicatio idiomatum.* "*Natus est* (*v.l. crucifixus*) *Dei Filius; non pudet quia pudendum est; et mortuus est Dei Filius; prorsus credibile est quia ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit; certum est quia impossibile.*[1] The passage is valuable for its ethical tone. As it stands related to its context it is an answer to the Gnostic tenet that contact with the flesh was "unworthy" of God. The insinuation touches a chord of chivalry in Tertullian. *Quodcunque Deo indignum est,* he exclaims, *mihi expedit; salvus sum, si non confundar de Domino meo.* He means that the true standard of what is reasonably to be expected from God must be love. Christ loved man in spite of his outward humiliation and the defilements of his origin; *amavit utique quem magno redemit.*[2] Whatever substance He is pleased to assume, He Himself makes worthy of the honour.[3]

Another point peculiar to Tertullian is his vehement insistance, in opposition to docetism and *à priori* ideas of matter as essentially evil, on the dignity of the corporeal element in man's nature. His Stoicism, as we have seen, inclined him to ascribe corporeity even to God, and to the soul of man.[4] Accordingly he expends much pains in refuting false or inadequate ideas of Christ's human nature.[5] He maintains that Christ made our flesh His own—the very flesh which had become subject to sin; and that in assuming it He sanctified it from sin.

[1] *de Carne Christi,* v. [2] *Ibid.* iv.

[3] *adv. Marc.* iii. 10: "Nulla substantia digna est quam Deus induat. Quodcunque induerit, Ipse dignum facit."

[4] See *de Anima,* v.–ix. [5] See *de Carne Christi,* iii.–vi.

His "Christian realism" carries him to great lengths, especially in his antagonism to the Valentinian idea that Christ's body was of sidereal or spiritual texture,[1] not, like ours, of gross earthly material; and therefore not, like ours, born of woman. He glories in the sanctification by Christ of even the lowliest stages in the ascent of man. "Christ loved man even in his uncleannesses."[2] "He reforms our birth by a second birth from heaven; He restores our flesh from all that oppresses it." He cleanses it from every stain in the very act of assuming it in its integrity. This anti-docetic line of thought leads Tertullian to insist, as no writer before him had equally done, on the reality of our Lord's human soul.[3] Thus there was a complete and substantial assumption of our humanity by the Son of God;[4] Tertullian, as it were, pronounces the final judgment of the Church on docetism in all its manifold shapes and disguises.[5] But his statements are by no means merely apologetic. He uses the strongest and most glowing language[6] to describe the sanctity and dignity of the material which the Son of God has once condescended to assume and to make His own. The living God, the true God could surely "purge away by His own operation whatever vileness might attach to matter, and heal it from all infirmity."[7] He could "purge the original substance of its dross." "Nay," cries Tertullian, "God forbid that He should abandon to everlasting destruction the labour of His own hands, the care of His own thoughts, the receptacle of

[1] σῶμα ψυχικόν. [2] *de Carne Christi*, iv.

[3] *Ibid.* x.; cp. Neander, *Antignosticus*, pp. 476, 477.

[4] In *de Carne Christi*, xx., Tertullian uses the words *concarnatur, convisceratur.*

[5] Cp. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 49.

[6] Fairbairn criticises the language as even materialistic. *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 97 note.

[7] *de Resurr. Carnis.* vi.

His own Spirit, the queen of His creation, the heir of His liberality, the priestess of His religion, the soldier of His testimony, the sister of His Christ."[1] The flesh has its share in redemption; the first Adam in the entirety of his nature is destined to be restored after the image of the second Adam. Matter has been consecrated by the Incarnation to be the veil and sacramental channel of the spiritual. "Since the soul is, in consequence of its salvation, chosen to the service of God, it is the flesh which actually renders it capable of such service. The flesh, indeed, is washed [in baptism] in order that the soul may be cleansed from stain; the flesh is anointed that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed [with the cross] that the soul too may be fortified; the flesh is shadowed by the imposition of hands that the soul also may be illuminated by the Spirit; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ that the soul likewise may be satiated with [the life of] God."[2]

It only remains to notice Tertullian's conception of the redemptive work of Christ. Though less of a mystic than Irenæus, he yet lays great stress on the Passion of Christ. One ground of his opposition to docetism is that if Christ's sufferings be merely putative "the entire work of God is subverted," for in Christ's death "lies the whole weight and fruit of the Christian name."[3] On the whole, the same idea of the fruits of Christ's death is found both in Irenæus and Tertullian: the leading thesis of both writers is that God became man in order to exalt man to a Divine life. The term "satisfaction" appears in Tertullian, but not in relation to Christ's work. It is connected with the legal view of sin which first becomes

[1] c. ix. [2] c. viii.

[3] *adv. Marc.* iii. 8: "Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi," etc.

prominent in his system,[1] and reappears in Anselm. It should be added that there are traces here and there of the idea that redemption consists mainly in the knowledge of God and His requirement for man.

Closely connected with Tertullian is *Novatian*, the opponent of Cyprian, a man of harsh and austere temper, but as a writer calm in tone and cultivated in style. His treatise *de Trinitate* shows every mark of intellectual dependence on Tertullian, and admirably illustrates the general type of Christology which prevailed in the West about the middle of the third century. The work was very influential, and did much towards promoting the acceptance of the Logos-doctrine in the West. Novatian goes beyond Tertullian, however, in his insistance on the subordination of the Son, starting perhaps from an even more transcendental conception of God,[2] and endeavouring to secure the Divine unity by attributing to the Son an absolute and complete subjection. Novatian, in fact, falls back upon the traditional doctrine inherited by Tertullian. Thus he declares that the Son was generated by an act of the Father's will: *quando ipse voluit, Sermo Filius natus est.*[3] He allows, indeed, that the Word ever was in the Father, but says that the Father must be thought of as *in a sense* preceding the Son; like Tertullian, he expresses the relationship of ingenerate and generate as a process *in time.*[4] He follows Tertullian also in his description of the Divine generation as *prolatio*;[5] in his

[1] Thus he uses such terms as *culpa, meritum, reatus, crimen, delictum.* See Harnack's note, i. p. 524. The language of *de Pœn.* ii. and iii. is almost exclusively legal in tone. On Tertullian's use of *satisfactio*, see a note in Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doc.* i. p. 260.

[2] See *de Trin.* ii. and iii.

[3] c. xxxi.

[4] c. xxxi.: "Quin et Pater illum etiam quadam ratione præcedit quod necesse est quadammodo prior sit qua Pater sit. Quoniam aliquo pacto antecedat necesse est eum qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit."

[5] c. xxii.

use of the word *spiritus* to denote the Divine nature;[1] in his treatment of the theophanies; in calling Christ *secunda Persona post Patrem*;[2] but he goes beyond his master in asserting the Son's subordination. The *vis Divinitatis* transmitted to the Son as an act of grace is finally *per substantiæ communionem* restored to the Father.[3] *Filius nihil ex arbitrio suo gerit nec ex consilio suo facit, nec a se venit, sed imperiis paternis omnibus et præceptis obedit: ut quamvis probet illum nativitas Filium, tamen morigera obedientia adserat illum paternæ voluntatis, ex quo est, ministrum.* The subjection of the Son, in fact, proves the unity of God. *Dum se Patri in omnibus obtemperantem reddit, quamvis sit et Deus, unum tamen Deum Patrem de obedientia sua ostendit ex quo et originem traxit.*

In fact, the relationship between Father and Son is ultimately one of unity, not essential, but moral. Thus commenting on the text, *Ego et Patrem unum sumus*, Novatian says, *Unum neutraliter positum societatis concordiam non unitatem personæ, sonat.*[4] He practically excludes Patripassianism by reducing the unity of the Divine Persons to a kind of ethical relationship.

There are striking passages of the *de Trinitate* which show Novatian's great anxiety to be true to the tradition of the Church (*regula veritatis*), and to the scriptural testimony that Christ is no mere man but Divine.[5] Novatian discerns very clearly that there is danger in ignoring any portion of recorded truth, especially when Scripture witnesses throughout to the Deity of Christ.

[1] *e.g.*, c. xxiv. [2] c. xxvi.

[3] c. xxvi.; ep. xxxi.: "Dum gradatim reciproco meatu illa Majestas atque Divinitas ad Patrem qui dederat eam rursum ab illo ipso Filio missa revertitur et retorquetur."

[4] cc. xxvii., xxx.

[5] See (*e.g.*) a passage that suggests a comparison with Leo's tome, illustrating the duality of natures in Christ, c. xi.

He also observes acutely that Sabellianism has at least the merit of being *Divinitatis Christi argumentum grande atque præcipuum.*[1] But on the whole he gives us an impression of intellectual embarrassment. He is hampered, as Tertullian is, by the associations of the word "person." He dreads the charge of ditheism if he allows the existence of two distinct persons who are Divine. Christ's personality therefore he regards as having had its origin in time. Clearly what was necessary was a more profound idea of personality in regard to the Godhead. "In the domain of spirit," says Dorner, "exclusiveness is not necessary to the maintenance of distinctions, as in the finite, material world. There, on the contrary, as Tertullian already vaguely felt, distinctions confirm unity; for a unity evolved out of distinctions is more compact and self-sufficient. . . . In the domain of spirit, the unity is not an abstract identity or continuity, but one that posits and confirms distinctions."[2]

Passing to *Hippolytus* we come in contact with a theologian who may be regarded as a link, like Irenæus, between the East and West. Probably he had spent much time in the East, before he settled as a presbyter of the Church at Rome. His history is very obscure, but he first rises into prominence as the opponent of Callistus (*circ.* 220). It seems probable that when Callistus betrayed Sabellian leanings, Hippolytus allowed himself to be elected bishop by his followers, and it seems likely enough that he made Portus the scene of his activity. His connections with Irenæus and possibly with Origen give to his theology a peculiar importance and interest.[3] It evidently bears the impress of a

[1] c. xxiii.; cp. the question ascribed to Noetus (Hipp. *c. Noet.* i.), τί οὖν κακὸν ποιῶ δοξάζων τὸν Χριστόν.

[2] *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 82, 83.

[3] See Lightfoot, *S. Clement*, vol. ii. pp. 317–477.

period when East and West were still in constant and close communication. It retains some of the characteristics peculiar to each school that we have been considering. Thus his general doctrine of the Godhead is Platonistic. God is originally solitary;[1] but was never ἄλογος, ἄσοφος, ἀδύνατος, or ἀβούλευτος. God existed in plurality (πολὺς ἦν). The Logos subsisted within the Godhead, "having in Himself the preconceived ideas that were hidden in the Father";[2] when the Father willed, and as He willed, the Logos was "begotten,"—issued forth as light from light in order to create, and to dispose all things according to the will of God.

Here Hippolytus restates the Logos-doctrine in the terms which had now become traditional with ante-Nicene writers. The Logos ever existed in God as the unspoken thought of the universe (ἐνδιάθετος τοῦ παντὸς λογισμός); but His true "generation" took place in connection with creation. Thus "begotten," the Logos stood over against God as "a second Person" (ἕτερος). "The Word or Reason proceeding forth was manifested in the universe as Son of God (παῖς θεοῦ)."[3] The charge of "ditheism" is met by Hippolytus as by Tertullian. "I say not that there are two Gods, but [I speak of] two persons (πρόσωπα δυό), and of a third dispensation, even the grace of the Holy Ghost."[4] The Logos then became Son of God, became a distinct *hypostasis* with a view to creation. Indeed, the name Son properly belonged to Him only as incarnate. "For the Word pre-incarnate (ἄσαρκος Λόγος) was not perfect Son, although He was perfect and only-begotten Word."[5] This statement of

[1] *Phil.* x. 32: θεὸς εἷς, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ ἁπάντων ποιητὴς καὶ κύριος, σύγχρονον ἔσχεν οὐδὲν, κ.τ.λ. Cp. *c. Noet.* x.

[2] *Phil.* x. 33.: ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ προεννοηθείσας ἰδέας.

[3] *c. Noet.* xi.

[4] *c. Noet.* xiv.

[5] *c. Noet.* xv.: Λόγον δν υἱὸν προσηγόρευε διὰ τὸ μέλλειν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι.

the temporality of the Sonship is even more explicit than that of Tertullian, and equally decided is Hippolytus' insistance on the Son's subordination: His absolute dependence on the Father's will in the fulfilment of His functions as creator, and enlightener of the prophets, and revealer of God.[1]

Similar to the treatment of Tertullian is Hippolytus' mode of dealing with the Divine unity. God is One, but in the economy is revealed as threefold, each Person of the Divine Triad being an object of faith and worship. The unity of the Three is of a moral kind (*οἰκονομία συμφωνίας*): it consists in a differentiation of functions.[2] "The Father decrees, the Son executes." "The Father commands, the Son obeys, the Spirit gives understanding. The Father is *above* all, the Son is *through* all, the Holy Ghost *in* all . . . The Father willed, the Son accomplished, the Spirit manifested."[3] Again, Hippolytus escapes the charge of Sabellianism by insisting (*c. Noet.* xiv.) that each person of the Trinity has a claim to be "acknowledged" by man, and that the unity of God can only be properly adored if with the Father, the Son and Spirit be recognised. The seemingly Arian element in Hippolytus' Christology consists not in his denial of the eternity of the Logos, but in the assertion that, *as Son*, the Logos had a beginning in time.[4]

The statement of the Incarnation by Hippolytus is

[1] *c. Noet.* xiv.

[2] Cp. *c. Noet.* viii.: *πῶς εἷς θεός; . . μία δύναμις τούτου, καὶ ὅσον μὲν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, εἷς ἐστι θεός, ὅσον δὲ κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν, τριχῆς* [l. *τριχῇ* vel *τριχῶς*] *ἡ ἐπίδειξις.*

[3] *c. Noet.* xiv.

[4] The passage *Phil.* x. 33, *εἰ γὰρ θεόν σε ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι, ἐδύνατο· ἔχεις τοῦ λόγου τὸ παραδεῖγμα*, scarcely seems to warrant Harnack's inference (*Dogmeng.* i. 493 note) that Hipp. expressly accentuates the *creatureliness* of the Logos. Indeed, the idea seems excluded by the context, where the Logos is contrasted with the world: *ὁ λόγος μόνος ἐξ αὐτοῦ· διὸ καὶ θεός, οὐσία ὑπάρχων θεοῦ. ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἐξ οὐδένος, κ.τ.λ.*

rich, full, and somewhat mystical in tone,—following the lines of Irenæus. If at times his tendency is to regard the Incarnation as no more than a theophany of an exalted kind, there are qualifying passages which emphatically assert the reality and completeness of Christ's human nature. In the last two chapters of the fragment *contra Noetum* (xvii., xviii.) Hippolytus gives a summary of his belief, which he traces to the tradition of the apostles. He holds a real descent of the Word from heaven (*ἀπ' οὐρανῶν κατῆλθεν*), the assumption by Him of a true body and reasonable soul of the Virgin Mary, in order to undergo a complete human experience (*γεγονὼς πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος*), as the new Man, and to restore fallen humanity by raising it into the life of incorruption. The concluding chapter (xviii.) gives a series of antithetic contrasts intended to enforce the substantial reality and integrity of either nature, and anticipating the main thought of Leo's *Epistle to Flavian.* In the treatise on *Christ and Antichrist* there is a passage which forcibly recalls the language of the Alexandrine Clement. "The Word shows His compassion and His freedom from respect of persons, by the saints, enlightening them, and schooling them as may be most advantageous to us, like a skilful physician, understanding the weakness of men. And the ignorant He loves to teach, while the erring He turns again to His own true way. And by those who live in faith He is easily found, while to those of pure eye and holy heart who desire to knock at the door, He opens immediately. For He casts away none of His servants as unworthy of the Divine mysteries."[1] On the other hand, the influence of Irenæus is very apparent in Hippolytus' description of Christ as "the new Man," "wearing the nature of the old man as a robe,"

[1] *de Christo et Antichr.* iii. The somewhat elaborate simile drawn from weaving (in c. iv.) recalls the manner of Ignatius.

and sanctifying each stage of life "that to every age He might become Himself a law."[1] Akin, too, to the general standpoint of the apologists is the conception of redemption as ἀφθαρσία, and the thought of the pre-incarnate activity of the Word in a process of continuous revelation through the law and the prophets.[2]

A comparison of Hippolytus' statements with those of Tertullian will justify us in regarding these two writers as the most prominent champions of the Logos-doctrine in the West during the third century.[3] Their argumentative efforts to give expression to the traditional belief are instructive by their comparative failure. It remained for Origen to bring out the full significance of those images (the sun and its ray, the fountain and its source) by which theologians found themselves obliged to supplement their reasonings. In an age of intensely keen intellectual activity it is instructive to notice that the germ of further progress was contained in the simple statement of S. John, *God is Light.*

§ IV. The Close of Third Century Christology

In the course of our survey of different types of Christological doctrine, we are now approaching the close of the ante-Nicene period. The tendencies which were to come into open collision in the fourth century became more and more clearly defined in the last decades of the third century. The doctrine of the Logos had established itself as an accepted element in the Christology of the Church, and on all sides there was a growing disposition to formulate

[1] *Phil.* x. 33 : ἐν βίῳ διὰ πάσης ἡλικίας ἐληλυθότα, ἵνα πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτὸς νόμος γενηθῇ. Cp. Iren. ii. 22. 4, iii. 18. 7.

[2] *e.g. c. Noet.* xi.

[3] Notice in *c. Noet.* xv. the hint that the Logos-doctrine is new, and accordingly unwelcome.

the results of the conflict with Gnosticism and Monarchianism in fixed and artificial symbols. The generation that preceded the Council of Nicæa was, in fact, a period of mutual explanations and of formulated creeds.[1] The technical terms of Nicene theology were all, or most of them, already current, but their connotation was not as yet exactly determined.[2] On all sides the great inconvenience of not possessing a regulative standard of faith was becoming manifest. The ancient baptismal creeds were inadequate in view of the problems that had been raised by theological science, and the speculations in which gifted individuals like Origen had indulged. In the years which followed Origen's death, it became evident that the Logos-doctrine might be very differently interpreted, according as it was combined with a very strict conception of the Divine unity, or with a tendency to lay particular stress on the distinctions of personality in the Godhead. Of this divergence the correspondence between Dionysius of Alexandria (*d.* 265) and his namesake of Rome (*d.* 269) is a prominent illustration. It has, indeed, been regarded as a prelude to the Arian dispute of the next century.

Dionysius "the great" of Alexandria belonged to the school of Origen, and appears to have inherited something of his master's spirituality, wisdom, and rare moderation in controversy. In his endeavours to cope with the widespread Sabellianism prevailing among the clergy of the Pentapolis, Dionysius addressed letters to certain bishops, in one of which, intending to assert the distinctness of the Son's personality, he allowed himself to use

[1] Harnack, *Dogmeng.* i. 708.

[2] See a list in Harnack, *l.c.* 692, note 2. Perhaps the most important are *οὐσία—ὑπόστασις—κτίζειν*, and *ποιεῖν—ὁμοούσιος—ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός—ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν—ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν—ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης—ἕνωσις κατὰ μετουσίαν—ἐνοικεῖν.*

unguarded expressions of the extreme subordinatianist type, which so perplexed the recipients that the letter was made the subject of formal complaint to Dionysius, the bishop of Rome. It was discussed in a synod held at Rome soon after 260. The bishop of Rome himself issued a document (to be noticed presently) of a mediating tendency, condemning both the Sabellianists and their opponents, but without naming Dionysius. At the same time he wrote privately to the bishop of Alexandria asking for explanations. In reply Dionysius wrote a lengthy treatise in four books (ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία), in which he complained that some of his expressions had been wrested from their true context and purport, and vindicated his orthodoxy at length.

The language complained of was as follows: Dionysius had stated that the Son of God was a creature (ποίημα καὶ γενητόν), and that He was not by nature a Son in the proper sense (φύσει ἴδιον), but in essence foreign to the Father (ξένον κατ' οὐσίαν); that the Father was related to Him as the husbandman to the vine or the shipbuilder to the boat; that being a creature (ποίημα) He was not before He was created (γένηται).[1]

This language as it stands is indefensible, and might have been more wisely withdrawn; but it is qualified, first, by the writer's purpose. He calls the Son a *creature*, because, like his great master, he could find no guarantee of His distinct *personality* except by insisting on His subordination in rank. It is true that he goes far beyond Origen in the reiterated expression ποίημα, but his intention was wholly different from that of Arius. He desired to emphasise the *personality*,[2] not the *creatureliness*, of the Logos. His language is, in fact, a premature

[1] ap. Ath. *de sent. Dion.* iv. Athanasius defends these illustrations as ἀνθρωπίνως εἰρημένα, x., *i.e.* as relating to our Lord's human nature.

[2] Ath. *l.c.*: καιροῦ καὶ προσώπου πρόφασις εἵλκυσεν αὐτὸν τοιαῦτα γρᾶψαι,

deduction from the Logos-doctrine which he inherited from Origen. Secondly, the expressions used were qualified by the images employed to illustrate his meaning. He adopted the accepted simile of the fountain and the stream, the root and the plant.[1] Finally, Dionysius explains himself fully in the letter to Dionysius of Rome. Here he enlarges on the image of the sun and its radiance; the Son of God is *ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀϊδίου*, and therefore Himself *ἀΐδιος*. Next, he recognises the word *ὁμοούσιος*, which, he admits, gives the sense of Scripture, though not actually found there; and he illustrates the term by the figure of a parent and child; so far the letter implicitly anticipates the Nicene doctrine. The doubtful word *ποιητής* is explained by Dionysius to mean, as applied to the Father, "author" of the Son's being. The Son is "produced" as the word is "produced," by him who utters it; *ποίησις* is a term applicable to literary and other "production." Finally, Dionysius accepts the phrase actually employed in the formal document of his namesake, *τὴν τριάδα εἰς τὴν μονάδα συγκεφαλαιούμεθα*.[2] Dionysius of Rome had regarded the language of the Alexandrine as tritheistic,—implying *ὑποστάσεις μεμερισμένας καὶ θεότητας τρεῖς*. Dionysius repudiates any notion of "division" of substance, in terms which indicate that already there is confusion between the different senses of *ὑπόστασις*. The Western bishop uses *ὑπόστασις* for the common substance or *essence* (*οὐσία*) of the Godhead; the Alexandrine uses *ὑποστάσεις* as virtually equivalent to *πρόσωπα, persons*.[3]

Thus it may fairly be maintained that Dionysius of

[1] Dion. Alex. *Fragm. Ep. ad D. Rom.* ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 393: *οἶδα δὲ καὶ μέμνημαι, πλείονα προσθεὶς τῶν συγγενῶν ὁμοιώματα, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 395; cp. 374.

[3] See note in Routh, *l.c.* p. 383.

Alexandria ultimately returns to Origen's position, and, indeed, he seems to state the doctrine of the eternity of the Son with less restriction than his master. The Son is eternal; the light never existed without its radiance. If the Father is the self-existent reason (*νοῦς*, or *λόγος ἐγκείμενος*), the Son is the forthcoming reason (*λόγος προπηδῶν*). Each is in the other: *οὔτε ὁ νοῦς ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄνους ὁ λόγος*.[1]

The dogmatic statement of Dionysius of Rome is preserved by Athanasius.[2] Like later utterances of Roman bishops, it displays the instinctive tenacity with which the Roman Church clung to the statements of the creed, accepting them in the fixed traditional sense, and making no attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions. The statement is an admirable example of the *via media*, taking the middle course between Sabellianism, *i.e.* the false interpretation of the Divine unity, and tritheism, *i.e.* the division of the Divine substance. It also condemns the "adoptianist" view of the Theodotians and Paul the Samosatene. The doctrine of the Trinity is thus summed up: "It must needs be that with the God of the universe the Divine Word is united, and the Holy Ghost must repose and habitate in God; thus in One as in a summit, I mean the God of the universe, the omnipotent, must of necessity the Divine Triad be gathered up and brought together."[3] There follows a scriptural proof that Christ is no creature. Scripture speaks of His *γέννησις*, but not of any *πλάσις* or

[1] Routh, *l.c.* 398; cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 180, 181.

[2] *de Decret. Nic. Syn.* xxvi. See Routh, *l.c.* pp. 373 ff.

[3] *ἡνῶσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον λόγον· ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν δὲ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· ἤδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα (τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω) συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαί τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη* [trans. by Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, i. 45].

ποίησις. "For if He *became* a Son (γέγονεν υἱός), there was a time when He was not. But He ever was, if so be He is *in the Father* as He Himself declares" (S. Jo. xiv. 11). It is noticeable also that the text Prov. viii. 22 (LXX. ἔκτισέ με, κ.τ.λ.) is explained by Dionysius to mean, "He set me over the works made by Him."

This celebrated dispute, if it is to be so called, thus ended in a practical agreement as to the nature and person of the Son. As Dorner remarks, the withdrawal of the Alexandrine Dionysius from his untenable position not only did justice to the general Christian consciousness of the Redeemer's person. It made conspicuously plain the fact that "no one of the disputants was disposed to treat the Son as a mere creature." Accordingly the Church advanced to meet the Arian struggle with its common consciousness greatly strengthened, and the settlement now arrived at was a prelude to the decision of Nicæa.[1]

Later writers of the school of Origen developed or expounded their teacher's system; but the fourth century had scarcely begun before there appeared some decided symptoms of reaction, and a tendency to return to the simple scriptural presentment of Christ's person and work. The most celebrated Origenists of the last quarter of the third century were *Pierius*, *Theognostus*, *Hieracas*, and *Gregory Thaumaturgus*.

Pierius, known as "Origenes Junior," was head of the catechetical school and the teacher of Pamphilus, the apologist of Origen. It would appear that his terminology, and his statements on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, were open to misconception.[2] *Theognostus*, in his *Hypotyposes*, developed and formulated the theology of Origen, and is adduced by Athanasius as a witness to the

[1] *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 185.

[2] See the passage from Photius in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii: 429 ff. (He spoke of δύο οὐσίαι or φύσεις in the sense of ὑποστάσεις.)

consubstantiality of the Son.[1] *Hieracas* is the link between Origenism and the monastic system of Egypt.[2] The *Panegyric* on Origen by *Gregory* (*d.* 270) of Neo-Cæsarea in Pontus (Thaumaturgus), shows that the latter entirely accepted his teacher's doctrine of the Trinity. The creed ascribed to Gregory, and said to have been taught to catechumens in his church, is in fact "a compendium of the Origenistic theology."[3] Pamphilus and Eusebius of Cæsarea must also be mentioned as notable disciples of the Alexandrian school. On the other hand, *Peter of Alexandria* (*mart.* 311) did not shrink from freely contradicting some of the less defensible points of Origen's system (*e.g.* his doctrine of a premundane fall); while in *Methodius* of Patara (*circ.* 300) appears a theologian who, writing from Origen's own Platonistic standpoint, rejects the main bulk of his opinions. His position resembles that of Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian, his Christology being of a mystical and ascetic type. It is not, however, necessary to describe it in detail for our present purpose.[4]

Nor is it necessary to trace the course of Christological thought in the West beyond Dionysius. In him already the characteristic features of later Western theology are apparent. The subordinatianism of Tertullian has been repressed; there is no longer any effort to fix *in time* the mystery of the hypostatic distinctions within the Deity. The scriptural testimony of the Son's Deity is accepted

[1] *de Decr. Nic. Syn.* xxv. The statement of Photius that Theognostus called the Son a creature (κτίσμα) is questioned by Bull (*Def. Nic. Creed*, bk. ii. c. 10, § 8), but is accepted by Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 418, 419.

[2] See Neander, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 485 ff.

[3] Harnack, *Dogmeng.* i. 707 note.

[4] See Harnack, i. 695–705. Harnack regards the theology of Methodius as highly significant, in its union of the rule of faith with Origenistic science, of theoretic optimism with world-renunciation, of mysticism with biblical "realism," etc. Dorner says little (div. i. vol. ii. pp. 175 ff.).

by Dionysius as an indisputable foundation, just as it is in a later age by Leo in his letter to Flavian; and there is no trace of any speculative interest in the profound problems which agitated the East. The Western Church was already occupied with immense practical and administrative tasks; it regarded the faith as an instrument for achieving the moral transformation of the world, but its passive resistance to innovations in doctrine proved to be of the most decisive importance in the doctrinal struggles of the next century.

1. *The Close of Third Century Theology; the Council of Antioch* (269).

The most conspicuous event of the latter half of the century was the council held at Antioch to consider the teaching of Paul of Samosata in 269. This council was in point of fact the last of a series of three synods, the first of which assembled as early as 264, chiefly owing to the exertions of the venerable bishop of Alexandria, Dionysius. Firmilian of Cæsarea (Cappadocia) presided over the first synod, and Gregory was present. In the final council the chief part was taken by the presbyter Malchion, a skilful dialectician of the Antiochene school, who is said by Jerome to have been the actual writer of the synodical letter addressed to the bishops of Rome and Alexandria.[1]

The most important doctrinal result of the Antiochene synods is the letter addressed by six bishops to Paul. It illustrates the tendency which was now widely prevalent, to formulate the faith in philosophical and technical phraseology. It is also of great significance as gathering up in one authoritative document the results of a century of active speculation and fertile thought. Finally, it shows how anxious the Fathers were to keep within the

[1] See the letter in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. pp. 303 ff.

lines of Scripture and tradition. It is begging a large question to say that the faith has here been transformed into a system of speculative theology. The controversies of the century had necessitated the use of new weapons, and the restatement of the faith in terms of current science and metaphysics. But the mind of S. John had moved among conceptions not less abstract than those of the Antiochene definition, and it has never been successfully shown that the more elaborate terminology conceals any real addition to the substance of the Church's original faith. The effort after exact expression was characteristic of the Greek mind, as in a later age the craving for concrete realisation of the objects of faith was characteristic of the Western mind. Theology does not necessarily lose its hold on the primary verities of religious faith by becoming philosophic; it does not desert Scripture because it borrows its weapons from the schools; it does not add to the contents of the creed by the development of its terminology. The most notable points in the synodical letter to Paul, which is cast somewhat in exegetical form, are the following:[1]

1. The bishops insist that they are only committing to writing the traditional faith of the Church, handed down from the apostles "who were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word." This position recalls the line of defence against Gnosticism which Irenæus, Hippolytus and Tertullian had found effective, and which had not been overlooked even by the bold thinkers of Alexandria.

2. A marked pre-eminence is assigned to the Father. He is *ἀγέννητος*, *εἷς*, *ἄναρχος*, *ἀόρατος*, *ἀναλλοίωτος*, *κ.τ.λ.* This entirely reflects the tendency of the time towards an abstract, Hellenic conception of God, akin to that of Philo and the Neo-Platonists. The defect of this view is that it is primarily intellectual rather than ethical,

[1] See Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. pp. 289 ff.

and that it logically necessitates a strictly subordinatianist view of the Son's nature and work. God is regarded as an object of knowledge transcending human thought, and only revealed, and that imperfectly, by the Son.

3. Doctrine of the Son: *υἱὸς γεννητὸς, μονογενὴς, εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀοράτου θεοῦ, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως.* It may be noticed that this phraseology is almost entirely Scriptural. The letter goes on to describe Christ as pre-existent (*πρὸ αἰώνων ὄντα*); very God, not merely in virtue of Divine foreknowledge (*προγνώσει*), but God "both in essence and hypostasis" (*οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει*).[1] The Godhead of the Son is demonstrated from the Scriptures; and His work is described in the usual subordinatianist terms. He "ever was with the Father," and "fulfilled the Father's will in the creation of the universe," being no mere instrument or abstract attribute of God, but a Son generated by the Father "as a living and personal energy" (*ζῶσαν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐνυπόστατον*); revealed in the Old Testament as one who conversed with the patriarchs, in fulfilment of the Father's counsel; described sometimes as "Angel," sometimes as "Jehovah" or "God." Throughout the document we are struck by the prominence assigned to the Logos as "Creator" and "Revealer" of God. This Hellenic conception of the Logos was undoubtedly dominant during the whole period now drawing to its close. The mediatorial function of the Son is barely recognised in the statement that the law was given to Moses "by the ministration of the Son" (*διακονοῦντος*), in virtue of which the title *μεσίτης* is given to Him in Gal. iii. 19. It will be noticed that the mode and time of the *γέννησις* are not

[1] *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* seem here employed to express the Son's real individual subsistence as a distinct personality. *οὐσία* is used in a sense inclining to the later Aristotelian usage, implying the *reality* of the Son's pre-existence.

touched upon, from which we may infer that the Origenist conception of the "eternal generation" is tacitly suggested in the phrase *σὺν τῷ πατρὶ αἰεὶ ὄντα.* Further, *γεννᾶν* is used to the exclusion of the material imagery implied in the phrases *προβολή*, *prolatio*, etc. Lastly, the free identification and interchange of the terms "Word" and "Son" marks a distinct step forward towards the Christology of Athanasius.

4. The doctrine of the Incarnation is next stated. The Incarnation is at once a condescension on the part of one who is "God and Lord of all created things," and a mission on the part of the supreme Father. It involves a true union of Godhead and manhood whereby a human body (*σῶμα*) is made the receptacle of the fulness of Deity, and becomes "deified" through inseparable union with Godhead. In Jesus Christ a single Divine person "emptied Himself of the state of equality with God" and became man in accordance with Old Testament prophecy.

It should be observed that no reference is made to the human soul of Christ,[1] and in the scriptural quotations by which the above statement is illustrated, the old distinction between *πνεῦμα* (Christ's higher nature, or Deity) and the flesh (*σῶμα*) which He assumed, reappears. There is also, no doubt, a reference to Origen in the statement that in so far as He is Christ [the Logos] is "one and the same in substance" (*οὐσίᾳ*), albeit He is conceived of under many *ἐπινοίαι.*[2]

The rejection of the word *ὁμοούσιος* by the Antiochene Synod will be noticed below. It is only necessary at this point to remark that the result of the synod implies

[1] The Incarnation is called *σάρκωσις.*

[2] *i.e.* "economic functions, relations to the world," Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 168. *οὐσία* seems to be equivalent to "persona subsistens." Routh, *ad loc.*

the victory of Alexandrine thought over tendencies which were first conspicuously displayed by Paul of Samosata, but which reappeared in the school of Lucian, and ultimately in Nestorianism. The Alexandrine teachers treated the pre-existence of Christ as the central point of their theology. They busied themselves in speculations respecting the generation and premundane condition of the Logos; they "made it their chief concern . . . to bring out distinctly the difference of kind between the fact of God's *becoming* man, and a mere influence of God upon a man; and to fix the attention upon the incomprehensible and inexplicable side of the mystery."[1] The Antiochene theology was critical and historical, "inclined to seek after clear and well-defined conceptions for the understanding"; and it accordingly preferred to form its idea of Christ from the simple gospel narratives, insisting on the distinctness and individuality of the figure portrayed in them, and having only a languid interest in the strictly theological problems raised by the Johannine doctrine of the Logos. The position of Arius represents, from this point of view, a stage or halting-place in a progressive movement of thought. Arianism is a mere compromise between the purely adoptianist view of Christ and the Logos-doctrine in its current subordinatianist form.[2] What the Church rejected in the Antiochene definition was the Ebionitic conception of Christ as an inspired or Divinely-indwelt man. The appearance of the pre-existent Son of God in bodily form was authoritatively declared to be *de fide* within the Catholic Church, as the rightful interpretation of the complex fact described in Holy Scripture.[3]

[1] Neander, *Church History*, vol. iv. p. 107 (E.T.).

[2] Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 646.

[3] The letter contains upwards of forty passages from Scripture, more than half of which are taken from the New Testament.

2. *Confusions in Ante-Nicene Terminology*

The language of theological writers in the first three centuries is admittedly inadequate. It is well known that their shortcomings in this respect gave occasion to Petavius to insist that almost all the ante-Nicene Fathers held the very opinions attributed to Arius, and condemned in 325. "It is most clear," he says, "that Arius was a genuine Platonist, and that he followed the opinion of those ancient writers who, while as yet the point had not been developed and settled, had fallen into the same error."[1] He points particularly to the fact that many ante-Nicene writers hold that the Son was not coeternal with the Father, nor coequal; but that He was produced by an act of the Divine will as an instrument for the work of creation.

A candid examination, however, of these writers will scarcely justify this strange conclusion. Rather it will be found that their language is unstudied, and of a free, devotional type, such as would be natural enough to men engaged in a conflict concerning the fundamental truths of faith, with Ebionitic and Gnostic tendencies alternately. Certainly, "they were in difficult and untried circumstances; they were making experiments in unknown regions of thought." What wonder, then, if their language is inconsistent, "tentative, and provisional."[2]

1. Thus we find what may be called "theopaschite" language in the sub-apostolic writers, *e.g.* *αἷμα θεοῦ*, *παθήματα θεοῦ*, *ὁ θεὸς πέπονθεν*; and even Tertullian speaks of "God crucified," "the flesh of God," etc.[3]

[1] Petav. *de Trin.* i. 5. 7, quoted by Bull, *Def. Nic. Creed*, i. 10. The treatise of Bull aims at showing that Petavius' view is "manifestly repugnant to the truth, and most unjust and insulting to the holy Fathers, whether those of the Council of Nice, or those who preceded it."

[2] Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 429.

[3] See references in Lightfoot, *S. Clement*, vol. ii. p. 15.

Such expressions imply a belief in the Deity of Christ, but would be dangerous in controversy with Gnosticism, as seeming to allow passibility in the Godhead; and they would become still more objectionable in view of Patripassianism like that of Noetus or Praxeas. The price, in fact, paid for securing the full Divinity of the Word would be an obscuration of hypostatic distinctions within the Deity.

2. Little needs to be said of the common tendency to insist overmuch on the subordination of the Son. Some writers, like Justin, lay exaggerated stress on the ministerial functions of the Son in creation and revelation. Justin even calls Him "another God under the Creator of the universe." Others, like Origen, regard the *derivation* of the Son's substance as an element in His being which constitutes not mere inferiority, but generic difference.[1] In the same way Tertullian contrasts the Son, whose essence is *derivatio totius et portio*, with the Father, who is the "entire substance" of Deity. We have already remarked in regard to this point of the Son's subordination, that it is urged in the interests of the Divine unity, the object of third century writers being to maintain, against Gnosticism and paganism, the continuity of the monotheistic revelation of the Old Testament. It is the One and self-same God who reveals Himself through the ministry of the pre-existent Word in the Old Testament, and in the incarnate Word of the New. Uppermost in their minds is the ministrative office of the Son.

3. Again, as to the mode and conditions of the Divine γέννησις, occasional statements are made which indicate the want of fixed connotation in the terms employed, and a defective conception of the Godhead. There seem to be, indeed, three, if not four, senses of the word γέννησις.

[1] Origen even uses the phrase, ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν; cp. p. 245.

(*a*) It is used to denote the mystery of the Son's eternal coexistence with the Father. In this sense the Son's "generation" is not an event in time, but an intemporal and necessary relationship to the Father. "This alone," says Bishop Bull, "is the true and properly so-called nativity of the Word."[1] This sense of γέννησις is rather implied than expressed in the favourite images by which the Son's relationship to the Father is described, —the sun and its radiance, the fountain and stream, etc.

(*b*) The term may mean that act of condescension whereby the Logos proceeds forth from the Father to create the universe; that change of state whereby the eternal Word from being ἐνδιάθετος became προφορικός; passed from a state of repose to one of energetic manifestation.

(*c*) γέννησις may also be used for the actual nativity in time by which *the Word became flesh*; or (*d*) the resurrection (cp. Ps. ii. 7, LXX.).

The tendency of the ante-Nicene Fathers is to use γέννησις in the second of the above significations, implying that the Word became hypostatised, became a "Son," only when He entered on the work of creation. This is expressly stated by Justin, Hippolytus, and Tertullian. The two writers last mentioned speak in explicit terms: "Not a perfect Son without the flesh, though a perfect Word, being the only begotten . . . whom God called Son, because He was destined to become such."[2] "There was a time when the Son was not."[3] Further, the γέννησις is ascribed to the Father's will. The Son is θελήσει γεννηθείς, says Justin;[4] He was generated by

[1] *Defence*, vol. ii. p. 505 ff. [2] Hippol. *c. Noet.* xv.

[3] Tert. *adv. Hermog.* iii. See Newman's *Arians*, Appendix, note 2. The same tendency might be illustrated from the writings of Zeno and Lactantius. See Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 189, 195.

[4] *Dial.* cxxviii.

the Father, *quando voluit*, says Novatian.[1] No doubt the intention of the phrase was to exclude the materialistic or fatalistic idea of some Gnostics, that emanations from Deity were due to necessary laws of being to which even Godhead was subject. The word θελήσει was meant to express a moral necessity, the correspondence of the Divine Being to the idea or law of His own nature.[2] Further, there was a tendency to borrow physical, and even materialistic, phraseology from the Gnostics; instances of which would be Justin's προβληθὲν γέννημα, and Tertullian's *prolatio* (προβολή). Both these writers employed such language to denote the separate existence of the Son in opposition to the Gnostic personification of mere attributes, or to Modalistic evasions. It is true that Tertullian qualifies by an explanation his use of the term *prolatio*, and Origen definitely repudiates it[3] as derogatory to the Divine nature; and, indeed, when applied to the subject of Divine personality, such language is entirely inadequate and even misleading. Nevertheless, it is actually employed by Western writers, and it was only the protests of the Alexandrine school that led to the exclusion of the phraseology in question. To Origen, especially, the Church owes a doctrine of the Divine generation which eradicated the prevalent idea that it was a temporal or physical event, and therewith all notions of a Sonship gradually perfected or conferred in time. In Augustine's time the older opinion had, in fact, become classed as a heresy.[4]

4. The rejection of the word ὁμοούσιος by the Council

[1] *de Trin.* xxxi.

[2] Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 413, says: "Physical necessity is objective, the compulsion of a power without and above; but moral need is subjective, a spontaneous and rational movement, obedience to the idea or law of one's own nature."

[3] Cp. Newman, *Arians*, pp. 190, 191.

[4] *Arians*, p. 422.

of Antioch was constantly urged at a later time as an insuperable objection to the adoption of the term in the Nicene symbol. The very word, or at least equivalent expressions, had been occasionally employed by ante-Nicene writers. It seems to have been introduced into theology by Gnostic writers,[1] and is said by Pamphilus to have been used by Origen,[2] while an equivalent expression is found in Tertullian and Novatian. Dionysius, as we have seen, reintroduced the word, and Theognostus had used the phrase *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*. In ordinary usage *ὁμοούσιος* would imply "generic unity." Two substances of the same kind or nature are *ὁμοούσια*. Thus, two men or two stars might be said to be "consubstantial" with each other. But, in regard to the incommunicable and unique essence of God, no abstraction is possible. God is above all possibility of comparison with His works. His nature is unique and solitary, "peculiar to Himself and one; so that whatever was accounted to be consubstantial or co-essential with Him, was necessarily included in His individuality."[3]

The rejection of the term at Antioch is said by Athanasius to have been due to the sophistic use of it by Paul of Samosata. He understood the word in a realistic sense, maintaining that if the Son were really "consubstantial" with the Father, there must be some prior "substance" (*οὐσία*) in which they both alike partake. Thus there would be three substances, one which was prior (*προηγουμένην*) and two other which

[1] Iren. i. 5, §§ 1, 6: eiusdem substantiæ. The word occurs in Ptolem. *ad Flor.* [ap. Epiph. *Hær.* i. 33]: *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἔχοντος τὰ ὅμοια ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὁμο-ούσια γεννᾶν τε καὶ προφέρειν*. It was also used by the Manichæans, Ath. *de Synod*, § 16.

[2] In his Comm. *in Hebr.* quoted by Pamphilus, *Apol.* See Harnack, *Dogm.* i. 580 note; Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 179 note.

[3] Newman, *Arians*, p. 187.

were derived from it.[1] This would imply that the Father was not the original fountain-head of all being; that even His Godhead was, like that of the Son, not ultimate but derivative. The term was accordingly set aside at Antioch, probably on the ground of its Sabellian connotation. According to Paul, the impersonal Logos, a mere attribute or quality, was "consubstantial" with the personal God, as if God and the Logos were no more than one subject. Under altered circumstances the catholic meaning of the word could be vindicated; indeed, as used by the Nicene Fathers, the *ὁμοούσιον* was calculated to secure the doctrine of the Son's Divinity by excluding the idea that He was created, or subject to mutability. It was intended at Nicæa to assert that the Divine *οὐσία*, unique and incommunicable, subsists by derivation in the Son. In the symbol of Nicæa the term *ὁμοούσιον* is in fact defined by the phrase *θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ*; it expresses the identity of the Divine substance, and excludes division of it. The Deity of Christ is one with that of the Father, from whom, nevertheless, as its source, it is derived.[2] As Augustine afterwards writes: *Pater igitur et filius simul una essentia, et una magnitudo, et una veritas, et una sapientia* (*de Trin.* vii. 3). *Substantia Patris ipse Pater est non quo Pater est, sed quo est . . . Persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est* (*ib.* 11).

3. *Anticipations of the Nicene Doctrine*

The doctrine of the Son's "consubstantiality," though

[1] Ath. *de Synod*, xlv. Cp. Bas. *ep.* lii. The theory of Paul implied an *ὑσία πρεσβυτέρα*, *i.e.* something *τοῦ ἀγεννήτου πρεσβύτερον*. Harnack remarks that this Aristotelian conception of *οὐσία* corresponds with Paul's general mode of thought (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 643).

[2] On the history and meaning of the Homo-usion, see Newman, *Arians*, pp. 184–190; *Ath. Treatises*, ii. 438 ff.; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 438–440; Bull, *Def. Nic. Creed*, pt. ii. c. i.; Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* vol. iii. pp. 360–365.

not expressly stated by the ante-Nicene writers, may be fairly considered to be implied in various expressions and illustrations which frequently meet us in their works.[1]

1. Thus they speak of the Son as "put forth" or "projected," not merely *by* the Father, but *from* Him. They employ very commonly the phrase ἐκ θεοῦ. Irenæus says, τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ γεννηθὲν θεός ἐστι.[2] Hippolytus, πάντα τοίνυν δι' αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ἐκ πατρός, κ.τ.λ. And this seems to be the most usual mode of expression.

2. Again, they call the Son "true," "genuine," "unique," or "proper" Son of God: begotten, as Justin says, ἰδίως, παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν γένεσιν.[3] Hippolytus, in a remarkable passage, points out that the Father begat the Son, and Him alone, ἐξ ὄντων. τὸ γὰρ ὂν αὐτὸς ὁ πάτηρ ἦν, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γεννηθὲν.[4] All created things are made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. The generation of the Son is unique. He is "only begotten" (μονογένης). His generation so far transcends any known mode of corporeal birth that speculation is unsafe, and inquiry to be discouraged.[5]

3. It is also to be remembered that the higher nature of Christ is frequently described as *spirit*, and His pre-existence definitely asserted. This implies that conclusions attained by reasoning from material laws and facts were felt to be inadequate.

4. Further, the Fathers constantly revert to the traditional imagery drawn from the sun and its radiance, etc. It is to be observed that Origen directly bases the doctrine of the eternal generation on this image. "When," he asks, "was that God whom John calls the light destitute of the radiance of His own glory, so that a man may venture to ascribe to the Son a beginning of

[1] See Bull, *Def.* vol. i. p. 85.
[2] Iren. i. 8. 5; Hipp. *c. Noet.* xi.
[3] *Apol.* i. 22.
[4] *Philos.* x. 33 *init.*
[5] Cp. Newman, *Arians*, pp. 160, 161.

existence?"[1] Other similitudes, *e.g.*, the stream proceeding from the fountain, the tree from the root, served to illustrate the "consubstantiality," or at least the inseparable coherence of the Divine persons. The scriptural image of light, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, was indeed inserted in the creed in illustration of the ὁμοούσιον.

5. They ascribe to the Son Divine attributes, and exempt Him from the number of created beings. Perhaps the descriptions by Irenæus of the Son's work would sufficiently illustrate this point. The very completeness and finality of redemption for Irenæus rests upon the fact that in Christ God Himself has entered into the sphere, and submitted to the limitations, of human life. The Logos, who by the Incarnation unites human nature to Himself, shares all the Divine attributes in their perfection. In assimilating man to Himself, He enables him to realise his original destiny, namely, likeness to the invisible Creator.[2] Christ is worshipped as God; He forgives as God; He is enabled to be our Mediator because He is in nature one with God, as, through His flesh, He is one with us. Irenæus, however, is only one of the "chain of representative writers" who habitually ascribe Divine attributes and titles to Jesus Christ.[3]

A general survey of the ante-Nicene literature will show how the way was gradually prepared for the work of the conciliar period. First we notice the uniform appeal made by Church writers to Scripture and the rule of faith. In this respect the epistles of Clement or Ignatius stand on a level with the synodal letter of Antioch. Just as the apostolic Epistles of S. Paul or S. John presuppose a knowledge of the Christian facts, so

[1] *de Princ.* iv. 28; cp. Tert. *adv. Prax.* viii.

[2] Cp. Iren. v. 16. 2; and see reff. in Liddon, *Bampt. Lect.* pp. 421, 422.

[3] See Liddon, *op. cit.* pp. 419 ff.

the collection of Scriptures presupposes the foundation of churches, and the foundation of churches the delivery once for all of a faith on which they were built. The whole Church thus read and understood the Scriptures in the sense of the apostolic teaching; the tradition is to be tested by Scripture, and is, in fact, identical with the true sense of Scripture.[1] We can hardly overestimate the reverence with which Scripture was regarded by the early writers. Irenæus compares it to the treasure hid in a field; Clement of Alexandria speaks of τὰ ἱεροποιοῦντα καὶ θεοποιοῦντα γράμματα; to Cyprian the Bible is *divinæ traditionis caput et origo*.[2] And in accordance with this point of view, the third-century Fathers are as far as possible from abandoning the guidance of Scripture: on the contrary, their one aim seems to be to revert to the standard of faith which they find implied in the express teaching of the New Testament.

But next the Fathers exhibit, even in their least satisfactory discussions, a constant desire to give articulate expression to the general Christian consciousness of Christ as a living and ever-present source of Divine grace and power. It is apt to be forgotten that parallel to the effort of Christian reason to formulate its belief is the continual growth of Christian experience, striving to find for itself intellectual expression. Thus Christian thinkers were constantly and necessarily impelled to make fresh efforts to adjust the different elements of their experience; to secure for the doctrine of God a form ever more satisfying and more complete. In studying, therefore, the development of doctrine within the Church, we must not ascribe too much to external

[1] Tert. *Præscr.* xxxviii. says to heretics: "Quod sumus, hoc sunt Scripturæ iam inde ab initio suo: ex illis sumus antequam aliter fuit; antequam a vobis interpolarentur." Cp. Iren. iii. 1. 1.

[2] Quoted by Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. i. pp. 121 f., 130.

causes; "we must not," says Dorner, "overlook the inner soul of the entire historical process. This soul was the conviction which possessed the Christian world that in Christ it had attained to unity, not with a middle being and secondary God, but with God Himself,—a unity, the archetype of which is set before us in the Incarnation of Christ. This conviction—call it mystical if we will—contained the kernel of Christianity, and never permitted the Church to regard the subordination of the Son as an end in itself, and as an independent dogma (as did Arianism)." On the contrary, the subordination of the Son was an *auxiliary doctrine* merely, intended to guard the Divine unity, and to show "that the truth contained in the general and pre-Christian conception of God was not violated by the new conception of God set forth in Christianity."[1]

4. *Concluding Survey of Third Century Christology*

Catholic theology had successfully maintained against heresy at least three fundamental points:

1. The doctrine of the Divine unity, and the distinctness of God from the world.

2. The reality of the Divine Incarnation, whether regarded as a supreme revelation of God, or as a condition necessary for the permanent union of God with man.

3. The authority of the tradition, or rule of faith, embodying the historic facts of Christ's life.[2]

The main problem, however, presented to third century thought was that of co-ordinating the Christian facts; of reconciling the unity of God with the Deity of the In-

[1] *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 110.

[2] The rule of faith being mainly historic, not dogmatic, was of little avail in the Christological controversies of the third century. The appeal (*e.g.* of Tert. Iren. Hippol.) is generally to Scripture.

carnate Christ. It is sufficiently clear that this problem could only be solved by restating or remodelling in some way the doctrine of the Divine Nature. As yet, however, the most thoughtful and adventurous school of theology, that of Alexandria, was dominated by an abstract and metaphysical conception of God which had been inherited from pagan Hellenism, while the Western Church was to some extent hindered by a lack of speculative interest in the questions of the time. Nevertheless, it may be said that some real progress had been made in the direction of accurate Christology. Thus Tertullian had brought into prominence the idea of Sonship, and it may perhaps be said that this fruitful conception is the most decisive contribution of the third century to Christian thought.[1] As compared with the term "Logos," the title "Son" was better calculated to secure the conception of distinct personality, and it at once suggested the idea of eternal ethical relationships within the Divine Being, prior to any economic self-manifestation in the universe. Origen had explained the generation of the Son as being no finite act temporal or pretemporal, but an eternal or intemporal process or relation.[2] The correspondence of the two Dionysii had brought into prominence the unity of the Divine essence subsisting in the Persons of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Already a number of theological terms were current, which only required to have their significance and associations precisely determined. Finally, the Council of Antioch had maintained, on grounds of Scripture and tradition, the eternal pre-existence of the Divine Son, who "ever was" with the Father. Nor must we forget that the plain unreflecting faith of ordin-

[1] Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 274. This seems to be more true than the statement that it was merely the *Logos*-doctrine which established itself as the result of third century struggles.

[2] Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 14.

ary Christians who believed in Christ simply as a Divine Saviour, was an influential factor in the gradual process of dogmatic definition.

But there was danger in opposite directions. On the one side the Westerns had so peremptorily emphasised the doctrine of the Divine unity as to obscure the distinctions of personality within the Godhead. The Logos-Christology can in fact hardly be said to have found a congenial soil in the West. For the most part it was reluctantly recognised by theologians, who preferred to speculation an unquestioning acceptance of the received creed, "Christ is very God, and God is one," without formal attempts at explanation or adjustment of complementary beliefs. The Easterns on their side had so insisted on the subordination of the Son as to allow themselves in ditheistic and even Arian language. They dreaded polytheism, but cannot be said to have had any logical defence against Arianism, which at a later period found it profitable to appeal to their authority. Nor can they be said to have done justice to soteriology. They were dominated in their statement of the Logos-doctrine by a scientific and cosmological interest. Lastly, the historic Christ, His human development and example, tended to fall into the background; and thus the way was prepared for the reactionary movement which took shape in Arianism.

PART IV

(*Continued*)

§ V. Arianism.

1. The doctrine of Arius.
2. The methods of Arius and his school.
3. Dogmatic consequences of Arianism.
4. Repudiation by the Church.
5. The Council of Nicæa.
6. The word *Homoousios.*

§ V. Arianism

At the close of the third century theology had succeeded in becoming completely philosophic. But philosophy was not merely dominant; it threatened to become a tyranny. The faith was in danger of becoming unintelligible to ordinary Christians. The figure of the historical Christ was practically buried beneath the profusion of metaphysical predicates which were finding their way into theological terminology; the doctrine of salvation was treated as secondary in importance to cosmological theory. From this point of view the interest of the fourth century lies—(1) in the reaction from the philosophic Logos-doctrine, (2) the restatement of the doctrine of God in a form ethical rather than metaphysical — biblical rather than Neo-Platonic. The thought of a real Divine redemption again asserts itself, thanks mainly to the genius and devotion of one man, Athanasius. The real interests at stake in the Arian controversy were those of the Christian religion, not of any particular system of philosophy. The question of the age was whether the redemption of humanity had actually been effected by One who was God, and if so, what was His relation to the God of Christian monotheism. The conception of the Son or Logos as a distinct hypostasis, which had been developed in the struggles of the third century, must now be adjusted with the ancient and continuous affirmation of His true Deity.

The Arian struggle actually broke out at Alexandria about 318. Arius was a presbyter in charge of a church in the city; a man of ascetic habits and high reputation, grave, learned, and skilful as a logician. The dispute began in consequence of a protest of Arius against a discourse on the Trinity pronounced by his bishop Alexander. Probably the bishop was insisting on one

particular aspect of the Origenistic Christology, the eternal coexistence of the Son with the Father; and his statement was objected to by Arius as Sabellian in tendency. Arius, on the other hand, insisted (from the Platonistic standpoint) that God alone is eternal, and that all other existence, including the being of the Son, must have been created by an act of the Divine will.

I. The doctrine of Arius may be traced to the school of Lucian at Antioch. Lucian (*d.* 311 or 312) had taught somewhat on the lines of Paul the Samosatene.[1] God was one; the Divine Logos was a created being sent forth into the world, who assumed a human nature in order to reveal the Father, and to provide an example to mankind. As a creature, the Son only reached the state of unalterable perfection by gradual advance and perseverance in virtue. Lucian seems, in fact, to have combined the ancient adoptianist view of Christ with the current Logos-doctrine of the East, and he employed in expounding his views the critical and literalistic exegesis of Scripture that was already traditional in the church of Antioch. Arius had been the pupil of Lucian, and inherited his teacher's conception of God, a conception derived from Platonism and essentially pagan. God according to this view was a supreme, ineffable, transcendent, isolated being, who needed some intermediary between Himself and the created universe. The minister of creation must be premundane but himself a creature. For God can have no Son in any strict sense. To attribute to Him the act of generation is to ascribe to Deity a capacity for corporeal affections and movements, and thus subject God to laws of mechanical necessity. In a Divine Being γέννησις can mean only an act of will whereby He creates a "Son" out of nothing; "generation" is merely a synonym for "creation." This doctrine

[1] Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, vol. ii. pp. 182 ff.

of God, framed in the supposed interests of the Divine unity, is, as Dorner points out, essentially *pre-Christian.* It is a reversion to pagan thought, and the conception of a created being neither God nor man, a demi-God between the Creator and universe, involves the very principle of polytheism. "These ideas," says Athanasius, "belong to the heathen."[1]

The Arian doctrine of the Son centres in two propositions—(*a*) the Son is not coeternal: ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν; (*b*) the Son is a created being: ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο.

The "Son of" God is called into existence by an act of the Divine free will, as an instrument for the creation of the world. He is "Son," therefore, only in a relative, not in the strict sense (only to be called Son, καταχρηστικῶς). In Scripture He is called "Image," "Word," "Wisdom," but not in the proper sense: the Divine Wisdom is an inherent attribute of Deity, not an hypostasis. The Son is, in fact, a creature, though unique (κτίσμα τέλειον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἕν τῶν κτισμάτων). In this sense He is termed "only begotten" by the Apostle S. John.

The Son, then, is a creature: ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν.[2] Accordingly, He is not coeternal with the Father (συναΐδιος τῷ πατρί). He is no more than a "great power" of God, like the locusts described by the prophet Joel.[3] Further, He is dependent on *grace*, having a creaturely nature *capable* of sin, even though actually sinless. He is subject to creaturely vicissitudes (τρεπτὸς φύσει ὡς τὰ κτίσματα). In essence He is foreign to God (ξένος, ἀλλότριος); He does not perfectly know, and therefore

[1] *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 18: Ἑλλήνων ἴδια ταῦτα; cp. iii. 15, 16.

[2] Obs. Arius omitted the word χρόνος. He would not commit himself to the idea that there was time *ante mundum.* He spoke of the Son as ἀχρόνως γεννηθείς, though he denied that He was ἄναρχος. He argued, however, as if he meant by ἦν ὅτε, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε; cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 11.

[3] Joel ii. 25, LXX.; cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 5.

cannot reveal the Father. His union with Deity is of a merely relative, moral kind,—the harmony of an obedient will.[1] Again, the human nature which was assumed by the creaturely Logos was imperfect. The incarnate Christ was without a human, rational soul (*νοῦς*). The Logos was in Christ united to a human body with merely animal soul (*ψυχὴ ἄλογος*). At this point, an element of docetism enters into the system of Arius;[2] the Incarnation is replaced by a mere *σάρκωσις*. It is fair to point out that the views of Arius seem to have developed under the pressure of opposition. He at first insisted on the uniqueness of the Son, as *κτίσμα τέλειον, υἱὸς μονογένης*, and even *πλήρης θεὸς μονογενής, θεὸς ἰσχυρός*, κ.τ.λ. But Arius refused to acknowledge that the Son was *ἀληθινὸς θεὸς*, a doctrine which seemed to him irreconcilable with the prerogatives of the Father. The Father alone can be *ἀγεννητός*; in this attribute of *ἀγεννησία* consists the essence of Deity. The Son as being originate (*γεννητός*) must belong to the order of creatures, and accordingly must be entirely "alien from the Father's essence."[3] The Platonistic idea of the gulf between the Creator and the creature led logically to the formula of later Arianism (*ἀνόμοιον*).

The above brief sketch will have illustrated the relation of Arianism, on the one hand, to the humanitarian doctrine of Paul of Samosata; on the other, to the current Logos-doctrine. The only point of difference between the position of Arius (or Lucian) and that of Paul was that Arius replaced the man adopted and

[1] Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 10. Christ being *τρεπτὸς*, His goodness was not an *essential* goodness; consequently His Sonship was the reward of a foreseen perseverance. In fact, Christ *μετοχῇ ἐθεοποιήθη*. Ath. *l.c.* i. 5.

[2] Cp. Ath. *c. Apoll.* ii. 3. This idea of Christ's humanity forms the starting-point of Apollinarianism. Cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 5, §§ 5–8.

[3] *ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητος.* Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 6.

elevated to Divine honour by a created but pre-existent spirit (the Logos).[1] This retention of the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son was a needless encumbrance, and necessitated the theory of a mutilated humanity, since the existence of a reasonable soul in Christ would seem to constitute a second personality.

II. *The methods of Arius and his school.*

The nature of Arian reasoning should be carefully studied. The early Arians had been for the most part trained in the school of Lucian at Antioch, where they had learned to apply to theology the processes of physical and mathematical reasoning. The abstract Platonist conception of God had been elaborated by the aid of critical exegesis and Aristotelian dialectic. Aristotelian rationalism so dominated the school that the idea of a real redemption was altogether lost sight of.[2] "Nothing was too majestic for a syllogistic formula."[3] Theology tended to become "a technology, *i.e.* a doctrine of the ingenerate and generate elaborated in syllogisms, and based upon Scripture." Thus Arius argued logically from the meaning of the word "Son." A father, he said, must be prior to his son. How could there be a Son of God at once γεννητὸς and ἀγεννητός?[4] This logic soon betrayed its author into gross and manifest inconsistencies: for example, though the Arian theory required that the nature of God should be regarded as mysterious and inscrutable even to the Son Himself, it was assumed that the Godhead could be exhaustively explained by reasoning logically from human relation-

[1] Cp. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. p. 184.

[2] Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. pp. 185, 186; cp. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 62 ff.

[3] W. Bright, *Church Hist.* 313–451, p. 11.

[4] Cp. a passage in the Macrostich, where the same point is formally urged, Ath. *de syn.* 26.

ships. Further, while starting from the metaphor of Sonship, Arius arrived at the point of denying any Divine Sonship in a strict sense. The later Arians acknowledged the mistake by consistently *denying* that the Divine Being was incomprehensible by human understanding.[1]

Thus the system of Arius was an attempt to discuss and formulate the mysteries of theology on a purely intellectual basis and with the aid of merely physical analogies and processes of reasoning. With Arius the abstract τὸ ἀγεννητὸν was equivalent to θεότης;[2] of love, of ethical attributes and relationships he had no notion whatever. On the other hand, no point is more constantly urged by Athanasius in his *Orations* than the futility and impiety of reasoning from earthly relations to the mysteries of the Divine nature. "If," he says, "they were disputing concerning any man, then let them reason in this human way, both concerning his word and his son; but if [they argue] concerning God, who created man, no longer let them entertain human thoughts, but others which transcend human nature. . . . Nor, again, is it right to inquire *how* the Word is from God, or how He is God's radiance, or how God begets, and what is the manner of His begetting. A man must be beside himself to venture on such points, since he demands to have explained in words a thing ineffable and proper to God's nature, and known only to Him and to the Son."[3] Again, "greatly do they err in entertain-

[1] Cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 43 (art. "Arians"); cp. Greg. Naz. *Orat. Theol.* xxvii. 2, *sub fin.*

[2] Ath. *de. Decr. Nic.* 30, 31 (*Ath. Treatises*, i. p. 53); cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 243; Fairbairn, *op. cit.* p. 405. "The invariable tendency in metaphysics is to the de-ethicisation of a Deity who can be described in terms neuter and abstract rather than personal and moral."

[3] *Orat.* ii. 35, 36; cp. i. 15: σφάλλονται μεγάλως περὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὰ σωμάτων ἐνθυμούμενοι. So ii. 34, iii. 1, 63, 67; cp. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 28.

ing material notions about that which is immaterial." As Athanasius clearly saw, the Arian objection that the idea of generation implied division or mutability in the Godhead could only be met by an entire exclusion of the very notion of materiality in relation to the Divine essence.

Arianism also appealed to Scripture.[1] Speaking generally, they made much of those New Testament passages which seem to imply human limitations in the incarnate Christ, and these they applied to the pre-existent Logos. "The scope of their malicious dealing with the dogma is the endeavour to show that the more lowly utterances which the Lord makes as man (ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρωπινοῦ) proceeded from His Godhead."[2] Thus they pointed to such passages in the Gospels as SS. Mk. xiii. 32; Lk. ii. 52; Mt. xix. 17, xx. 23; and especially S. Jo. v. 19, xiv. 28, etc. In the Acts and the Epistles: Acts ii. 36, κύριον καὶ χριστὸν ἐποίησε; Phil. ii. 7 ff.; Heb. i. 4, κρείττων γενόμενος, iii. 1, πιστὸν ὄντα τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν; Col. i. 15 (for the Arian interpretation of which see Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 63). They also set great store by certain Old Testament statements, *e.g.* Deut. vi. 4; Ps. xlv. 6, 7, ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς; and especially Prov. viii. 22, which was an accepted Christological passage, *The Lord possessed* (LXX. ἔκτισε) *me in the beginning of His way*, etc.[3] The earlier leaders of Arianism

[1] See a list of passages in Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 1; cp. iii. 26.

[2] Greg. Nyss. *c. Eunom.* ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 5. 7; cp. Hil. *de Trin.* ix. *init*: "Quæ ab eo secundum hominem dicta sunt dicta esse secundum naturæ divinæ infirmitatem [mentiuntur hæretici]."

[3] As to this passage obs.—(1) the clear sense of the Heb. קנה is "possessed"; Aq. ἐκτήσατο; Jerom. Vulg. al. *possedit.* The word occurs Gen. iv. 1, קניתי, LXX. ἐκτησάμην. On the other hand, in Gen. xiv. 19, 22, LXX. has ἔκτισε. Cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. p. 270; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 62 note. (2) Accepting the reading ἔκτισε catholic interpreters were divided. Some distinguish κτίζειν (beget) from ποιεῖν

were not systematic exponents of the doctrine, their literary activity being mainly confined to epistles in which they mutually encouraged one another. The first who wrote a formal defence of the Arian position was the sophist Asterius, to whom Athanasius occasionally refers in the *Orations*.[1] In his work (*συνταγμάτιον*) he seems to have based an argument on 1 Cor. i. 24 and S. Jo. xiv. 10, but his main contention was the logical impossibility of admitting more than one uncreated being. The usual method of Arianism was to quote texts piecemeal (*μονόκωλα*), insisting pertinaciously on the importance of a few isolated passages, and entirely ignoring the general drift of Scripture. As Athanasius complains, "when forced from the conceptions, or rather misconceptions, of their own hearts they fall back upon passages of Divine Scripture, and even of these, from want of perception, as usual, they discern not the true meaning; and laying down their own impiety as a sort of canon of interpretation, they wrest the whole of the Divine oracles into accordance with it."[2]

At a later time[3] it became customary with the Arians to appeal to the authority of old writers, especially to Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius of Alexandria. Origen had spoken of the Son as *θεὸς* or *δεύτερος θεός*, not *αὐτόθεος*, or even *αὐτοάγαθος*. Dionysius and Gregory had spoken of the Son as a "creature." But apart from the questionable statements of particular writers, there had been much in the subordinatianist teaching of the third century which

(create out of nothing). The eternal *γέννησις* might be possibly described as *κτίσις*. Or *ἔκτισε* was explained as *ἐπέστησε τοῖς ἔργοις* (Dion. Rom. See Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 376). But Ath. and others explain *ἔκτισε* simply of Christ's human nature (*Orat.* ii. 45 ff.); cp. Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 2, etc.

[1] Ath. *Orat.* ii. 37, iii. 2. See Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. (*s.v.* "Asterius"); Harnack, i. 198.

[2] *Orat.* i. 52.

[3] Cp. Ath. *de Sent. Dion.* 1.

naturally appeared to favour the Arian view. The desire of formal and logical consistency impelled the Antiochene school to simplify the catholic doctrine by dropping one element in Origen's teaching (the eternal generation of the Son), and pressing the other (subordinatianism) to its logical consequences. In this lay the strength of Arianism: that it contended for the very truths which had been the subject of the closing controversies of the third century—the unity of God and the distinctness of the Son's personality.[1]

There are some general causes which account for the temporary success of Arianism. Its leading defenders understood the art of popularising their doctrine. In itself it had the merit of simplicity, and early in the controversy Arius composed the *Θαλεία* ("spiritual banquet"), a collection of songs for popular use. This publication led to a general and terrible irreverence. The lowest classes became familiarised with the most sacred language and doctrines, hitherto only imparted under the discipline of reserve by the Church. Christian divisions became a laughing-stock of the theatres.[2] Profane questions were asked of women and boys in the streets. "Quarrels took place in every city and village concerning the Divine dogma, the people looking on and taking sides."[3] In the court, in private houses, in public thoroughfares, in shops and market-places, there was a "war of dialectics."

In the second (post-Nicene) stage of the quarrel much was due to court influence. After Nicæa, the Eusebian party became merely a secular faction, dependent on the favour of the emperor.[4] "All authorities," says Mr.

[1] Cp. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, pp. 15, 16.
[2] Gwatkin, p. 30; cp. Ath. *Orat.* i. 22.
[3] Theodoret ap. Newman, *Arians*, p. 452.
[4] Ath. *Orat.* ii. 43: *τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην προστασίαν ὑποτιθέασι.* Cp. iii. 28.

Gwatkin, "are agreed that Arian successes began and ended with Arian command of the palace."[1] The policy of the party was to secure control, by sheer violence or by cunning intrigues, of all the leading episcopal sees: a plan which they successfully accomplished in the East, though they never obtained any real hold upon the West. Further, Arianism commended itself to heathen philosophers by its abstract and transcendental conception of God; its antithesis of Being "create" and "increate" (*γενητόν, ἀγένητον*); its practical denial of any possible contact between God and man. On the other hand, it was acceptable to the vulgar, as inculcating the worship of a demi-god. For it must be remembered that heathen influences were still very strong in the empire; the civil service, the army, and the courts of law were filled with pagans; education was largely in the hands of pagans; indeed, general society itself was as yet scarcely touched by Christian ideas. Further, it would seem that the outbreak of the heresy at Alexandria was due to the fact that circumstances were more favourable there than elsewhere to the spread of a heathenised form of Christianity.[2] Finally, we may notice that Jewish influence was favourable to the doctrine of Arius, which appealed to Jewish minds not only by its rigid monotheism and its denial of Christ's true Godhead, but also by its lax moral tone.[3] Athanasius, indeed, frequently charges his Arian opponents with being in effect "Judaisers," but the imputation taken strictly is not fair, because the element of creature-worship in Arianism was irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of Judaism.[4] There seems, however, to

[1] *Studies of Arianism*, p. 3. [2] Gwatkin, pp. 18, 19.

[3] Cp. Newman's *Arians*, p. 18 ff.; Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 17, cp. i. 8, iii. 27, 55, etc.; *de Decret. Nic.* i. ff.; *Ath. Treatises*, i. p. 389 note.

[4] Gwatkin, p. 27.

be truth in the suggestion that in its practical moral results Arianism displays some affinity to the corrupt Judaism which at Antioch and elsewhere was a source of debasement and temptation to unstable members of the Christian Church.[1]

III. The dogmatic consequences of Arianism are pointed out in various passages of Athanasius. Practically they may be described as twofold.

1. The Arian doctrine, on the one hand, involves a false conception of God. It does not merely admit the element of creature-worship, and so violate the first principle of theism;[2] it denies the very possibility of a Divine revelation. God, according to the philosophic view of Arius, is infinitely remote from man; He remains ineffable, mysterious, inaccessible, unknowable; neither self-communication nor generation can be ascribed to Him. He remains an abstract simple unity, the supreme cause in relation to the world, for ever separate from the creature, for ever beyond the reach of human faculties.[3] For, as we have seen, Arianism denied that the Son could have any essential knowledge of the Father. "Even to the Son the Father is invisible. The Word cannot perfectly and exactly either see or know His own Father. Nay, the Son knows not even His own substance,"[4] etc. Thus, "alike by the Divine transcendence and by his own lowliness, man is condemned to remain eternally distant from God."[5]

2. Again, the Arian doctrine undermines the very idea of redemption and atonement. No true union is

[1] Newman, *Arians*, pp. 9–12, 18–24.

[2] Ath. *Orat.* ii. 23, iii. 64.

[3] Ath. *Orat.* ii. 22, seems to be arguing from an Arian statement when he says: *οὐ δυνατὸν τοῖς γενητοῖς οὔτε βλέπειν οὔτε γινώσκειν, ἀλλ' ὑπερβαίνει πάντας ἡ τε ὄψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτου γνῶσις, κ.τ.λ.*

[4] *Thalia*, ap. Ath. *Orat.* i. 6.

[5] Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 240.

possible between God and man. "If," argues Athanasius, "the Son were merely a creature, man would have remained as he was before subject to death, not being united to God." If the Logos be a creature, and there is need of a mediator between Creator and creature, the latter being unable to endure the untempered touch of God (*τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκράτου χειρός*), the Logos Himself will need a mediator, and that mediator a second, and so on *εἰς ἄπειρον*.[1] In a word, on the Arian theory mediation is impossible. Man is capable at best of an ethical sonship, not of receiving a communication of the Divine life. He cannot be *a partaker of the Divine nature*;[2] he must be content with an independent endeavour to follow the example of Christ. Thus "the Arians had made their problem impossible by neglecting its spiritual conditions." The Arian Christ is a witness "not to the love of God, but to a gulf beyond the power of almighty love to close. . . . Revelation (on this theory) is a mockery, atonement an idle phrase, and therefore Christ is dead in vain."[3] No mere creature can impart the principle of sanctification which alone can purify, or the life which alone can re-create the creature separated from its Creator by sin.

IV. We now come to the repudiation of Arianism by the Church. Arius found a certain measure of support in Egypt, but especially in Palestine and Syria, where his tenets fell in with the prevalent dread of Sabellianism. His chief supporter, however, was Eusebius of Nicomedia, who, partly from hostility to the bishop of Alexandria, partly from conviction, warmly espoused the cause of Arius. A synod held in Bithynia pronounced

[1] *Orat.* ii. 69 and 24–26.

[2] 2 Pet. i. 4. On the Arian theory man is only capable, as Christ was, of a *μετοχὴ χάριτος*.

[3] Gwatkin, *Studies*, etc. p. 28.

in his favour, and Eusebius of Cæsarea exerted himself to bring about an understanding between Arius and his bishop.[1] When Constantine, by his victory over Licinius, became master of the empire (323), he found it necessary to deal with the dispute, which had already embroiled all the eastern coast provinces. He could not overlook the *political* danger of a disturbance in Egypt; and accordingly he wrote to both Alexander and Arius, urging them in the interests of peace to give up so "insignificant" and scandalous a dispute. The letter was conveyed to Alexandria by a Western prelate, Hosius of Cordova, who was perhaps deemed likely to be an impartial mediator in the dispute. His efforts were unavailing, and it is possible that he agreed with Alexander to induce Constantine to summon a general council.[2] The council accordingly met at Nicæa in June 325.

In the catholic defence of the faith three leading principles may be noticed—principles which to some extent placed the Church teachers at a disadvantage in the conflict with their restless and unscrupulous opponents.

1. *Reserve in imparting doctrine* (*disciplina arcani*): partly dictated by the fact that as yet there was no authoritative and generally accepted symbol of faith, partly by instinctive reverence for revealed truth. In the early Church instruction was oral, the reception of it was a privilege, and the effect of this reserve was the growth of a spirit of profound reverence for Christian mysteries. No attempt was made to popularise doctrine. The knowledge of the faith was a special privilege

[1] See Gwatkin, c. 2; Newman, *Arians*, c. 3; Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 186–190.

[2] Harnack thinks Hosius played an influential part in this crisis (*Dogmengesch.* ii. 190).

reserved for the baptized. The *traditio symboli* was an important element in the Western rite of baptism; and the historian Sozomen even excuses himself for omitting to insert the Nicene symbol in his history: "It is not improbable," he says, "that this book may fall into the hands of some who are uninitiated."[1] The mysteries and secret religious associations of heathenism probably exercised a considerable influence on the usage of the Church, but it was the work of Christianity to "rectify, combine, and complete the inventions of uninstructed nature." Whatever may have been its origin, the *disciplina arcani* fulfilled a very necessary function in the practical system of the Church.

2. *A conviction that human language was unequal to the task of perfectly expressing Divine truth.* The tendency of Church teachers was invariably to discourage speculation on the great mysteries of the faith. The Fathers use images, not arguments. They acknowledge the poverty and inadequacy of human thought and language.[2] Especially in regard to the subject of the Divine generation the Fathers urge the need of caution; they confess ignorance; they submit to the necessary limitations of human intellect; they accept the revealed fact, without inquiry into its mode.[3] In this reserve Athanasius is conspicuous. Thus, in his *Orations* (ii. 36) he protests earnestly against asking the question "How" in regard to Divine relations, or inquiring into "the mode of the Divine generation." In another typical

[1] See Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, x. p. 293 note; cp. Newman, *Arians*, chap. ii. § 1.

[2] See Orig. *de Princ.* i. 2. 4.

[3] See several quotations in Newman, *Arians*, p. 160; cp. Greg. Naz. *Orat. Theol.* xxix. 8; Hil. *de Trin.* ii. 2. "Cogimur sermonis nostri humilitatem ad ea quæ inenarrabilia sunt extendere," etc. Cp. c. 9, "Nescio, non requiro," etc. Chrys. *hom. ad Phil.* 228 f., speaks in a similar strain of the mystery of the Virgin-birth.

passage (ii. 32) he asks, "When did man ever see light apart from its radiance? or who ventures to say that the express image is different from the substance? or how is it not sheer madness to entertain the thought that God was ever wordless or wisdomless? For such illustrations and such images has Scripture set before us, in order that, considering the incapacity of human nature to comprehend God, we might be able even from these to form some idea, so far as it is attainable, however inadequately and dimly."[1]

Gregory of Nyssa, it may be added, uses similar language in regard to the mystery of the union of two natures of one Divine Person.[2]

3. *The Church gathers in council in order to confront the modern doctrines of Arius with the common "tradition,"* or consensus of the catholic world. The same method had been informally adopted by such writers as Irenæus and Tertullian. In the fourth century it takes a new shape in conciliar action. And we should notice that the "tradition" finally comes to light in the Council of Nicæa, and is embodied in a fixed and authoritative form. "As regards the faith, the Fathers [at Nicæa] wrote not, *It seemed good*; but, *Thus believes the Catholic Church*; and thereupon they confessed what was the ground of their faith, in order to show that their own sentiments were not novel but apostolical, and that what they wrote down was no invention of theirs, but is the same [doctrine] as was taught by the apostles."[3]

V. *The Council of Nicæa.*[4]

[1] Cp. Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* iii.; Aug. *de Trin.* vi. i. See Note A, *Images of the γέννησις*, p. 323.

[2] *Orat. cat.* x., xi. [3] Ath. *de Syn.* v. [*Ath. Treatises*, i. 68].

[4] The number of bishops attending is variously stated 250, 270, 300, or 318. Only a few Western bishops were present; the Roman bishop sent two priests as deputies. The president is not known; it may well have been Hosius. See Harnack, *Dogm.* ii. 222 ff. Appendix, Note B.

From the different creeds of the various churches it was necessary to select some symbol as a standard. The party of Arius made the tactical mistake of producing an uncompromising Arian creed, which was naturally rejected. Accordingly, Eusebius of Cæsarea presented the creed of his Church. He was the most learned representative of that large conservative body in the Council which adhered to the theology of Origen, and deprecated any attempt to define the doctrine of the Trinity more precisely, as an innovation.[1] The creed of Eusebius was short and comparatively simple, but it was evasive on the real point at issue.[2] There was nothing contained in it which Arius might not have accepted in his own sense. Accordingly, though the Cæsarean creed was acceptable to the conservative majority of the Council, it did not satisfy Alexander and his friends, who could be content with nothing short of an explicit condemnation of Arianism. Thus, while adopting the creed presented by Eusebius, they insisted on changes in detail which would expressly exclude the heretical opinion. The Emperor himself, prompted apparently by Hosius, suggested the single phrase ὁμοούσιος, but other clauses and expressions needed alteration or expansion. To the final form of the symbol the representatives of Antioch and Jerusalem probably contributed

[1] As to Eusebius' own views, see Dorner, i. ii. 217 ff.; Harnack, ii. 18 note; Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. *s.v.* "Eusebius"; Gwatkin, *Studies*, p. 38 f. He agreed with Arius in his Platonistic conception of God, but did not go so far as to call the Logos a creature. He was rather a secondary God, begotten at the Father's will (*βουληθεὶς ὁ θεὸς γέγονεν υἱοῦ πατήρ*). He insisted on the *logical* priority of the Father as *cause*, rather than on the *temporal* priority maintained by Arius.

[2] The creed is given in Harnack, ii. 224 note. The most important words are: *καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, ζωὴν ἐκ ζωῆς, υἱὸν μονογενῆ, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένον, δι' οὗ καὶ ἐγένετο τὰ πάντα, τὸν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν σαρκωθέντα, κ.τ.λ.*

something, as well as the Alexandrians. The most important amendment was the substitution of "Son" for "Logos" in the second article,[1] and the more exact definition of *γεγεννημένον* in the words *γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*; and below, *θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί*. In this last phrase the two ideas which Arianism studiously confused, *generation* and *creation*, were carefully contrasted.[1] The ambiguous *σαρκωθέντα* was explained by the addition of *ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*, and, finally, anathemas were added, which expressly prohibited an Arian interpretation of the symbol.

The creed was not adopted without prolonged debate, and strenuous opposition to the phrases *ὁμοούσιος*[2] and *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*. But the pacific explanations of the Emperor ultimately overcame the reluctance of the conservative body in the Council. Only two bishops refused to sign the creed.[3] Eusebius of Cæsarea, however, felt impelled to write an apologetic letter to his Church, explaining the motives of his action, and the sense in which he accepted the decision of the Council.[4] Arius was condemned and banished; his writings were ordered to be burned, and his followers were branded with the name "Porphyrians," a term which practically meant "enemies of Christ."

VI. *The word ὁμοούσιος.*

We know so little of the actual proceedings of the Council that we cannot explain with certainty how the word *ὁμοούσιος* again came to the front. It does not

[1] Gwatkin, p. 41. See the two creeds side by side in Heurtley, *de Fide et Symb.* pp. 4, 5.

[2] See below, p. 317.

[3] Euseb. of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nicæa signed, but their signature did not save them from subsequent banishment.

[4] *Ath. Treatises*, i. 55–59; Harnack, ii. 226–229.

occur in the letter of Alexander, and is very sparingly employed by Athanasius,[1] who was more concerned with the fact connoted by the term than the term itself; and it seems improbable that any Eastern prelate would have suggested the use of an expression which had been rejected at Antioch. The conjecture that it was reintroduced by Hosius seems, on the whole, the most likely to be correct.[2] Since the issue of the dispute between the two Dionysii, the Western Church would naturally be likely to cherish a term which seemed to guard the Divine Monarchia. This suggestion also accounts for the fact that Constantine himself urged, and defended, the insertion of the term in the creed.[3]

There were, of course, very obvious objections to the word. Not only had it been set aside at Antioch (269) owing to the sophistic objections urged by Paul of Samosata. It appeared inadmissible chiefly for the reason that it was not found in Scripture;[4] and the use of non-scriptural terms would be a serious, though not quite unexampled, innovation. Further, the word had a Sabellian connotation. The οὐσία of God being equivalent to His personality, that which is "consubstantial" must, it was urged, be included within His substance, just as a man's reason (λόγος) is part of himself. To others, ὁμοούσιος might seem to have a materialistic sense. Thus Arius in his letter to Alex-

[1] In the first three orations *c. Ar.* he only uses it once (i. 9).

[2] Harnack, ii. 227 note, who thinks Hosius' Christology was based on that of Tertullian (*adv. Prax.*) and Novatian.

[3] "He interpreted it," says Eusebius, "as not used in the sense of corporeal affections, nor as if the Son derived his subsistence from the Father, κατὰ διαίρεσιν or κατὰ ἀποτομήν; for that the immaterial and intellectual and incorporeal nature could not be subject to any corporeal affection," etc. (ap. Ath. *de Decret. Nic.* See *Ath. Treatises*, i. p. 56.)

[4] Ath. *de Syn.* xxviii.

ander[1] denies the idea, which he ascribes to Manichæus, that the Divine offspring is "a consubstantial portion" (*μέρος ὁμοούσιον*) of the Father.

So far as we can ascertain, the word was defended on three main grounds:—

1. *Necessity*: there was no other term available which would equally serve to exclude the Arian view, or guard the sense of Scripture against Arian evasions. The essential doctrine implied in the word was the truth that the Son is not a created being. To secure this point *ἐκ θεοῦ* was insufficient, for Arius might point to S. Paul's phrase *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα* (1 Cor. viii. 6), and include the Son among *τὰ πάντα*. Again, "exact image" (*ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών*) would be inadequate, *likeness* to God being possible in a relative or moral sense for creatures. In order therefore to guard the traditional sense of Scripture, the term *ὁμοούσιος* seemed to be indispensable, but there was no desire to encumber the faith of the Church with metaphysical terminology. The catholics were reluctantly "compelled to concentrate[2] the sense of Scripture . . . in order to defeat the perversity of the heretics, and to show that the Word was other than created things."

2. *The limiting force of the context*, especially the anathemas appended to the creed. The term, *ὁμοούσιον* would be guarded from Sabellianising perversion by the words which defined it, *μονογενῆ, τούτεστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*. On the other hand, a materialistic interpretation was excluded *à priori* by the acknowledged conception of God as Spirit, and as essentially One.

[1] ap. Ath. *de Syn.* xvi. This objection would be "a serious difficulty in the West, where *οὐσία* was translated by the materialising word *substantia*." Gwatkin, p. 42.

[2] *de Decret.* xx.: *ἠναγκάσθησαν . . . συναγαγεῖν ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, κ.τ.λ.*

3. As to the rejection of ὁμοούσιος at Antioch, it was contended the term had only been discarded in so far as it was capable of fallacious misuse. Athanasius carefully explains the exact import of the step taken at Antioch,[1] and maintains that great teachers such as Origen, Theognostus, and Dionysius had used the word, or some exact equivalent, in a catholic sense, *i.e.* with the intention of affirming that the Son of God is truly a Son, and therefore Divine and increate. Even Eusebius in his letter to the church of Cæsarea admits that "among the ancients, some learned and illustrious bishops and writers have used the term."[2] It was contended that at Antioch and at Nicæa, the word was not used *in eadem materia.* Paul may have employed the word in one sense, but Arius certainly wished to reject it in another.

Thus the Nicene Council resulted in the admission of a symbol which, as Athanasius declares, vindicated the cause of truth and of religious devotion to Christ.[3] But the victory of the Alexandrine defenders of the faith was too sudden and complete to be lasting. It was "a revolution which a minority had forced through by sheer strength of clearer Christian thought";[4] and the history of the next half-century is one of disastrous reaction in the East, and slow consolidation of conservative feeling in the West. In modern times the Nicene theology has been severely criticised, as too metaphysical to be any adequate expression of the Church's faith. It represents, it has been said, the triumph of metaphysics over ethics, "scholastic terms over moral realities."[5] But such criti-

[1] See above, p. 289. [2] *Ath. Treatises,* i. p. 58, ii. *s.v.* ὁμοούσιος.
[3] *de Syn.* liv.: ἐκδικοῦντες μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν εἰς Χριστὸν εὐσέβειαν.
[4] Gwatkin, p. 50.
[5] See Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 91. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures,* viii., ix.

cism seems to overlook two facts: first, the actual prominence carefully assigned in the creed to the idea of sonship (υἱὸς being brought to the front, and λόγος withdrawn); secondly, the necessary distinction between the intellectual self-expression of faith, and its practical moral activity. These two aspects of faith are not antagonistic or mutually exclusive. The example of Athanasius shows that the same mind can at once clearly grasp the ethical and spiritual significance of the central Christian fact,—the Divine redemption of man in Christ,—and yet insist on the necessity of securing it from corruption or evanescence amid the pressure of hostile thought, by enshrining it in an adequate symbol. Further, no contrast can fairly be drawn in this connection between the apostles and their successors. "The Church needed a long education," says Bishop Lightfoot, "before she was fitted to be the expositor of the true apostolic doctrine. A conflict of more than two centuries with Gnostics, Ebionites, Sabellians, Arians supplied the necessary discipline. The true successors of the apostles in this respect are not the Fathers of the second century, but the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries. In the expositors of the Nicene age we find, indeed, technical terms and systematic definitions; but . . . the main idea of Christ's person, with which he (S. Paul) confronts Gnostic Judaism is essentially the same as that which the Fathers of these later centuries opposed to the Sabellianism and the Arianism of their own age."[1]

We have therefore no reason to entirely regret the vast influence exercised by Hellenic thought upon Christian theology. Elements providentially prepared, when once assimilated by the Church, minister to her work and growth, and cannot be lost. The Nicene theology does not mark a stage at which the development of Christian

[1] *Ep. to the Colossians* (ed. 7), p. 125. See Note C in the Appendix.

thought was arrested; it has a permanent function to fulfil in the presentation and defence of Christianity; it has finality only as the fact which it enshrines and guards has finality. Any certainly true fact is in a sense final; but the "finality," or, in other words, the objective certainty of a fact, is a condition of its fruitfulness and power.

APPENDIX

Note A.—*Images of the γέννησις*

The illustrations most familiar are: *Root and Plant—Fountain and Stream—Sun and Ray.*[1]

Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 33 is valuable as showing the use made of the last illustration (φῶς καὶ ἀπαύγασμα).

The ἀπαύγασμα—

(1) is "proper" to the light (ἴδιον). Cp. iii. 3, 4.

(2) does not divide or diminish the οὐσία of the sun.

(3) is in itself whole and complete (ὁλόκληρον καὶ τέλειον).

(4) is truly derived—is τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, γέννημα ἀληθινὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Cp. iv. 10.

(5) is independent of *will.* Cp. iii. 66.

(6) is contemporaneous with its cause. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxix. 3, points out that the Son and Spirit are οὐκ ἄναρχα τῷ αἰτίῳ; yet not every αἴτιον is prior to its effects (οὔδε γὰρ τοῦ φωτὸς ἥλιος). The Son and Spirit are therefore ἄναρχα τῷ χρόνῳ.

An old writer (? Zeno of Verona; see Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. 187) uses the images of two seas connected by a strait, each being distinct yet inseparably connected with the other, while perpetual interchange of waters is going on.

Note B.—*The Principles of Conciliar Authority*

In conciliar action the Church confronts heresy by an explicit judgment, by a declaration of her true belief.

1. The *nature* of a conciliar judgment.

[1] Est namque ita æterna ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatur ex luce. Orig. *de Princ.* bk. i. 2, § 4.

(*a*) The Church proclaims no new truth. She is the guardian of a tradition. Bishops attend as *representing* their churches; as competent *witnesses* of what is held and believed. They are "the rulers of the Christian people who received as a legacy the deposit of doctrine from the apostles, and by means of it, as need arose, exercised their office of teaching. Each bishop was in his own place the *doctor ecclesiæ* for his people" (*Ath. Tr.* ii. 82). Cp. Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 31 (p. 153).

A conciliar decree is, in fact, a declaration in writing of what has ever been held, and taught orally or implicitly, in the Church. Thus Athanasius strenuously resists Arianism as a "novelty," an innovation (*τὸ μὴ ἐκ πατέρων ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐφευρεθέν. Orat.* i. § 8. Cp. *de syn.* § 47; *Ath. Tr.* i. 73–77). It is important to observe that in her councils the Church does not lay down new truth, but only declares her true meaning. She *excludes* false interpretations and forms of thought. She does not say "Yes" to fresh truths, but says "No" to novelties. When Arius appears on the scene with negations and limitations, circumscribing the area of truth, the Church by saying "No" to Arianism "guards the latitude of truth." See MacColl, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 1–6; *Lux Mundi*, p. 240.

(*b*) Consequently the validity of a council depends on the adequacy of its testimony to the true belief of the Church. Vinc. Lir. *Comm.* xxx. adduces the council of Ephesus as an illustration. Its object was to find out from *magistri probabiles* (*i.e.* from the testimony of bishops and authoritative patristic writings) what was actually the catholic belief as to the person of Christ. The council proceeded by eliminating all that appeared to be local or accidental, and so arrived at the consentient belief of the Church throughout the world. Indeed, no council ever claimed to do more than "give explicit expression to what the Church from the beginning had implicitly believed."

(*c*) Further, a conciliar decree or dogma guards and summarises the sense of *Scripture*, for the *tradition* embodied in dogma is Scripture unfolded. Creeds are a breviary of Scripture truths. "Scripture being the proof of the creed, and the creed the interpretation of Scripture, the harmony of these is the first

rule of interpretation" (Manning, *Unity of the Church*, p. 35). *Neque illis nova fit revelatio, sed quod in purissimis scripturæ ac traditionis fontibus detegunt, hoc fidelibus proponunt*, etc. (Hooke quoted by Palmer, *Treatise on the Church*, ii. 138, note). The same principle is pointed out in such passages as Hippol. *c. Noet.* iii. iv. ix.; Ath. *c. Gent.* 1; *Orat. c. Arian*, i. 9; Leo, *ad Flav.* 1. Cp. *Ath. Tr.* i. 69, 140; Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, i. pp. 10–12.

(*d*) The strength of dogma lies in its being a *balanced* statement. The Church endeavours to guard different aspects of a complex truth; to do justice to both sides of the antithesis involved in such a fact as the Incarnation.[1] This is admirably explained by Novatian, *de Trin.* xi. On the other hand, some writers, *e.g.* Dr. Hatch, in his *Hibbert Lectures*, overstate the Church's insistance on logical precision in her definitions. The real truth is that ecclesiastical dogmas present complementary aspects of truth, rather than suggest the mode of synthesis. It was the *opponents* of the Church's faith who insisted on logic, and applied the processes of rigid dialectic to Divine mysteries.

Cp. Mozley on *Development*, quoted by Gore, *R. C. Claims*, pp. 2 f.; Wilberforce, *Incarn.* p. 109.

2. The *conditions* of an ecclesiastical judgment.

(*a*) Sufficient authority. A single Church or individual teacher may put forth an opinion (*e.g.* the African Church on heretical baptism), but such an opinion cannot bind the Church if it is at variance with her creed. "Our rule should be, *cum ecclesia doctores recipere, non cum doctoribus ecclesiæ fidem deserere*," says Vincent (*Common.* xxviii.). No single Church can speak in the name of the universal Church. Cp. *Ath. Tr.* i. p. 16.

(*b*) Universal acceptance. The test of a dogma being true is

[1] The true doctrine of the Trinity is, in fact, a mediating statement. Greg. Nyss. says: διὰ μέσον τῶν δύο ὑπολήψεων χωρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἑκατέραν τε τῶν αἱρέσεων καθαιροῦσαν, καὶ ἀφ' ἑκατέρας παραδεχομένην τὸ χρήσιμον. *Orat. Catech.* c. 3. So Bern. *tract. de err. Abæl.* 3. 7: Novit pietas fidei . . . *medium* tenens *iter*, regia incedere via.

its subsequent reception by the Church. "Œcumenical" as applied to a council means "lawfully called, truly representative, approved and received by the Church." A conciliar decree is only "endorsed through œcumenical acceptance."

See, generally, Palmer, *Treatise on the Church*, pt. iv. chap. iii.; Bp. Forbes on *Art.* 21; Gore, *R. C. Claims*, chap. iii.; Moberly in *Lux Mundi*, ess. vi.

Note C.—*The Christian Fact as guarded by the Definitions of the Church*

The following passage from Mr. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief* is of great interest in this connection :—

"Whatever opinion the reader may entertain of the decisions at which the Church arrived on the doctrine of the Trinity, it is at least clear that they were not in the nature of explanations. They were, in fact, precisely the reverse. They were the *negation* of explanations. The various heresies which it combated were, broadly speaking, all endeavours to bring the mystery, so far as possible, into harmony with contemporary speculations, Gnostic, Neo-Platonic, or Rationalising; to relieve it from this or that difficulty; in short, to do something towards 'explaining' it. The Church held that all such explanations, or partial explanations, inflicted irremediable impoverishment on the idea of the Godhead which was essentially involved in the Christian revelation. They insisted on preserving that idea in all its inexplicable fulness; and so it has come about that while such simplifications as those of the Arians, for example, are so alien and impossible to modern modes of thought that, if they had been incorporated with Christianity, they must have destroyed it, the doctrine of Christ's Divinity still gives reality and life to the worship of millions of pious souls, who are wholly ignorant both of the controversy to which they owe its preservation, and of the technicalities which its discussion has involved" (p. 279).

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